ture to incur indebtedness on behalf of the State, and which clauses, it has been urged, were equally imperative in restraining indebtedness on behalf of the several political divisions of the State. The constitution of Kentucky prohibited any act of the legislature authorizing any debt to be contracted on behalf of the Commonwealth, except for certain specified purposes, unless provision should be made in such act for an annual tax sufficient to pay such debt within thirty years; and the act was not to have effect unless approved by the people. It was contended that this provision was not to apply to the Commonwealth as a mere ideal abstraction, unconnected with her citizens and her soil, but to the Commonwealth as composed of her people, and their territorial organizations of towns, cities, and counties, which make up the State, and that it embraced in principle every legislative act which authorized a debt to be contracted by any of the local organizations of which the Commonwealth was composed. The Supreme Court of that State held otherwise. "The clause in question," they say, "applies in terms to a debt contracted on behalf of the Commonwealth as a distinct corporate body; and the distinction between a debt on behalf of the Commonwealth, and a debt or debts on behalf of one county, or of any number of counties, is too broad and palpable to admit of the supposition that the latter class of assignee, without notice of any defects. The city offered to show that the warrants were issued without any authority from the city council, and without any vote of the council authorizing the same. It was held that the evidence should have been admitted, and that it would constitute a complete defence. See further, Head v. Providence, &c. Co., 2 Cranch, 169; Royal British Bank v. Turquand, 6 El. & Bl. 327; Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 544; Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How. 287; Sanborn v. Deerfield, 2 N. H. 254; Alleghany City v. McClurkan, 14 Penn. St. 83; Morris Canal and Banking Co. v. Fisher, 1 Stock. 667; Clapp v. Cedar Co., 5 Iowa, 15; Commissioners, &c. v. Cox, 6 Ind. 403. It is of course impossible to reconcile these authorities; but the doctrine in the case of Gould v. Town of Sterling appears to us to be sound, and that, wherever a want of power exists, a purchaser of the securities is chargeable with notice of it, if the defect is disclosed by the corporate records, or, as in that case, by other records where the power is required to be shown. That the powers of the agents of municipal corporations are matters of record, and the corporation not liable for an unauthorized act, see further, Baltimore v. Eschbach, 18 Md. 276; Johnson v. Common Council, 16 Ind. 227. Those who deal with a corporation must take notice of the restrictions in its charter, and see to it that the contracts on which they rely are entered into in the manner the charter authorizes. Brady v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 2 Bosw. 173; Same case, 20 N. Y. 312; Swift v. Williamsburg, 24 Barb. 427.

debts was intended to be embraced by terms specifically designating the former only." The same view has been taken by the courts of Iowa, Wisconsin, and Illinois of the provisions in the constitutions of those States restricting the power of the legislature to contract debts on behalf of the State in aid of internal improvements; 2 but the decisions of the first-named State have since been doubted.3

Another class of legislation has recently demanded the attention of the courts, which has not been less troublesome, from the new, varied, and peculiar questions involved, than that in relation to municipal subscriptions in aid to internal improvements. As the power to declare war and to conduct warlike operations rests in the national government, which is vested with unlimited control of all the resources of the country to that end, the duty of national defence, and, consequently, to defend all the citizens as well as all the property of all the municipal organizations in the several States, rests upon the national authorities. This much is conceded, though in a qualified degree, also, and subordinate to the national government, a like duty rests upon the State governments, which may employ the means and services of their citizens for the purpose. But it is no part of the duty of a township, city, or county, as such, to raise men or money for warlike operations, nor have they any authority, without express legislative sanction, to impose upon their people any burden by way of taxation for any such purpose. Nevertheless, when a war arises. which taxes all the energies of the nation, which makes it necessary to put into the field a large percentage of all the able-bodied men of the country, and which renders imperative a resort to all available means for filling the ranks of the army, recruiting the navy, and replenishing the national treasury, the question be

1 Slack v. Railroad Co., 13 B. Monr. 16.

* Dubuque County v. Railroad Co., 4 Greene (Iowa), 1; Clapp v. Cedar County, 5 Iowa, 15; Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136; Bushnell v. Beloit, Ibid. 195; Prettyman v. Supervisors, 19 Ill. 406; Robertson v. Rockford, 21 Ill. 451; Johnson v. Stark County, 24 Ill. 75; Perkins v. Lewis, Ibid. 208; Butler v. Dunham, 27 Ill. 474.

* State v. Wapello County, 13 Iowa, 388. And see People v. Supervisor, &c., 16 Mich. 254.

* Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272; Gove v. Epping, 41 N. H. 545; Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9; Baldwin v. North Branford, 32 Conn. 47; Webster v. Harwinton, Ibid. 131. See also Claflin v. Hopkinton, 4 Gray, 502; Cover v. Baytown, 12 Minn. 124.

comes a momentous one, whether the local organizations, those which are managed most immediately by the people themselves, may not be made important auxiliaries to the national and State governments in accomplishing the great object in which all are alike interested; and if so, whether there is any constitutional principle which would be violated by making use of these organizations in a cause where failure on the part of the central authority would precipitate general dismay and ruin. Indeed, as the general government, with a view to convenience, economy, and promptness of action, will be very likely to adopt, for any purposes of conscription, the existing municipal divisions of the States, so that its demand for recruits for its armies will seem to impose. the special duty of meeting it on the people whose municipal organization embraces the territory covered by the demand, the question we have stated would appear to be rather one of form than of substance, and it would hardly seem to be open to doubt, that the duty which rests upon the citizens of the municipality may properly be assumed by the municipality itself, and then be discharged like any other municipal burden, if the legislature shall grant permission for that purpose.

One difficulty that suggests itself in adopting any such doctrine is, that, by the existing law of the land, able-bodied men between certain specified ages are alone liable to be summoned to the performance of military duty; and if the obligation is assumed by the municipal organizations of the State, and discharged by the payment of money or the procurement of substitutes, the taxation required for this purpose can be claimed, with some show of reason, to be taxation of the whole community for the particular benefit of those upon whom the obligation rests. When the public funds are used for the purpose, it will be insisted that they are appropriated to discharge the liabilities of private individuals. Those who are already past the legal age of service, and who have stood their chance of being called into the field, or perhaps have actually rendered the required service, will be able to urge with considerable force that the State can no longer honorably require them to contribute to the public defence, but ought to insist that those within the legal ages should perform their legal duty; and if any upon whom that duty rests shall actually have enrolled themselves in the army with a view to discharge it, such persons may claim, with even greater reason, that every consideration of

equality and justice demands that the property they leave behind them shall not be taxed to relieve others from a duty equally imperative.

Whatever may be the abstract reasoning on this subject, there can be no question, in the light of the judicial decisions which have been made, that the people of any municipal corporation or political division of a State have such a general interest in relieving that portion of their fellow-citizens who are liable to the performance of military duty, as will support taxation or render valid indebtedness contracted for the purpose of supplying their places, or filling any call of the national authorities for men, with volunteers who shall be willing to enter the ranks for such pecuniary inducements as may be offered them. The duty of national defence rests upon every person under the protection of the government who is able to contribute to it, and not solely upon those who are within the legal ages. The statute which has prescribed those ages has for its basis the presumption that those between the limits fixed are best able to discharge the burden of military service to the public benefit, and it does not absolve any others from being summoned to the duty, if at any time the public exigency should seem to demand it. Exemption from military duty is a privilege rather than a right, and, like other statutory privileges, may be recalled at any time when reasons of public policy or necessity seem to demand the recall. Moreover, there is no valid reason, in the nature of things, why those who are incapable of performing military service, by reason of age, physical infirmity, or other cause, should not contribute, in proportion to their ability, to the public defence by such means as are within their power; and it may well happen that taxation, for the purpose of recruiting the armies of the nation, will distribute the burden more equally and justly among all the citizens than any other mode which could be devised. Whether it will be just and proper to allow it in any instance must rest with the legislature to determine; but it is unquestionably competent, with legislative permission, for towns, cities, and counties to raise money by loans or by taxation to pay bounty moneys to those who shall volunteer to fill any call made upon such towns, cities, or counties to supply men for the national armies.1

"The power to create a public debt, and liquidate it by taxation, is too clear for dispute. The question is therefore narrowed to a single point: Is the purpose

Relief of the community from an impending or possible draft is not, however, the sole consideration which will support taxation by the municipal corporations of the State to raise money for the purpose of paying bounties to soldiers. Gratitude to those who have entered the military service, whether as volunteers or drafted men, or as substitute for others who were drafted or were in this instance a public one? Does it concern the common welfare and interest of the municipality? Let us see. Civil war was raging, and Congress provided in the second section of the act of 24th February, 1864, that the quota of the troops of each ward of a city, town, township, precinct, &c., should be as nearly as possible in proportion to the number of men resident therein liable to render military service. Section three provided that all volunteers who may enlist after a draft shall be ordered shall be deducted from the number ordered to be drafted in such ward, town, &c. Volunteers are therefore by law to be accepted in relief of the municipality from a compulsory service to be determined by lot or chance. Does the relief involve the public welfare or interest? The answer rises spontaneously in the breast of every one in a community liable to the military burden. It is given, not by the voice of him alone who owes the service, but swells into a chorus from his whole family, relatives, and friends. Military service is the highest duty and burden the citizen is called to obey or to bear. It involves life, limb, and health, and is therefore a greater 'burden' than the taxation of property. The loss or the injury is not confined to the individual himself, but extends to all the relations he sustains. It embraces those bound to him in the ties of consanguinity, friendship, and interest; to the community which must furnish support to his family, if he cannot, and which loses in him a member whose labor, industry, and property contribute to its wealth and its resources; who assists to bear its burdens, and whose knowledge, skill, and public spirit contribute to the general good. Clearly the loss of that part of the population upon whom the greatest number depend, and who contribute most to the public welfare, by their industry, skill, and property, and good conduct, is a common loss, and therefore a general injury. These are alike subject to the draft. The blind and relentless lot respects no age, condition, or rank in life. It is therefore clearly the interest of the community that those should serve who are willing, whose loss will sever the fewest ties, and produce the least injury.

"The bounty is not a private transaction in which the individual alone is benefited. It benefits the public by inducing and enabling those to go who feel they can best be spared. It is not voluntary in those who pay it. The community is subject to the draft, and it is paid to relieve it from a burden of war. It is not a mere gift or reward, but a consideration for services. It is therefore not a confiscation of one man's property for another's use, but it is a contribution from the public treasury for a general good. In short, it is simply taxation to relieve the municipality from the stern demands of war, and avert a public injury in the loss of those who contribute most to the public welfare." Speer v. School Directors of Blairsville, 50 Penn. St. 159. See also Waldo v. Portland, 33 Conn. 363; Bartholomew v. Harwinton, Ibid. 408; Fowler v. Danvers, 8 Allen, 80; Lowell v. Oliver, Ibid. 247.