for the purpose of establishing an antecedent probability of his committing the offense,51 and the presence or absence of a motive is always to be considered by the jury, in connection with all the other evidence in the case, in determining his guilt or innocence 52 §102. -Good motive. A wilful act prohibited and made punishable by the common law or by statute is none the less a crime because the accused was actuated by a good motive.53 One may not contract. State v. York, 131 Iowa 635, 109 N. W. 122. 51 United States. Thompson V. United States, 144 Fed. 14, 7 Ann. Cas. 62; Schmidt v. United States, 133 Fed. 257. Alabama. Spicer v. State, 188 Ala. 9, 65 So. 972; Patterson v. State, 156 Ala. 62, 47 So. 52; Stone v. State, 105 Ala. 60, 17 So. 114; Clifton v. State, 73 Ala. 473; Jones v. State, 13 Ala. App. 10, 68 So. 690. Illinois. People v. Holtz, 294 Ill. 143, 128 N. E. 341. Kentucky. Bates v. Com., 189 Ky. 727, 225 S. W. 1085. Louisiana. State v. McHamilton, 128 La. 498, 54 So. 971. Massachusetts. Com. v. Feci, 235 Mass. 562, 127 N. E. 602; Com. v. Oklahoma. Roe v. State, Texas. Okla. Williams v. State, 77 Tex. Cr. 563, 179 S. W. 710; Martin v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. 242, 53 S. W. 849. Wisconsin. Cupps V. State, 120 Wis. 504, 97 N. W. 210, 98 N. W. 546, 102 Am. St. Rep. 996. 52 United States. Pointer v. United States, 151 U. S. 396, 38 L. Ed. 208, 14 Sup. Ct. 410. Alabama. Stone v. State, 105 Ala. 60, 17 So. 114. Delaware. State v. Miller, 9 Houst. 564, 32 Atl. 137; State v. Hand, 1 186 S. W. 976; State v. Aitken, 240 Mo. 254, 144 S. W. 499; State v. David, 131 Mo. 380, 33 S. W. 28. New York. People v. Geppi, 221 N. Y. 62, 116 N. E. 793; People v. Becker, 215 N. Y. 126, 109 N. E. 127, Ann. Cas. 1917 A 600; s. c., 215 N. Y. 721, 109 N. E. 1086. Oregon. State v. Hembree, 54 Ore. 463, 103 Pac. 1008. South Carolina. State v. Coleman, 20 S. C. 441. Wisconsin. Cupps V. State, 120 Wis. 504, 97 N. W. 210, 98 N. W. 546, 102 Am. St. Rep. 996. On the question of motive, the defendant should be judged by the information upon which he acted, rather than upon the accuracy of his information. State v. Baldwin, 36 Kan. 1, 12 Pac. 318. 53 United States. Reynolds V. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 25 L. Ed. 244; United States v. Harmon, 45 Fed. 414. commit a crime because he hopes or expects that good may come of it, nor escape liability for acts done in violation of law because the ultimate object to be attained may be beneficent or indifferent.54 Nor is it a defense that the accused violated the law in order to escape personal inconvenience or annoyance,55 nor that he acted in accordance with his religious belief or scruples.56 And a violation of the law is illegal and subjects the offender to punishment though committed for the purpose of enforcing another law.57 § 103. Religious belief and belief in impropriety of law. Since a good motive is no excuse, if a man of sound mind does an act New York. People v. Corrigan, 195 N. Y. 1, 87 N. E. 792, rev'g 129 App. Div. 62, 113 N. Y. Supp. 504, and aff'g 129 App. Div. 75, 113 N. Y. Supp. 513; People v. Hegeman, 57 Misc. 295, 107 N. Y. Supp. 261. Oklahoma. Crawford v. Ferguson, 5 Okla. Cr. 377, 115 Pac. 278, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 519. Pennsylvania. Specht v. Com., 8 Pa. St. 312, 49 Am. Dec. 418. See People v. Kirby, 2 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 28, where a father was indicted for the murder of his two infant children to whom he was greatly attached, doing it as he said because he thought they would be better off. So on a prosecution for a nuisance it is no defense that the public may be or is in fact benefitted by the acts complained of (see ch. 36, infra), and on a prosecution for publishing obscene matter (see § 1116, infra), or sending such matter through the mails (see § 1476, infra), it is no defense for the accused to show that his object was to correct evils and abuses in intercourse between the sexes, and thus do a public good. And on a prosecution for destroying and removing a fence from around a graveyard, it is no defense that the defendant's object was to keep cattle from breaking into the graveyard and that it was better protected in this respect after the removal than before. Phillips v. State, 29 Tex. 226. On indictment for maliciously and feloniously setting fire to a building with intent to injure the owner, it is immaterial that defendant's intent was not to injure the owner but that he might procure the reward for giving the first alarm. Reg. v. Regan, 4 Cox C. C. (Eng.) 335. And it is no defense to a prosecution for carrying a pistol concealed that defendant carried it merely for the purpose of exhibiting it as a curiosity. Walls v. State, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 572. 54 People v. Corrigan, 195 N. Y. 1, 87 N. E. 792, rev'g 129 App. Div. 62, 113 N. Y. Supp. 504, and aff'g 129 App. Div. 75, 113 N. Y. Supp. 513; Phillips v. State, 29 Tex. 226. escape 55 That he was impelled to commit perjury solely by the desire to the importunities of Wall street. People v. Corrigan, 195 N. Y. 1, 87 N. E. 792, rev'g 129 App. Div. 62, 113 N. Y. Supp. 504, and aff❜g 129 App. Div. 75, 113 N. Y. Supp. 513. 56 See § 103, infra. 57 As where persons are guilty of a riot in seeking to compel observance of a prohibitory liquor law. Crawford v. Ferguson, 5 Okla. Cr. 377, 115 Pac. 278, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 519. which he knows is prohibited and punished by law, he cannot escape responsibility on the ground that he acted because of and in accordance with his religious belief or scruples.58 Thus, a man cannot set up his religious belief to escape liability for violation of a statute prohibiting and punishing bigamy and polygamy,59 or punishing labor on Sunday,60 or the disinterring of a dead body,61 or the beating of a drum in the streets of a town,62 or the failure to furnish necessary medical attendance to his child.63 And belief in the inexpediency of vaccination will not affect the validity of a statute requiring it, nor entitle the believer to exemption from the statute.64 58 Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 33 L. Ed. 637, 10 Sup. Ct. 299; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 25 L. Ed. 244; Harrison v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. 164, 69 S. W. 500; Reg. v. Wagstaff, 10 Cox C. C. (Eng.) 531. And see the sections referred to in the following notes. 59 See § 1130, infra. 60 See § 1335 et seq., infra. 61 In Reg. v. Sharpe, 1 Dears. C. C. (Eng.) 160, 7 Cox C. C. 214, a son was indicted for disinterring the body of his mother, who had been buried in a dissenting congregation's burying grounds, and it was held that the fact that he acted from motives of affection and religious duty, and intended to bury her with his father in other burying grounds, was no defense. 62 Like the members of the Salvation Army. State v. White, 64 N. H. 48, 5 Atl. 828. 63 See § 1150, infra. That it is no defense to a charge of manslaughter where the child dies, see § 677, infra. 64 Com. v. Pear, 183 Mass. 242, 66 N. E. 719, 67 L. R. A. 935. CHAPTER 4 CAPACITY TO COMMIT CRIME I. MARRIED WOMEN § 104. In general. § 105. Presumption of coercion and rebuttal thereof. § 106. Particular offenses. II. INFANTS § 107. As affected by age-Conclusive presumption of incapacity. - Rebuttable presumption of incapacity. § 108. Capacity to distinguish between right and wrong-In general. - Meaning of rule. Insane delusions. Insane irresistible impulse. Moral and emotional insanity. § 122. Dementia præcox. § 123. Idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded persons. § 124. Epileptics. § 125. Deaf-mutes. $126. Kleptomania. § 127. Somnambulism and somnolentia. § 128. Hypnotism. IV. INTOXICATION AND USE OF DRUGS § 129. Voluntary drunkenness in general. § 130. Delirium tremens or settled insanity. § 131. Drunkenness of insane person. 132. Drunkenness may negative specific intent or knowledge-In general. § 135. Homicide cases-In general. § 136. - Whether intoxication will reduce homicide to manslaughter or assault. § 137. Involuntary drunkenness. § 138. Use of drugs. V. CORPORATIONS § 139. In general. § 140. Whether corporations are "persons" within criminal statutes. § 141. Misfeasance. § 142. Offenses involving evil intent. § 143. Offenses involving personal violence. § 144. Corporations in hands of receivers. I. MARRIED WOMEN § 104. In general. A married woman is criminally responsible for any offense committed voluntarily and of her own free will.1 But, as a general rule, she is not responsible for offenses committed by the coercion of her husband, since in such case she is considered as acting under compulsion and not of her own will; 2 and, as we shall see, there is generally a rebuttable presumption of coercion if she Iowa. State v. Fertig, 98 Iowa 139, 67 N. W. 87. Kansas. State V. Hendricks, 32 Kan. 559, 4 Pac. 1050. Maine. State v. Nelson, 29 Me. 329. Massachusetts. Com. v. Neal, 10 Mass. 152, 6 Am. Dec. 105. New Jersey. State v. Martini, 80 N. J. L. 685, 78 Atl. 12. North Carolina. State v. Seahorn, 166 N. C. 373, 81 S. E. 687. Ohio. Tabler v. State, 34 Ohio St. 127. West Virginia. Gill v. State, 39 W. Va. 479, 20 S. E. 568, 26 L. R. A. 655, 45 Am. St. Rep. 928. England. 4 Bl. Com. 28; 1 Hale P. C. 45; Anon., Lib. Ass'n, 137, pl. 40; Anon., W. Kelyng, 28; Reg. v. Dykes, 15 Cox C. C. 771. And see other cases eited in the following notes and in §§ 105, 106, infra. As to the husband's responsibility in such cases, see § 105, infra. |