Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: And Other WritingsStephen Buckle Cambridge University Press, 15 Φεβ 2007 - 278 σελίδες David Hume's An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, first published in 1748, is a concise statement of Hume's central philosophical positions. It develops an account of human mental functioning which emphasizes the limits of human knowledge and the extent of our reliance on (non-rational) mental habits. It then applies that account to questions of free will and religious knowledge before closing with a defence of moderate scepticism. This volume, which presents a modified version of the definitive 1772 edition of the work, offers helpful annotation for the student reader, together with an introduction that sets this profoundly influential work in its philosophical and historical contexts. The volume also includes a selection of other works by Hume that throw light on both the circumstances of the work's genesis and its key themes and arguments. |
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Σελίδα 6
... passion for sci- ence, says she, but let your science be human, and such as may have a direct reference to action and society. Abstruse thought and profound researches I prohibit, and will severely punish, by the pensive melancholy ...
... passion for sci- ence, says she, but let your science be human, and such as may have a direct reference to action and society. Abstruse thought and profound researches I prohibit, and will severely punish, by the pensive melancholy ...
Σελίδα 7
... passions , and the various species of sentiment which discriminate vice and virtue . How painful soever this inward search or enquiry may appear , it becomes , in some measure , requisite to those , who would describe with success the ...
... passions , and the various species of sentiment which discriminate vice and virtue . How painful soever this inward search or enquiry may appear , it becomes , in some measure , requisite to those , who would describe with success the ...
Σελίδα 10
... passions , which fall within the comprehension of every human creature ; and the finer and more philosophical distinctions are no less real and cer- tain , though more difficult to be comprehended . Some instances , espe- cially late ...
... passions , which fall within the comprehension of every human creature ; and the finer and more philosophical distinctions are no less real and cer- tain , though more difficult to be comprehended . Some instances , espe- cially late ...
Σελίδα 11
... passions of the mind into two classes , the selfish and benevolent , which were supposed to stand in constant opposition and contrariety ; nor was it thought that the latter could ever attain their proper object but at the expense of ...
... passions of the mind into two classes , the selfish and benevolent , which were supposed to stand in constant opposition and contrariety ; nor was it thought that the latter could ever attain their proper object but at the expense of ...
Σελίδα 12
... passion for some one general principle ; it must , however , be confessed , that they are excusable in expecting to find some general principles , into which all the vices and virtues were justly to be resolved . The like has been the ...
... passion for some one general principle ; it must , however , be confessed , that they are excusable in expecting to find some general principles , into which all the vices and virtues were justly to be resolved . The like has been the ...
Συχνά εμφανιζόμενοι όροι και φράσεις
actions allowed analogy animal appear argument arise Aristotle atheism believe body cause and effect character Cicero circumstances common conclusion conjoined connexion consequences consider contrary course of nature DAVID HUME degree Deity derived Descartes discover dispute divine doctrine employed endeavour enquiry entirely epic poetry Epicurean Epicurus evidence examine existence experience external objects farther feel force Francis Hutcheson give Henry Home human nature Hume Hume's idea of power imagination immediately impossible infer influence instance Jansenist kind laws learning Lucretius Malebranche mankind manner matter of fact means ments mind miracle moral motion Natural Philosophy necessity never observation operations opinion particular passion perceptions philosophers Plutarch present pretend principles produce proof proposition prove Pyrrhonism reasonings concerning reflection regard relation religion render resemblance Rorarius scepticism seems senses sensible qualities sentiment Sextus Empiricus species supposed supposition Tacitus thing thought tion Treatise truth universe virtue whole
Δημοφιλή αποσπάσματα
Σελίδα 144 - If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: For it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
Σελίδα 101 - That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish.
Σελίδα 100 - A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.
Σελίδα 115 - Our most holy religion is founded on faith, not on reason; and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is by no means fitted to endure.
Σελίδα 135 - Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, may they say, in assenting to the veracity of sense ? But these lead you to believe that the very perception or sensible image is the external object. Do you disclaim this principle, in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something external? You here depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments ; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any convincing...
Σελίδα 15 - The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated "thoughts" or "ideas." The other species want a name in our language. and in most others: I suppose. because it was not requisite for any but philosophical purposes to rank them under a general term or appellation. Let us. therefore. use a little freedom and call them "impressions.
Σελίδα 76 - Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans ? Study well the temper and actions of the French and English.