v. London United Tramways, [1908] 1 K.B. 611, also affirmed by the Court of Appeal in 24 Times L.R. 577, it would have been a simple proposition if the plaintiff's possession alone had been sufficient. He, too, was a tenant in possession, but for an unexpired term, which, fortunately for him, had not merged, owing to the imperfect surrender, and the recovery was had not in respect of the possession, but clearly of this unexpired term alone.

These cases are not inconsistent with such cases as the one so much relied on of Perry v. Clissold, [1907] A.C. 73; and Ex parte Chamberlain (1880), 14 Ch. D. 323; and Stewart v. Ottawa and New York R.W. Co. (1899), 30 O.R. 599.

In the last of these cases the learned Chancellor pointed out the scope and principle of such statutes, and shewed that there are really two stages one, the ascertainment of the party to be dealt with in proceeding to fix the compensation; the other, the right to the compensation itself after it is fixed. And as to the first, it was there held, quite in accordance with the more recent case in the Privy Council, that where a person is found in possession apparently as owner, which is not at all the position of these claimants, he may be dealt with, for the purpose of the first stage, as if he was in fact the owner, and that the statutory body cannot at that stage put him to proof of title. But, after the compensation has been fixed, and has been paid into Court, as it may be (see sec. 210), the person applying for it-who need not have been named in the award: see sec. 205 (2)-would certainly then be required to prove his title before obtaining the money out of Court.

None of these cases, nor, indeed, any of the other cases which, after a somewhat diligent search, I have been able to find, affords any foundation, in my opinion, for the proposition that a person, having no estate and no interest in the land itself-nothing, in fact, but mere possession-has any right to share in the compensation provided for by the statute.

The cases decided under the statute 11 Geo. IV. ch. 20, the Hungerford Market Act, referred to by Riddell, J., are not, in my opinion, at all in point. Section 19 of that statute, the

foundation for such decisions, has no counterpart in our statute nor in the general Imperial Acts. And that they are exceptional was pointed out by Lord Denman, C.J., who presided in them all, in the later case, before referred to, of Rex v. Liverpool and Manchester R.W. Co., 4 A. & E., at p. 656. The cases to which I refer are Ex parte Farlow, 2 B. & Ad. 341 (to which Riddell, J., referred with apparent approval), and The King v. The Hungerford Market Co., Ex parte Gosling (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 596. Section 19, before mentioned, is as follows:-"All tenants for years or from year to year or at will, who shall sustain any loss, damage or injury, in respect of any interest whatsoever, for goodwill, improvements, tenants' fixtures, or otherwise, which they now enjoy, by reason of the passing of this Act, shall be entitled to compensation."

I have not attempted to follow all the arguments addressed to us by the learned counsel for the claimants. As will have appeared, the material fact upon which I proceed is of the very simplest, and it is this-the claimants are not entitled to compensation because they had on the date in question no estate or interest in the lands. It matters not, in my opinion, how the severance of the reversion, which stood in the way of renewal, came about, nor whether such severance was compulsory or voluntary, or even whether there ever had in fact been a severance at all, the undisputed fact being that the prior lease had expired on June 30th, 1902, and had not been renewed, and no new tenancy created, thus leaving the claimants entirely without title or interest in the land. The lessors were not even bound to renew or to grant a new lease. They had the option to refuse, and in that case to pay for the tenants' improvements. They did refuse, and what (if any) obligation between the claimants and the city follows upon such refusal we are not at present required to nor in a position to deal with.

In my opinion, the claimants, for the reasons stated, have failed to make out a valid claim to compensation, and the appeal should therefore be allowed with costs.

ONTARIO.]

UNPAID TOLLS-SEIZURE.

[BRITTON, J.

CLISDELL V. KINGSTON AND PEMBROKE R.W. Co.

(18 O.L.R. 169.)

Railway Carriage of Goods-Delivery to Consignee-Seizure by Railway Company for Unpaid Tolls Dominion Railway Act, sec. 345-“Seize”— Termination of Carrier's Lien-Demand-Conversion-Damages.

By sec. 345 of the Dominion Railway Act, R.S.C. 1906, ch. 37, a railway company may, instead of proceeding by action for the recovery of tolls upon goods carried, "seize the goods for or in respect whereof such tolls are payable, and may detain the same until payment thereof," etc.:Held, that a railway company are not, by this enactment, given a lien on property carried, to such an extent and of so general and wide an application as to allow them to re-take goods which have been delivered, and as to which the ordinary carrier's lien has terminated; the section does nothing more than confirm and establish the carrier's lien; there is the right to seize and detain, but the right must be exercised and enforced before there is an absolute and unconditional delivery of the goods to the consignee. Semble, that in this case there was not a sufficient demand for the tolls due to the defendants, on account of which they seized goods which they had previously delivered to the consignee, the demand being for a gross sum, including a sum for tolls.

Held, also, that the defendants, having converted the goods, were liable for damages; and the measure was the value of the goods.

THIS action was brought by the plaintiff, as liquidator of the Wilbur Iron Ore Company Limited, against the defendants, to recover damages for the removal by the defendants of a quantity of coal from the premises of the Wilbur company, and the conversion of it to their (the defendants') own use. The facts are stated in the judgment.

The action was tried before BRITTON, J., without a jury, at Toronto, on the 22nd February, 1909.

A. W. Holmested, for the plaintiff.

I. F. Hellmuth, K.C., for the defendants.

March 4, 1909. BRITTON, J.:-The defendants, as carriers, had carried coal for and delivered the same to the Wilbur Iron Ore Company Limited, in large quantities and at different times. On the 10th, 13th, and 15th August last the defendants carried

coal in four cars in all, and on these days delivered that coal to the company named, upon their own property. Upon this coal so delivered the tolls and freight charges had not been paid. The coal was in a pile called a "stock" pile.

On the 31st August the defendants, about six o'clock in the afternoon, took possession of coal from that pile, intending to take, and taking so far as it could be identified, coal that had been carried by the defendants on the 10th, 13th, and 15th August named.

An order for the winding-up of the Wilbur Iron Ore Company Limited was made on the 26th August, 1908, and the plaintiff was on that day appointed liquidator.

It was admitted at the trial that the quantity of coal taken by the defendants was 138 1/10 tons. It was also admitted that the tolls and freight and other charges due the defendants, and unpaid prior to and on the 26th August, 1908, upon the coal taken and upon coal that had been consumed by the Wilbur company, carried on the days mentioned, amounted to $568.25.

The defendants made reasonable efforts to sell the coal so taken, and failed, and, as the cars in which the coal was placed were required, the coal was mixed with the defendants' own coal and used by the defendants for their own purposes.

The defendants assert a statutory right to follow and seize the coal in question under sec. 345 of the Dominion Railway Act, R.S.C. 1906, ch. 37.

Section 344: "In case of refusal or neglect of payment on demand of any lawful tolls or any part thereof, the same shall be recoverable in any court of competent jurisdiction."

Section 345: "The company may, instead of proceeding as aforesaid for the recovery of such tolls, seize the goods for or in respect whereof such tolls are payable, and may detain the same until payment thereof, and in the meantime such goods shall be at the risk of the owners thereof.

"2. If the tolls are not paid within six weeks, and, where the goods are perishable goods, if the tolls are not paid upon demand, or such goods are liable to perish while in possession of the company by reason of delay in payment or taking delivery by the consignee,

the company may advertise and sell the whole or any part of such goods, and, out of the money arising from such sale, retain the tolls payable and all reasonable charges and expenses of such seizure, detention and sale.

"3. The company shall pay or deliver the surplus, if any, or such of the goods as remain unsold, to the person entitled thereto." This section 345 first appeared, in substance, as sec. 234 of 51 Vict. ch. 29. There power was given to the agents or servants of the company to seize the goods, etc. It was, in a slightly changed form, re-enacted as sec. 280 of ch. 58, 3 Edw. VII. (1903).

The word "seize" is relied upon by the defendants. That word does not appear in the corresponding section of the English Act, viz., sec. 97, 8 Vict. ch. 20 (1845).

I am unable to agree with the defendants' contention that, by virtue of the word "seize," they are virtually given a lien on property carried, to such an extent and of so general and wide an application as to allow them to retake goods which have been delivered and as to which the ordinary carrier's lien has terminated. The word "seize," in practice, generally means "taking possession of the property of a person condemned by the judgment of some tribunal" -see Bouvier's Law Dict.-or, taking possession of property pending a trial or an adjudication in reference to something which might result in the property being liable, should the adjudication be adverse to the owner. It usually implies force. The ordinary meaning is "to take possession of "-" to lay hold of." Generally a seizure is made under a writ or warrant or authority or process specially issued in particular cases provided for by law.

The section under consideration does nothing more, in my opinion, than confirm and establish the carrier's lien. If, while that lien exists and can be enforced, there is, from the circumstances, any condition that renders a seizure necessary, it may be made; if not, there remains the right to detain and dispose of the goods as provided by the section. If the defendants are right, the startling result would be that, without warrant or claim in Court, or legal process, they could follow the goods carried and take them wherever found and at any time after the delivery to the consignee, so long