that the penalty is no part of the crime, but is simply a consequence of its commission, and hence that an act may constitute a crime although no penalty is prescribed for its commission.65 And in those jurisdictions in which the common law of crimes is effective, a violation of a public statute is indictable at common law where the statute itself prescribes no penalty.66 In any event, the penalty need not be provided by the law defining or denouncing the offense, but it is sufficient if there is a general statute providing a punishment for crimes for which no specific penalty is otherwise provided.67 As a rule, if the purpose of a statute is to protect the public genN. H. 257; State v. Parker, 91 N. C. 650. Where provisions of a city charter elating to disorderly persons contain no provision for the punishment of the prohibited acts, it is to that extent nugatory, and a person convicted thereof cannot be punished. People v. Lunn, 81 N. Y. Misc. 476, 143 N. Y. Supp. 401; People v. Schermerhorn, 59 N. Y. Misc. 146, 112 N. Y. Supp. 222. Where this rule obtains, the repeal of the provision fixing the punishment for an offense leaves no crime although the provision defining the crime is not repealed. People v. McNulty, 93 Cal. 427, 26 Pac. 597, 29 Pac. 61, writ of error dismissed 149 U. S. 645, 37 L. Ed. 882, 13 Sup. Ct. 959. It is not necessary that each section of the act should contain or disclose the penalty for its infraction, but it is sufficient if the penalty appears in the closing section which is made applicable to the earlier sections. United States v. Crosby, 1 Hughes 448, Fed. Cas. No. 14,893. 65 United States v. O'Connor, 31 Fed. 449; Jenkins v. State, 14 Ga. App. 276, 80 S. E. 688. But a person canot be punished for an offense where no penalty is prescribed for its commission by the statute creating it or otherwise. Gibson v. State, 38 Ga. 571. 66 Keller v. State, 11 Md. 525, 69 Am. Dec. 226; State v. Fletcher, 5 For jurisdictions in which the common law obtains, see § 20, supra. 67 California. Ex parte Ellsworth, 165 Cal. 677, 133 Pac. 272. District of Columbia. Palmer v. Lenovitz, 35 App. Cas. 303. Florida. Fine v. Moran, 74 Fla. 417, 77 So. 533; Douglas v. Smith, 66 Fla. 460, 63 So. 844; Stinson v. State, 63 Fla. 42, 58 So. 722; Snowden v. Brown, 60 Fla. 212, 53 So. 548. Iowa. Bopp v. Clark, 165 Iowa 697, 147 N. W. 172, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 493, Ann. Cas. 1916 E 417; State v. York, 131 Iowa 635, 109 N. W. 122; State v. Shea, 106 Iowa 735, 72 N. W. 300; State v. Conlee, 25 Iowa 237. New York. People v. Long Island R. Co., 134 N. Y. 506, 31 N. E. 873, aff'g 58 Hun 412, 12 N. Y. Supp. 41. General provisions of this char acter apply to statutes adopted after their enactment. State v. York, 131 Iowa 635, 109 N. W. 122. A provision that whenever an act is declared to be a misdemeanor and no penalty is provided for its commission, it shall be punished in a certain manner, does not apply to any act which the statute prohibiting it does not declare to be a misdemeanor. State v. Gaunt, 13 Ore. 115, 9 Pac. 55. And it has been held that a pro erally, the use of the word "fine" in prescribing the penalty for doing an act makes such act a criminal offense, 68 especially when the act is also denominated an offense,69 or the word conviction is also used.70 And the same is true where a statute makes an act punishable either by fine or imprisonment,71 or by a fine, and, in default thereof, imprisonment.72 And an act may also be a crime where the statute uses the word penalty, if the context shows that it was used in the sense of fine.73 If a statute prohibits an act which is not criminal at common law and at the same time provides a civil penalty, the act is not indictable. But where the act was criminal at common law, or is already prohibited by a former statute, the imposition of a civil penalty will not take away the power to punish by indictment.75 And the same is true where the statute itself contains any provisions showing that the legislature did not intend the civil penalty to be exclusive.76 IV. EXPIRATION AND REPEAL OF LAWS § 77. Express repeal. Of course a statute may be expressly repealed by the legislature.77 A repealing clause in a statute is to vision that persons doing certain prohibited acts shall be punished "as for misdemeanor," does not declare such acts to be misdemeanors, and hence is not within a general statute providing a punishment for misdemeanors for which no other punishment is specially prescribed. People v. Lunn, 81 N. Y. Misc. 476, 143 N. Y. Supp. 401; People v. Schermerhorn, 59 N. Y. Misc. 146, 112 N. Y. Supp. 222. 68 United States v. Joyce, 138 Fed. 455; Dyer v. County of Placer, 90 Cal. 276, 27 Pac. 197; Bopp v. Clark, 165 Tov a 697, 147 N. W. 172, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 493, Ann. Cas. 1916 E. 417; State v. Ostwalt, 118 N. C. 1208, 24 S. E. 660, 32 L. R. A. 396. "A fine," said Lord Coke, "signifieth a pecuniary punishment for an offense or contempt against the king." 1 Co. Litt. 126 b. 69 State v. Marshall, 64 N. H. 549, 15 Atl. 210, 1 L. R. A. 51. 70 Ex parte Howe, 26 Ore. 181, 37 Pac. 536. 71 State v. Ostwalt, 118 N. C. 1208, 24 S. E. 660, 32 L. R. A. 396. 72 See State v. Burton, 113 N. C. 655, 18 S. E. 657. Compare City of Oshkosh v. Schwartz, 55 Wis. 483, 13 N. W. 552. 73 Schick v. United States, 195 U. S. 65, 49 L. Ed. 99, 24 Sup. Ct. 826, 1 Ann. Cas. 585; State v. Horgan, 55 Minn. 183, 56 N. W. 688. 74 People v. Shea, 3 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 562; People v. Stevens, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 341; Ott v. Jordan, 116 Pa. St. 218, 9 Atl. 321. 75 People v. Shea, 3 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 562; Susquehannah & Bath Turnpike Road Co. v. People, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 267; People v. Stevens, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 341. 73 People v. Shea, 3 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 562; People v. Stevens, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 341. 77 Parshall v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. 177, 138 S. W. 759. See State v. Bielman, 86 Wash. 460, 150 Pac. 1194. A statute fixing the rate of speed be construed in accordance with the rules applicable to the construction of statutes generally, and the intention of the legislature, as manifested in the statute containing it, will govern in determining what acts or parts of acts are repealed thereby.78 A provision in a statute repealing all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with it, will operate to repeal all statutes which are clearly repugnant to it, to the extent of such repugnancy, but not statutes which, by a reasonable construction, can be brought into harmony with it.79 Such a provision, therefore, repeals nothing which would not be impliedly repealed without it,80 for, as we shall see, if two statutes are so inconsistent that they cannot stand together, the earlier statute is impliedly repealed by the later one.81 A repealing clause may be valid though contained in a statute all the other provisions of which are unconstitutional, where it clearly appears that it was the intention of the legislature to repeal the existing statutes in any event. But where the evident purpose was to make way for the new enactment, the repealing clause is dependent upon the other provisions of the act, and will fall with them if they are invalid.82 It has been held that a vote against local option in a particular locality does not operate to repeal a local option law which becomes. operative or inoperative in particular localities in accordance with. the decision of the voters, and hence does not prevent a conviction for a violation of the law while it was in effect or annul a previous at which automobiles may be driven, and providing that the limitations therein fixed shall be exclusive of all others fixed by any law of the state or of any political subdivision thereof, that cities, etc., shall have no power to enforce any ordinance inconsistent with its provisions, and that no such ordinance then in force or thereafter enacted shall have any force, operates to repeal such an existing ordinance, though the word repeal is not used. Ex parte Wright, 82 Tex. Cr. 247, 199 S. W. 486. 78 Parshall v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. 177, 138 S. W. 759. 79 State v. Drexel, 74 Neb. 776, 105 N. W. 174; Parshall v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. 177, 138 S. W. 759. So a statute which merely imposes a punishment for an offense and repeals all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with it does not repeal the provisions of a previous act defining such offense. State v. Marks, 127 La. 1031, 54 So. 340; State v. Cain, 106 La. 708, 31 So. 300. 80 Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 155 Fed. 945, aff'd 208 U. S. 452, 52 L. Ed. 567, 28 Sup. Ct. 313; Struthers v. People, 116 Ill. App. 481; State v. Yardley, 95 Tenn. 546, 32 S. W. 481, 34 L. R. A. 656. 81 See § 78, infra. 82 Parshall v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. 177, 138 S. W. 759, and cases cited. And see State v. King, 124 Md. 491, 92 Atl. 1041, and § 78, infra. conviction for such a violation.88 But there is also authority to the contrary.84 $ 78. Implied repeal of statutes. If two statutes are so inconsistent that they cannot stand together, the earlier act is impliedly repealed by the later one,85 to the extent of such repugnancy,86 un 83 People v. Brown, 273 Ill. 169, 112 N. E. 462, Ann. Cas. 1918 D 772, aff'g 196 Ill. App. 400; Com. v. Hoke & Yocum, 14 Bush. (77 Ky.) 668. As to the effect of the repeal of a statute generally see § 80, infra. 84 Halfin v. State, 5 Tex. App. 212. 85 United States. United States v. Stafoff, 268 Fed. 417; United States V. Puhac, 268 Fed. 392; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 155 Fed. 945, aff'd 208 U. S. 452, 52 L. Ed. 567, 28 Sup. Ct. 313; United States v. Barr, 4 Sawy. 254, Fed Cas. No. 14,527. Alabama. Jordan v. State, 15 Ala. 746; City of Birmingham v. Baranco, 4 Ala. App. 279, 58 So. 944. Illinois. Wilson v. Ohio & M. Ry. Co., 64 Ill. 542, 16 Am. Rep. 565; Sullivan V. People, 15 Ill. 233; Struthers v. People, 116 Ill. App. 481. Indiana. Johns v. State, 78 Ind. 332, 41 Am. Rep. 577; Huber v. State, 25 Ind. 175; Wall v. State, 23 Ind. 150. Kentucky. Com. v. Boyd, 181 Ky. 382, 205 S. W. 390. Louisiana. State v. Jones, 127 La. 768, 53 So. 985; State v. Hickman, 127 La. 442, 53 So. 680; State v. Callahan, 109 La. 946, 33 So. 931. Maryland. Beall v. Southern Maryland Agr. Ass'n of Prince George's County, 136 Md. 305, 110 Atl. 502. Massachusetts. Flaherty Thomas, 12 Allen 428. V. Michigan. Shannon v. People, 5 Mich. 71. Mississippi. Miller v. State, 33 Miss. 356, 69 Am. Dec. 351. Missouri. State v. Shields, 230 Mo. 91, 130 S. W. 298; State v. Dolan, 93 Mo. 467, 6 S. W. 366. Oklahoma. Crowell v. State, 6 Okla. Cr. 148, 117 Pac. 883. Oregon. State v. Gaunt, 13 Ore. 115, 9 Pac. 55. Pennsylvania. Homer v. Com., 106 Pa. St. 221, 51 Am. Rep. 521. Tennessee. State v. Yardley, 95 Tenn. 546, 32 S. W. 481, 34 L. R. A. 656; Wharton v. State, 5 Coldw. 1, 94 Am. Dec. 214. Vermont. In re Turner, 92 Vt. 210, 102 Atl. 943. Michigan. In re Lambrecht, 137 Mich. 450, 100 N. W. 606. New York. Mongeon v. People, 55 N. Y. 613. Texas. Parshall v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. 177, 138 S. W. 759. Where the new act is held not to apply to persons convicted of offenses before it took effect because it is ex post facto as to them, there is no repeal by implication as to such persons. In re Lee, 177 Cal. 690, 171 Pac. 958. less it clearly appears that there was no such intention on the part of the legislature.87 And the same is true where a later act undertakes to cover the whole subject-matter of an earlier act, and is evidently intended as a substitute for it.88 Repeals by implication are not favored, however, and the general rule is that an intention to repeal a prior law will never be implied if it can be avoided by any reasonable construction of the statutes. If both acts can be given full force without conflict, or if the later act is merely affirmative, or cumulative, or auxiliary, and not inconsistent, the earlier act is not repealed, and both must stand.89 87 Cain v. State, 20 Tex. 355. There is no implied repeal where the later statute expressly states that it is supplementary to and in aid of the earlier one. People v. Harris, 123 N. Y. 70, 25 N. E. 317. 88 United States. United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88, 20 L. Ed. 153; Farley v. United States, 269 Fed. 721; United States v. Stafoff, 268 Fed. 417; United States v. Windham, 264 Fed. 376; United States v. Barr, 4 Sawy. 254, Fed. Cas. No. 14, 527. Alabama. City of Birmingham v. Baranco, 4 Ala. App. 279, 58 So. 944. Dakota. People v. Sponsler, 1 Dak. 289, 46 N. W. 459. Georgia. Horn v. State, 114 Ga. 509, 40 S. E. 768; Hardy v. State, 25 Ga. App. 287, 103 S. E. 267. Illinois. People v. Town of Thornton, 186 I. 162, 57 N. E. 841; Andrews v. People, 75 Ill. 605; Struthers v. People, 116 Ill. App. 481. Kentucky. Com. v. Boyd, 181 Ky. 382, 205 S. W. 390. Louisiana. State v. Jones, 127 La. 768, 53 So. 985. Maryland. Beall v. Southern Maryland Agr. Ass'n of Prince George's County, 136 Md. 305, 110 Atl. 502. Massachusetts. Com. v. Marshall, 11 Pick. 350, 22 Am Dec. 377; Com. v. Cooley, 10 Pick. 37. Michigan. People v. Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 559, 171 N. W. 557; Shanv. People, 5 Mich. 71. non Missouri. State v. Shields, 230 Mo. 91, 130 S. W. 298. Texas. Robertson v. State, 70 Tex. Burks v. Com., 126 Va. 763, 101 S. E. 230. A statute covering the whole subject of cattle stealing withdraws that subject from the general statute on the subject of larceny, and repeals the latter to that extent, especially where the two are inconsistent. State Hickman, 127 La. 442, 53 So. 680. V. In United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 88, 20 L. Ed. 153, it was held that a statute which embraced all the provisions of a former statute on the same subject, and also contained new provisions, and which imposed different and additional penalties, operated as a repeal of the earlier statute, without any repealing clause. In Pleasant Grove City v. Lindsay, 41 Utah 154, 125 Pac. 389, a statute providing methods for the entire regulation of the liquor traffic, and prohibiting all cities from interfering with or permitting the traffic excèpt upon the terms and conditions provided for in the act, was held to impliedly repeal all municipal ordinances on the subject. 89 United States. United States v. Wright, 229 U. S. 226, 57 L. Ed. 1160, 33 Sup. Ct. 630; Ex parte Crow Dog, |