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Members not to be questioned for speeches.-§ 12. For any speech or debate in either house of the Legislature, the members shall not be questioned in any other place.
[Section 12 of article III of the amended constitution of 1846, without change.]
Bills may originate in either house.-§ 13. Any bill may originate in either house of the Legislature, and all bills passed by one house may be amended by the other.
[Section 18 of article III of the amended constitution of 1816, without change.]
Enacting clause of bills.- § 14. The enacting clause of all bills shall be "The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows," and no law shall be enacted except by
[Section 14 of article III of the amended constitution of 1846, without change]
(See Burnham v. Acton, 35 How. Pr. 50.)
Manner of passing bills.-§ 15. No bill shall be passed or become a law unless it shall have been printed and upon the desks of the members, in its final form, at least three calendar legislative days prior to its final passage, unless the Governor, or the acting Governor, shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate passage, under his hand and the seal of the State; nor shall any bill be passed or become a law, except by the assent of a majority of the members elected to each branch of the Legislature; and upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its final passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays. entered on the journal.
[Section 15 of article III of the amended constitution of 1846 amended. The section formerly read: "No bill shall be passed unless by the assent of a majority of all the members elected to each branch of the legislature, and the question upon the final passage shall be taken immediately upon its last reading, and the yeas and nays entered on the journal."]
For law relating to certificates of presiding officers, see Legislative Law, $40.
The presumption is that a law published under the authority of the government was correctly passed so far as relates to matters of form. (People v. Supervisors of Chenango, 8 N. Y. 317.)
It is not necessary under the constitution that the presiding officer should certify that an act was passed by a majority of all the members elected. This is presumed. (Id.)
It is sufficient where a bill has been passed by ayes and nays, and subsequent amendments disagreed to by the other house, if such amendments are receded from without an aye and nay vote. (Id.)
The requirement that the question upon the final passage of a bill be taken immediately upon its last reading, and the ayes and nays be entered in the journal, is only directory. (People v. Supervisors of Orange, 27 Barb. 584.)
The certificate of the presiding officers of each house required by Laws 1847, chapter 253, is only presumptive evidence of the fact. If the certificate is omitted, the fact that three-fifths were present may be shown by other evidence. (People v. Supervisors of Chenango, 8 N. Y. 318.)
Private and local bills not to embrace more than one subject. $16. No private or local bill, which may be passed by the Legislature, shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in
[Section 16 of article III of the amended constitution of 1846, without change.]
The design of this section was that no portion of the state or its people should be made the subject of legislative action without notice. (People v. Supervisors of Chautauqua, 43 N. Y. 10, 15; People v. Hills, 35 id. 449.)
No definite rule can be laid down as to what constitutes a local act, but each case must be determined upon its own circumstances. (People, ex rel. v. Newburgh Plank road Co., 86 N. Y. 1, 7.)
A general provision in a local act is valid, although not expressed in the title, and though the local provisions are void because not expressed in the title. (Ferguson v. Ross, 126 N. Y. 459; People v. Supervisors of Chautauqua, 43 id. 10; People v. McCann, 16 id. 58; Williams v. People, 24 id. 405.) The local provisions are void, if by containing general law, the act embraces more than one subject though but one local or private subject. (People v. Supervisors of Chautauqua, 43 N. Y. 10, 23.)
An act embracing all the cities of the state, or all things of a certain class is general, although by so ne limitation of population or otherwise, only a particular city or the inhabitants of a single locality receive its benefit. (Ferguson v. Ross, 126 N. Y. 459, 464; People, ex rel. v. Squire, 107 id. 593; Matter of Church, 92 id. 4; Matter of Elevated R. R., 70 id. 327; Treanor v. Eichhorn, 74 Hun, 58; Burnham v. Acton, 7 Rob. 95.)
An act is local which in its subjects relates but to a portion of the people of the state, or to their property, and may not, either in its subject, operation or immediate and necessary results, affect the people of the state or their property in general. (People v. Supervisors, 43 N. Y. 21; Kerrigan v. Force, 68 id. 383.)
A statute, local in one sense, may in some cases be general. (Burnham v. Acton, 7 Rob. 95.)
An act may be public and still local. Thus the following acts though public are local and require the subject to be expressed in the title: Defining jurisdiction of local courts, amending municipal charters, regulating elections of city officers in a particular city, providing for laying out streets or highways or constructing bridges in a particular locality, taxing to pay expense of the work, regulating fees of officers in a particular county or the expenses of judicial sales therein. (Ferguson v. Ross, 126 N. Y. 459, 464, and cases cited.) A statute, general in form, is not private or local, because every application must be local or private. (Matter of N. Y. El. R. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 327; Matter of Gilbert El. R. R. Co., id. 361.)
The legislature may make local exceptions in general laws. (Matter of N. Y. El. R. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 327.)
(As to what are and what are not local acts, see Sweet v. City of Syracuse, 129 N. Y. 316, 331; Waterloo, etc., Co. v. Shanahan, 128 id. 345; Ferguson v. Ross, 126 id. 459, 465; People v. Squire, 107 id. 593; People v. Newburgh Plankroad Co., 86 id. 1; People, ex rel. Troy, etc., v. Carter, 52 Hun, 458, affirmed in 117 N. Y. 625; People, ex rel. Burroughs, v. Brinkerhoff, 68 N. Y. 259; People, ex rel. Rochester, v. Briggs, 50 id. 553; People v. Hills, 35 id. 449; Bangs v. Duckinfield, 18 id. 592, 597; People v. O'Brien, 38 id. 193; Ex parte Van Antwerp, 56 id. 261; Matter of Lexington Avenue, 29 Hun, 303; Matter of Woolsey, 95 N. Y. 135; Treanor v. Eichhorn, 74 Hun, 58; Phillips v. Schumacher, 10 id. 405; Matter of De Vaucene, 31 How. Pr. 289; Central Crosstown R. R. Co. v. Twenty-third St. R. R. Co. [N. Y. Super. Ct.] 54 id. 168; People v. Duffy, 49 Hun, 276, and cases cited under section 18 of this article.)
It is necessary that the title be such as to fairly suggest or give a clue to the subject, but when that is expressed, all matters fairly and reasonably connected with it, and all measures which will or may facilitate its accomplishment, are proper to be incorporated in the act. (Astor v. Arcade R. R. Co., 113 N. Y. 93, 110; Sweet v. City of Syracuse, 129 id. 316, 331; Van Brunt v. Town of Flatbush, 128 id. 50.)
Any means provided by an act for accomplishing the purpose as expressed in the title, not clearly incongruous and foreign, will not render it invalid. (People, ex rel. etc., v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553; Kerrigan v. Force, 68 N. Y. 384.) The intention was to require sufficient notice of the subject of proposed legislation of a private or local character to be so expressed in the title as to put all persons concerned in proposed legislation upon their guard. (Johnston v. Spicer, 107 N. Y. 185; Astor v. Arcade R. R. Co., 113 id. 93.)
It is not sufficient to state in the title of a local bill merely that it amends a chapter of a previous year (People v. Hills, 35 N. Y. 449); but it is not necessary that the most expressive title should be adopted, nor should the courts criticise too rigidly the details of a bill to find extraneous matter (People, ex rel. Rochester, v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 558); "An act to amend the several acts in relation to the city of Rochester," was held sufficient. (Id.)
Cases in which it was held that the title did or did not sufficiently express the subject. (Curtin v. Barton, 139 N. Y. 505; Van Brunt v. Flatbush, 128 id. 50; Wrought Iron Bridge Co. v. Attica, 119 id. 204; Astor v. Arcade R. R. Co., 113 id. 93, 110; Sweet v. Syracuse, 129 id. 331; Cole v. State, 102 id. 48, 58Water Commissioners v. Dwight, 101 id. 9; People, ex rel. etc., v. Squire 107 id. 593; Ensign v. Barse, 107 id. 329; Tingue v. Port Chester, 101 id. 294; Matter of U. S., 96 id. 227; Supervisors of Seneca V. Allen, 99 id. 532; People v. Newburgh, etc., Co., 86 id. 1; Harris v. People, 59 id. 599; Wensler v. People, 58 id. 516; People, ex rel. Comrs., v. Banks, 67 id. 568; Village of Gloversville v. Howell, 70 id. 287; People, ex rel. Rochester, v. Briggs, 50 id. 553; People v. O'Brien, 38 id. 193; People v. Hills, 35 id. 449; Gaskin v. Meek, 42 id. 186; McCabe v. Kenny, 52 Hun, 514; Reed v. Schmit, 39 id. 223; McIntyre v. Allen, 43 id. 124; Prentice v. Weston, 47 id. 121, affirmed in 111 N. Y. 460.)
Existing law made applicable to be inserted.-§ 17. No act shall be passed which shall provide that any existing law, or any part thereof, shall be made or deemed a part of said act, or which shal! enact that any existing law, or part thereof, shall be applicable, except by inserting it
in such act.
[Section 17 of article III of the amended constitution of 1816, without change.]
This section does not require the re-enactment of general laws whenever it is necessary to resort to them to carry into effect a special statute. (People, ex rel. Comrs., v. Banks, 67 N. Y. 568, 575.)
Where a statute in itself grants some power, confers some right, imposes some duty, or creates some burden or obligation, it does not conflict with this section, because it refers to some other existing statute, general or local, for the purpose of pointing out the procedure, or some administrative detail, necessary for the execution of the power, the enforcement of the right, the proper performance of the duty, or the discharge of the burden or obligation. (People, ex rel. Everson, v. Lorillard, 135 N. Y. 285 291; Mallory v. Reichert, 32 Hun, 86.)
Does not apply to an act purporting to amend existing laws. (People, ex rel. Elec., etc., Co., v. Squires, 107 N. Y. 602.)
Prior to this section, a repeal d act might have been incorporated in an existing law by reference. (Blauvelt v. Nyack, 9 Hun, 153. See also Curtin V. Barton, 139 N. Y. 505, 514; Matter of Application of Union Ferry Co., 98 id. 158; People, ex rel. v. Hayt, 7 Hun, 39; Wells v. City of Buffalo, 14 id. 438; Matter of Mayor, etc., of New York, 34 id. 441 ; Nash v. White's Bank of Buffalo, 37 id. 57, S. C., 105 N. Y. 243; Weinckie v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 61 Hun, 619.)
Cases in which private and local bills shall not be passed; restrictions as to laws authorizing street railroads.-§ 18. The Legislature shall not pass a private or local bill in any of the following cases: Changing the names of persons.
Has no application to corporations. (Moran v. Lydecker, 27 Hun, 585.) Laying out, opening, altering, working or discontinuing roads, highways or alleys, or for draining swamps or other low lands.
The legislature may, nevertheless, confer the power it before possessed upon boards of supervisors. (People, ex rel. Morrill, v. Supervisors of Queens, 112 N. Y. 585; People, ex rel. Comrs., v. Banks, 67 id. 568.) Not applicable to
act laying out city street (Matter of Lexington Ave., 29 Hun, 303; Matter of Woolsey, 95 N. Y. 135, rev'g 29 Hun, 629); nor to provision in village charter authorizing board of trustees to widen a street. (People v. Lohnas, 54 Hun, 604. See also Matter of Church, 92 N. Y. 1; Treanor v. Eichhorn, 74 Hun, 58; Weinckie v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. R., 61 id. 619; Swikehard v. Michels Sp. T. Sup. Ct.], 8 Misc. Rep. 568.)
Locating or changing county seats.
Providing for changes of venue in civil or criminal cases.
"An act to amend and consolidate the charter of the village of Waterloo" ot in violation of this provision. (Reed v. Schmit, 39 Hun, 223.)
Providing for election of members of boards of supervisors.
An act providing for the length of term of supervisors in but four counties is unconstitutional. (People, ex rel. v. Hoffman [Sp. T.], 60 How. Pr. 324.) This provision applies to town, not to city, supervisors. A provision of a city charter allowing the supervisors of each ward to be "elected by the electors of each ward" is valid. (People, ex rel. Clancy, v. Supervisors, 139 N. Y. 524.)
Selecting, drawing, summoning or impaneling grand or petit jurors (See People v. Petrea, 92 N. Y. 128.)
Regulating the rate of interest on money.
The opening and conducting of elections or designating places of voting.
Creating, increasing or decreasing fees, percentage or allowances of public officers, during the term for which said officers are elected or appointed.
An act increasing fees of sheriff of Kings county, which did not in terms apply to the sheriff in office, held constitutional. (Kerrigan v. Force, 68 N. Y. 381.) Does not apply to officers having fixed salaries (Mangam v. Brooklyn, 98 id. 585); nor to an act relating to the compensation of certain county treasurers, which does not in terms apply to county treasurers in office at the time of its passage. (Supervisors of Seneca v. Allen, 99 id. 532. See also Cole v. State, 102 id. 48; People, ex rel. Lynch, v. Duffy, 49 Hun, 276; Ricketts v. Mayor, 67 How. Pr. 320.)
Granting to any corporation, association or individual the right to lay down railroad tracks.
An act amending an act authorizing corporations created for the transmission of letters, etc., in the cities of New York and Brooklyn, by adding the words "and to provide for the transportation of passengers in said tubes," held unconstitutional. (Astor v. Arcade R. R. Co., 113 N. Y. 93.) An act authorizing the construction of an "illustrative section" of elevated railroad, held void. (People, ex rel. Harvey, v. Loew, 192 id. 471.) An act extending the expired time of a railroad is invalid. (Matter of Brooklyn, etc., R. R. Co., 75 id. 335.) Authority to change motive power, although it necessitates a change of rails, is not invalid. (People v. L. I. R. R. Co. [Sp. T.] 9 Abb. N. C. 181; Matter of N. Y. El. R. R., 70 N. Y. 327, where the subject is thoroughly discussed.) The regulation of an existing right is not within this prohibition.) Gilbert El. R. R. Co. v. Anderson, 3 Abb. N. C. 434. See also Farnham v. Benedict, 107 N. Y. 159; Matter of N. Y. & L. I. Bridge Co., 54 Hun, 400.)
Granting to any private corporation, association or individual any exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever.
Designed to prohibit original and independent grants. An act restricting and regulating an existing right is not within this prohibition. (Matter of Gilbert El. R. R., 70 N. Y. 361. See Matter of Application of Union Ferry Co., 98 id. 139; Syracuse Water Co. v. Syracuse, 116 id. 167, 186; Trustees of Firemen's Fund v. Roome, 93 id. 314; Moran v. L. I. City, 101 id. 439.)
Providing for building bridges, and chartering companies for such purposes, except on the Hudson river below Waterford, and on the East river, or over the waters forming a part of the boundaries of the state.
It may nevertheless confer the power of local legislation in regard to building bridges upon board of supervisors. (Town of Kirkwood v. Newbury, 122 N. Y. 571. See People, ex rel. Keene, v. Board of Supervisors of Queens, 142 id. 271; Wrought Iron Bridge Co. v. Attica, 119 id. 204.)
The legislature shall pass general laws providing for the cases enumerated in this section, and for all other cases which in its judgment, may be provided for by general laws. But no law shall authorize the construction or operation of a street railroad except upon the condition that the consent of the owners of one-half in value of the property bounded on, and the consent also of the local authorities having the control of, that portion of a street or highway upon which it is proposed to construct or operate such railroad be first obtained, or in case the consent of such property owners cannot be obtained, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, in the department in which it is proposed to be constructed, may, upon application, appoint three commissioners who shall determine, after a hearing of all parties interested, whether such railroad ought to be constructed or operated, and their determination, confirmed by the court, may be taken in lieu of the consent of the property owners.
[Section 18 of article III of the amended constitution of 1816 amended by changing the words general term of the supreme court, in the district" in the last paragraph to “ appellate division of the supreme court, in the department."]
The provisions of the last paragraph of section 18 in reference to consent do not apply to the streets of New York city, the title to those streets being in the city. (In re Gilbert El. R. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 361.)
This paragraph does not prevent the imposing of further conditions not inconsistent herewith. (Matter of Thirty-fourth St. R. R. Co., 102 N. Y. 343.) Refers to a part of a road as well as to a complete railroad. (Matter of Metropolitan Transit Co., 111 N. Y. 588.)
The powers and franchises of street railroad corporations existing prior to January 1, 1875, may be regulated without violating this provision. (Matter of Petition of 3rd A. R. R. Co., 121 N. Y. 536.)
The legislative power to authorize the construction of a s'reet railway is subject to the limitation that the franchise is granted for public purposes. (Fanning v. Osborne, 102 N. Y. 441.)
Private claims not to be audited by legislature. - § 19. The Legislature shall neither audit nor allow any private claim or account against the State, but may appropriate money to pay such claims as shall have been audited and allowed according to law.
[Section 19 of article III of the amended constitution of 1846, without change.]