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CHAPTER XIV.

OF THE OPINIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHERS AND LEGISLATORS OF ANTIQUITY, CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLE

OF POPULATION,-PLATO.

(1) In this appeal to ancient history on the subject of the principle of population, a just exposition of the views of legislators and philosophers of early times cannot be misplaced, especially as the inquiry will terminate, it is hoped, in delivering some of the brightest names of antiquity from the foulest aspersion that can be cast upon human beings, the supposition of their having deliberately and systematically enjoined infanticide.

(2) One of the most judicious of our writers, Dr. Paley, says, that "the influence of names is in exact proportion to the want of knowledge1,”—an aphorism which, though it may more frequently be an apology for the indolence than a spur to the industry of the human mind, and give far oftener presumption to conceited ignorance, than confidence to real knowledge, is, nevertheless, under certain limitations, undoubtedly true, especially in matters open to general observation and experience. As to the subject of population, at all events, it must be presumed that the longer the world has endured, the more perfectly must it have become known; and it seems, therefore, somewhat to reverse the order of things, to seek for proofs of its nature and effects, or the opinions of mankind regarding them, as far back as nearly two thousand years,

1 1 Paley, Moral Philosophy, Pref., xvi.

I am, however, perfectly willing to remit the appeal which the present argument involves, to the knowledge and experience of any preceding period of history, however near, or however remote; being firmly convinced that the divine apophthegm, " it is not good for man to be alone," will be as true to the last, as it was in the first, and has been in every stage of human existence.

(3) The principal antagonist of human increase, referring to the philosophers and legislators of ancient times, omits all mention of those who, he knows, do not concur with him, and quotes those only, who, he supposes, do. The institutions of Confucius and Zoroaster, which, we are instructed to believe, had an especial view to the encouragement of population; and which have continued to influence an almost incalculably greater number of human beings, than those to which he has referred, are, therefore, left unnoticed; even the authority of the greatest political philosopher, (to say nothing of his more sacred pretensions,) which the world ever beheld, Moses, is not once glanced at, while the opinions, or rather reveries, of one or two of those, who are denominated the "thinking men of Greece," are brought forward, and, as I shall prove, grossly misinterpreted, in order to represent antiquity as fully imbued with the belief, that the principle of population had an evil tendency to increase. To redeem, then, these authorities, who are certainly amongst the most celebrated of antiquity, from the imputation of holding the most erroneous views, and most heinous doctrines, regarding this subject; and, at the same time, to deliver the true principle of population from the disadvantage of their

1 See Du Halde, &c.

2 Zoroaster abhorred celibacy. Gibbon, vol. i., p. 324.

supposed hostility, is the purport of the present chapter. But in order to this, I must first take a summary view of the political condition of the states of ancient Greece.

(4) The republics of Greece, constituting what are now generally denominated the free states of antiquity, were, at the period when their legislators and philosophers flourished, in the possession, principally, of the descendants of colonists and conquerors, who, having subdued the original inhabitants, reduced them to the condition of abject slavery'. The latter, vastly the most numerous body, the original and rightful possessors of the soil; of the same complexion and speaking often the same language, and consequently identified in their origin3, were nevertheless deprived of all political existence whatever; and, instead of possessing any property, were themselves, individually and universally, the property of others. The recollection of their past condition, (and some of them had been of the most exalted rank,) or any recognition that they had feelings and rights as human beings, little encumbered the politicians of Greece. It is utterly impossible, therefore, to describe the treatment these unhappy beings often received: not only was all the drudgery of existence imposed upon them, whether that of agriculture or the mechanical arts, but they were, in some of the states, subject to the caprice or cruelty of masters, whose atrocities regarding them have left no parallel in human history. And still it is from viewing the institutions of Greece, that declaimers can rave about human rights, and infidels cant about moral systems, which are to disparage Christianity. If such a people had

1

Thucyd., 1. i., c. 101.

Mitford, Hist. Greece, vol. ii., p. 81.

2 Gillies, Hist. Greece, vol. i., p. 157. Thucyd., l. i., c. 101.

really held the notion of the natural redundancy of human beings, it would have suited their political code and conduct, and formed, I think, but a very suspicious argument in its favour. But I deny the assumption altogether.

3

(5) The successors, then, of these colonists and conquerors, owned the property of the entire country, which was, in each state, parcelled out amongst them, either originally, or, at subsequent periods, according to the number of the citizens; reserving, however, a considerable quantity, perhaps, unappropriated, as a common stock 1. Now, as a share of this property constituted the only means of subsistence, (for the "thinking persons of Greece" rejected all personal industry with a view to obtaining a livelihood, whether mechanical or agricultural, as positively infamous; an opinion fully sanctioned by both Plato and Aristotle, in their imaginary Republics,) the necessity they were under of keeping the population, as much as possible, at one level, is instantly obvious. Had the citizens multiplied beyond the number of their allotments, the excess would have been unprovided for; had they fallen far short of the latter, the state would have become weakened and endangered. Hence arose the care of their lawgivers, and the expedients of their philosophers, on the subject of population. But, although both alternatives were anticipated by them, and corrections prescribed for each, agreeably to the pernicious principle of their entire system, still I will venture to assert, that their great anxiety was about a ruinous diminution, rather than a pernicious increase, of their citizens; and tenfold 1 Aristot., De Repub., 1. iv., c. 11.

2 Bacon's Essays, Works, vol. i.,

p. 327.

Plato, De Legibus, 1. ii., and 1. vii. Aristotle, De Repub., 1. iii., c. 5., p. 344, A. Ibid., 1. vii., c. 10, (437, D.)

more precautions were dictated with reference to the former, than to the latter case.

(6) Such was the basis of their political philosophy, though it may well be doubted whether this equality was ever fully realized; if it were, it is quite clear it was of no permanent continuance. Notwithstanding all their precautions, property accumulated in the hands of some citizens, others fell into decay; the latter had, therefore, to be sustained out of the public stock1; and partly, perhaps, by the munificence of the wealthy. In this state of things, it is easy to conclude, that both these ranks, comprehending the whole body of the people, would be generally averse from any increase in the numbers of the freemen. But the learned historian of Greece, who entirely confirms the preceding view of the subject, has so well described the feelings and interests of the citizens under these circumstances, that I shall conclude this hasty introduction to the question at issue in his words. Alluding to Xenophon, he says: "the increase of "citizens, the only secure and effective strength of a "state, appears to be totally out of his consideration. "But from all the remaining writers of the age we

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may gather, that the spirit of every Grecian govern"ment, whether oligarchy or democracy, was generally "adverse to an increase of citizens: for every citi

zen having an interest in a certain public capital, "increase of citizens was increase of partners. Un"less the danger was pressing, the general disposition, "therefore, was always adverse to an increase. The "rich disliked it, as our parishes commonly dislike 66 any increase in their respective inhabitants; because 1 Mitford, History of Greece, vol. iii., 291. Demosthenes. Leland, vol, i., pp 222, 223, 224, 225. 2 Isocrates, Oratio Areop., pp. 29.

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