§ 90. Intent may be inferred from circumstances. § 91. Criminal intention presumed from act. § 92. Responsibility for unintended results. § 93. Natural and probable consequences. § 94. Presumptions and inferences as to specific intent. § 95. Repentance and change of intent. $ 102. $103. - Good motive. - Religious belief and belief in impropriety of law. § 82. Definition of intent. "Intent is the purpose or design with which an act is done, and involves the will." It has been defined to be the purpose to use a particular means to effect a definite result." In statutory crimes the criminal intent is the doing of the act prohibited with the intent charged in the statute. Intent is to be dis accomplish the purpose. Jones v. State, 13 Ala. App. 10, 68 So. 690. 3 Greene v. Fankhauser, 137 N. Y. App. Div. 124, 121 N. Y. Supp. 1004. To establish perjury it is not necessary to establish any other intent than that specified in the statute. People v. Corrigan, 195 N. Y. 1, 87 N. E. 792, rev'g 129 N. Y. App. Div. 62, 113 N. Y. Supp. 504, and aff'g 129 N. Y. App. Div. 75, 113 N. Y. Supp. 513. tinguished from motive, which is the moving cause which induces action, and has to do wholly with desire.* § 83. Necessity for criminal intent-In general. No principle of the common law is better settled or more generally applicable than the principle that an act is not a crime if the mind of the person doing the act is innocent. The maxim is, "Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea." A wrongful act and a wrongful intent must concur. And generally this is equally true in the case of statutory offenses. But it is within the power of the legislature to dispense with the necessity for a criminal intent, and to punish particular 4 See § 101, infra. 5 Alabama. State v. Southern Exp. Co., 200 Ala. 31, 75 So. 343; Gordon v. State, 52 Ala. 308, 23 Am. Rep. 575; Jones v. State, 13 Ala. App. 10, 68 So. 690. California. People v. White, 34 Cal. 183. Connecticut. Myers v. State, 1 Conn. 502. Florida, Smith v. State, 71 Fla. 639, 71 So. 915. Georgia. Stern v. State, 53 Ga. 229, 21 Am. Rep. 266. Illinois. Meadowcroft v. People, 163 Ill. 56, 45 N. E. 991, 35 L. R. A. 176, 54 Am. St. Rep. 447. Indiana. Fritz v. State, 178 Ind. 463, 99 N. E. 727. Kansas. State v. Eastman, 60 Kan. 557, 57 Pac. 109; Wagstaff v. Schippel, 27 Kan. 450, Louisiana. State v. Irvine, 126 La. 434, 52 So. 567. Michigan. People v. Rice, 161 Mich. 657, 126 N. W. 981; People v. Welch, 71 Mich. 548, 39 N. W. 747, 1 L. R. A. 385. Mississippi. Miles V. State, 99 Miss. 165, 54 So. 946. Blacklock, 23 New Mexico. State v. N. M. 251, 167 Pac. 714. New York. People v. Corrigan, 195 N. Y. 1, 87 N. E. 792, rev 'g 129 N. Y. App. Div. 62, 113 N. Y. Supp 504, and aff 'g 129 N. Y. App. Div. 75, 113 N. Y. Supp. 513; People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286, 62 L. R. A. 193; People v. Flack, 125 N. Y. 324, 26 N. E. 267, 11 L. R. A. 807; People v. D'Antonio, 150 App. Div. 109, 134 N. Y. Supp. 657; Greene v. Fankhauser, 137 App. Div. 124, 121 N. Y. Supp. 1004. Ohio. Birney v. State, 8 Ohio 230. Pennsylvania. Com. v. Weiss, 139 Pa. St. 247, 21 Atl. 10, 11 L. R. A. 530, 23 Am. St. Rep. 182. Washington. State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 Pac. 1020, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1216, Ann. Cas. 1912 B 917. England. Levet's Case, Cro. Car. 538, 1 Hale, P. C. 474; Rider v. Wood, 2 El. & El. 338; Reg. v. Tinkler, 1 Fost. & F. 513; Reg. v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. Div. 168; Chisholm v. Doulton, 22 Q. B. Div. 736. The necessity for showing intent in prosecutions for particular offenses is considered in the chapters dealing specifically with the various crimes. See chaps. 9-47, infra. acts without regard to the mental attitude of the doer. And even at common law ignorance of law is generally no excuse for crime although it may negative the existence of an actual criminal intent." § 84. Accident. Generally a person cannot be held criminally responsible for an act or omission which was the result of an unavoidable accident or casualty, which by the exercise of ordinary prudence he could not reasonably have anticipated or guarded against. This is true, for example, where a person kills or injures 10 another as the result of such an accident; or where a railroad company accidentally violates a statute requiring it to provide separate coaches for white and colored passengers.11 But one may be criminally responsible for the result of an accident if it was due to such carelessness and recklessness on his part as to indicate a disregard for the safety of others.12 The effect of a mistake of law 18 or fact 14 on criminal responsibility is considered in other sections. § 85. Statutes rendering intent unnecessary. It is within the power of the legislature, if it sees fit, to dispense with the necessity for a criminal intent, and to punish particular acts without regard to the mental attitude of the doer, and there are many statutory offenses in which this has been done. Under statutes of this character, proof of a criminal intent is not necessary to sustain a conviction, and its absence is not a defense.15 The only intent neces sary in order to sustain a conviction under such a Masters v. District of Columbia. Florida. Smith v. State, 71 Fla. 639, 71 So. 915; Mills v. State, 58 Fla. 74, 51 So. 278. Idaho. State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699, 70 Pac. 1051. Illinois. People v. Johnson, 288 Ill. 442, 123 N. E. 543; People v. Fernow, 286 Ill. 627, 122 N. E. 155. Kansas. Hays v. Schuler, 107 Kan. 635, 193 Pac. 311; City of Emporia v. Becker, 76 Kan. 181, 90 Pac. 798, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 946. Kentucky. Goodman v. Com., 169 Ky. 542, 184 S. W. 876; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Com., 119 Ky. 519, 84 S. W. 566; Wayman v. Com., 14 Bush 466. Louisiana. State v. Quinn, 131 La. 490, 59 So. 913. Maine. State v. Huff, 89 Me. 521, 36 Atl. 1000. Maryland. State v. Baltimore & S. Steam Co., 13 Md. 181. Massachusetts. Com. v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141, 93 N. E. 249, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 467, 20 Ann. Cas. 1152; Com. v. Connelly, 163 Mass. 539, 40 N. E. 862; Com. v. Wentworth, 118 Mass. 441; Com. v. Farren, 9 Allen 489; Com. v. Boynton, 2 Allen 160; Com. v. Mash, 7 Metc. 472. Michigan. People v. Hatinger, 174 Mich. 333, 140 N. W. 648; People v. Rice, 161 Mich. 657, 126 N. W. 981; People v. Roby, 52 Mich. 577, 18 N. W. 365, 50 Am. Rep. 270; People v. Waldvogel, 49 Mich. 337, 13 N. W. 620. Minnesota. State v. Gilbert, 141 Minn. 263, 169 N. W. 790; State v. Shevlin-Carpenter Co., 99 Minn. 158, 108 N. W. 935, 9 Ann. Cas. 634; s. c., 102 Minn. 470, 113 N. W. 634, 114 N. W. 738, aff'd 218 U. S. 57, 54 L. Ed. 930, 30 Sup. Ct. 663. statute Montana. State v. Smith, 57 Mont. 563, 190 Pac. 107; State v. Kahn, 56 Mont. 108, 182 Pac. 107. Nebraska. State v. Heldenbrand, 62 Neb. 136, 87 N. W. 25, 89 Am. St. Rep. 743. Nevada. State v. Zichfeld, 23 Nev. 304, 46 Pac. 802, 34 L. R. A. 784, 62 Am. St. Rep. 800; State v. Gardner, 5 Nev. 377. New Jersey. Halsted v. State, 41 N. J. L. 552, 32 Am. Rep. 247. New Mexico. State v. Alva, 18 N. M. 143, 143 Pac. 209. New York. People v. Persce, 204 N. Y. 397, 97 N. E. 877, aff'g 135 App. Div. 919, 120 N. Y. Supp. 1141; People v. Corrigan, 195 N. Y. 1, 87 N. E. 792, rev'g 129 App. Div. 62, 113 N. Y. Supp. 504, and aff'g 129 App. Div. 75, 113 N. Y. Supp. 513; People v. D'Antonio, 150 App. Div. 109, 134 N. Y. Supp. 657; People v. Kimmel, 88 Misc. 38, 150 N. Y. Supp. 311. North Carolina. State v. McBrayer, 98 N. C. 619, 2 S. E. 755. Ohio. State v. Kelly, 54 Ohio St. 166, 43 N. E. 163. Oklahoma. Garver v. Territory, 5 Okla. 342, 49 Pac. 470. Pennsylvania. Com. v. Weiss, 139 Pa. St. 247, 21 Atl. 10, 11 L. R. A. 530, 23 Am. St. Rep. 182. Rhode Island. State v. Smith, 10 R. I. 258. Texas. Hughes v. State, 67 Tex. Cr. 333, 149 S. W. 173. Washington. State v. Ferry Line Auto Bus Co., 99 Wash. 64, 168 Pac. 893. is the intent to do the prohibited thing,16 or, as the rule is sometimes stated, a person who knowingly violates the statute will be conclusively charged with a criminal intent.17 But even under such a statute the unlawful acts must have been voluntarily, and, in that 249, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 467, 20 Ann. Cas. 1152. A person who with knowledge of all the facts deliberately violates a positive law which he is presumed to know cannot be excused on the ground that he intended no wrong. Wayman v. Com., 14 Bush. (77 Ky.) 466. And see other cases cited in the following notes: 16 United States. Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 153 Fed. 1, aff'd 209 U. S. 56, 52 L. Ed. 681, 28 Sup. Ct. 428, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 400. Indiana. Knight & Jillson Co. v. Miller, 172 Ind. 27, 87 N. E. 823, 18 Ann. Cas. 1146. Maine. State v. Huff, 89 Me. 521, 36 Atl. 1000. Missouri. State v. Silva, 130 Mo. 440, 32 S. W. 1007. Nevada. State v. Zichfeld, 23 Nev. 304, 46 Pac. 802, 34 L. R. A. 784, 62 Am. St. Rep. 800. New York. People v. Persce, 204 N. Y. 397, 97 N. E. 877, aff'g 135 App. Div. 919, 120 N. Y. Supp. 1141. North Carolina. State v. Downs, 116 N. C. 1064, 21 S. E. 689. "When an act forbidden by law is intentionally done the intent to do the act is the criminal intent which imparts to it the character of the offense, and no one who violates a law which he is conclusively presumed to know can be heard to say that he had no criminal intent in doing it." State v. Silva, 130 Mo. 440, 32 S. W. 1007; State v. Southern Ry. Co., 122 N. C. 1052, 30 S. E. 133, 41 L R. A. 246; State v. McLean, 121 N. C. 589, 28 S. E. 140, 42 L. R. A. 721; State v. Smith, 93 N. C. 516; State v. King, 86 N. C. 603. "The criminal intent is inseparably involved in the intent to do the act which the law pronounces criminal." State v. Southern Ry. Co., 122 N. C. 1052, 30 S. E. 133, 41 L. R. A. 246; State v. Voight, 90 N. C. 741. 17 California. In re Ahart, 172 Cal. 762, 159 Pac. 160. Idaho. State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699, 70 Pac. 1051. Kentucky. Goodman v. Com., 169 Ky. 542, 184 S. W. 876; Louisville R. Co. v. Com., 130 Ky. 738, 114 S. W. 343, 132 Am. St. Rep. 408; Com. v. Bull, 13 Bush 656. Massachusetts. Com. v. Connelly, 163 Mass. 539, 40 N. E. 862; Com. v. Mash, 7 Metc. 472. Montana. State v. Smith, 57 Mont. 563, 190 Pac. 107; State v. District Court, Silver Bow Co., 44 Mont. 318, 119 Pac. 1103, Ann. Cas. 1913 B 396. Nebraska. State v. Heldenbrand, 62 Neb. 136, 87 N. W. 25, 89 Am. St. Rep 743. North Carolina. State v. Southern Ry. Co., 122 N. C. 1052, 30 S. E. 133, 41 L. R. A. 246; State v. McLean, 121 N. C. 589, 28 S. E. 140, 42 L. R. A. 721; State v. McBrayer, 98 N. C. 619, 2 S. E. 755. The law makes the act the crime, and infers a criminal intent from the act itself. Mills v. State, 58 Fla. 74, 51 So. 278. Thus, if a person, in violation of a statute, intentionally opens a grave for the purpose of removing anything interred therein, a criminal intent is conclusively presumed. State v. McLean, 121 N. C. 589, 28 S. E. 140, 42 L. R. A. 721. |