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their troops, in summing up the victories they have gained, and the towns they have taken. Then they tell us, what high articles were insisted on by our mi nisters, and those of the confederates, and what pains both were at in persuading France to accept them. But nothing of this can give the least satisfaction to the just complaints of the kingdom. As to the war, our grievances are, that a greater load has been laid on us than was either just or necessary, or than we -have been able to bear; that the grossest impositions have been submitted to, for the advancement of private wealth and power, or, in order to forward the more dangerous designs of a faction, to both y which a peace would have put an end; and that the part of the war which was chiefly our province, which would have been most beneficial to us, and destructive to the enemy, was wholly neglected. As to a peace, we complain of being deluded by a mock treaty; in which, those who negotiated took care to make such demands, as they knew were impossible to be complied with; and therefore might securely press every article as if they were in earnest.

These are some of the points I design to treat of in the following discourse: with several others, which I thought it necessary at this time for the kingdom to be informed of. I think I am not mistaken in those facts I mention; at least not in any circumstance so material, as to weaken the consequences I draw from them.

After ten years war with perpetual success, to tell us it is yet impossible to have a good peace, is very surprising, and seems so different from what has ever happened in the world before, that a man of any

*Which I thought,' &c. expression, and badly arranged. I thought it necessary at this time be informed. S.

This sentence is bald in the It should run thus-of which that' the kingdom should

party may be allowed suspecting*, that we have been either ill used, or have not made the most of our victories, and might therefore desire to know where the difficulty lay. Then it is natural to inquire into our present condition; how long we shall be able to go on at this rate; what the consequences may be upon the present and future ages; and whether a peace, without that impracticable point which some people do so much insist on, be really ruinous in itself, or equally so, with the continuance of the


* May be allowed suspecting' is ungrammatical, it should be- may be allowed to suspect,' &c. S.





THE motives that may engage a wise prince or state in a war, I take to be one or more of these: either to check the overgrown power of some ambitious neighbour; to recover what has been unjustly taken from them; to revenge some injury they have received, which all political casuists allow; to assist some ally in a just quarrel; or, lastly, to defend themselves when they are invaded. In all these cases, the writers upon politicks admit a war to be justly undertaken. The last is, what has been usually called pro aris et focis; where no expense or endeavour can be too great, because all we have is at stake, and conse quently our utmost force to be exerted; and the dispute is soon determined, either in safety, or utter destruction. But in the other four, I believe, it will be found, that no monarch or commonwealth did ever engage beyond a certain degree; never proceeding so far as to exhaust the strength and substance of their country by anticipations and loans, which, in a few years, must put them in a worse condition than any they could reasonably apprehend from those evils, for the preventing of which they first entered into the war; because this would be to run into real infallible ruin, only in hopes to remove what might, perhaps, but appear so, by a probable speculation.

And as a war should be undertaken upon a just and prudent motive, so it is still more obvious, that a prince ought naturally to consider the condition he is in, when he enters on it; whether his coffers be full, his revenues clear of debts, his people numerous and rich by a long peace and free trade, not overpressed with many burdensome taxes; no violent faction ready to dispute his just prerogative, and thereby weaken his authority at home, and lessen his reputation abroad. For, if the contrary of all this happen to be his case, he will hardly be persuaded to disturb the world's quiet and his own, while there is any other left of preserving the latter, with honour and safety.


Supposing the war to have commenced upon a just motive; the next thing to be considered, is, when a prince ought in prudence to receive the overtures of a peace; which I take to be, either when the enemy is ready to yield the point originally contended for, or when that point is found impossible to be ever obtained; or when contending any longer, although with probability of gaining that point at last, would put such a prince and his people in a worse condition than the present loss of it. All which considerations are of much greater force, where a war is managed by an alliance of many confederates, which, in a va riety of interests among the several parties, is liable to so many unforeseen accidents.

In a confederate war, it ought to be considered which party has the deepest share in the quarrel: for although each may have their particular reasons, yet one or two among them will probably be more concerned than the rest, and therefore ought to bear the greatest part of the burden, in proportion to their strength. For example: two princes may be competitors for a kingdom; and it will be your interest to take the part of him, who will probably allow you good conditions of trade rather than of the other,


who may possibly not. However, that prince, whose cause you espouse, although never so vigorously, is the principal in that war, and you, properly speaking, are but a second. Or a commonwealth may lie in danger to be overrun by a powerful neighbour, which, in time, may produce very bad consequences upon your trade and liberty: it is therefore necessary, as well as prudent, to lend them assistances and help them to win a strong secure frontier; but, as they must, in course, be the first and greatest sufferers, so, in justice, they ought to bear the greatest weight. If a house be on fire, it behoves all in the neighbourhood to run with buckets to quench it; but the owner is sure to be undone first: and it is not impossible, that those at next door may escape by a shower from Heaven, or the stillness of the weather, or some other favourable accident.

But, if any ally, who is not so immediately concerned in the good or ill fortune of the war, be so generous as to contribute more than the principal party, and even more in proportion to his abilities, he ought at least to have his share in what is conquered from the enemy; or, if his romantick disposition transport him so far, as to expect little or nothing from this, he might however hope, that the principals would make it up in dignity and respect; and he would surely think it monstrous to find them intermeddling in his domestick affairs, prescribing what servants he should keep, or dismiss, pressing him perpetually with the most unreasonable demands, and

This phrase, in which the word, never, is improperly used instead of, ever, has been adopted by most writers; to show its absurdity it will be only necessary to examine how the same thing is expressed in a different mode, as thus however vigorously how vigorously soever. How monstrous would it appear to say, how never vigorously! how vigorously so never! S.


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