duly entered upon these verdicts. The ap-| There was testimony tending to show that B. plicant for dower sued out a bill of excep- F. Gilmer sold timber growing partly on lot tions, complaining of the direction of the verdict and of certain interlocutory rulings respecting the admissibility and the exclusion of evidence. Jno. D. & E. S. Taylor, of Summerville, for plaintiff in error. Maddox & Doyal, of Rome, and Wesley Shropshire, of Summerville, for defendants in error. EVANS, P. J. (after stating the facts as above). [1] 1. The issues in both cases revolve around the ownership of lot 95 at the 95 and partly on lot 112, which latter lot was owned by him. A deed executed in 1905 by B. F. Gilmer to one Edmondson to secure a loan and embracing lots 95 and 112 was also received in evidence. The evidence established that Mrs. Sarah J. Bagby had prescriptive title based on more than seven years' adverse possession under the deed from the Stricklands to her. The deed in her husband's possession from Mrs. testimony of the second wife that she saw a Bagby to him is entirely too vague and uncertain to identify any land or to authorize time of the death of B. F. Gilmer. The applian inference that Mrs. Bagby had parted cant for dower asserts his ownership, and the administratrix of his first wife contends with her title to this land. Nor is the circumthat it belonged to her intestate. It appeared for taxation in his name, while he was livfrom the evidence that Mrs. Sarah Bagby ing on the land with Mrs. Bagby as a memhad two children, Mary and Thomas. The former was the first wife of B. F. Gilmer. ber of the family, sufficient to overcome the After his marriage to her, Gilmer with his adverseness of her possession. It is a matwife lived upon the land of Mrs. Bagby.ter of not unusual occurrence for the male Mrs. Bagby remained on the land until her member of a household to return property death in 1891. After her death Mr. Gilmer belonging to the female members thereof in and his wife continued to live on the land un til the death of Mrs. Gilmer in 1908. Mrs. Gilmer left four children, who agreed not to disturb their father's possession after their mother's death. In 1911 B. F. Gilmer con stance that B. F. Gilmer returned the land his own name. Upon the death of Mrs. Bagby lot 95 was inherited by her daughter and son, and the latter sold his interest to the former, who thus became vested with the whole title. Upon the first Mrs. Gilmer's tracted a second marriage with the applicant band and four children. So it thus appears death in 1908 her title descended to her husfor dower, and died three years thereafter. Gilmer lived upon the land continuously from that Mr. Gilmer had one undivided fifth inthe time of his first marriage until his death, terest in this property, which was subject to administration as a part of his estate and to returning it for taxation in his own name. He kept the deeds to the land in a trunk be considered in the assignment of dower to where they were found after his death. his wife. Accordingly it was error for the Three of them were introduced in evidence, court to direct a verdict which in effect to wit: A deed to lot 95 from C. D. Price, would deny to his administrator and widow their respective shares in this undivided executor of C. Price, to Jacob Strickland, duly recorded, dated December 28, 1862; a deed interest in the first Mrs. Gilmer's estate. from Jacob C. Strickland to Jacob C. and in evidence of the deed from Price, executor, [2] 2. Objection was made to the reception Elisha W. Strickland, "attorneys for the to Jacob Strickland, on the ground that the heirs and legatees of Hardy Strickland, all of deed showed a material alteration on its said county," dated January 14, 1867, convey face, and no preliminary proof explanatory of ing lot 95; and a deed dated January 14, the alteration was submitted. The objection 1867, from Jacob C. and Elisha W. Strickwas based upon Civil Code, § 5831, which deland, attorneys for the heirs and legatees of clares that, if the paper appears to have been Hardy Strickland, deceased, to Mrs. Sarah materially altered (unless it is the cause of J. Bagby. Several witnesses testified that B. action and no plea of non est factum is filed), F. Gilmer declared that the land belonged the party offering it in evidence must explain to his first wife, and for that reason he the alteration where the paper does not come would not sell or incumber it. Thomas Bag- from the custody of the opposite party. This by in 1915 quitclaimed by deed all of his in- section does not apply to registered deeds. A terest in lot 95 to the administratrix of his registered deed shall be admitted in evidence deceased sister, Mrs. Mary Bagby Gilmer. without further proof, unless the maker of He testified that he had sold his interest in the deed or one of his heirs or the opposite this land in 1870 and received the purchase party in the case will file an affidavit that price when he left the state for Texas, but the deed is a forgery. Civil Code 1910, § had omitted to make a deed. The applicant 4210. The presumption, under this section, is for dower testified that a short time prior to that the alteration was made at or before the the death of her husband he examined his time of the execution of the deed, and in the land papers and exhibited to her a deed from absence of an affidavit of forgery such regisMrs. Bagby to himself. She was unable to tered deed is admitted in evidence without extell what land was described therein, or give planation of the alteration. Collins v. Boring, the names of the witnesses to the deed, or 96 Ga. 360, 23 S. E. 401; McConnell v. Slap [3] 3. In order for a deed executed under a power of attorney to have effect as a muniment of title, the power of attorney must be executed with the same formality which is required for a deed, and must accompany the deed, or proof of its existence by secondary evidence in case of its loss or destruction must be submitted. But a deed executed under a power will serve as color of title, although the power of attorney be not produced. The deed from Jacob C. and Elisha W. Strickland, attorneys for the heirs and legatees of Hardy Strickland, deceased, to Mrs. Sarah J. Bagby, was properly received in evidence as color of title. [4] 4. The quitclaim deed from Thomas E. Bagby to Mrs. Ada S. Harrison, administratrix of Mary J. Gilmer, contained the following recital: the property has been redeemed by himself or the moving creditor; and redemption can be accomplished only by payment of the secured debt in full. In the absence of equitable ground, the mere fact that the lien of a judgment creditor, obtained against the grantor subsequently to the making of the security deed, cannot be enforced by levy and sale until the grantor's title has become revested by redemption, is insufficient to subject the grantor's interest in the land as an equitable asset." Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Rylee, 139 Ga. 669(3), 78 S. E. 27. Suit, Cent. Dig. §§ 3, 9-11; Execution, Cent. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Creditors' Dig. §§ 51, 98-102.] 2. CREDITORS' SUIT 39(1) PLEADING CONDITIONS PRECEDENT. "Sarah J. Bagby during her life divided her estate between her two children, to the said Thomas E. Bagby and Mary J. Gilmer, in which said division the said Mary J. Gilmer was awarded the above-described lot of land. Said Thomas E. Bagby was paid his interest in cash. This division and settlement was consummated on August 31, 1870; and, the said Thomas Evey her equity of redemption to D., which exBagby never having executed a conveyance to said Mary J. Gilmer of his undivided interest in said lot of land, this deed is executed for the purpose of carrying out said settlement made on said date and vesting the paper title to said lot of land in the estate of Mary J. Gilmer." The instrument was executed and attested as a deed, and was entitled to be recorded as a deed. It was duly recorded. Such deed was admissible in evidence without proof of its execution, but the recital of facts there in is not evidence of the truth of such recital as against one who was not a party to the instrument. First National Bank of Gainesville v. Cody, 93 Ga. 127, 19 S. E. 831. Certain creditors obtained judgments against B. in 1915. The defendant in 1904 had purchased certain land for which A. had advanced the purchase price, taking a deed directly to himself and executing a bond agreeing to convey the land to B. upon repayment of the debt; and B. entered into possession of the property. In 1911 B. executed a contract of sale of the land to C., upon consideration of a stated sum in cash paid, and the assumption of the debt to A.; but there was no change of possession. In 1914 B. executed a paper purporting to conpressed a money consideration, but the only purpose thereof was to secure an existing debt owed by B. to D. In March, 1915, B. executed a promissory note to E., to secure which she transferred the bond for title issued to her by A. Subsequently D. transferred her interest in the property to E. The conveyance by B. to D. was made for the purpose of avoiding payment of the debts owed to plaintiffs, a fact known to D., and also to E., at the times D. received her conveyance from B. and transferred her interest to E. B. died in 1915, and left her husband in possession, who was collecting the rents. The land was worth a stated sum sufficient to pay the plaintiffs and all valid liens against it. Held, that a petition in an equitable action instituted by creditors against A., C., D., E., and the husband of B. to require all of the parties to interplead and adjust their claims in one action, and to have a receiver appointed to take charge of the property and collect rents, and to plied to the claims of all parties as their interhave the property sold and the proceeds ap alleged facts as above stated, but did not allege that A., the obligor in the bond for title, had been paid his debt, was properly dismissed on [5] 5. A witness testified that during certain years one Stark was engaged in lending money on real estate, and that B. F. Gilmer applied to Stark for a loan of money, Stark demanding a lien upon lot 95, and Gilmer de-ests might be determined by the decree, which clining to give it for the reason that it belonged to his wife. In rebuttal and as an impeachment of this testimony, the tax digest for these years was offered in evidence to show that Stark returned no property for taxation. The tax digest was entirely irrelevant for that purpose, and was properly rejected. Judgment reversed. All the Justices con cur. (146 Ga. 717) FIRST NAT. BANK OF COMMERCE et al. v. MCFARLIN. (No. 370.) general demurrer. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Creditors' Suit, Cent. Dig. §§ 154-156, 163.] Error from Superior Court, Franklin County; J. N. Worley, Judge. Action between the First National Bank of Commerce and others and Mrs. Doskie McFarlin. From the judgment, the Bank and others bring error. Affirmed. Geo. L. Goode, of Carnesville, for plaintiffs in error. J. H. & Parke Skelton, of Hartwell, (Supreme Court of Georgia. April 12, 1917.) Sam B. Swilling, of Royston, E. C. Stark, of (Syllabus by the Court.) 1. CREDITORS' SUIT 7-EXECUTION 38 EQUITABLE "A debtor has no leviable interest in land Commerce, and W. R. Little, of Carnesville, for defendant in error. which he has conveyed to secure a debt until the Justices concur. the law, his possession was not a violation of the act; and that to consider the law as applying to liquor in possession before the law became effective would be to give to it a construction repugnant to the Constitution of Georgia (Civil Code, § 6358), and to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. That this contention Intoxicating liquors being subject to the police power of a state, even when such liquors is unsound we entertain no shadow of a are acquired legally they are taken with their doubt. Intoxicating liquors are peculiarly, inherent infirmities, and subject to such legis- beyond all cavil, the subject of police power lation as the state may enact under its police of the state, and their inherent evil qualities power. The legislation, as an incident to the main purpose, may impair the property value of are so well recognized as to form an unquesthe liquor or destroy it altogether, when such tioned basis for such exercise of power. We incidental result is necessary to the main pur-will therefore not consume space for the citapose and enforcement of the law. The act of tion of authorities on this point. The exerthe General Assembly (Acts [Ex. Sess.] 1915, p. 90) which forbids the possession of more than cise of this power by Legislatures, as well as a specified amount of intoxicating liquor at one the adjudications of the courts, has been time applies alike to that which was acquired progressive toward the complete outlawing before and after May 1, 1916, and is not unconstitutional for any of the reasons assigned. of intoxicating liquors. The present nearly [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Intoxicating harmonious view of the question did not alLiquors, Cent. Dig. §§ 4, 17, 18, 29, 121.] ways prevail. There was a time when many 2. CRIMINAL LAW 10642 GROUNDS OF things now forbidden by law, because harmMOTION FOR NEW TRIAL-CONSIDERATION. ful to the public morals, were permitted to Grounds of a motion for a new trial not ap-flourish without let or hindrance. Lotteries, proved by the trial judge cannot be considered. The evidence warranted the verdict. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2676, 2887, 2948.] Fish, C. J., and Atkinson, J., dissenting. Error from City Court of Savannah; John Rourke, Jr., Judge. Andrew D. Barbour was convicted in the city court of Savannah on a count charging him with having in his possession at one time more than one gallon of vinous liquor. His motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were overruled, and he brings error. Affirmed. Andrew D. Barbour was convicted on an accusation charging him with a violation of the prohibition law. The accusation contained six counts. The defendant was found guilty on the fourth count. He filed a motion for a new trial, and a motion in arrest of judgment. Both motions were overruled, and he excepted. The fourth count charged him with having in his possession at one time more than one gallon of vinous liquor. bucket shops, and numerous other activities, as well as barrooms, were considered legitimate. Few will now be found to defend any of these. The dangerous character of alcoholic liquors is universally recognized by the courts. The fact that it is an article fraught with such dangerous perils to the morals, good order, health, and safety of the people places it upon a different plane from that of other kinds of business. It is well settled that in legislating in behalf of the public morals, health, and safety, the state by reason of its police power may enact laws which incidentally impair property values (Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205), or destroy them altogether (Cureton v. State, 135 Ga. 660, 70 S. E. 332, 49 L. R. A. [N. S.] 182; Southern Ex. Co. v. Whittle, 194 Ala. 406, 69 South. 652, L. R. A. 1916C, 278; Glenn v. So. Ex. Co., 170 N. C. 286, 87 S. E. 136; Preston v. Drew, 33 Me. 558, 54 Am. Dec. 639; Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 34 Sup. Ct. 281, 58 L Ed. 539; Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U. S. 31, 29 Robt. L. Colding, of Savannah, for plain-Sup. Ct. 10, 53 L. Ed. 75). It is true that the tiff in error. Walter C. Hartridge, Sol. Gen., of Savannah, for the State. GILBERT, J. (after stating the facts as above). [1] 1. Among the provisions of the prohibition law enacted at the extraordinary session of the General Assembly in 1915 (Acts [Ex. Sess.] 1915, p. 90), which became effective on May 1, 1916, was that which forbids any person to have in his possession at any one time more than one gallon of vinous liquors. It was for a violation of this provision of the law that the plaintiff in error was sentenced. He insists that he possessed the wine prior to May 1st; that, having acquired the wine when it was lawful to do so, and before his property rights were affected by Constitution declares, "Protection to person * * ** is The police power of the states touching the health, morals, property, peace, good order, and dignity of the people is essential to the existence and prosperity of the states; and this power has never been delegated to the federal government, nor restrained by the Constitution of the United States. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357, 28 L. Ed. 923; In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 Sup. Ct. 865, 35 L. Ed. 572; United States v. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 15 Sup. | afterward, this power being a necessary inCt. 249, 39 L. Ed. 325. The impairment of property value or destruction is not the primary object, but is permitted because it is a necessary incident to the main purpose. Intoxicating liquors being subject to the police power of the state, they are, even when lawfully acquired, taken with their inherent infirmities, and subject to such legislation as may thereafter be enacted within the police powers of the state. "The ultimate purpose and end of prohibition is to prevent the use of liquor as a beverage. This ultimate end is approached step by step, and when the preponderant and prevailing morality of the nation believes that the public welfare demands the final step, the way will be found to accomplish the end." State v. Phillips, 109 Miss. 22, 67 So. 651, L. R. A. 1915D, 530. As a means of preventing the use of liquor as a beverage the state has the power, it is universally admitted, to prohibit traffic in intoxicating liquors, and this power would be futile unless there was also full power to make it effective. Since the state has the power to prohibit the manufacture and sale, it also has the power, as an incident to the right, to restrain the means by which intoxicating liquors for personal use can be obtained. Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 242 U. S. 311, 320, 37 Sup. Ct. 180, 61 L. Ed. 326. It follows as an irresistible conclusion that likewise the state may constitutionally prohibit the possession of intoxicating liquors, as an incident to the main purpose. The act in question became effective many months after its passage and approval by the Governor. Notwithstanding this fact, it | is insisted that its provisions do not apply to liquors in possession at the time it became effective. If this were true, the beneficent effects of the legislation would be a negligible quantity. If intoxicating liquors in possession of persons in Georgia at the time were not affected by the law, surely such liquor stored in other states, but owned by citizens of Georgia, would not be affected. To follow this reasoning would lead us to the inevitable result that no liquor in existence prior to May 1, 1916, upon the inhabited globe would be affected by the legislation, and hence, if found in possession after May 1, 1916, such possession would not be made illegal by the act. It requires no argument to those who are at all familiar with the ingenuity of those who desire to traffic in intoxicating liquors, to demonstrate that under such a construction the most stringent prohibition laws conceivable would become a matter of jest. Dealers in alcoholic liquors have never been known to be overnice and delicate in adhering to the strict letter of the law. For the reasons above stated the state may not only limit the quantity of liquor a person may possess, but it may forbid him to possess any at all, whether ac cident to the main purpose of the legislation, and to the enforcement of the law. All pro visions of this law are incidental to the main purpose. Ownership and property rights are distinct from the matter of possession. But neither ownership, nor property rights, nor possession will be permitted to hinder the operation of laws enacted for the public welfare. Man possesses no right under the laws or Constitutions, state or federal, which is not subservient to the public welfare. The public, through its proper channels, may commandeer a proportion of his property or his income for the support of the government. At his death it may subject to the public use a portion of his estate; and when necessary for the public defense in times of war, it may conscript such citizens as are required, and expend their very lifeblood that the state may live. Under the police power it may slaughter diseased cattle; it may destroy unwholesome food; it may compel vaccination; it may confine the insane or those afflicted with contagious disease; suppress obscene publications and houses of ill fame (Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 14 Sup. Ct. 499, 38 L. Ed. 385); and require sanitary conditions in the homes and premises of citizens even against their will. It would be preposterous then to deny the power of the state to forbid the possession by its citizens of that which is destructive of the public welfare, or its right to destroy entirely such baneful products when necessary to protect the morals, the health, and the safety of the public. As was said by Chief Justice Shaw in Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. (61 Mass.) 53: "All property in this commonwealth is * * held subject to those general regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general welfare." In Reg. v. Vine, L. R. 10 Q. B. 195, where the question was whether the enactment that "every person convicted of felony shall forever be disqualified from selling spirits by retail" affected a person convicted of felony before the passage of the act, Cockburn, C. J., speaking for the court, said that it did affect him, and rendered his license void. Every member of society impliedly assents that his own individual welfare, his property, his liberty, and his life shall yield to the welfare of the community, and, if necessary, shall be sacrificed to the public good. "Salus populi suprema lex." We hold, therefore, that the law is not retroactive, nor is it repugnant to the Constitution of Georgia, nor to the Constitution of the United States for any of the reasons assigned. Delaney v. Plunkett, 146 Ga. 547, 91 S. E. 561. [2] 2. All other assignments of error have been decided adversely to the contentions of the plaintiff in error in Delaney v. Plunkett, supra, and in Bunger v. State, 92 S. E. 72. The evidence authorized the verdict. The 544, 65 S. E. 352, and Fears v. State, 102 Ga. | a new trial and in arrest of judgment were 274, 29 S. E. 463, are not applicable to the overruled, and he brings error. Affirmed. facts of this case, since both of these cases were decided prior to any legislation in this state limiting the quantity of intoxicating liquors that one may lawfully possess. The court having declined to approve any of the grounds of the amended motion for a new trial, they cannot be considered. Dickens v. State, 137 Ga. 523, 73 S. E. 826. The evi All the Justices con-i dence warranted the verdict. FISH, C. J., and ATKINSON, J. (dissenting). For reasons stated in the dissenting opinion in the case of Delaney v. Plunkett, 146 Ga. 547, 91 S. E. 561, so much of section 16 of the act approved November 18, 1915 (Acts 1915 [Ex. Sess.] p. 90), as purports to inhibit the keeping on hand liquors owned and possessed in this state, which were lawfully so owned and possessed prior to the first day of May, 1916, is violative of those provisions of the state and federal Constitutions, which guarantee the right of private property and immunity from retroactive laws. This case does not involve the constitution ality of section 20 of the act approved No vember 17, 1915. This dissent does not apply to the ruling announced in the second headnote. (146 Ga. 672) BUNGER v. STATE. (No. 335.) (Supreme Court of Georgia. April 10, 1917.) (Syllabus by the Court.) 1. STATUTES 21-ENACTMENT-CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. of Savannah on an accusation charging him John D. Bunger was tried in the city court with a violation of the prohibition law. The accusation contained four counts.. Upon two counts the defendant was found not guilty. One count was abandoned, and upon the fourth count he was found guilty. He filed a motion for a new trial, and a motion in arrest of judgment. Both motions were overruled, and he excepted. The count upon which he was convicted charged him with unlawfully having in his possession at one time more than two quarts of spirituous liquors. Bonhan & Herzog, of Savannah, for plaintiff in error. Walter C. Hartridge, Sol. Gen., of Savannah, for the State. GILBERT, J. [1] The act of the General Assembly entitled "An act to further mitigate the evils of intemperance and to make more effective the laws touching the sale and keeping on hand of certain prohibited liqours," etc. approved November 18, 1915 (Acts 1915, Extraordinary Session, p. 90), is not null and void for any of the reasons assigned. The Constitution (article 3, § 4, par. 3) limits the session of the General Assembly to 50 days, to which there is but one exception, which is therein stated to be a pending impeachment trial. Civil Code 1910, § 6417. "Neither house shall adjourn for more than three days, or to any other place, without the consent of the other; and in case of a disagreement between the two houses on a question of adjournment, the Governor may adjourn either or both of them." Constitution, art. 3, § 7, par. 24 (Civil Code 1910, § 6452). The act of the General Assembly entitled "An act to further mitigate the evils of intemperance The General Assembly may adjourn sine and to make more effective the laws touching die at any time within the prescribed limit, the sale and keeping on hand of certain prohib-provided the two houses comply with the reited liquors," etc., approved November 18, 1915 (Acts 1915 [Ex. Sess.] p. 90), is not null and void for any of the reasons assigned. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 18-27.] 2. STATES 41-POWER OF EXECUTIVE-CON VENING GENERAL ASSEMBLY. The Constitution (article 5, § 1, par. 13 [Civ. Code 1910, § 6482]) empowers the Governor to "convoke the General Assembly on extraordinary occasions," and in the exercise of such prerogative his action is not reviewable. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see States, Cent. Dig. § 47.] 3. OTHER ASSIGNMENTS-FORMER DECISION. All other assignments of error on constitutional grounds which were properly made have been decided adversely to the contention of the plaintiff in error in the cases of Delaney v. Plunkett, 146 Ga. 547, 91 S. E. 561, and Barbour v. State, 92 S. E. 70. The evidence authorized the verdict. Fish, C. J., and Atkinson, J., dissenting. Error from City Court of Savannah; John Rourke, Jr., Judge. John D. Bunger was convicted of the violation of the prohibition law, his motions for quirements of the Constitution. A failure on the part of either house, or of both, to conform to these requirements will not have the effect of abrogating or modifying the limitation of 50 days fixed by the Constitution. To reach any other conclusion would be unauthorized. If a failure to comply with the terms of the Constitution by either house as to agreement on adjournment can extend the session beyond 50 days, it follows that the constitutional limitation is subject to the whims, caprices, and mistakes of the General Assembly. If either house or both should vote to adjourn contrary to the constitutional requirement, the result would be the same as if no action whatever had been taken. [2] 2. The Constitution (article 5, § 1, par. 13) empowers the Governor to "convoke the General Assembly on extraordinary occasions." Civil Code 1910, § 6482. He alone is to determine when there is an extraordinary occasion for convening the Legislature, |