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I think this law is

belief in the uniformity of the laws of nature. misstated, though I will not delay to correct the statement. It is sufficient for the present purpose that Mr. Upham has misunderstood, and therefore misapplied it.

A law is a rule of procedure. This is the basis of the idea, in all its modifications.

Physical laws the laws of nature-are the rules by which natural events are governed. Moral laws are the rules by which rational, accountable beings ought to govern themselves. Human law specifies that which, by the determination of a competent authority, must be considered the proper rule of procedure, by those subject to the authority.

The subject here is physical law: using that term-physical-in its widest sense, as including whatever is subject to an unvarying and fore-appointed consecution. The laws of belief are not human laws; they are not moral: and, if beside these, there be any but physical, I am not aware of it.

Perhaps this is as proper a place as any to observe that the word physical, when applied to cause, is not synonymous with bodily. The laws by which one idea suggests another, or of association, are physical, though mental. Neither is it necessarily opposed to voluntary. So far as the will is subject to law, that law is physical, although the result of it be a voluntary operation. But of this hereafter.

Law is not to be defined a "mode of expression"-" denoting an order of sequence," &c. (See Wayland's Moral Science.) It is an ideality, or pure mental conception. It implies, therefore, always, a mind conceiving, as well as a will governing; and in two of its forms, viz., moral and human, will governed; governed, however, by rewards and punishments, or by itself, in conformity to law. Whether the primary law of belief, above referred to, (of the uni formity of the laws of nature,) as expressed by Mr. Upham, throws any discredit upon the miracles of Christianity, needs not to be now considered. I do not intend to examine, in detail, our author's mode of presenting these, although I doubt whether any of them be very well described by him. The manner in which the one under consideration is appealed to, in the Essay on the Will, seems to render a brief remark or two reasonable. First of all, then, it appears to me not exactly proper to say that the law in question is of the uniformity of the laws of nature. I would rather say, it is the universal conviction that nature is governed by law,-not at random. It is difficult to determine how law can exist and not be uniform. I am inclined to think that we may seek in his faulty phraseology for the ground of the mistakes which Mr. Upham has made in his applications of this law.

The reader will please note the phraseology employed. The conviction is not, that nature must be, but that, she is governed by law. The Supreme might have done otherwise; and that, in particular cases, things have been governed by a rule, not inherent in their own nature, we have ample testimony. This conviction, in my view, is not a primary law of belief at all. It is a conclusion forced upon all minds, by observation of the fact, that it is so. It is, therefore, a conclusion, subject, in particular cases, to observation

and testimony, which is not the case with what is properly called a law of belief.

That this conviction, such as it is, has been misunderstood, and, therefore, misapplied, by Mr. Upham, I think will appear from the following remarks:

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Law is a rule of procedure, and is to be distinguished from the result of the process. Thus, it is a great law that the earth shall revolve around the sun, and around its own axis. This is the rule. The result is that we have summer and winter,-day and night. Mr. Upham's mistake lies in affirming the uniformity of the result, and not of the law. Now, the result may or may not be uniform. When the law operates under the same circumstances, this will be the case; otherwise, it will not.

The pertinency of the remark will be shown by a simple instance. If we infer the sun's rising from his having risen heretofore, by the aid of this law of belief, manifestly we must infer that he will rise at the same time, and in the same relative position as before. It is surprising that this mistake should occur in the same section in which it is rebuked. The case of the man who inferred that it would snow at Rome at the same season at which it had snowed repeatedly before, is precisely that of the man who infers the sun's rising to-morrow from his having risen to-day. This leads me to notice the fundamental error of both; which is the more important, as it seems to be a current error among the philosophic of the day. See Int. Phil., vol. i, p. 45.

It lies essentially in mistaking results for laws. Mr. Upham supposes the mistake lay in the individual's inferring from too small a number of facts. In a measure it did. Under certain circumstances, we have nothing on which to base an inference, but a multitude of results, or rather the same result, often repeated. But, in most cases of this kind, does not the error lie in inferring from the fact past, to the result future, directly? The process should be from the fact known, to infer the law; and, from the law, the result to come. The law, once seen, is a law, until superseded. And had the law been that it should snow, the man would have been justified in inferring, not only from its having snowed thrice, but, even from a single fall of snow. For a law, we need to see it once only, and it standeth sure for ever.*

Another instance of the misapplication of this law is in vol. i, p. 128. I think that is an erroneous application. Let us examine it.

The argument of the author, in that case, seems to run thus:I am naturally inclined to speak the truth.-But I am a man.By the law of belief before us, all men have the same inclinations: therefore, all men have this inclination. But the intermediate proposition, here, is identical; for before it can be affirmed that any being is a man, in all respects, it must be ascertained that he has this inclination. The proper argument in the case is, by analogy,

The reader will not now understand me to deny the correctness of the conclusion, that the sun will rise; nor the correctness of the usual mode of reaching it: but, that Mr. Upham has not stated that process precisely as it is. The method of arriving at this conclusion, already noted, though true, is not possible to an Indian? For the amusement of those who are pleased with such questions, it is desired to know, how the Indian may correctly derive this inference? This inquiry will evidently present some modification of the views already expressed.

thus :-I am a man, and have a certain inclination. Another has the general characteristics of manhood; therefore, by analogy, he has this, viz., a certain inclination.

Let us pass now to other topics.

The remarks on the immateriality of the soul are conclusive, but not perfect. The power of negative arguments does not seem to be understood. We know what is, by its evidence. But, how do we know what is not? I answer, in various ways; but, particularly in this:-There is, 1. No evidence that the thing is. 2. There is the certainty that if the thing were, there would be evidence of it. Therefore it is not.

Upon this basis I would construct a negative argument for the immateriality of the soul. That doctrine is a negation-a denial of materiality.

Is the soul material? I answer, No! Because, 1. There is no evidence that it is. 2. If it were, there would be evidence. I take this to be as conclusive an argument as possible: at least, it goes the length of throwing the onus probandi where it should be,-uponthe materialist.

* We come now to a series of important topics, on which, particularly in reference to the author's manner of treating them, it is proposed to make some remarks. These will be included under the following heads:-1. Mental activity and passivity. 2. Definitions and simple terms. 3. Freedom in general;-of the will in particular.

Neither in the remarks now to be made, nor in those made already, is it forgotten that the critic himself is as liable to criticism as his author. The writer proposes his opinions freely, vouching only for his care in elaborating them, and for the honesty of his purpose in making them known; but by no means expecting them to be im plicitly received by those who read. It is not forgotten, that the reviewed may turn reviewer; and that Professor Upham's practised eye may detect of real mistakes in the strictures more and greater than the writer of the strictures seems to himself to have detected in the philosophy and its accompanying essay,

Of the points above specified, in order.

1. Of mental passivity and activity.

Without delaying now to determine how far the mental operations are the mere offspring of physical causes, (in the sense of physical

* Strictures might, without difficulty, be passed upon various parts of the prin cipal work under notice. One point only, beside those above mentioned, I wish to bring to view, as it may afford some entertainment to those who are fond of solving such problems. It is a great question:-How does the mind first obtain the notion of externality? In the Int. Phil. it is considered, that this notion is received through the sense of touch.-See vol. i, p. 244. Whether that opinion be correct or not, the proof of it is not attempted. Now, if it be correct, how can it be shown to be so? Whoever will undertake it, will find the following points to be made out. 1. The true sense of external and internal, in relation to this subject, must be clearly discriminated. This is no small matter. I am apprehensive most persons would go astray here. 2. The proof must be adduced that this notion cannot be furnished by any other sense than touch, nor by any combination of the senses. 3. It must be shown that touch furnishes the intimation that its own organ is external; for not other bodies only, but each one's own body: nay, the very finger which touches is external in the present case. It strikes me that this last point has escaped observation. 34

VOL. VII.-July, 1836.

already noted,) and how far not, it is sufficient to observe that, in certain respects, there are important differences between them. While, in one case, the mind receives the action of external agents, in others it acts upon them. It acts upon them too, not passively, as the sledge hammer upon the iron placed under it, but by an impulse of its own. While truly moved by other things, it truly moves itself. It is this which distinguishes the mind from a piece of mechanism; which, in truth, constitutes man a "living soul."

But Mr. Upham has come as near as possible to making the mind entirely passive. By what method he eluded the proper sense of this term passive, in contradistinction from active, it is difficult to determine. He has, however, done so very effectually.

Commenting upon the opinion of Butler and Stewart, that habit strengthens the active determinations of our nature, but not the passive, he derives this word from the Latin, patior, to suffer; and accordingly understands those philosophers to refer to that part of our constitution by which we endure pain. It were as reasonable to consider passive verbs as expressive of pain only. Is it not notorious, that in some cases we receive the action of external objects, in which cases we are passive; while in others the mind acts upon, in which cases it is active ?-See vol. i, p. 173. The same mistake is made in reference to passion, which is considered a form of suffering. But does not the word etymologically point out the fact, that in a case of excited sensibility the affection is so strong as to make the man passive rather than active in its indulgence;victim, not a master?

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The mental state, which led to these mistakes, probably led to oversight of the proper distinction between emotions and desires. The author, in separating these, chooses to consider emotion as transitory, and desire permanent. But the distinction fails in too many cases, or rather, no such distinction exists. Desire is active, emotion is passive.

These, indeed, are minor points. It is more important that the whole book is constructed in total neglect of the active property of the mind. Perhaps, we may say, it is put together with an evident intention to make the mind appear as mechanical as possible.

Evidence of this is seen in the parts relating to association, abstraction, attention, and imagination.

1. Association, (see vol. i, p. 477.) The power of the mind over its trains of association, seems to me considerably different from what it is represented to be by Mr. Upham. We have far greater liberty than simply to dwell upon an idea, and then follow just such trains of thought from it as present themselves. We can, to a great extent, specify what law of association shall operate; whether that of contiguity, of contrast, or of cause and effect.

2. Abstraction, (vol. i, p. 341.) We see the theory of passivity still more clearly in the remarks on abstraction. The process, as there delineated, is merely one wheel moving another by cogs and crevices. A complex idea, says our author, is before the mind; a desire to examine some particular part of it springs up, consequently all the other parts fall off, and we have the process of abstraction. It is not necessary to dispute about the desire. But how could it escape the writer, that in the desire of the mind (supposing it to

exist) it is implied that that particular part which the mind desires to examine is already abstracted?

The simple process seems to be this:-The mind, in contemplating a complex object, makes sometimes a part, sometimes a quality, the subject of its contemplation. It has, therefore, a power of contemplating parts separately from other parts, and qualities apart from the subjects in which they inhere. This power is abstraction. This power the mind can exercise with no other restriction than that which is common to all the faculties, viz., that there be a proper object, a proper opportunity, and a suitable physical condition. The brain being the mind's organ, the third particular is an indispensable prerequisite to the mental action.

It may be granted, that some form of desire precedes the mental action, though not that form which Mr. Upham supposes. Neither does the desire, such as it is, operate upon the abstracting or other faculty, mechanically; but by previously influencing the will.

3. Attention, (vol. i, p. 361.) This power, too, is set free from the dominion of the will, and moves only as it is moved. Under this head there is an instance of the fault now noticed, too striking to be passed. The author is answering the question, Can the mind attend to more than one object at once? This question he resolves into two others, viz., 1. Can the mind attend at once to several things to which it can attend separately? 2. Can the mind, by one and the same sense, attend at once to several things, to which it can attend by that sense separately? The former question is answered in the affirmative; and, for an instance, we are shown that we can attend at once to the beautiful color and odorous smell of a rose. But the second question is answered in the negative;

we cannot attend to two sounds or two smells at once.

Now, I remark, in the first place, that whatever answer is given to the one question must be given to the other. For, if because sensations of different objects are at the same instant received by several senses, I must be supposed to attend to all these objects; then, because I can receive sensations of sound, by the same sense, from several sounding bodies, I must also be considered as attending to these at the same instant. But the latter, i. e., the negative answer, is correct:-the former, therefore, is incorrect. How, then, is Mr. Upham led into this mistake? I answer, by his theory of passivity. Attention, with him, is not the voluntary direction of the mind to an object; but simply the presence of the sensation, combined, perhaps, with desire, but still lacking the element of selfdirection. The whole section is an instance of the almost total want of that discrimination, which should, by all means, characterize an intellectual philosopher.

4. Reasoning and imagination, (vol. ii, pp. 24, 25, 92.) Reasoning, which certainly, if any, implies the voluntary power, is in the same independent state with the powers above mentioned. Imagination also. In the remarks on this latter, the power of the will is virtually nullified. "Whatever a person wills, or professes to will to imagine, he has already imagined; and, consequently, there can be no such thing as strictly voluntary imaginings." Accordingly, it is represented as a contradiction in terms, to speak of willing to imagine a brazen sea. But, I think it is not so. I can, by abstrac

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