misdirection, or want of proper direction, or any ambiguity, or doubt, in, or arising out of, the charge in any respect; and in that I cannot but think everyone was then right.

If there had been any misdirection, or want of proper direction, that would not entitle the plaintiff to a new trial, because no objection was made at the proper time, and when, if made, it might have been corrected; so that a new trial, as of right, is out of the question.

This Court may, of course, notwithstanding such want of objection, grant a new trial, but that is, and must in the interests of the proper administration of justice and having regard to the respective functions of Court and jury, be a rare occurrence, based upon some plain miscarriage, or probable miscarriage, in some essential respect.

There was, in my opinion, nothing of that character in this case, nor, indeed, any ground for granting a new trial, even if objection had been duly taken to the charge.

Each act of alleged negligence relied upon by the plaintiff was clearly and fully left to the jury, and there was nothing like a suggestion that if they found against the defendants in respect of any one of them they need not find as to the others; if there had been, objection to the charge would immediately have been made. Any such ground of complaint is merely an afterthought, which requires perversion of the fact, and a stultification of those having the conduct of the plaintiff's case throughout, to give it any sort of a foundation. Not only did the learned trial Judge set forth-clearly set forth-the three grounds upon which the plaintiff's claim was rested, but he also, in the plainest words, told the jury that any one or all of them they might find in the plaintiff's favour.

In most of such cases as this the plaintiff's contention is based upon the obviously fallacious ground that the jury must "negative" all acts of negligence relied upon by him except that which they have found in his favour. Their duty is to find only the proximate cause of the injury; all other acts of negligence, no matter how plain or how gross, are immaterial, and therefore

subjects with which the jury, in their verdict, are not concerned. It was not necessary, and it would have been improper, for the jury to have found upon any question of negligence which they found was not the proximate cause of the injury. Having found that the proximate cause of the injury was the want of the notice, other causes, if any, not proximate, were immaterial.

To have told the jury that, if they found the proximate cause of the injury to have been but one of the three grounds of negligence alleged, they had better add another for fear that one might not hold water, could hardly have been right; and yet that is really what, in many of these cases, is desired, and that towards which, in some charges, there seems to be in these days a drifting.

Looking for anything like a miscarriage of justice in this case, one meets with the opposite of that. The charge of the learned Judge and the findings of the jury seem to me unexceptionable. To have found for the plaintiff on any of the other grounds would have been to have found against the weight of the evidence and contrary to that learned Judge's firm views.

That the want of the notice was not actionable negligence I have no sort of doubt. The closing of the door as a means of ingress was not the act of the defendants; it was done under compulsion of the law, and the blame, if any in law, for the absence of a notice is attributable to those who compelled the closing of the door without requiring the notice. The defendants fully complied with their order.

I would allow the appeal.

Moss, C.J.O. and MACLAREN, J.A., concurred.

ONTARIO.]

NEGLIGENCE-EXCESSIVE DAMAGES.

[COURT OF APPEAL.

MORIN V. OTTAWA ELECTRIC R.W. Co.

(18 .L.R. 209.)

Damages Negligence Injury-Impairment of Prospects of Marriage—Remoteness-Excessive Damages.

In an action for negligence, impairment of the prospects of matrimony, in the case of a young woman, by reason of physical injuries, may be taken into consideration by the jury in estimating the damages.

In such a case of accident to a young woman of about 21 years of age, living, with her father, but earning $6 a week as a stenographer, which accident resulted in the amputation of her left leg at the knee, paresis in a hand and arm, of which there might never be complete recovery, injury to her back, and a very serious shock to her nervous system:

Held, that a verdict of $5,500 damages was not so excessive as to necessitate a new trial.

THIS was an appeal by the defendants from the judgment of Meredith, C.J.C.P., at the trial of this action before him and a juryat Ottawa, on October 6th, 1908, which trial resulted in a verdict in favour of the plaintiff Lena Morin for $5,500 and of the plain, tiff Oliver Morin, her father, for $233.

The action was brought by the plaintiffs for damages in respect to an accident caused, as alleged by them, by the negligence of the defendants, resulting in a collision between a car of the defendants, in which the plaintiff Lena Morin was a passenger, and another car of the defendants.

The appeal was on the ground that the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff Lena Morin was excessive and unreasonable, and on the ground that the learned trial Judge misdirected the jury in charging them that they might take into consideration, in assessing the damages, the fact that the prospects of matrimony of the said Lena Morin were affected by reason of her injuries.

The appeal was argued on February 4th, 1909, before Moss, C.J.O., and OSLER, GARROW and MACLAREN, JJ.A.

8-IX. C.RY.C.

I. F. Hellmuth, K.C., for the the appellants, contended that the damages were excessive, and that especially the prospects of marriage should not have been considered, and referred to Smith v. Pittsburg R.W. Co. (1898), 90 Fed. 783; Johnston v. Great Western R.W. Co., [1904] 2 K.B. 250; Cray v. Wabash and Grand Trunk R.W. Co's. (1908), 13 O.W.R. 141.

A. E. Fripp, K.C., for the respondents, contended that there was nothing to warrant the Court in concluding that the jury had gone astray in their verdict.

April 5, 1909. Moss, C.J.O.:-At the trial the defendants abandoned their defences to the plaintiffs' allegations of negligence, and the sole question submitted to the jury was as to the damages proper to be awarded to the plaintiffs respectively.

The plaintiff Oliver Morin was allowed $233, and this is not objected to. The plaintiff Lena Morin, who was injured by reason of the negligent conduct of those in charge of one of the defendants' cars, in which she was riding, was allowed $5,500.

The defendants complain of the amount as excessive, and ask for a new trial on that account. They also complain of misdirection, but, on the argument of the appeal, this ground did not appear to be urged with much confidence.

The objection is that the learned trial Judge, when specifying the heads of damage which the jury might consider and take into account in estimating the compensation which the plaintiff Lena Morin might receive, included amongst them the effect, if any, on her prospects of matrimony of the injuries which she had received. The learned Judge did not press the point very strongly. What he said was: "I suppose all women have a hope of marriage: how far will it interfere with her prospects of being settled in life and how far can you fairly measure that in money?" And he added, dealing apparently not only with this, but with all the other heads he had been previously alluding to: "It is a very difficult thing for anyone to estimate, and all you can do is to bring your sound judgment fairly to the consideration of these matters."

At the time of the accident the plaintiff Lena Morin was between 20 and 21 years of age, living with her father, but earning her own livelihood, working as a stenographer at a salary of $6 per week. She had been engaged in this occupation for over three years. From her injuries resulted the amputation of her left leg at the knee, the loss of control of, or a form of paresis in a hand and arm-from which according to the medical testimony there may never be an entirely satisfactory recovery-and a very serious shock to her nervous system.

Manifestly, the burden of these tends to affect more or less permanently the health and constitutional powers of the individual, and the jury had an opportunity of observing the plaintiff while she was giving her testimony, and of forming some judgment a to her physical condition. From what they saw and heard, they could draw their own conclusions as to whether the results of her injuries were or were not likely to impair her prospects of a suitable marriage and settlement in life, with the accompanying freedom from self-dependence.

A jury may properly take into consideration any damages that are the natural and necessary result of the act complained of, and it would not be improper to draw the attention of the jury in this case to what was, in all probability, in the minds of all, the possibly injurious effect of the accident upon her prospects of entering into the marital relation.

There does not appear to be any case or opinion unfavourable to this view in our own or the English courts, while, on the other hand, the views of courts in the United States, so far as expressed, are favourable. There is nothing in what the learned trial Judge said that would be likely to unfairly influence the jury in considering the question of damages, and a new trial ought not to be granted on the ground of misdirection.

As to the damages being excessive, it must be confessed that they seem liberal. But they are the jury's estimate, and it is to be borne in mind that the plaintiff has not only been greatly crippled in the use of her major limbs, but she was subjected to the pain and suffering incident to these and the other injuries