Εικόνες σελίδας
PDF
Ηλεκτρ. έκδοση

the contractor fifty thousand dollars, from the Internal Improvement Fund. The improvement was made, but the State officers declined to draw warrants for the amount, on the ground that the fund from which payment was to have been made was exhausted. The State then passed an act for the levying of tolls upon the property passing through the improvement sufficient to pay the contract price within five years. The court held this act void. As the State had no power to construct or pay for such a work from its general fund, and could not constitutionally have agreed to pay the contractors from tolls, there was no theory on which the act could be supported, except it was that the State had misappropriated the Internal Improvement Fund, and therefore ought to provide payment from some other source. But if the State had misappropriated the fund, the burden of reimbursement would fall upon the State at large; it could not lawfully be imposed upon a single town or district, or upon the commerce of a single town or district. The burden must be borne by those upon whom it justly rests; and to recognize in the State a power to compel some single district to assume and discharge a State debt would be to recognize its power to make an obnoxious district or an obnoxious class bear the whole burden of the State government. An act to that effect would not be taxation, nor would it be the exercise of any legitimate legislative authority. And it may be said of such an act, that, so far as it would operate to make those who would pay the tolls pay more than their proportion of the State obligation, it

1 Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269. "Uniformity in taxation implies equality in the burden of taxation.". Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio, N. S. 15. "This equality in the burden constitutes the very substance designed to be secured by the rule." Weeks v. City of Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 258. "There can be no doubt that, as a general rule, where an expenditure is to be made for a public object, the execution of which will be substantially beneficial to every portion of the Commonwealth alike, and in the benefits and advantages of which all the people will equally participate, if the money is to be raised by taxation, the assessment would be deemed to come within that class which was laid to defray one of the general charges of government, and ought therefore to be imposed as nearly as possible with equality upon all persons resident and estates lying within the Commonwealth. . . . . An assessment for such a purpose, if laid in any other manner, could not in any just or proper sense be regarded as 'proportional' within the meaning of the constitution." Merrick v. Inhabitants of Amherst, 12 Allen, 504, per Bigelow, Ch. J. Taxation not levied according to the principles upon which the right to tax is based, is an unlawful appropriation of private property to public uses. City of Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. Mon. 498.

was in effect taking their property for the private benefit of other citizens of the State, and was obnoxious to all the objections against the appropriation of private property for private purposes which could exist in any other case.

And the Supreme Court of Iowa has said: "If there be such a flagrant and palpable departure from equity in the burden imposed; if it be imposed for the benefit of others, or for purposes in which those objecting have no interest, and are therefore not bound to contribute, it is no matter in what form the power is exercised, whether in the unequal levy of a tax, or in the regulation of the boundaries of the local government, which results in subjecting the party unjustly to local taxes, — it must be regarded as coming within the prohibition of the constitution designed to protect private rights against oppression however made, and whether under color of recognized power or not." 1

When, therefore, the legislature directs the levy of a tax for a purpose not public, and which cannot properly be made a public burden on any of the grounds above indicated, or which if public cannot properly be made to rest on the district taxed, we must conclude that they are exercising an authority not conferred in the general grant of legislative power, and which is therefore unconstitutional. "The power of taxation," says an eminent writer, "is a great governmental attribute, with which the courts have very wisely, as we shall hereafter see, shown extreme unwillingness to interfere; but if abused, the abuse should share the fate of all other usurpations."2 In the case of burdens thus assumed by the legislature on behalf of the State, it must be very rare indeed that a remedy can be afforded in the courts. It would certainly be a very dangerous assumption of power for a court to attempt to stay the collection of State taxes because an illegal demand was included in the levy; and indeed, as State taxes are not usually levied for the purpose of satisfying specific demands, but a gross sum is raised which it is calculated will be sufficient for the wants of the year, the question is not one usually of the unconstitutionality of taxation, but of the misappropriation of moneys which have been raised by taxation. But when the State orders a city, township, or village to raise money by taxation for a specified purpose, and that purpose is one in no degree tending to the public benefit, and 1 Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 92.

[blocks in formation]

this fact is plain and palpable, the usurpation is also in the same degree plain and palpable, and a court of competent jurisdiction could not feel at liberty to decline to enforce the paramount law.

In the second place, it is of the very essence of taxation that it be equal and uniform; and to this end, that there should be some system of apportionment. Where the burden is common, there should be common contribution to discharge it.1 Taxation is the equivalent for the protection which the government affords to the persons and property of its citizens; and as all are alike protected, so all alike should bear the burden, in proportion to the interests secured. Taxes by the poll are justly regarded as odious, and are seldom resorted to for the collection of revenue; and when levied. upon property there must be an apportionment with reference to a uniform standard, or they degenerate into mere arbitrary exactions. In this particular the State constitutions have been very specific, but in providing for equality and uniformity they have done little more than to state in concise language a principle of constitutional law which is inherent in the power to tax.

Taxes may assume the form of duties, imposts, and excises; and those collected by the national government are very largely of this character. They may also assume the form of license fees, for permission to carry on particular occupations, or to enjoy special franchises. They may be specific; such as are often levied upon corporations, in reference to the amount of capital stock, or to the business done, or profits earned by them. Or they may be direct, upon property, in proportion to its value, or upon some other basis of apportionment, which the legislature shall regard as just, and which shall keep in view the general idea of uniformity. The taxes collected by the States are mostly of the latter class, and it is to them that the constitutional principles we shall have occasion to discuss will apply.

As to all taxation apportioned upon property, there must be taxing districts, and within these districts the rule of absolute uniformity must apply. A State tax is to be apportioned through the State, a county tax through the county, a city tax through the city; while in the case of local improvements, benefiting in a peculiar manner some portion of the State or of a county or city, it is competent to arrange a special taxing district, within which the expense shall be apportioned. School districts and road districts are

1 2 Kent, 231; Sanborn v. Rice, 9 Minn. 273.

also taxing districts for the peculiar purposes for which they exist, and villages may have special powers of taxation distinct from the townships of which they form a part. Whenever it is made a requirement of the State constitution that taxation shall be upon property according to value, such a requirement implies an assessment of valuation by public officers at such regular periods as shall be provided by law, and a taxation upon the basis of such assessment until the period arrives for making it anew. Thus, the constitutions of Maine and Massachusetts require that there should be a valuation of estates within the Commonwealth to be made at least every ten years; the constitution of Michigan requires the annual assessments which are made by township officers to be equalized by a State board, which reviews them for that purpose every five years; 2 and the constitution of Rhode Island requires the legislature "from time to time" to provide for new valuations of property for the assessment of taxes in such manner as they may deem best.3 Some other constitutions contain no provisions upon this subject; but the necessity for valuation is necessarily implied, though the mode of making it, and the periods at which it shall be made, are left to the legislative discretion.

There are some kinds of taxes, however, that are not usually assessed according to the value of property, and some which could not be thus assessed. And there is probably no State which does not levy other taxes than those which are imposed upon property. Every burden which the State imposes upon its citizens with a view to a revenue, either for itself or for any of the municipal governments, or for the support of the governmental machinery in any of the political divisions, is imposed under the power of taxation, whether imposed under the name of tax, or under some other designation. The license fees which are sometimes required to be paid by those who follow particular employments are, when imposed for purposes of revenue, taxes; the tolls upon the persons or property making use of the works of public improvement owned and controlled by the State, are a species of tax; stamp duties when imposed are taxes, and it is very customary to require that corporations shall pay a certain sum annually, in proportion to their

1 Constitution of Maine, art. 9, § 7; Constitution of Mass. Part. 2, ch. 1, § 1,

art. 4.

2 Constitution of Mich. art. 14, § 13.

3 Constitution of Rhode Island, art. 4, § 15.

capital stock, or by some other standard, and which is the mode regarded by the State as more convenient and suitable for the taxation of such organizations. It would therefore seem that the constitutional requirements, that taxation upon property shall be according to value, do not include every species of taxation; but all cases like those we have referred to are, by implication, excepted. But in addition to these cases, there are others where taxes are levied directly upon property, which are nevertheless held not to be within the constitutional provisions. Assessments for the opening, making, improving, or repairing of streets, the draining of swamps, and the like local works, have been generally made upon property, with some reference to the supposed benefits which the property would receive therefrom. Instead, therefore, of making the assessment include all the property of the municipal organization in which the improvement is made, a new and special taxing district is created, whose bounds are confined to the limits within which property receives a special and peculiar benefit, in consequence of the improvement. Even within this district the assessment is sometimes made by some other standard than that of value; and it is evident that if the taxing district is created with reference to special benefit, it would be equally just and proper to make the taxation within the district have reference to the benefit the property receives, rather than its relative value. The opening or paving a street may increase the value of all property upon or near it; and it may be just that all such property should contribute to the expense of the improvement: but there is very little proportion between the previous value of such property and the benefit which it will receive. A lot upon the street may be greatly increased in value, another at a little distance may be but slightly benefited; and if no constitutional provision interferes, it would seem just and proper that the tax levied within the taxing district should have reference, not to value, but to benefit.

Taxation upon this basis, however, has been met by this objection; that it was appropriating private property for public use without providing compensation, and was therefore in violation of those constitutional principles which declare the inviolability of private property. But those principles have no reference to the taking of property under the right of taxation. When the constitution provides that private property shall not be use without just compensation made therefor, it has reference to

taken for public

« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »