govern all other forces in nature.

If "the laws of matter

are suspended by the laws of life" each time an animated being moves any part of its body, one physical law is counteracted in precisely the same manner, and to an equivalent degree, each time another physical law is called into action. The law of gravitation, for instance, is equally neutralized by the law of magnetism each time a magnet suspends a weight in the air. In each case, a law is successfully resisted precisely to the extent of the force employed. The arm that is raised by the animated being falls again, in obedience to law, as soon as the force which raised it is exhausted, quite as certainly as the weight descends when the magnetic current fails. This, however, is not the suspension of law in the sense of a miracle, but, on the contrary, is simply the natural operation upon each other of co-existent laws. It is a recognized part of the order of nature,1 and instead of

1 Dr. Mozley says, in the preface to the second edition of his Bampton Lectures: "It is quite true that we see laws of nature any day and any hour neutralized and counteracted in particular cases and do not look upon such counteractions as other than the most natural events: but it must be remembered that, when this is the case, the counteracting agency is as ordinary and constant an antecedent in nature as the agency which it counteracts. The agency of the muscles and the agency of the magnet are as ordinary as the agency of gravitation which they both neutralize. .... The elevation of a body in the air by the force of an arm, is a counteraction indeed of the law of gravitation, but it is a counteraction of it by another law as natural as that of gravity. The fact therefore is in conformity with the laws of nature. But if the same body is raised in the air without any application of a known force, it is not a fact in conformity with natural law. In all these cases the question is not whether

a law of nature has been counteracted, for that does not constitute a fact contradictory to the laws of nature; but whether it has been counteracted by another natural law. If it has been, the conditions of science are fulfilled. But if a law of nature has been counteracted by a law out of nature, it is of no purpose, with a view to naturalize scientifically that counteraction of a law of nature, to say that the law of nature has been going on all the time, and only been neutralized, not suspended

rendering credible any supernatural suspension of laws, the analogy of animated beings distinctly excludes it. The introduction of life in no way changes the relation between cause and effect, which constitutes the order of nature, and is the essence of its law. Life favours no presumption for the suspension of law, but, on the contrary, whilst acting in nature, universally exhibits the prevalence and invariability of law. The "laws of life" may be subtle, but they are an integral portion of the great order of nature, working harmoniously with the laws of matter, and not one whit more independent of them than any one natural law is of another.

The supposed "Efficient Cause," is wholly circumscribed by law. It is brought into existence by the operation of immutable physical laws, and from the cradle to the grave it is subject to those laws. So inseparably is it connected with matter, and consequently with the laws which regulate matter, that it cannot even become conscious of its own existence without the intervention of matter. The whole process of life is dependent on obedience to natural laws, and so powerless is this efficient cause to resist their jurisdiction, that, in spite of its highest efforts, it pines or ceases to exist in consequence of the mere natural operation of law upon the matter with which it is united, and without

or violated. These are mere refinements of language, which do not affect the fact itself, that a new conjunction of antecedent and consequent, wholly unlike the conjunctions in nature, has taken place. The laws of nature have in that instance not worked, and an effect contrary to what would have issued from those laws has been produced. This is ordinarily called a violation or suspension of the laws of nature; and it seems an unnecessary refinement not to call it such. But whatever name we give to it, the fact is the same; and the fact is not according to the laws of nature in the scientific sense." p. xii. f.

which it is impotent. It cannot receive an impression from without that is not conveyed in accordance with law, and perceived by an exquisitely ordered organism, in every part of which law reigns supreme; nor can it communicate from within except through channels equally ordered by law. A slight injury may derange the delicate mechanical contrivances of eye, ear, and vocal chords, and may further destroy the reason and paralyze the body, reducing the animated being, by the derangement of those channels to which physical law limits its action, to a mere smouldering spark of life, without consciousness and without expression. The "laws of life" act amongst the laws of matter, but are not independent of them, and the action of both classes of law is regulated by precisely the same principles.

Dr. Mozley's affirmation, that antecedently one step on the ground and an ascent to heaven are alike incredible, does not help him. In that sense it follows that there is nothing that is not antecedently incredible, nothing credible until it has happened. This argument, however, while it limits us to actual experience, prohibits presumptions with regard to that which is beyond experience. To argue that, because a step on the ground and an ascent to heaven are antecedently alike incredible, yet as we subsequently make that step, therefore the ascent to heaven, which we cannot make, from incredible becomes credible, is a contradiction in terms. If the ascent be antecedently incredible, it cannot at the same time be antecedently credible. That which is incredible cannot become credible because something else quite different becomes credible. It is apparent that such an argument is vicious. Experience comes

with its sober wisdom to check such reasoning. We believe in our power to walk because we habitually exercise it we disbelieve in bodily ascensions because all experience excludes them. The step is part of the recognised order of nature, and has none of the elements in it of the miraculous. But if we leap into the air on the brink of a precipice, belief in an ascent to heaven is shattered to pieces at the bottom to which the law of gravitation infallibly drags us.

There is absolutely nothing in the constitution of nature, we may say, reversing Dr. Mozley's assertion, which does not prove the incredibility of a Divine suspension of physical laws, and does not create a presumption against it. There is no instance producible, or even logically conceivable, of any power whose effects are opposed to the ultimate ruling of the laws of nature. The occurrence of anything opposed to those laws is incredible. Dr. Mozley has himself shown that miracles cannot be explained either by unknown connection with known law, or by reference to unknown law; and he renounces the explanation of "higher law." His distinction between the laws of nature and the "laws of the universe," by which he nevertheless endeavours to make a miracle credible, is one which is purely imaginary, and cannot affect us in our present position within the order of nature. We know of no laws of the universe differing from the laws of nature. So far as human observation can range, these laws alone prevail. For all practical purposes, therefore, such a distinction is futile, and belief is necessarily limited to the actual operation of natural laws. The occasional intervention of an unknown "efficient cause," producing the effects

1 Bampton Lectures, 1865, p. 163.

called "miracles"-effects which are not referrible to any known law is totally opposed to experience, and such a hypothesis to explain alleged occurrences of a miraculous character cannot find a legitimate place within the order of nature.

2.

THE proposition with which Dr. Mozley commences these Bampton Lectures, and for which he contends to their close, is this: "That miracles, or visible suspensions of the order of nature for a providential purpose, are not in contradiction to reason." 1 He shows that the purpose of miracles is to attest a supernatural revelation, which, without them, we could not be justified in believing. "Christianity," he distinctly states, "cannot be maintained as a revelation undiscoverable by human reason—a revelation of a supernatural scheme for man's salvation without the evidence of miracles."2 Out of this very admission he attempts to construct an argument in support of miracles: "Hence it follows," he continues, "that upon the supposition of the Divine design of a revelation, a miracle is not an anomaly or irregularity, but part of the system of the universe; because, though an irregularity and an anomaly in relation to either part, it has a complete adaptation to the whole. There being two worlds, a visible and invisible, and a communication between the two being wanted, a miracle is the instrument of that communication." 3

Here, again, the argument is based upon mere assump

1 Bampton Lectures, 1865, p. 6.

* Ib., p. 23.

⚫ lb., p. 23.