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sued for the purchase price of goods, mayi In Tacoma Coal Co. v. Bradley, 2 Wash. show that the goods were not what he con- 600, 27 Pac. 454, 26 Am. St. Rep. 890, this tracted for.

court said: In Smith v. Pickands, 148 Mich. 558, 112 "It is undoubtedly true that, if the brick were N. W. 122, the court held that the burden defective, and appellant was silent, and did not

give notice or offer to return them within a reaof proof was on the vendee to show that the

sonable time after discovering defects, the right goods delivered were not as specified in the to rescind the sale was thereby' waived. But the contract after an acceptance by the pur- right to recover damages on account of defective chaser,

quality was in no wise affected.” In Home Ice Factory v. Howells Mining

Again, in Dickinson Fire, etc., Co. v. Orowe Co., 157 Ala. 603, 48 South. 117, there was & Co., 63 Wash. 550, 115 Pac. 1087, we said: a contract by the terms of which the vendor

"If we should concede that there was a breach

of warranty, the rule is that a failure to give contracted to ship the vendee the best qual

notice or to offer to return the property within ity of coal, and the vendee sought to es- a reasonable time after discovering the defects cape liability on the purchase price on the operates as a waiver of the right to rescind, and

leaves the purchaser only the right to recover ground that the coal received was of an in

or offset damages to the extent of the diminished ferior grade, and the court there held that

value of the article." the quality of the coal was an issue in the

In Dayton v. Hooglund, 39 Ohio St. 671, the case, and evidence was taken on that ques

was taken on that ques. | court held that: tion.

"In a suit for the price of a lot of iron manIn Neck v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 158 ufactured by the plaintiff for the defendant, the Wis. 298. 148 N. W. 869, a quantity of cement defendant, in case there is a breach of warranty was sold under a written contract which pro

| as to the quality of the iron, may recoup for

such damages as he has sustained, although he vided that the cement should conform to has used the iron without offering to return it." standard specifications for Portland cement

Other cases adhering to this rule are adopted by the American Society for testing Stark Bros. Nurseries & Orchards Co. v. materials with methods of testing recom- | Mayhew, 160 Mo. App. 60, 141 S. W. 433; mended by the American Society of Engi

Grisinger v. Hubbard, 21 Idaho, 469, 122 Pac. neers. Evidence was admitted showing that 853. Ann. Cas. 1913E. 87: J. Rosenbaum the cement was inferior by the use of anoth- | Grain Co. v. Pond Creek Mill & Elevator Co., er test, and, in answer to the vendor's con- 22 Okl. 555, 98 Pac. 331; Graff v. Osborne, 56 tention that the only way the cement could | Kan. 162, 42 Pac. 704. be shown inferior in quality was by the test | The case of Williams & Co. v. Miller & Co., provided for in the contract, the court said:1 Wash. T. 88, cited by respondent, does seem “In the absence of a provision • . mak

to support its contention that the acceptance ing the test the sole evidence of the inferiority of the cement, the fact might be established by

and use of goods estops the vendee from other evidence."

| showing that they were not what he conMette & Kanne Distilling Co. v. Lowrey,

tracted for. But from the facts in that case 39 Mont. 124, 101 Pac. 966, holds that, in an

it does not appear whether or not there was

| any warranty of the goods sold, or whether action by a vendor to recover the purchase price of chattels sold under a contract, the

there was any provision in the contract for

inspection, either of which conditions would burden of proof is on the vendor to show al delivery of the goods described in the con

change the rule; and, if that case could be

| construed as supporting respondent's contentract, thus recognizing the rule that the vendee can show that the goods delivered

tion, it has been impliedly overruled by the

Tacoma Coal Co. and Dickinson Cases, supra, were not the goods described in the con

in so far as it attempts to hold that a vendee tract. [3] Respondent next contends that, be

is liable for the contract price of goods when

he has accepted goods inferior to those decause Peterson accepted and used the brick

scribed in the contract. without notifying it, until this action was

The case of Childs Lumber Co. v. Page, 28 instituted, that they were of a quality in

Wash. 128, 68 Pac. 373, holds that, where a ferior to that contracted for, he cannot now

| party does not object to materials furnished be heard to say that the bricks were inferior to those described in the contract. In discuss

for the construction of a building, but allows ing the rules applicable to this contention, it

them to be used in the building, he cannot will be well to keep in mind that respondent

thereafter refuse to pay for them on the is attempting to recover the purchase price

ground that they were inferior. But the conof highway paving brick as provided for in

tract in that case provided for an inspection

on the part of the vendee. the contract of purchase; there thus being

[4] There is a well-defined distinction in an express warranty that the brick to be delivered would be highway paving brick..

the rule where an inspection or test is proPeterson is not seeking to rescind the con

vided for in the contract, which was noticed tract nor to avoid liability for the value of

by us in Hurley-Mason Co. v. Stebbins, 79 the brick, but is attempting to set off the

Wash. 366, 140 Pac. 381, L. R. A. 1915B, 1131. difference in price between the brick describ

In that case we said in part:

"The authorities cited by the respondent are ed in the contract and the brick he claimed clearly distinguishable from the case here. In to have received.

| Tacoma Coal Co. v. Bradley, 2 Wash. 600, 27 Pac. 454, 26 Am. St. Rep. 890, there was involv- , with the judgment of the trial court in denying ed the sale of bricks by the manufacturer for the motions for directed verdict, etc. construction of coke ovens. The sale was not! (Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Appeal and expressly subject to inspection or test, and the Error, Cent. Dig. 88 3938–3943, 4023, 4024; order for the bricks negatived any implication | Dec. Dig. Om997, 1003.) to that effect. * * * While recognizing the rule, as sustained by the New York and Wiscon- Department 1. Appeal from Superior sin authorities, that, in the absence of a war- | Court. Spokane County; H. L. Kennan, ranty and a breach, the vendee's right to recover damages does not survive the acceptance of the

Judge. property after an opportunity to discover de Action by E. M. Skoug against John M. fects, unless notice has been given to the vendor | Downs and another. From a judgment for or the vendee returns or offers to return the

plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed. property, the court points out the fact, which we have also noted, that this rule does not apply D. R. Glasgow, of Spokane, for appellants. in cases of express warranty of quality." | Zent, Powell & Redfield, of Spokane, for re

Schopp v. Taft, 106 Iowa, 612, 76 N. w. spondent. 843, cited by respondent, sustains this doctrine, and holds that, in the absence of a PER CURIAM. No question of law is inwarranty, when goods are tendered by the volved in this case. It was tried by a jury. seller in performance of an executory con- There is testimony to sustain the verdict. In tract of sale, and accepted by the buyer after such cases this court will not inquire into an opportunity of inspection, without objec- the preponderance of the evidence, interfere tion, the purchaser is liable for the price with the verdict, or with the judgment of the agreed upon.

trial court in denying motions for directed In Yeiser v. Russell & Co. (Ky.) 83 S. W. verdict, judgment non obstante veredicto, and 574, relied upon by respondent, the court for a new trial. We interfere in jury cases said:

only when it can be said that there are no "There is no better settled principle of law facts which will support the legal conclusion than that, if a vendee accepts goods delivered

that a judgment should be rendered. under a warranty of quality, or retains them after the discovery that they are not the articles

A part of a real estate commission wbich purchased, and fails to give notice within a respondent claims and which is the foundareasonable time that he declines to receive them, tion of his suit was taken in the form of a because not in conformity with the contract, or

promissory note which was discounted by apexercises ownership over them, he cannot thereafter refuse to pay for them.”

pellants. It is contended that in any event While this case holds that the vendee will

respondent's judgment must be diminished

to the extent of the discount. Whether rehave to pay for the goods, it does not hold that he has to pay the contract price, or that

spondent was bound to lose the discount or he cannot recoup damages for the difference

| any part of it was for the jury. between the contract price and the price of

The judgment is affirmed. the goods actually delivered. In fact, in this very case the vendee did file a counter

(89 Wash. 55) claim for damages accruing from the failure SUMNER V. GRAYS HARBOR RY. & of the vendor to deliver the goods he con

LIGHT CO. (No. 12913.) tracted to deliver, and a judgment for $40 (Supreme Court of Washington. Jan. 4, 1916.) was entered in favor of the vendee, and the 1. CARRIERS Om 318-SETTING DOWN Passexvendor took nothing. The right of a vendee GERS-NEGLIGENCE. when sued for the purchase price of goods

Evidence, in a passenger's action for per

sonal injury while alighting from defendant's to show that the goods received were not as

street car, apart from any negligence of the concontracted for is well established. Tacoma ductor in failing to warn her that the car was Coal Co. v. Bradley, supra, and Dickinson still in motion, held not to show any negligence Fire, etc., Co. v. Crowe & Co., supra.

on the part of the defendant.

(Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Carriers, We conclude, therefore, that it was error

Cent. Dig. $$ 1270, 1307-1314; Dec. Dig. Om to exclude evidence of the kind of brick actu- 318.j ally delivered by the respondent, and for this

2. CARRIERS 303–SETTING Down PASSENreason the judgment must be reversed, and GERS-ANNOUNCEMENT OF STREET. the cause remanded for further proceedings A street car conductor's announcement of consistent with this opinion.

a stopping place, is not of itself an invitation to a passenger to alight before the car comes to

a full stop and does not show that the conducFULLERTON, MAIN, and ELLIS, JJ., tor intended or had any reason to believe that concur.

the passenger would alight before the car stop(89 Wash. 92)

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Carriers,

Cent. Dig. 88 1216, 1218, 1224, 1226–1232, SKOUG V. DOWNS et al. (No. 12806.)

1234-1240, 1243; Dec. Dig. Om303.) (Supreme Court of Washington. Jan. 6, 1916.) 3. CARRIERS 303–SETTING Down PASSENAPPEAL AND ERROR 997, 1003_REVIEW GERS-WARNING OF CAR's MOTION. VERDICT-DIRECTION OF VERDICT.

Where a passenger, after the announcement Where there is testimony to sustain the of her stopping place, went to the platform, verdict, the appellate court will not inquire into stood in the doorway, and, after directing the the preponderance of the evidence or interfere i conductor's attention to her suit case, which he

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picked up, stepped from the car while it was ir suit case. Q. Where was the suit case ? A. motion, slowly coming to a stop, there was no Setting in the vestibule. Q. Where with refernegligence on the part of the conductor in fail. ence to his position ? A. Sitting right at the ing to warn her that the car was in motion. back up as close to the rear of the car as could

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Carriers, be. Q. Sitting behind him or beside him or in Cent. Dig. 88 1216, 1218, 1224, 1226–1232, front of him? A. I think it would be at the 1234-1240, 1243; Dec. Dig. 303.)

side of him. Q. And then what did you do? A.

The last I can remember I went and took hold Department 2. Appeal from Superior

of the handle on the door to step out, and that

is the last I can remember then. Q. Did he say Court, Grays Harbor County; Mason Irwin,

anything to you about the car not having stopJudge.

1. I didn't hear him. Q. Why did you Action by Ethyl Sumner against Grays get off the car when you did ? A. Well, I Harbor Railway & Light Company. Judg.

thought the car had stopped, and I was supposed

to get off when the car stopped. Q. Could you ment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

see that it had not stopped? A. No, it had Reversed, and case dismissed.

stopped apparently to me. The fog was so

thick-I didn't feel any motion of the car. Bridges & Bruener, of Aberdeen, for appel- Was the fog any thicker than usual on that

Q. lant. F. W. Loomis, of Aberdeen, for re night? A. Yes, sir; very thick, * * * Q. spondent.

You could see just as well as if you had been outdoors all the while ? * * A. Well, I

wasn't outside of the car when I last remember. PARKER, J. The plaintifr seeks recovery That is, I wasn't out onto the pavement. The of damages which she claims as the result of

last I can remember is taking hold—just as I personal injuries caused by the negligence of

reached for the handle of the car and stepped

down onto the first step. Q. Did you see anythe defendant's servant while she was alight. I thing that night? Could you see the objects on ing from one of its street cars. Trial before the street, or anything, that night? A. Not the court, and a jury resulted in verdict and plain. *.* QDid you wait at the vestibule

for any length of time, for a moment? A. I judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the sum hes

the sum hesitated there. I thought he would get the suit of $208.36, from which the defendant has ap- case picked up. Q. The car was still in motion pealed. The principal contention of counsel at that time? A. It must have been. Q. You for appellant is that the trial court erred in

knew it was still going? A. Yes, while I was

standing in the door. Q. You say that you stepdenying their motion for directed verdict in

ped out and took hold of the handle of the door, appellant's favor, made at the close of the was it, or of the steps? A. Just right there as evidence for the plaintiff and also at the you step out. * * * Q. When did you ask

the conductor for your suit case? A. Just as close of all the evidence.

I stood in the vestibule door. As I went out At about 9 o'clock on the evening of No- I looked where it was left, and it was gone. vember 11, 1914, the respondent was a passen- Just then I said to him: "That is my suit case.' ger on one of appellant's street cars in Aber

* * * Q. As the conductor turned around in

a southerly direction over towards the brewery deen. She was on her way home, expecting to

I to get your grip, you, thinking the car had stopto leave the car at Washington street, at ped, stepped off the car? A. I don't know which point she usually left the car when re- whether I stepped off or fell off. The last I turning to her home from the business porto her home from the business nor can remember is when I took hold of the handle.

* * * Q. And the conductor at that time was tion of the city. It will be conducive to ac- just turning around getting the suit case in the curacy to tell the story of the incidents im- back of the vestibule? A. Yes, sir. * * * mediately preceding the accident in respond-/Q. You say you don't remember after you stepent's own language. She was asked and an- !

ped off, fell off, or whatever happened that

night. You say it was still in motion ? A. It swered in her testimony as follows:

must have been, but I thought it was not. I "Q. When you got on the Heron street car did didn't remember anything until I got in my you tell the conductor where you wanted to go? house." A. Not when I got on. Q. Did you later? A. | [1] Other evidence shows that respondent I think when he called Washington street I just nodded my head at him. * . Q. Al stepped or tell to the ground while the car ways got off at Washington street? A. While I was moving slowly, and that it thereafter was living in that part of town I always got off moved some 10 or 12 feet before coming to a at Washington street. * * * Q. How did you full stop. It also appears that the car was know it was your destination ? A. He called Washington street. * * * Q. Where was he

possibly a few feet beyond the usual stopping when he called the street? A. If I remember place when it came to rest. It does not apright, I think he was about in the middle of the pear, however, that there was any difference car. * * * Q. When did you get up? A. When I thought the car was about where I

in the surface of the street at any point would get off: slacking up about enough. I alongside of the track at or between the usual * * * Q. Did the conductor go out ahead of stopping place of the car and the place where you or behind you? A. He went out, and then it actually did stop, assuming that it really I got up and went out ufter him. Q. Where was the conductor when you went out? A. He

passed the usual stopping place. So, so far was in the vestibule. * * * Q. What direc- as the surface of the street is concerned one tion was he facing? Toward you or facing some place was as safe to alight as another withother- A. He had turned around to pick up lin these limits. There were no gates or doors my suit case, and he would really be facingI can't tell the directions in Aberdeen; facing

at the sides of the vestibules of the car for towards the brewery out that door of the car. | the conductor to open or close, as in some Q. Was he picking up your suit case as you cars. There was no jerk or sudden acceleracame out of the car? A. As I stood in the door.

tion of speed of the car which might throw Q. As you came up to the door, what direction was he facing? A. Facing me. Q. Did you say

one off their balance or furnish the least anything to him? A. I told him that was my cause for their falling. The car was gently

On

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coming to a stop. There is nothing in the , firmative negligent act on the part of the evidence indicating that respondent was not company contributing to the injuries for in full possession of all her faculties, both which damages were claimed. We have no mental and physical. She was of mature such condition here. years. This version of the facts we think is In Morris v. I. C. R. R. Co., 127 La. 445, 53 as favorable to respondent as the evidence South. 698, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 629, there will admit of.

were involved conditions similar to those be[2, 3] It seems clear to us that there is no fore us. In answering contentions of subpossible ground of negligence on the part of stantially the same nature as here made, appellant upon which the respondent can re- Chief Justice Breaux, speaking for the court, cover, except it might be said that the con- | observed: ductor was negligent in failing to warn her! "The train was still in motion. Plaintiff testiof the fact that the car had not stopped when fied that it was in motion, but that he was not she stepped off. Manifestly, there was no

aware of it at the time. The question arises:

Did it not devolve upon him to satisfy himself affirmative act of negligence whatever com- before alighting that the train was standing mitted by appellant, or any of its servants, ready to permit passengers to alight? If a pascontributing to respondent's injuries. Coun- senger, who has every reasonable opportunity

to assure himself that the train is at full stop,

fails to make inquiry, he cannot hold others lianumber of decisions holding that it is not ble for damages in case he alights while it is in contributory negligence, as a matter of law, motion and is hurt. There were lights at the on the part of a passenger, when a station or

depot. Near the depot there were visible ob

jects, although it was in the night, whereby it stopping place is announced, for him to get was possible to satisfy himself that the train up and proceed to the platform with a view was still moving. Besides, the motion of the of alighting. These decisions are of no aid car is of itself a warning that the train is still

moving and has not come to a full stop. Plainhere. Other decisions render it plain that tiff's position is that there was negligence on such an announcement is not of itself an in the part of the flagman, who should have warnvitation to a passenger to alight before the ed him of the danger and should have notified train or car comes to a full stop. So the fact th

| him not to attempt to alight. Unquestionably

c that would have been a very proper act on the that the conductor announced Washington part of the flagman. The question is whether street as the stopping place, then being ap the company is liable for the failure of its flagproached, and that respondent in response

man to thus notify and warn the plaintiff. That

is not the trend of the decisions. * * * The ther

allow, flagman had seen plaintiff pass him. He was argues little or nothing here. Such facts do standing behind him on the steps. He, the tesnot show an invitation to respondent to alight timony states, had no reason to infer that plainbefore the car came to rest, nor do they

tiff would seek to alight at that particular time.

It happens (it is within common knowledge) show that the conductor had any such intent,

that passengers frequently step down to that nor do they argue that the conductor had step, while on their way to alight, without atany reason to believe that the respondent tempting to step off before the car has stopped.

We are not led to infer from the testimony that would attempt to ang at verore the car came the flagman had invited the passenger to step to rest. According to the respondent's own off. It is true, as before stated, that at about testimony, she was standing in the doorway, the time the whistle sounded for Kentwood, be and directed the conductor's attention away

announced that the next stop was that place.

There is not in this announcement an invitation from her to her suit case, and saw him partly to alight before the train has stopped. The folturn to pick it up immediately preceding her lowing is from the text of Thompson on Neg. stepping off the car. The real question is. Jigence, vol. 3 (2d Ed.) 8 2845: Ordinarily a

railway carrier of passengers is under no duty conceding all these facts in the light most

to assist adult passengers who are in apparent favorable to respondent's contention, Was the good health and possession of their faculties conductor negligent in failing to warn re to get on and off its vehicles or to find seats for spondent that the car was in motion? We

them; but its duty is limited to giving them a

reasonable time and opportunity to do so with. think it must be decided as a matter of law

out assistance, and this is especially true where that he was not negligent in that respect. there are no special sources of danger.'” Of the decisions of this court relied upon

In Armstrong v. Portland Ry. Co., 52 Or. by counsel for respondent, our attention is 437, 97 Pac. 715, à situation quite similar to called to Brown v. Seattle City Ry. Co., 16 this was involved. The plaintiff, arising Wash. 465, 47 Pac. 890, and Ranous v. Seat- from her seat and going to the platform upon tle Electric Co., 47 Wash. 544, 92 Pac. 382. an announcement of the street she expected In the Brown Case the car was standing still to alight at, stepped off the car before it when the plaintiff arose to go out, and sud- came to rest, there being no invitation for denly, when she was stepping to the ground, her to do so. Holding that there was no neg. the car started, throwing her to the ground ligence upon the part of the conductor, Chief and injuring her. In the Ranous Case while Justice Bean, speaking for the court, obthe plaintiff was getting ready to step off the served: car, it apparently being about to come to a “It clearly and undisputably shows that there stop, its speed was suddenly accelerated, and was no negligence on the part of defendant, and the lurch caused by such acceleration threw that plaintiff was injured because she attempt

ed to alight from a moving car, without any neplaintiff onto the street. In these cases, cessity, or seeming necessity, for so doing, and therefore, there was manifestly a positive af- that she was not advised or requested to do so

by defendant's servants. This was negligence on the part of the railway company's servant of such an obvious character that the court was to the plaintiff to step off. justified in directing a verdict against her. 3 Thompson on Negligence, 8 3013.

In Long v. Red River T. & S. Ry. Co. (Tex. "It is argued, however, that defendant is lia- Civ. App.) 85 S. W. 1048, there were also inble because the conductor did not notify plain- volved facts which might well be construed tiff that the car was still in motion and warn as an invitation to the plaintiff to get off the her against the danger of her contemplated act; but the evidence does not show that the conductor knew, or had any reason to believe, that she We are of the opinion that it must be held was intending to get off the car until it had

as a matter of law that appellant's conductor stopped. Plaintiff was of mature years and in possession of all her faculties, and we are not

was not guilty of negligence in failing to advised of any rule of law making it negligence notify respondent that the car was still in for the conductor of a street car, under such motion when she stepped off. circumstances, not to warn such a person of the

The judgment is reversed, and the case disdanger to be apprehended in alighting from a moving car. The facts do not bring the case

missed. within the rule announced in Smitson V. S.

HOLCOMB, MOUNT, and MAIN, JJ., conP. Ry, Co., 37 Or. 74, 60 Pac. 907. There the injured party was a passenger on a steam rail- | cur. way. As the train approached her destination it stopped, and she was invited by one of the

(89 Wash. 172) company's servants to alight but, as she was in In re BUCHANAN'S ESTATE. (No. 12925.) the act of doing so, the train suddenly started, injuring her. The facts, therefore, are entirely

(Supreme Court of Washington. Jan. 10, 1916.) different from those shown in the present case. HUSBAND AND WIFE 257 - COMMUNITY Here there was no invitation or request to PROPERTY-CORPORATE STOCK. plaintiff, from any employé or agent of defend Deceased, in contemplation of their marriage, ant, to alight from the car, and they had no rea- and her husband contributed in the proportion son for supposing or believing that she would at- of five-ninths and four-Dinths, respectively, to tempt to do so while the car was in motion. the amount required for the purchase of stock in There is therefore no ground upon which the a lumber company in the name of the husband. defendant can be charged with negligence by Thereafter for several years, and until the reason of the failure of the conductor to notify death of deceased, the husband gave his time plaintiff that the car was still in motion, or that to developing the business of the corporation, she was liable to be injured if she attempted to drawing a salary therefor, and mainly as the realight before it stopped."

sult of his efforts the value of the stock in

creased manyfold. At the time of the death of These views find support in Illinois Central

deceased one-half of the corporate stock of the R. R. Co. v. Massey, 97 Miss. 794, 53 South. corporation stood in the name of the husband, 385, and Burton v. Wichita R. & Light Co., and the dividends paid on the stock had been 89 Kan. 611, 132 Pac. 183.

so intermingled that no part thereof could be

said to be the separate property of either the The decision principally relied upon by husband or the wife. It appeared that the counsel for respondent, and which probably growth of the business and increase in value lends as much support thereto as any in the of the original investment resulted, not as a books, is that of Blue Grass Traction Co. v.

natural increase apart from the efforts of the

husband while a member of the community, but Skillman (Ky.) 102 S. W. 809. That case resulted from his personal efforts during his is possibly distinguishable from the one be- married life in the performance of which he was fore us, in that the conductor could plainly

the servant of the community. Held, that the

gains and profits produced by the personal efsee that the plaintiff was going to get off

forts of the husband, though added to in a while the car was in motion. If not so dis measure by the original investment, became tinguishable, we are inclined to view that de community property, and that, though the funds cision as not being in harmony with the

used in purchasing the stock were separate prop

erty, yet, since they had lost their identity and weight of authority. However, the Kentucky become intermingled with community property, court in the later case of Louisville Ry. Co. the entire interest in the corporation which V. Furnas, 155 Ky. 470, 159 S. W. 994, ex- stood in the name of the husband was commupressed views apparently quite in harmony

nity property, and should be administered as

such. with the decisions we have above noticed.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Husband and In Elwood v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Wife, Cent. Dig. 88 904–908, 910; Dec. Dig. Co., 77 Conn. 145, 58 Atl. 751, 1 Ann. Cas. Omw 257.] 779, we have a decision which it may be Department 2. Appeal from Superior said is not in harmony with our conclusion Court, Pierce County; C. M. Easterday, here reached. That decision, however, seems Judge. to proceed upon the theory that the facts Proceeding in the administration of the esshowed an invitation on the part of the con-tate of Sarah A. Buchanan, deceased, whereductor to the plaintiff to alight while the car in Earl McCoy seeks to have brought into was in motion.

the estate and administered as part thereof In Cooper v. Georgia C. & N. Ry. Co., 61 s. property claimed by James Buchanan as his C. 345, 39 S. E. 543. we have a condition separate property. From judgment for Earl where there was an acceleration of the speed McCoy, James Buchanan, personally and as of the train, instead of its coming to a stop. / administrator, appeals. Affirmed. as it was apparently doing at the time thel F. D, Oakley, of Tacoma, for appellant. plaintiff stepped off. The facts of that case Burkey, O'Brien & Burkey, of Tacoma, for may also be well construed as an invitation respondent.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 154 P.-9

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