lowing statement, which was duly excepted to: "Now, this contract is introduced here. I have heard Mr. Wheeler testify. He is the engineer for the town. I have heard this contract read, and the specifications, and all that, and it occurs to me at this time that the town of Sallisaw is not liable in this matter. Well, I haven't decided the question, but, as I say, if the town is liable, it is under this contract, and the view of the court at this time is that under that contract the city would not be liable. I will instruct the jury in the matter." (1) Was the Oklahoma Engineering Company an independent contractor? (2) Did the court commit prejudicial error in the statement made in the presence of the jury in regard to the nonliability of the town of Sallisaw? (3) Were said minors, daughters of deceased, entitled to compensation on aecount of the death of their father for a period beyond the time of attaining their majority? [1, 2, 4,] That said Oklahoma Engineering Company was not an independent contractor, under the provisions of the contract hereinbefore recited, entered into with the town of Said statement was not afterwards withdrawn by the court, or the jury cautioned by the court not to be influenced thereby. The court, upon request of plaintiff, in- Sallisaw, is not an open question in this structed the jury as follows: "No. 1. You are instructed that when a municipal corporation, such as the incorporated town of Sallisaw in this case, contracts for the making of a public improvement under the supervision and direction of its own engineer or other proper officer, by and under the terms of which contract, the contractor is subject to the orders and control of such engineer or other officer, and said engineer or officer having authority to direct the manner and mode of doing the work or the control of the employés of the contractor, then under the terms of such contract the municipal corporation is liable in damages for the neglect and wrongful killing of an employé of such contractor." jurisdiction. Missouri, K. & O. Ry. Co. 1. Ferguson, 21 Okl. 266, 96 Pac. 755; Chas T. Derr Const. Co. et al. v. Gelruth, 29 OL 538, 120 Pac. 253; Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Bennett, 36 Okl. 358, 128 Pac. 705; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Bond, 148 Pat 103; Muskogee Elec. Trac. Co. v. Hairel et al., 148 Pac. 1005. See, also, New Orleans, M. & C. R. R. Co. v. Hanning, 15 Wall. 649, 21 L. Ed. 220; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518, 10 Sup. Ct. 175, 33 L. Ed. 440; Bibbs, Adm'r, v. N. & W. R. R. Co., 87 Va. 711, 14 S. E. 163; De Palma et al. v. WeinThe court also instructed the jury man et al., 15 N. M. 68, 103 Pac. 782, 24 L lows, which instruction was duly except-R. A. (N. S.) 423; Conners v. Hennessey, 112 ed to: as fol "No. 12. If your verdict should be for the plaintiff, you will assess the damages at such a sum as will compensate them for their pecuniary loss, resulting from the death of their father. And in that connection you are instructed that said plaintiffs would not be entitled to any compensation on account of the death of the deceased for a period beyond the time of their attaining their majority." The jury returned a verdict in favor of the town of Sallisaw and against the Oklahoma Engineering Company in the sum of $1,350, to which said verdict plaintiffs duly excepted. Plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled, excepted to, and judgment entered in accord with the verdict. To reverse said judgment plaintiffs appeal to this court. Defendants insist that no prejudicial error intervened in the trial of this cause, and ask that the judgment, which includes an award against defendant Oklahoma Engineering Company in the sum of $1,350, be affirmed. Roy Frye and Joe Bailey Allen, both of Sallisaw, for plaintiffs in error. Curtis & Pitchford, of Sallisaw, Read & McDonough, of Ft. Smith, Ark., and J. H. Jarman, of Sallisaw, for defendants in error. COLLIER, C. (after stating the facts as above). The request of defendants, in their brief, that the judgment against defendant Oklahoma Engineering Company in the sum of $1,350 be affirmed, is an admission that the death of Kin Pressley was due to the negligence of said company, for which said company was liable. This admission leaves Mass. 96. Whether or not the Oklahoma Engineering Company was an independent contractor was from the face of the contract, in the light a question of law for the court to determine of surrounding circumstances, and it was prejudicial error to submit this question as a question of fact to the jury. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Bond, supra; Muskogee Elec. Trac. Co. v. Hairel et al., supra. But the question of whether or not the Oklahoma Engineering Company was an independent contractor was submitted to the jury as a question of fact, under instruction No. 1, requested by plaintiff. Therefore the insistence of plaintiff that such action of the court was prejudicial error, or even error, has no basis upon which to stand. Certainly it is unnecessary to cite authorities to sustain the proposition that one cannot complain on appeal to this court of errors which he caused the trial court to commit, and to which no exception was, or could have been, saved. [3] The statement of the court, in the presence of the jury, that the town of Sallisaw was not liable, was made entirely ex mero motu, so far as the record discloses, and was duly excepted to by plaintiffs. This statement was not withdrawn from the jury by the court, or the jury instructed to disre gard such statement. That said statement of the court made a lasting impression upon the jury, affecting their verdict, is shown by the inconsistent verdict returned by the jury, finding in favor of the town of Sallisaw and against the Oklahoma Engineering Com "In an action on behalf of a minor to recover * struction No. 1, in effect instructed that, if | Petrie v. Columbia & Greenville R. Co., 29 S. the Oklahoma Engineering Company was lia- C. 303, 7 S. E. 515. ble, the town of Sallisaw was also liable. Said statement in the presence of the jury, we think, was reversible error. When remarks, made by a judge in the progress of a trial, are calculated to mislead the jury, or prejudice the party complaining, and the verdict of the jury conclusively shows that such remarks affected their verdict, the mak ing of such remarks in the presence of the jury is reversible error. City of Guthrie v. Carey, 15 Okl. 276, 81 Pac. 431; Skelly v. Boland, 78 Ill. 438. [5] The instruction of the court that said plaintiffs would not be entitled to any compensation on account of the death of their father, beyond the time of attaining their majority, does not correctly state the law. This action was brought under sections 5281 and 5282, Rev. Laws 1910, supra, and to hold the measure of damages as instructed by the court to be correct would be to read into said section 5281 the words "minor children," which cannot be legally done. The action for damages for the wrongful killing of the father is given to the widow and children of the deceased, regardless of the ages of the children; and that adult children, as well as minor children, are embraced in the word "children," used in said section, is emphasized by the provision in said statute that the damages are "to be distributed in the same manner as personal property"; and, also, by the provision in said section that, if there be no widow or children, the right of recovery is given to the next of kin. [6] In an action to recover damages for the wrongful killing of a father, the right of a son of the deceased to recovery for any pecuniary loss he may have sustained by the death of his mother is not limited to his minority, but also extends to and includes any such loss sustained to his majority. Valente et al. v. Sierra Ry. Co., 158 Cal. 412, 111 Pac. 95. In Tuteur, Adm'r, v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 77 Wis. 505, 46 N. W. 897, it is held: "The fact that the children were all of age when their mother's death was caused by negligence would not preclude a recovery for the loss of such pecuniary benefits as they had a reasonable expectation of securing from her additional accumulations." * "Under the statute giving children a right of action for negligence causing the death of their father, the right of action is not limited to minors. "Beaumont Trac. Co. v. Dillworth (Tex. Civ. App.) 94 S: W. 352. "There is no sufficient legal reason for limiting the ** * damages (in such an action (to recover damages for a wrongful death)] to the minority of the children, if the jury are legally persuaded that they will continue after that age." Tilley, Adm'r, v. Hudson River R. Co., 29 N. Y. 252, 86 Am. Dec. 297. "Our statute, which gives a right of action to the administrator of one negligently killed, for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, and children, * does not exclude an action for the benefit of adult children. * * * * damages for the wrongful death of his mother, * * the recovery is not limited to the pecuniary loss suffered by the minor prior to his majority. * Butte Elec. Ry. Co. v. Jones, 164 Fed. 308, 90 C. C. A. 240, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1205. * Under a statute conferring a right of action on the surviving husband, wife, and children, the word "children" as used in such statute, may include persons over the age of 21 years. Galveston, H. & San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Kutac, 72 Tex. 643, 11 S. W. 127. It is unnecessary to further cite authorities to show that the right of recovery in an action by children for the wrongful death of their father is not confined to pecuniary loss sustained during their minority, but may continue after such children reached their majority, as it is, in effect, directly so held by this court on rehearing, in Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Eldridge, 41 Okl. 463, 139 Pac. 254. See, also, Shawnee Gas & Elec. Co. v. Motesenbocker, 41 Okl. 454, 138 Pac. 790. In an action, under said section 5281, supra, by the children of a deceased, the correct measure of damages is the pecuniary loss, regardless of the age of the children, suffered by them by reason of being deprived by the death of their father of an expectancy of pecuniary benefits, to be determined by the age, physical condition, occupation, earning capacity, habits, and the use made by deceased of his earnings. Big Jack Min. Co. v. Parkinson, 41 Okl. 125, 137 Pac. 678; Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lukert, 16 Okl. 397, 84 Pac. 1076; Western Union Tel. Co. v. McGill, 57 Fed. 699, 6 C. C. A. 521, 21 L. R. A. 818; Bartlett v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 21 Okl. 415, 96 Pac. 468. As said Oklahoma Engineering Company, under the provisions of the contract entered into by it with the town of Sallisaw, was not an independent contractor, but the servant and agent of said town, said town is liable for the negligent acts of said company as its agent, within the scope of its authority. Chas. T. Derr Const. Co. v. Gelruth, supra; Muskogee Elec. Trac. Co. v. Hairel et al., supra. This case should be reversed and remanded. PER CURIAM. Adopted in whole. WILSON et al. v. JONES. (No. 4668.) (Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Dec. 21, 1915. Rehearing Denied Feb. 8, 1916.) (Syllabus by the Court.) 1. APPEAL AND ERROR 323-JOINT JUDGMENT-CASE-MADE-NECESSARY PARTIES. Where a joint judgment has been rendered against two defendants, only one of whom filed a motion for a new trial, but both join in a peFor other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1796, 1798-1805; Dec. Dig. 323.] 2. PLEADING 355-DEPARTURE-MODE OF OBJECTION-MOTION For Judgment. Treating the record as a transcript, the only question attempted to be raised is that of a departure in the pleadings, and as the objection to the pleadings on the ground of a departure is made by a motion for judgment on the pleading, and not by a motion to strike, the same does not present error to this court. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. §§ 1102-1110; Dec. Dig. 355.] Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 3. Error from District Court, Wagoner County; R. C. Allen, Judge. Action by George Jones against Isaac N. Bailey and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and the defendants Bailey and Wilson bring tion to plaintiff in error Bailey, and that Bailey procured the abstract thereto, and that the sale and conveyance was by warranty deed, and that Bailey was to pay for the land in the future upon a satisfactory showing of an abstract to be made in the future; while the last-amended petition alleges the terms of an oral contract to sell real es tate and deliver a deed only upon the payment of the purchase price agreed upon, thus insisting that the latter petition contradicts the previous verified petitions, in this, that Jones did not sell and convey to Bailey by warranty deed the land in question on the date on which the oral contract to sell is alleged to have been entered into. And in support of this contention plaintiff in error has cited Johnson v. Bank, 59 Kan. 250, 52 Pac 860; Bank v. Woodruff, 14 N. M. 502, 94 Pac 957; Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33 Pac. 23, 20 L. R. A. 199, 62 Am. St. Rep. 17; Myers v. Presbyterian Church, 11 Okl. 544, @ Pac. 874. We do not think that the error complained of has been properly presented to this court. A motion for judgment on the pleading was filed and overruled by the court, and the plaintiff in error attempts to raise the question of a departure in the pleadings under his motion for judgment on the plead RITTENHOUSE, C. The judgment in this ings. It was held in Merchants' & Planters' case, in part, is as follows: on, "It is further considered, ordered, and adjudged that the plaintiff have judgment against the defendant Isaac N. Bailey and defendant E. G. Wilson for the sum of $675 and interest there* which the court finds to be the sum of $946. That on and after the expiration of six months * * issue an order of sale * the proceeds arising therefrom, be paid as follows: First, the sum of $146.87 to F. W. Casner taxes paid by him; ** second, the unpaid costs of this action; third, amount found due F. W. Casner, to wit, the sum of $1,277, # * * and the residue, if any, to the amount of $946, * be paid to plaintiff. * * Ins. Co. v. Marsh, 34 Okl. 453, 125 Pac. 1100, that: "An objection to a pleading on the ground of a departure must, in this jurisdiction, be raised by a motion to strike. It cannot be raised by demurrer, or by an objection to the introduction of evidence." And in the case of St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Mountain Park Stock Farm Co., 23 Okl. 79, 99 Pac. 647, wherein it was held that there was a departure in the pleadings, but that the question of a departure could not be raised by an objection to the introdne The decree further provides that E. G. Wil-tion of evidence under the pleadings, and that son, Isaac N. Bailey, and Lillie E. Bailey are forever barred and foreclosed from all right, title, estate, interest, or equity of redemption in or to the property in controversy. A motion has been filed to dismiss this appeal, for the reason that this is a joint judgment, and that the defendant Bailey is a necessary party to the appeal. [1] The judgment is a joint judgment. Isaac N. Bailey did not file a motion for a new trial, and the fact that the petition in error purports to be in the name of both of the defendants in no wise cures the neglect to properly lay the foundation for appeal in the lower court. Bowles et al. v. Cooney et al., 146 Pac. 221. [2] The record is sufficient, however, to be treated as a transcript, and it is insisted that there was filed in the case three petitions, and that the last-amended petition was a palpable departure from the two previous petitions, which alleged that the defendant in error sold and conveyed the land in ques the defendant waived the defect by failing to move to strike the reply and going to trial on the issues thus raised. In the instant case, the question of departure in the pleadings was attempted to be raised by a motion for judgment on the pleadings; this motion is a plea in the nature of a demurrer, and admits, for its purpose, the truth of all the facts, which are well pleaded by the opre site party. C. E. Sharp Lbr. Co. v. Kansas Ice Co. et al., 42 Okl. 689, 142 Pac. 1016. We therefore conclude that the failure to file a motion for a new trial by the codefendant, Isaac N. Bailey, precludes this court from examining the errors alleged to have occurred during the trial; and treating the record as a transcript, the question of a departure in the pleadings not having been raised by motion to strike, that question is not presented for our review. The cause should therefore be affirmed. PER CURIAM. 'Adopted in whole. 55 Okl. 780) HAMRA et al. v. FITZPATRICK et al. (No. 5859.) RUMMONS, C. This action was commenced in the district court of Pottawatomie county by the defendants in error, hereinaft (Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Jan. 18, 1916.) er styled the plaintiffs, to restrain the plain (Syllabus by the Court.) 1. APPEARANCE 10 GENERAL tiffs in error, hereinafter styled the defendants, from selling certain real estate in OkAPPEAR-lahoma county under an execution issued out of the district court of Pottawatomie county upon a judgment in favor of the defendant After a special appearance, objecting to the Hamra and against the plaintiff Joseph E. jurisdiction of the court over the persons of defendants has been overruled, defendants, by Fitzpatrick. The defendants filed a special filing an answer alleging that they have been appearance, objecting to the jurisdiction of damaged by the granting of a temporary in- the district court of Pottawatomie county junction, and praying judgment against plain tiffs for the amount of such damages, enter a over their persons, and over the subject-matgeneral appearance and waive any error in over-ter of the action, which being overruled, they ruling such special appearance. excepted, and answered the petition of the [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appearance, plaintiffs setting up facts to defeat plaintiffs' Cent. Dig. §§ 53, 54; Dec. Dig. 10.] 2. NEW TRIAL 110-POWER TO GRANT-MOTION. It does not constitute error for a trial court at the same term at which judgment is entered to grant a new trial on its own motion. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see New Trial, Cent. Dig. § 231; Dec. Dig. 110.] 3. HOMESTEAD 96 EXEMPTION-PURCHASE MONEY. recovery and also setting up a claim for damages against the plaintiffs in the sum of $402.50 because of the wrongful issuing of a temporary injunction in the case, and praying judgment against the plaintiffs for that sum. The plaintiffs replied to this answer. The cause was tried to the court, resulting in a judgment finding that the judgment the execution Under the provisions of sections 2 and 3, of which was sought to be restrained was for art. 12, Constitution, and section 3346, Rev. a part of the purchase price of the tract of Laws 1910, the purchasers have no homestead land in Oklahoma county, that said tract of exemption against levy and sale under execution to satisfy a judgment for a part of the purchase land was the homestead of plaintiffs, and exprice of the tract of land in which the exemp-empt from levy and sale under the judgment tion is claimed, even though the vendor may recovered by the defendant Hamra, and have lost or waived his vendor's lien upon such land. granting plaintiffs a perpetual injunction [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Homestead, against the defendants restraining them from Cent. Dig. §§ 147-153; Dec. Dig. 96.] 4. HUSBAND AND WIFE 14-CONVEYANCE TO HUSBAND AND WIFE. Where a tract of land has been conveyed in fee to husband and wife, the conveyance indicating no intent to create an estate in joint tenancy, they hold as tenants in common. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Husband and Wife, Cent. Dig. §§ 71-86, 88, 89; Dec. Dig. 14.] 5. HOMESTEAD 96 EXEMPTION-PURCHASE MONEY-HUSBAND AND WIFE-TENANTS IN COMMON. Where the vendor of a tract of land conveyed by him to husband and wife as tenants in common has judgment for the balance unpaid of the purchase price against the husband alone, neither the husband nor the wife can claim a homestead exemption in such land to prevent the levying upon and sale under execution of the interest of the husband in said land to satisfy such judgment. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Homestead, Cent. Dig. 88 147-153; Dec. Dig. 96.] Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 1 Error from District Court, Pottawatomie County; Chas. B. Wilson, Jr., Judge. Action by Joseph E. Fitzpatrick and others against H. J. Hamra and others. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants bring error. Reversed, with directions. McDougal, Lytle & Allen, of Sapulpa (Robert Wheeler, of Tecumseh, of counsel), for plaintiffs in error. P. O. Cassidy and E. D. Reasor, both of Shawnee, for defendants in error. levying upon or selling the said tract of land to satisfy the judgment of defendant Hamra. The defendants in due time filed their motion for new trial, to the overruling of which they excepted, and appeal to this court. persons. [1] The first assignment of error urged by defendants complains of the overruling of their special appearance. Whatever error there may have been in the overruling of this special appearance has been waived by the defendants. The action of injunction being a transitory action, defendants could not object to the court's jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action and their special appearance could only go to the jurisdiction of the trial court over their when the defendants sought to counterclaim against the plaintiffs for damages because of the issuing of a temporary injunction, as themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, they did in their answer, they submitted and waived any error the court may have committed in overruling their special appearance. Austin Manufacturing Co. v. Hunter, 16 Okl. 86, 86 Pac. 293; Wm. Cameron & Co. v. Consolidated School District, 44 Okl. 67, 143 Pac. 182; Commonwealth Cotton Oil Co. v. Hudson (No. 5483), 155 Pac. 577, not yet officially reported. [2] It seems that there had been a former judgment in this cause rendered, and that the trial court on its own motion grant For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes ed plaintiffs a new trial at the same term of court at which such judgment was rendered. The defendants assign this ruling of the court as error upon the authority of Long v. Board of County Commissioners, 5 Okl. 128, 47 Pac. 1063. The holding of the territorial Supreme Court in that case as to the granting of a new trial by the court upon its own motion during the term has been expressly overruled by this court in the case of Todd v. Orr, 44 Okl. 459, 145 Pac. 393. So the trial court committed no reversible error in granting the new trial of which defendants complain. [3] The only remaining assignment of error presents the most serious question in this case, which is whether the tract of land in Oklahoma county being occupied by plaintiffs as their homestead was exempt from levy and sale under execution upon the judgment of defendant Hamra against the plaintiff Joseph E. Fitzpatrick; it being admitted that such judgment was for a part of the purchase price of said tract of land. Section 2, art. 12, of our Constitution provides: "The homestead of a family shall be and is hereby protected from forced sale for the payment of debts, except for the purchase money therefor or a part of such purchase money." Section 3, art. 12, of the Constitution says: "Provided, that no property shall be exempt for any part of the purchase price while the same or any part thereof, remains in the possession of the original vendee, or in possession of any purchaser from such vendee, with notice." Section 3346, R. L. 1910, provides: "The exemption of the homestead provided for in this chapter shall not apply where the debt is due: First, for the purchase money of such homestead or a part of such purchase money." It is contended by the defendants that under the constitutional and statutory provisions above quoted the plaintiffs had no homestead exemption in the tract of land against the judgment of the defendant Hamra. On the other hand, the plaintiffs contend that the homestead is exempt as to the judgment for the reason that at the time the defendant Hamra conveyed the tract of land to plaintiffs he waived his vendor's lien for the unpaid purchase money by taking other security therefor, and for the further reason that the title to the tract of land was conveyed to plaintiffs, who are husband and wife, and stands in the names of both of them, and that therefore it cannot be sold while occupied by them as a homestead to satisfy the judgment against the plaintiff Joseph E. Fitzpatrick. provisions of most of the states contain the same exception as to the purchase price or any part thereof of the homestead; and it seems that the overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that the homestead exemption does not apply as to a judgment for the purchase price thereof, or any part thereof, independently of any question as to the right of the holder of the judgment to a vendor's lien upon the land. In the case of Greer v. Oldham, 10 Ky. Law Rep. 889, 11 S. W. 73, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky says: vendor. "A vendee in part payment of the purchase money, executed his note to a creditor of the note is not entitled to a lien, yet, as it was exeHeld that, while the holder of that cuted for a part of the purchase money, the vendee cannot claim a homestead as against it." In Boone County Bank v. Hensley, 62 Ark. 398, 35 S. W. 1104, the Supreme Court of Arkansas says: "The Constitution of this state ordains: The homestead of any resident of this state, who is subject to the lien of any judgment or decree of married or the head of a family, shall not be any court, or to sale under execution, or other process thereon, except such as may be rendered for the purchase money, or for specific liens,' etc. Const. art. 9, § 3. The statutes do not enlarge or change the exemptions allowed by the Constitution, but provide how they may be claimed. The Constitution determines what the exemptions of a debtor, including the homestead, shall be. When he claims its benefits, he must take them subject to its exceptions. In the exceptions there are no exemptions. "The Constitution, in providing that homesteads shall not be exempt from sales for the purchase money, does not undertake to create liens, but to deny to the debtor the right to hold his homestead exempt from sale under executions issued on judgments for the purchase money which he owes for the same, and to subject it to sale in such cases. No man has a right creditor in any such manner. to hold property for which he is owing his No such dishonesty is tolerated by the Constitution. Kimble v. Esworthy, 6 Ill. App. 517; Williams. Jones, 100 Ill. 362; Bush v. Scott, 76 IIL 524; Smith v. High, 85 N. C. 93; For . Brooks, 88 N. C. 234; Hoskins v. Wall, 77 N. C. 249; Whitaker v. Elliott, 73 N. C. 186." In the case of Bentley v. Jordan, 71 Tenn. (3 Lea) 353, the Supreme Court of Tennessee says: "The Constitution of 1870 provides as follows: 'A homestead in possession of each head of a family, and the improvements thereon, to from sale under legal process during the life of the value in all of $1,000.00, shall be exempt such head of a family, to inure to the beneût of the widow, and shall be exempt during the This exemption shall not operate against public minority of their children occupying the same. taxes, nor debts contracted for the purchase money of such homesteads, or improvements thereon.' * Article 11, § 11. We have examined the authorities cited in homestead is not exempt from sale for the sat "Under these provisions it is obvious that the the briefs of counsel for both plaintiffs and isfaction of any debt or liability contracted for defendants, and have made some investiga- its purchase.' It may be sold by execution is tion into other authorities, and from the sued on a judgment recovered on such a debt. or otherwise subjected by legal process. view we take of the case it is unnecessary The creditor proceeds, not by virtue of the ven to determine whether or not the defendant dor's lien, which is only enforceable in equity. Hamra had waived his vendor's lien upon and may be lost by waiver, but by virtue of the the tract of land sought to be sold by him property by 'legal process'; the homestead ex general right of a creditor to subject his debtor's |