subsequent conduct of that statesman, affords reason to doubt his sincerity upon this occasion; for while the memorial told Bonaparte of his danger, it at the same time acquainted the royalists with their strength and prospects of ultimate success. It taught Napoleon, however, that he had little to expect from the exertions of his Jacobinical friends, and that he must still confide chiefly in his own resources. Under this impression he suddenly retired from the palace of the Thuilleries, where he had been under the necessity of making daily condescensions to the mob, and took up his residence in the Elysée Bourbon; and here, in a state of comparative independence, surrounded by his military adherents and some select members of the Cabinet, he made arrangements for his future proceedings.

He found himself in the first instance under the necessity of redeeming the pledge which he had made on his return from Elba, of giving to the nation a constitution which should secure their liberties: a commission which included the distinguished names of Bishop Gregoire and Benjamin Constant, was appointed by himself, and on the 22d of April it was presented to the nation under the singular title of "An Additional Act to the Constitutions of the Empire." Two anomalies have been justly noticed in this important document; first, that by its designation Napoleon seemed to sanction his previous mass of organic laws, many of which were contrary to each

other, and few of them congenial with the spirit of a free government. 2dly, It was made to flow from the pure grace and favour of the Emperor, although a principal objection to the Constitution of Louis XVIII. was that it appeared in the shape of a royal charter, instead of a national compact.

The "Additional Act" scarcely differed from the Royal Charter in any thing except the abolition of the Censorship of the Press, and the exclusion of the Bourbous from the throne, even in case of the extinction of the Imperial dynasty. It gave much dissatisfaction both to the Constitutionalists and Republicans: to the first, because it left Bonaparte's former mass of contradictory laws unrepealed; and to the latter, because it admitted an upper house, which the Emperor could fill with his own minions, so as effectually to controul the representatives of the people; it therefore became the subject of attack and raillery on all sides. Many were highly indignant that Napoleon had not recognized his abdication, and left the choice of the dynasty as well as the form of the government to the free will of the people; as it afforded the strongest presumption, that he only waited till victory should again smile upon his standard to re-assume all his dictatorial habits.*

* In an official note presented to the Ministers of the Allies on the 8th of August, 1815, Fouché asserts" that public expectation was deceived to such a point, that a cry of indignation was heard from one end of France to the other ;" and he regrets that at that moment decisive negociations were not opened with the King as well as with the Allied Powers.

The following were the principal features of Napoleon's Charter. It instituted two assemblies, which, like the British Parliament, were to exercise the legislative power in concert with the Sovereign. The Emperor possessed the right of nomination to the Chamber of Peers, and this dignity was hereditary; while the people were permitted to chuse their representatives, 629 in number, every fifth year. The Sovereign had the power of proroguing or dissolving the Legislature. No member of either Chamber could be prosecuted during a session for any offence, unless the Chamber to which he belonged should countenance the accusation. No taxes were to be raised, no loans contracted, nor any military levies, without an express law decided upon by the Chamber of Deputies, These legislative regulations seem to have been copied from the British Constitution; but the members had not, as in this country, the privilege of introducing a new law, the origin of which could emanate only from the Sovereign. The Chambers might indeed reject it, and if they desired the introduction of a particular law, they might request him to bring it forward: but neither was he bound to agree with their request. Hence the freedom of legislation was evidently checked, as it would be more ungracious and impolitic in the Sovereign to reject a law which had received the solemn sanction of the Chambers, than to refuse a request for a primary discussion. The

Ministers of the Crown were to be responsible for the acts of the government: Judges were irremovable except for flagrant misconduct, and all trials were to be publicly conducted. No individual could be arrested or punished, but according to the prescribed forms of law; but no express provision was made for the security of personal liberty similar to that glorious bulwark of British freedom, the Habeas Corpus Act. Finally, religion was to be unfettered, the press free, and the right of petitioning universal.

The sense of the nation on the Additional Act, was ordered to be collected in somewhat the same manner in which it had been done when Napoleon was made Consul and Emperor, the result of which was to be laid before the approaching Champ-deMai. The registers were placed under the management of trusty agents, and extraordinary means are said to have been resorted to for the purpose of increasing the number of the signatures. Public functionaries, the army and navy, the lowest labourers, and even domestic servants were required to affix their names to the new code. Yet notwithstanding these singular exertions, not quite thirteen hundred thousand of three millions of qualified persons signed in favour of the Additional Act, while four thousand two hundred and seven had the courage to protest against it.* A

* M. de Kergolay had the hardihood to publish his solemn protest against the article which disinherited the Bourbons, not

deputation from each of the Electoral Assemblies was ordered to attend at the Champ-de-Mai, where an Assembly of the Peers and Representatives was also appointed, for the purpose of determining the grand result of the votes.

only as an attack upon the liberty of the French people, but because he considered the restoration of that dynasty as the only mode of restoring happiness to the country. The following jeu d'esprit was circulated about the same time :—

Vote, with Reasons assigned, inscribed at the Prefecture of the Seine, on May 1st, 1815.

"I, the undersigned, in virtue of the part of the Sovereignty which was promised to me in 1792, of which I was swindled in 1800, and solemnly robbed by an Organic Senatûs Consultum in 1814; which ws restored to me by a proclamation of the 1st of March, 1815; which was again taken from me by an Additional Act of the 22d; and which I shall take back as soon as I am the strongest, if 1 think it worth the trouble :

"I reject the Additional Act to the constitutions, the said constitutions, and all that has followed them, down to this Additional Act, and also all that shall follow it.

"Imprimis, Because Napoleon himself acknowledges that he has no title to govern, except that of a dictatorship imposed by force, and that the right of a conqueror is not that of a legislator. Item, Because Buonaparte's liberty is a pleasantry for which I have no relish. Item, Because Buonaparte's equality is that of helots and galley slaves. Item, Because the peerage of Buonaparte is a saturnal assemblage at which the heart revolts. Item, Because the hereditary succession of Buonaparte's peerage, is a gratuitous insult to other nations. Item, Because permission to exercise the right of thinking, speaking, and writing, under Buonaparte, can only be a snare. Item, Because the vote of the people would be illusory. Item, Because the vote of the army will be contradictory to all moral ideas, and hostile to the constituent principles of nations. Item, Because the important restriction, (the rejection of the Bourbons,) contained in the 67th article is a