Types of Ethical Theory, Τόμος 2Clarendon Press, 1886 |
Άλλες εκδόσεις - Προβολή όλων
Συχνά εμφανιζόμενοι όροι και φράσεις
admit æsthetic affections animal Aristotle authority beauty become benevolence chap character claim conception conduct conflict conscience constitutes Cudworth Descartes desire difference distinction Divine doctrine duty elements essence experience expression external F. H. Bradley fact faculty feeling former function give happiness hedonism hedonistic Herbert Spencer higher human Hutcheson Ibid idea impulse inner instinct intellectual intuitive J. S. Mill James Mill lative latter Leslie Stephen less means ment merit mind moral consciousness moral constitution moral judgment Moral Sense moral sentiments motive nature never object obligation ourselves outward passion perception phenomena Plato possible present principle Professor Sidgwick Prudence psychological reason recognise regard relation relative reverence right and wrong rule scale Science of Ethics self-consciousness sensation sentient Shaftesbury simply social springs of action supposed theory things thought tion true truth Utilitarian virtue whole word
Δημοφιλή αποσπάσματα
Σελίδα 318 - Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures: no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.
Σελίδα 308 - ... pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.
Σελίδα 305 - Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne.
Σελίδα 332 - I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.
Σελίδα 174 - Let them melt away as waters which run continually: when he bendeth his bow to shoot his arrows, let them be as cut in pieces.
Σελίδα 318 - ... the test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against quantity, being the preference felt by those who, in their opportunities of experience, to which must be added their habits of self-consciousness and selfobservation, are best furnished with the means of comparison.
Σελίδα 310 - I may therefore conclude that the passion of laughter is nothing else but sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly...
Σελίδα 308 - I believe that these sources of evidence, impartially consulted, will declare that desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable or rather two parts of the same phenomenon; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact...
Σελίδα 326 - Intense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure — Such marks in pleasures and in pains endure. Such pleasures seek, if private be thy end: If it be public, wide let them extend. Such pains avoid, whichever be thy view: If pains must come, let them extend to few.
Σελίδα 309 - ... to think of an object as desirable (unless for the sake of its consequences) and to think of it as pleasant are one and the same thing; and that to desire anything except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility.