held, that as the original authority needed not to have been in writing, the note given was sufficient, the ratification amounting to an authority in the first instance. Lastly, the statute speaks of a contract for the sale of goods; it therefore does not relate to an agreement merely to procure them. Thus, where there was an undertaking to procure coals, and convey them to Ipswich, it was not necessary that such a contract should be in writing; for if the coals could not have been got, the subject matter of the contract could never have come into existence. Perhaps, now that we are upon the Statute of Frauds, it may not be amiss to advert to that part of the 4th section which virtually compels the maker of any agreement, which is not to be performed within a year, to put it in writing. And here it is observable, that it must decidedly appear upon the agreement that it cannot be Selwyn, 839. performed within the time; if by possibility it may, the case will not be within the statute. Again, though the agreement be in fact performed within the year, still if it be matter of contract that the original time should exceed the year, the statute will not be complied with unless Id, 841. there be a writing. A contract was made on the 7th of May, for a year's service, to commence on the 30th of the following June: this was obviously a contract which could not be performed within the year, and so governed by the statute. There is a difference between this and the 17th section, relating to goods, as to the consideration being in writing. It is sufficient if the bargain appear in writing under the latter section, but here the word agreement being introduced, the consideration for the mutual contract must be evident. The following undertakings were consequently deemed not to be binding, although in writing: "Mr. Wakefield will engage to pay the bill "drawn by Pitman in favour of Stephen Saunders :" P 1 Barn. & Ald. 722, Bracegirdle v. Heald. 4 Barn. & Ald. 595, Saunders . Wakefield. 3 Bro. & Bing. 14, Jenkins v. Reynolds. See 5 East, 10, ters. 9 East, 348, Stadt v. Lill. Selwyn, 841. "To the amount of 100l., be pleased to consider me "I guarantee the payment of any goods which "J. Stadt delivers to J. Nicholls." Here the stipulated delivery of the goods constituted the consideration, and when the delivery took place the consideration attached, so that where it appears by necessary inference it will be sufficient. With respect to the signature, a letter beginning "My dear Robert," and ending "your affectionate mother," without the name, was held an insufficient Selby v. Selby. agreement; for it does not follow, because you may identify the writer, that the signature will be sufficient. 3 Merivale 3, Consideration, illegal. It has been already intimated, that without a due consideration, there will be no foundation for the promise to fulfil the supposed contract; an illegal consideration must, therefore, be carefully avoided (e). Whatever tends to subvert the constitution, or is con (e) As in the cases of smuggling, trading to forbidden ports, selling bricks contrary to the statute of 17 Geo. 3, c. 42, which requires them to be of certain dimensions, selling liquors of less than 20s. value at one time, contrary to 24 Geo. 2, c. 40, &c. See Comyn on Contracts, 59-68; and as to liquors, 5 Barn. & Ald. 241, Burnyeat v. Hutchinson, where it was held no excuse that spirits under 20s. formed only a part of the bill. And a bill of exchange given partly for liquors under 20 s. at one time, and partly for money lent, &c. was totally vitiated, the security being entire. 3 Taun. 226, Scott v. Gillmore. The statute extends to spirits mixed with water. Ibid. are collected. trary to public policy, as smuggling, &c. will never be suffered in courts of justice to support an agreement. So that where contracts were entered into abroad for the purpose of introducing smuggled goods into this country, and aid given in the importation, the vendors have been Selwyn, 64, prevented from recovering here the price of such goods; where the cases for to do otherwise would be the enforcing an agreement made for the express purpose of infringing the laws. So where a British agent bought some goods in an enemy's country, and sent them here from the enemy's port, although it did not appear that they had been purchased from persons at enmity with us, and although they were sent in a neutral ship, the consideration was illegal, and a policy of insurance upon such merchandize was held void. 8 Term Rep. 548, Potts v. Bell. Contracts in contravention of the navigation laws are also illegal, and cannot be enforced, and there are many statutes which prohibit the sale of goods under particular circumstances, an infringement of which, by adopting a contract in opposition to them, will render the consideration illegal. And it is of no consequence that the buyer accept the goods so prohibited by statute as where bricks were made under the statutable 11 East, 300, size, and accepted, the buyer being ignorant of their Law v. Hodson. deficiency; for the Act was passed to protect the buyer under such circumstances. The statute 42 George 3. prohibits the brewer from using any thing except malt and hops in the brewing of beer, and the defendant bought some drugs from the plaintiff, the latter being aware that they were to be used in the brewery: it was holden that he could not recover the price of them, for the Court will not give sanction to a contract entered into against the policy of the law. So again, agreements which tend to invade the privileges of a company having an exclusive trade, are illegal; and so are contracts against orders in council, 1 Maule & Sel wyn, 593, Langton v. Hughes. 3 Maule & Selwyn, 117, Wil kinson v. Lou donsack. 1 Barn & Ald, 53, Holland v. Hall. Cowper, 341, as the exportation of military stores to South America, at a time when a prohibition was in force against such a traffic. These are merely put as examples of the general principle; it not being possible to enumerate in the present work all the illegal contracts which may be entered into. But unless the vendor have a share in the unlawful transaction, he will not be precluded from recovering. So that where the sale and delivery of smuggled goods were complete abroad, and the seller was a foreigner, though he knew the manner in which it was intended to dispose of them, it was resolved that his action would lie, as he had not been instrumental in running them into England. A broker sued for his commission on procuring freight: it was objected that the voyage contemplated was illegal, and that if certain licences could not be procured, that the whole adventure would be against law; but the Court said, that a party was not bound upon such an occasion to see to the performance Haines. Busk. of every thing which might legalize the adventure, and judgment was given for the broker. 5 Taunton, 521, Comyn, 58, Hilberds v. Pet- Ib. Wardle v. 1. Absolute; contracts. A gambling speculation regarding the sale of goods, as the paying the difference between the market price of a commodity on one day and that of another, is bad, like a time bargain in the stocks, and so it was held in the case of a sham contract for tallow. The agreement or contract being reduced to writing, 2. Conditional and the consideration legal, we proceed to inquire whether it be absolute in its terms, or whether any conditions be annexed. If the contract for a number of articles is entire as to the whole of them, payment cannot be demanded unless all be delivered; but where the defendant bought several things, and accepted half a chest of French plums, tendering the money for them, he rebutted the presumption of a joint contract, and was obliged to take the remainder of his purchases. 1 Campb. 53, Champion v. Short. But where the purchaser accepted some cream of tartar, but refused two chests of lac dye, under these circumstances, that the plaintiffs were to have two days upon deliberating whether they would let him have the dye at his price, it was held that these orders were distinct, and the statute of frauds intervened to bar any recovery for the lac dye. There was a contract for a horse, to have him a month upon trial; at the end of a fortnight the buyer said he liked the horse, but not the price; the plaintiff said he had better return the horse, but the defendant kept him ten days longer, and then the plaintiff refused to take him back. There was a condition annexed to this contract, that the defendant might have a month to decide upon the horse; he had not determined the contract till he had actually returned the horse. A party makes an offer; the intended purchaser requests time to consider; he afterwards agrees: here it has been held, where this negotiation took place by the post, that the moment the offer was made it continued the same identical offer during every instant of the time the letter was travelling, and that the instant it was accepted the contract became binding on the parties. In the particular case the vendors misdirected the letter, and that mistake occasioning a delay of two days, they sold the goods to another person; this was through their neglect, and they were held answerable for the consequences (ƒ). A broker sold goods on Saturday sell. to the plaintiff, and sent him on the same day the sold note, with the words "quality to be approved of on "Monday;" the plaintiff not having signified his disapproval on the Monday, the broker sent the defendant, on the Friday following, the bought note (which was The authority of Cooke v. Oxley, 3 Term Rep. 653, seems to be shaken by this decision. Barnewall & Alderson, 681, Adams v. Lind |