Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: And Other WritingsStephen Buckle Cambridge University Press, 15 Φεβ 2007 - 278 σελίδες David Hume's An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, first published in 1748, is a concise statement of Hume's central philosophical positions. It develops an account of human mental functioning which emphasizes the limits of human knowledge and the extent of our reliance on (non-rational) mental habits. It then applies that account to questions of free will and religious knowledge before closing with a defence of moderate scepticism. This volume, which presents a modified version of the definitive 1772 edition of the work, offers helpful annotation for the student reader, together with an introduction that sets this profoundly influential work in its philosophical and historical contexts. The volume also includes a selection of other works by Hume that throw light on both the circumstances of the work's genesis and its key themes and arguments. |
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Σελίδα 3
... man chiefly as born for action ; and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment ; pursuing one object , and avoiding another , according to the value which these objects seem to possess , and according to the light in which ...
... man chiefly as born for action ; and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment ; pursuing one object , and avoiding another , according to the value which these objects seem to possess , and according to the light in which ...
Σελίδα 6
... Man is a sociable, no less than a reasonable being: But neither can he always enjoy company agreeable and amusing, or preserve the proper relish for them. Man is also an active being; and from that disposition, as well as from the ...
... Man is a sociable, no less than a reasonable being: But neither can he always enjoy company agreeable and amusing, or preserve the proper relish for them. Man is also an active being; and from that disposition, as well as from the ...
Σελίδα 14
... man feels the pain of exces- sive heat , or the pleasure of moderate warmth , and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation , or anticipates it by his imagination . These faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions of the ...
... man feels the pain of exces- sive heat , or the pleasure of moderate warmth , and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation , or anticipates it by his imagination . These faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions of the ...
Σελίδα 15
... man , which not only escapes all human power and authority , but is not even restrained within the limits of nature and reality . To form mon- sters , and join incongruous shapes and appearances , costs the imagination no more trouble ...
... man , which not only escapes all human power and authority , but is not even restrained within the limits of nature and reality . To form mon- sters , and join incongruous shapes and appearances , costs the imagination no more trouble ...
Σελίδα 16
... man is not susceptible of any species of sensation , we always find that he is as little susceptible of the correspondent ideas . A blind man can form no notion of colours ; a deaf man of sounds . Restore either of them that sense in ...
... man is not susceptible of any species of sensation , we always find that he is as little susceptible of the correspondent ideas . A blind man can form no notion of colours ; a deaf man of sounds . Restore either of them that sense in ...
Συχνά εμφανιζόμενοι όροι και φράσεις
actions allowed analogy animal appear argument arise Aristotle atheism believe body cause and effect character Cicero circumstances common conclusion conjoined connexion consequences consider contrary course of nature DAVID HUME degree Deity derived Descartes discover dispute divine doctrine employed endeavour enquiry entirely epic poetry Epicurean Epicurus evidence examine existence experience external objects farther feel force Francis Hutcheson give Henry Home human nature Hume Hume's idea of power imagination immediately impossible infer influence instance Jansenist kind laws learning Lucretius Malebranche mankind manner matter of fact means ments mind miracle moral motion Natural Philosophy necessity never observation operations opinion particular passion perceptions philosophers Plutarch present pretend principles produce proof proposition prove Pyrrhonism reasonings concerning reflection regard relation religion render resemblance Rorarius scepticism seems senses sensible qualities sentiment Sextus Empiricus species supposed supposition Tacitus thing thought tion Treatise truth universe virtue whole
Δημοφιλή αποσπάσματα
Σελίδα 144 - If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: For it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
Σελίδα 101 - That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish.
Σελίδα 100 - A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.
Σελίδα 115 - Our most holy religion is founded on faith, not on reason; and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is by no means fitted to endure.
Σελίδα 135 - Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, may they say, in assenting to the veracity of sense ? But these lead you to believe that the very perception or sensible image is the external object. Do you disclaim this principle, in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something external? You here depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments ; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any convincing...
Σελίδα 15 - The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated "thoughts" or "ideas." The other species want a name in our language. and in most others: I suppose. because it was not requisite for any but philosophical purposes to rank them under a general term or appellation. Let us. therefore. use a little freedom and call them "impressions.
Σελίδα 76 - Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans ? Study well the temper and actions of the French and English.