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Petersburgh and we escaped from this experiment with the loss of the engines, tools, copper bolts and fastenings which had been sent out, and the expenses of the journey. Had the General been allowed to build there, the value of the materials and workmanship must have been paid in advance; and the peace of Tilsit would have placed the shius in the hands of Alexander.

The Portugueze were civil enough to offer us the timber of the Brazils; and Admiral Campbell, a Scotch officer in their service, laid various plans for profiting by it before Mr. Pitt and the late Lord Melville. He represented to them that ships of the line might be built in the Brazils at the rate of £16 per ton, just half the price of building a ship of the same class in England. It turns out, however, on more minute inquiries, that there is very little timber near the sea coast in Brazil fit for ship-building; that there is but one slip for line-of-battle ships in all Brazil, which is at Bahia; that shipwrights are so little accustomed to building there, that a 64 gun ship, the Principe de Brazil, was four years on the stocks; and that the price would at least equal that of building in England.

In the Mediterranean islands, in the Morea, in Albania, Dalmatia and Croatia, the finest oak timber, in point of size and shape, is most abundant; and we had recourse to the eastern shores of the Adriatic for a supply of this article, which was paid for, felled, and brought down to the sea coast. The defection however of Austria put the French in possession of our timber, which had judiciously been placed in a most convenient situation for the use of their naval arsenal at Venice! We have since, it is true, recovered a part of it in the Rivoli, and we shall probably recover the remainder in the same way when the enemy may chuse to give us a fair opportunity. Thus much for foreign dependence.

Having cursorily stated the demand for naval timber, and the sources of supply, we shall next undertake to shew that, instead of continuing to build in England at the extravagant rate in which wę have proceeded since the renewal of the war, we have ample means within our reach of keeping up our naval force to its present effective standard, by bringing forward a yearly supply of eight ships of the line and sixteen frigates, without building a single new ship at home, except, perhaps, now and then a first rate, for many years to come. We say extravagant, because though in the year 1807, nọ less than eight ships of the line were launched, 22 of the line were ordered to be built, 19 of which were contracted for in merchants' yards, and in the following year, five more, while something very little short of 100 sail of the line were quietly rotting at their moorings in ordinary.

It is a vulgar and, in our conception of the matter, a very erroneous opinion, that ships are laid up in ordinary to preserve them.

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We should rather define it as the state in which a good sound ship may, in the quietest manner possible, become rotten in a given number of years, without being of any use whatever in the mean time, except that of creating a considerable expense, in the interest of a dead capital, the pay of her warrant officers, and the wear and tear of her mooring tackle; besides encumbering the harbour where she is laid up. A ship, as soon as launched, if not immediately wanted for service, is put into a state of ordinary. If she has been built of unseasoned timber, or of seasoned timber mixed with American oak or pitch pine, it is pretty clear that, in the course of twelve months, the dry-rot will have made a considerable progress; if put together in the usual manner, as described by Mr. Pering, in two years she will be sufficiently shrunk to play pretty freely on her fastenings, and to let in oozing drip;' and at the end of five years, she will require what is called a thorough repair' to put her into a state of service. Mr. Pering asserts positively, that no ship ever received a thorough repair, without costing more money than when she was built, and in some instances half as much again.' It may thus happen that a 74 gun ship, without performing one day's service, may, some five or six years after launching, be brought forward from the ordinary, at an expense to the public of £150,000.

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Instead then of building new ships, to rot in ordinary, we should recommend the opposite plan of bringing those already in ordinary forward for service, as the surest means of saving them from decay. For this purpose we should select those whose repairs would not exceed one third, or, at the most, one half of the original cost, and after providing sufficiently for guard, receiving, prison, hospital, and convalescent ships, break up the remainder; taking care to preserve the sound parts for the repair of other ships, and to dispose of the rest for fire wood; we should thus get rid of much trouble and incumbrance, and save the interest of money on a dead and decaying capital.

We are fully aware of the difficulty of repairing the ordinary in the manner proposed. We know that the present accommodations of our dock-yards are by no means correspondent with the extended scale of the naval establishment; yet we still believe, that under a well regulated system of management, much of the difficulty might be overcome. But if ships are allowed to remain in dock for three or four years, waiting for timber or for hands-if small frigates or sloops are suffered to occupy docks for first rates, ten, or twelve months-then indeed, not even the magnificent scale of the projected naval arsenal at Northfleet, of which we have heard so much, would be sufficient to repair the ordinary. There are no less than 18 docks in the six naval yards, into which ships of the line can be taken, besides seven others for frigates, &c. and we think it has

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been satisfactorily shewn that, by a due appropriation of them, there might be constantly brought forward eight or ten sail of the line from the ordinary, which are more than are wanted, as we shall nów proceed to shew.

Assuming it as a fact, that 400,000 tons of shipping are in a state of ordinary, of which 80 or 100,000 tons may consist of ships of the line; that one fourth of these, or, which amounts to the same thing, that twenty 74 gun ships may advantageously be repaired, and that twenty more are actually on the stocks; we would propose that two new and two old ships should be brought forward for service every year; that two sail of the line should be built annually at Bombay, and the timbers of two others prepared at the same time, to be brought home in their holds. By these means we have at once the eight ships of the line necessary to keep up the efficiency of the fleet. The sixteen frigates might be procured by building one at Bombay, one at Trincomalle, one at Bengal, one at Prince of Wales's island, and one at Trinidad, each of which should bring home her duplicate, or, at least, a considerable part of it; the remaining six might be provided at home, either from the ordinary, or by building them of fir. The sloops, gun-brigs, tenders, and other small vessels might be built of fir or larch; or, as we have already observed, if built in India, from the refuse of the timber employed in the large ships, they would cost little more than the price of labour.

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There are others, however, who would go a readier way to work, and reduce our present naval establishment, as unnecessarily large to cope with that of the enemy. It was observed by the late Lord Melville in the House of Lords in 1810, (and the same sentiments have been uttered in the other house,) that the naval establishment of this country was then upon a scale considerably exceeding what in, wisdom, in sound policy, and on every principle of economy it ought to be.' He admitted that our naval superiority ought at all times to be decisive and commanding; but that, considering the scarcity of naval timber, and the high price of naval stores of every description, it was not a time for the country to give way to an ostentatious and prodigal expenditure. He thought that about ninety sail of the line would be amply sufficient for home and foreign service, and therefore recommended keeping as many ships of the line as possible sound and entire to meet future exigencies-in other words, to lay them up in ordinary. The effect of this, we have al

In a letter to Lord Melville respecting troop-ships, and the general state of the navy, a pamphlet supposed to be written by his late secretary, Mr. Budge, and well deserving the attentive perusal of every man connected with naval concerns.

+ Printed Speech of the late Lord Melville, made in the House of Lords on the subject of employing troop-ships.

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ready explained. On the other point we are not much disposed to differ from his lordship, considering the enemy's force then afloat, and supposing a suspension of farther preparations on his part. We agree with him that, between the period of the victory of Trafalgar and that of his lordship's speech, a considerable reduction might have been made; but we totally dissent from any such reduction now. Our navy, it is true, rides triumphant on the ocean without a rival, because the only one with which it has, of late years, had to contend, does not now venture to leave its ports-at least, with any intention to meet us. But, are we to consider this conduct of the enemy as altogether the effect of fear, or of a premeditated system? Is he inactive in his naval preparations? Does he shew, either in words or measures, that he has finally yielded the point of naval superiority? Are the maritime peace, to which he has so often pledged himself, and the maritime rights about which so much clamour has been raised, meant only as windy words' to bully us out of those rights obtained by the blood and treasure of our ancestors, and sanctioned by time and treaties? Or, do not the active preparations in all his ports, rather indicate a determined perseverance in some settled plan which, he fondly hopes, will tend to our destruction? and ought they not to convince us that the great battle is yet to be fought which must firmly establish our naval superiority ? We have ، scotched the snake, not killed it. Before then we talk of reducing our navy, let us examine the present state of that of the enemy. If our researches are at all correct, it will be found pretty nearly as under:Line. Frigates.

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in such a state of forwardness that, in the course of the next year, we shall have opposed to us, under French colours, ninetyseven sail of the line and eighty-seven frigates. If to these we add

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twenty-six sail of the line and twelve frigates belonging to Russia, (exclusive of ten sail of the line and as many frigates in the Black Sea,) twelve sail of the line and six frigates to Sweden, and four sail of the line and one frigate to Denmark, most of which are in a state of service, and all of which were, but a very few months ago, in declared hostility to us, we shall have a force to watch at least, if not to contend with, of one hundred and thirty-nine sail of the line and one hundred and six frigates. The number of ships in commission, in the British navy, fluctuates from one hundred to one hundred and five sail of the line, and from one hundred and forty to one hundred and fifty frigates, with a proportion of smaller vessels and stationary ships. If the enemy would leave his ports and contest with us, as formerly, the point of naval superiority, then, indeed, we might spare a few ships of the line, and reckon upon recruiting our own force, as formerly, from his. But the system of naval warfare has undergone a total change since the unparalleled victory of Trafalgar. If the enemy now steals out by chance, or moves his ships from one port to another, the achievement is hailed as a triumph. The present system of the French government is not to fight, but to keep in port; ours to blockade him there; and, to do this effectually, the blockading squadron must necessarily exceed that of the enemy blockaded. But with this excess, it is not always possible to confine him to his ports. What then, it may be asked, is the advantage of our blockading system? We shall briefly state what, to us at least, appear to be the inconveniences which attend it, and the good effects by which those inconveniences are counterbalanced. It is the more important to settle these points, because on them hinges the answer to the following question-Can we, consistently with national policy and national security, dismantle a part of our present force (not to preserve it, for that we have shewn to be out of the question, but) to effect an annual saving of something short of one million?

In the first place, then, instead of our ships taking a cruize, as in former wars, to look for the enemy at sea, and then return to Spithead to refit and refresh, and to remain in port for the winter months, they now keep the sea in all kinds of weather, and in all seasons of the year, off the enemy's ports. This, it is obvious, cannot be done without an extraordinary wear and tear in the ships, a great expense in sending out provisions and water for their supply, and a great anxiety, on the part of the officer commanding the blockading squadron, lest the enemy should effect his escape. It is well known that the constant watching for an opportunity of getting at the enemy, and frustrating his plans, has so preyed on the spirits and constitution, as to wear out many of our best offiThe patience, perseverance, and good will with which both

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