Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father." Next comes our text, "The Spirit itself beareth witness," &c. Could any

one who had no previous opinion think, in reading this verse, of any other spirit than that same of which the apostle had been previously speaking? I am sure not.

The Spectator next makes the extraordinary remark, that " in the 16th verse the apostle merely states a fact; while Mr. Wesley unfolds and defends his theory, as that fact." Now, pray, what is the fact stated "in the 16th verse?" And what is the theory which Mr. Wesley unfolds and defends as that fact? Is not the fact that the Spirit beareth witness? And is not the theory the very same? Mr. Wesley's doctrine, dignified in the Spectator with the name of a theory, is neither more nor less than a paraphrastic rendering into English of that simple statement of fact, contained in the 16th verse. Properly speaking, Mr. Wesley advances no theory. Yet, upon the supposition of a theory, the Spectator founds several learned and pious lamentations upon the deplorable influence of theorizing upon the Church of God. While we concur in these lamentations, so far as they are brought to bear upon attempts actually made to reduce revealed truth into apparent consistency with human speculations, we cannot consent either that the doctrines of Scripture, or the principles necessarily and inseparably connected with them, shall be driven from the world, under the name of theories. Notwithstanding the learning and research of our Presbyterian brethren, we apprehend their subtle method of severing facts from theories is but lately learned. Their metaphysical edge had tried itself often upon the effort to prove that God's foreordination of all things does not include some things-that the inevitableness of damnation to the reprobate, does not prove that they may not be saved, if they will-ere it became keen enough to sever the simple scriptural "statement of fact," that the Spirit beareth witness, from Mr. Wesley's" theory," that the Holy Ghost beareth testimony. This is neologistic tact. Does a New-Divinity man wish to deny a doctrine? He pronounces it a theory. The Bible contains nothing but facts, one would think; and, for doctrines they are to be ranked among philosophic theories. They may understand, however, that when the matter of fact (as they term it) is a Divine explanation of a mode, it is not to be got rid of by calling it a theory. We have in Scripture the fact, that some men are the children of God. Being such, they need to know it. How, then, shall they know it? What is the mode? The "simple statement of fact in the 16th verse" is a Divine theory touching the mode: "The Spirit itself beareth witness," &c.

If, then, Rom. viii, 16, bear upon its front an unequivocal declaration of the fact or doctrine of a Divine testimony in the hearts of believers, we may consider whether there be not another passage of Scripture, which, while it repeats the simple statement of fact, gives also some insight into the mode.

We follow Mr. Wesley in referring to Gal. iv, 6, "And because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father."

Here is the same cry which is spoken of Rom. viii, 15. Only, that whereas in Romans, the cry is uttered by the believer, here it is

uttered by the Spirit. Manifestly by the believer, at the impulse of the Spirit-by the Spirit, through the believer. This makes no difference in the fact; but sheds some light on the mode.

Mr. Wesley has remarked, (as already quoted,) that the Spirit does not always communicate its testimony by a voice, either inward or outward. We should infer as much from this passage. This is the theory, verified by experience. The penitent suddenly believes in Christ. And suddenly all is changed. From cries of anguish, from sense of guilt, from fear of wrath, from imploring pardon, he feels no guilt, he dreads no wrath, he implores not pardon; but, under the overpowering influence of his heart, he cries aloud, Abba, Father. This cry is accompanied by the sweeping away of all (for the time) that contradicts the cry. The various sensations described, the pangs of remorse, the view of God as a stern judge, these are gone. Christ is precious, and he wonders that he did not trust in him; God is lovely, and he wonders that he had not loved him before; his heart is filled with child-like simplicity, with confiding affection; there is an irresistible persuasion, which if doubted will yet return, that God is reconciled. And, as the assurance beats down all demurring, he cries, Abba, Father. This is the Spirit of adoption, by which he cries; it is the Spirit of Christ itself crying. In many cases, doubtless, (perhaps in all at the commencement of religious experience, or rather at that stage of it when they enter into the light and liberty of God's children,) a simple state of mind, like the child's conviction of his own identity. Ask him (the child) if he is conscious of his own identity,-he does not comprehend you. Perhaps if you persist in explaining terms, and asking proofs you will make him doubt at last, whether he be the same-the very same he was yesterday. Nevertheless, he acts, (not thinks, nor feels) he acts that he is the same. So with the babe in Christ. He acts out, with his very heart, in his inmost soul, that God is his Father.

We have now finished what may properly be called the statement of the doctrine. From this, I think it will appear, that the writer in the Spectator has not gained as accurate a notion of what Mr. Wesley meant by the doctrine in question, as might be gathered from the sermons of that venerated man. We have also considered, in some degree, the scriptural language in reference to the subject.

In connection with the direct witness of the Divine Spirit, Mr. Wesley taught the necessity of a resort to the testimony of conscience to an examination of our tempers and conduct. This testimony he calls a test of the former.

In referring us to conscience, Mr. Wesley so evidently has the support of Scripture, that no argument is needful. Nor does the Spectator question the propriety of such a reference; but, only its consistency with the admission of the more authoritative and infallible testimony of the Divine Spirit. It is to be considered, however, in the first place, What is a test? If I mistake not, its object is to detect, not soundness, but unsoundness. Proof, as well as testimony, is of two kinds,-negative and positive. In other words, before receiving a doctrine, we may inquire, whether its falsity cannot be shown from other doctrines. If it can, this is proof of its falsity; but, if it cannot, it is negative proof of its truth. So with testimony.

If the assertion be that a certain person was in a certain place, we may, without asking whether he was seen there, inquire if he were not seen elsewhere. If he were not, this is negative proof, that he was where he was affirmed to be. So to vary the language, negative evidence is that which refutes evidence leading to a contrary conclusion. Negative proof is that refuting an assertion which implies something contrary to the one which is intended to be proved.

Whether Mr. Wesley formally states this as the relation sustained by conscience, to the assertion made by one, respecting himself, that he is a child of God, I do not remember. That this is his view, I think is shown by his use of the word test. When we determine the truth of any assertion, by inquiring into the existence of certain circumstances, which would show themselves if the assertion were true, this is a test. If a man be a child of God, he will love him. Loving God is, therefore, a test of his filiation.

Beside, a test measures degrees. By direct testimony we may know whether an individual was present in a certain place, at a certain time. But if he were seen elsewhere, just before, and elsewhere again, just after, he must have been present at the place specified but a short time. I do not vouch for the precise accuracy of the illustration, but the truth of what is stated can easily be seen. That a man is adopted into God's family, proves him born again, or regenerate but, it is no measure of the degree of his love, faith, hope, joy, &c. This measure can only be found in his feelings and conduct.

The secondary testimony of conscience may, therefore, be of great use, even to him who has the witness of God's Spirit. 1. In preparing him to give a ready reception to the Divine testimony, by refuting the doubting cavils of his own heart, as well as the subtle insinuations of the devil. 2. By furnishing him with a measure of his advancement.

We believe each of these witnesses has its place; and that the presence of one, in its province, will by no means excuse the absence of the other from its province.

Other illustrations, beside those already given, readily present themselves. Does not he who has faith know it; and by the best possible means, viz. consciousness?* Why, then, do the Scriptures refer us to outward works as an evidence of our faith? Doubtless the Spectator and Mr. Wesley would answer, that it is for some such purpose as this: 1. That faith may not degenerate into sentimentalism 2. That faith may have a suitable measure.

So of love. Does not the man who loves God know it? Why is he then taught to test his love to God, by his love to the brethren? The Scriptures do not classify proofs, saying, this is primary, that is secondary. They tell us what are proofs, and expect us to believe them, whether we comprehend them or not. But when an objection is advanced against proofs, which is real, while those proofs are supposed to hold a certain relation, we may very pro

*I do not here proceed upon that strange conceit, that faith is a "self-evident" principle. When a sacred writer says, He that believeth hath the witness in himself," I suppose him to mean, that a lively faith is accompanied by a Divine testimony.

perly consider them as holding some different relation, in which they may maintain their consistency. Proceeding upon this principle, we suppose that in appealing to conscience for a knowledge of our state, the question is not, How shall he who has the witness of the Spirit know it? he knows it by itself: but, How shall he who fancies he has it, when he has it not,-how shall he know that his fancy is fancy? Evidently, by conscience.

We say that we are assured of the existence of those things which are revealed to us by sight. We need no other testimony. Shall we hence infer that there is no need of a consultation of the senses? Shall a man in the jaundice affirm that all things are yellow, and refuse to be convinced because sight furnishes testimony of the highest possible kind?

The case to which the Spectator refers makes nothing for his argument. The case referred to is introduced by the writer, in illustration of a strange remark, that in those cases in which the fruits of the Holy Spirit and a holy life present themselves, the power of the test to detect delusion is gone. I suppose the writer means about this: An individual has what Mr. Wesley styles the witness of the Spirit. He has also the test,-a good conscience. Now, complains the Spectator, in this case, the test cannot detect any de lusion. He speaks truly. Conscience here detects no delusion. And for the best of reasons,-there is none.

This writer is deceived by his own prepossessions. He assumes there is delusion, and then complains that it cannot be detected.

The case is this:-A certain female, (subject to nervous irregu→ larity,) was seized with conviction, and brought to cry, with a feeling heart, "What must I do to be saved?" In this state she continued for ten days. At the end of which, as she was lying down, revolving anxiously her situation, the room where she was, was suddenly filled with light, and a voice came to her, assuring her, that her sins were forgiven; and immediately filled with a rapturous conviction of her acceptance with God, she rushed forth, to inform others what great things the Lord had done for her.

Now, the Spectator supposes this to have been mere delusion, and then complains that the test was incapable of detecting it; for, all the fruits of the Spirit followed. In the language of the writer himself, "until her death she was one of the most devotedly pious members of the Church where she lived." And now, because where there was no delusion, (none to affect the argument,) the test shows none, therefore the test is nothing worth. The fault of the writer lies in assuming the point in dispute, that there was delusion; for of that there is no proof. Nay, the proof is the other way.

When an individual professes to know something which we have not the means of knowing, and which we therefore disbelieve, but which yet proves to be fact, the natural conclusion is, that that other individual has some means of knowing the fact, not accessible

to us.

This principle will oblige us to admit that the person in question was, by some means, furnished with the knowledge of her adoption. For, 1. She was adopted, as the Spectator admits. 2. She was adopted at that time; for then she began to walk in newness of VOL. VII.-July, 1836. 31

life. 3. At that time she came to the knowledge of her adoption. She must therefore have had some means of knowing.

Let us now turn to another part of the article.

It is made matter of objection that Mr. Wesley should consider this Divine evidence of our adoption a necessary preparation to the exercise of love to God. "This impression precedes holiness in the sinner's heart." In support of his view on this point, Mr. Wesley quotes John; We love Him, because He first loved us.

Mr. Wesley's argument stands thus. He is refuting the opinion of those who refer the Christian for the evidence of his state to the fruits of the Spirit only. Their assertion is, We may know ourselves children of God, by our loving him. Mr. Wesley replies, We love him only by knowing we are his children.

In other words, we are not to refer primarily to the fruits of the Spirit, in order to evince an adoption; because these fruits presup. pose not only the fact, but our knowledge of the fact that we are adopted.

At this opinion, as stated by Mr. Wesley, the Spectator is amazed. "What!" say they, "cannot love God-cannot know-cannot believe the love of God, until visited by inspiration!" However, the latter part of the exclamation is superfluous. Mr. Wesley's opinion is that we cannot love God (with a filial love) until we know that God, for Christ's sake, hath pardoned our sins. The term inspiration is equivocal and may convey a false idea. As to believing the love of God, in one sense we may, without being born again.

One remark may be worth making now. That is, that neither of this passage, nor of the two very prominent passages already quoted, the one from Romans the other from Galatians, does the Spectator offer any explanation. The position of the writer is that of an objector, who pulls down without building up; who refutes without proving. Neither does he advance any contradictory passage. His objections are merely metaphysical, or theoretic. This does not comport so well as might be wished with his own remarks already noticed. However, let us proceed.

Our remarks multiply, and we must needs be brief. It is not questioned but that one may comprehend the fact that God loved us, and that Christ died for us, without being born again. But can we exercise the love of children,-filial love,-till we recognize our parent? For it is of this filial love the apostle speaks; and this is correlative to God's paternal love. With this remark, we leave the topic, hoping that religious writers will bring religious opinions to the test of Scripture, and not to that of their own prepossessions, as is done by the writer before us.

If Mr. Wesley's system included much of what is called the taste scheme, those who think this a reproach should see that the "tastes" were different from those of the sacred writers, when they tell us to "taste and see that the Lord is good ;" and speak of tasting of the heavenly gift, of the good word, and of the powers of the world

to come.

We now come to the formal objections presented by the Spec. tator. We are sorry there should be any appearance of special pleading in these objections. Yet, I am greatly mistaken, if the