and wrong test so far as it goes," 22 hold that it is not the sole test; that, to render a person criminally responsible, he must, in addition to being able to know right from wrong, be capable of exercising the power to choose between them, and that a man is not responsible for an act done under and solely by reason of an insane and irresistible impulse, though he may have known that it was wrong.23 Ann. Cas. 1912 A 23; Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269, 21 Am. Rep. 360. And see State v. Nixon, 32 Kan. 205, 4 Pac. 159. When it overrides the reason and judgment, obliterates the sense of right as to the act done, and deprives the accused of the power to choose between right and wrong. State v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729, 15 S. E. 982, 18 L. R. A. 224. 22 See § 117, supra. 23 Alabama, Mizell v. State, 184 Ala. 16, 63 So. 1000; Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 60 Am. Rep. 193. Arkansas. Woodall V. State, Ark. 231 S. W. 186; Hankins v. State, 133 Ark. 38, 201 S. W. 832, L. R. A. 1918 D 784; Diggs v. State, 126 Ark. 455, 190 S. W. 448; Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 530, 180 S. W. 186; Green v. State, 64 Ark. 523, 43 S. W. 973; Bolling v. State, 54 Ark. 588, 16 S. W. 658; Williams v. State, 50 Ark. 511, 9 S. W. 5. Colorado. Ryan v. People, 60 Colo. 425, 153 Pac. 756, L. R. A. 1917 F 646, Ann. Cas. 1917 C 605. Connecticut. State v. Saxon, 87 Conn. 5, 86 Atl. 590; State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136. Delaware. State V. Windsor, 5 Harr. 512; State v. Reidell, 9 Houst. 470, 14 Atl. 550; State v. Jack, 4 Pennew. 470, 58 Atl. 833. Georgia. Flanagan v. State, 103 Ga. 619, 30 S. E. 550. Illinois. The "unsoundness of mind or affection of insanity must be of such a degree as to create an un controllable impulse to do the act charged, by overriding the reason and judgment, and obliterating the sense of right and wrong as to the particular act done, and depriving the accused of the power of choosing between them." Lilly v. People, 148 Ill. 467, 36 N. E. 95; Hornish v. People, 142 Ill. 620, 32 N. E. 677, 18 L. R. A. 237; Dacey v. People, 116 Ill. 555, 6 N. E. 165; Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 391, 83 Am. Dec. 231. And see People v. Penman, 271 Ill. 82, 110 N. E. 894. In cases of partial insanity of the type known as paranoia, the mere ability to distinguish right from wrong is not the correct test, but the accused must be capable of knowing right from wrong as to the particular act, and must be capable of exercising the power to choose between them and though he may be capable of distinguishing right from wrong as to a particular act, he is not responsible if he is impelled to do it by an irresistible impulse. People v. Lowhone, 292 Ill. 32, 126 N. E. 620; s. c., 296 Ill. 391, 129 N. E. 781. And see People v. Geary, 298 Ill. 236, 131 N. E. 652. Indiana. Morgan v. State, Ind. —, 130 N. E. 528; Plake v. State, 121 Ind. 433, 23 N. E. 273, 16 Am. St. Rep. 408; Bradley v. State, 31 Ind. 492; Stevens v. State, 31 Ind. 485, 99 Am. Dec. 634. Iowa. State v. McCullough, 114 Iowa 532, 87 N. W. 503, 55 L. R. A. 378, 89 Am. St. Rep. 382; State v. Felter, 25 T 155 Ky. In order that a person may be exempt on the ground of irresistible 541, 159 S. W. 1155; Thompson v. Com., 155 Ky. 333, 159 S. W. 829; Abbott v. Com., 107 Ky. 624, 55 S. W. 196; Montgomery v. Com., 88 Ky. 509, 11 S. W. 475; Shannahan v. Com., 8 Bush 463, 8 Am. Rep. 465; Smith v. Com., 1 Duv. 224; Scott v. Com., 4 Metc. 227, 83 Am. Dec. 461. Louisiana. State v. Lyons, 113 La. 959, 37 So. 890. Massachusetts. Com. v. Cooper, 219 Mass. 1, 106 N. E. 545; Com. v. Gilbert, 165 Mass. 45, 42 N. E. 336; Com. v. Rogers, 7 Metc. 500, 41 Am. Dec. 458. Michigan. People v. Quimby, 134 Mich. 625, 96 N. W. 1061; People v. Durfee, 62 Mich. 487, 29 N. W. 109. Montana. State v. Crowe, 39 Mont. 174, 102 Pac. 579, 18 Ann. Cas. 643; State v. Keerl, 29 Mont. 508, 75 Pac. 362, 101 Am. St. Rep. 579. And see State v. Colbert, 58 Mont. 584, 194 Pac. 145. New Hampshire. State v. Jones, 50 N. H. 369, 9 Am. Rep. 242; State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399, 6 Am. Rep. 533. Ohio. Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146. Pennsylvania. Com. v. De Marzo, 223 Pa. 573, 72 Atl. 893; Com. v. Hallowell, 223 Pa. 494, 72 Atl. 845; Com. v. Barner, 199 Pa. 335, 49 Atl. 60; Com. v. Wireback, 190 Pa. St. 138, 42 Atl. 542, 70 Am. St. Rep. 625; Taylor v. Com., 109 Pa. St. 262; Coyle v. Com., 100 Pa. St. 573, 45 Am. Rep. 397; Com. v. Mosler, 4 Pa. St. 264. Vermont. State v. Kelsie, 93 Vt. 450, 108 Atl. 391; Rogers v. State, 77 Vt. 454, 61 Atl. 489; Doherty v. State, 73 Vt. 380, 50 Atl. 1113. And see State v. Kelley, 74 Vt. 278, 52 Atl. 434. Virginia. Thurman v. Com., 107 Va. 912, 60 S. E. 99; Dejarnette v. Com., 75 Va. 867. Wyoming. Flanders v. State, 24 Wyo. 81, 156 Pac. 39, 1121. In Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 60 Am. Rep. 193, the court said: "We think that the inquiries to be submitted to the jury, in every criminal trial where the defense of insanity is interposed are these: 1. Was the defendant, at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, as a matter of fact, afflicted with a disease of the mind, so as to be either idiotic or otherwise insane? 2. If such be the case, did he know right from wrong, as applied to the particular act in question? If he did not have such knowledge, he is not legally responsible. 3. If he did have such knowledge, he may nevertheless not be legally responsible if the two following conditions occur: (1) If, by reason of the duress of such mental disease, he had so far lost the power to choose between the right and wrong, and to avoid doing the act in question, as that his free agency was at the time destroyed; (2) and if, at the same time, the alleged crime was so connected with such mental disease, in the relation of cause and effect as to have been the product of it solely." And see Porter v. State, 140 Ala. 87, 37 So. 81; Green v. State, 64 Ark. 523, 43 S. W. 973; State v. Lyons, 113 La. 959, 37 So. 890. In Com. v. Mosler, 4 Pa. St. 264, it was said by Chief Justice Gibson: "There may be an unseen ligament pressing on the mind, drawing it to consequences which it sees, but cannot avoid, and placing it under coercion, which, while its results are clearly perceived, is incapable of resistance. The doctrine which acknowledges this mania is dangerous in its relations, and can be recognized only in the clearest cases. It ought to be shown impulse, in any case, the impulse must be the result of disease of the mind,24 and the act must have been the product of the disease solely.25 Mere frenzy, excitement, or ungovernable passion, resulting from motives of hatred, anger, or the like, is not insanity, and is not an excuse for crime in any jurisdiction.26 The impulse must also be irresistible, or, in other words, the disease must exist to such an extent as to subjugate the intellect, and render it impossible for the person to do otherwise than yield thereto,27 and it must be an impulse to commit the particular offense with which the defendant is charged.28 § 121. Moral and emotional insanity. Whenever irresistible impulse is relied upon as a defense, care must be taken to distinguish between insane irresistible impulse-that is, irresistible impulse resulting from disease of the mind-and mere moral perversion and passion. As a rule neither so called moral 29 nor emotional in * * to have been habitual, or at least to have evinced itself in more than a single instance. To establish it as a justification in any particular instance it is necessary either to show by clear proof its contemporaneous existence, evidenced by present circumstances, or the existence of an habitual tendency developed in previous cases, becoming in itself a second nature." This was approved in Com. v. Hillman, 189 Pa. St. 548, 42 Atl. 196, 69 Am. St. Rep. 827, and Coyle v. Com., 100 Pa. St. 573, 45 Am. Rep. 397. Compare Scott v. Com., 4 Metc. (Ky.) 227, 83 Am. Dec. 461, where it was held that the disease need not have manifested itself in former acts of like character. 24 Porter v. State, 140 Ala. 87, 37 So. 81; Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 60 Am. Rep. 193; Hankins v. State, 133 Ark. 38, 201 S. W. 832, L. R. A. 1918 D 784; Bolling v. State, 54 Ark. 588, 16 S. W. 658. 25 Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 60 Am. Rep. 193; Hankins v. State, 133 Ark. 38, 201 S. W. 832, L. R. A. 1918 D 784; Diggs v. State, 126 Ark. 455, 190 S. W. 448; Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 530, 180 S. W. 186; Green v. State, 64 Ark. 523, 43 S. W. 973; State v. Hockett, 70 Iowa 442, 30 N. W. 742; State v. Stickley, 41 Iowa 232. 26 See § 121, infra. 27 Scott v. Com., 4 Metc. (Ky.) 227, 83 Am. Dec. 461; Com. v. Wireback, 190 Pa. St. 138, 42 Atl. 542, 70 Am. St. Rep. 625; Taylor v. Com., 109 Pa. St. 262. 28 The fact that a person has an irresistible impulse to commit robbery will not excuse him for a homicide committed to avoid apprehension and possible conviction for the robbery. State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135, 134 Pac. 632, L. R. A. 1916 D 590, Ann. Cas. 1916 C 537. 29 Alabama. Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 60 Am. Rep. 193; Boswell v. State, 63 Ala. 307, 35 Am. Rep. 20. Arkansas. Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 530, 180 S. W. 186; Green v. State, 64 Ark. 523, 43 S. W. 973. California. People v. Kerrigan, 73 Cal. 222, 14 Pac. 849. Florida. Hall v. State, 78 Fla. 420, 83 So. 513; Cochran v. State, 65 Fla. 91, 61 So. 187. sanity,30 unconnected with disease of the mind, will excuse crime. So a person will not be excused for crime because he has become so morally depraved that his conscience has ceased to control or influence his actions.31 And mere frenzy, excitement, or ungovernable passion, resulting from motives of hatred, anger, jealousy, disappointment, revenge, or the like, is not insanity, and is not an excuse for crime Georgia. Spann v. State, 47 Ga. 553; Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424. Indiana. Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 550. Kentucky. It is no excuse that the defendant's moral perceptions lead him to believe that there is no wrong in violating a particular statute. Thompson v. Com., 155 Ky. 333, 159 S. W. 829. Louisiana. State v. Lyons, 113 La. 959, 37 So. 890. Maryland. Spencer v. State, 69 Md. 28, 13 Atl. 809. New York. People v. Carlin, 194 N. Y. 448, 87 N. E. 805; People v. Farmer, 194 N. Y. 251, 87 N. E. 457. Pennsylvania. Taylor v. Com., 109 Pa. St. 262. Texas. Harrison v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. 164, 69 S. W. 500; Leache v. State, 22 Tex. App. 279, 3 S. W. 539, 58 Am. Rep. 638. Wyoming. Flanders v. State, 24 Wyo. 81, 156 Pac. 39, 1121. Construing the language of the court literally, moral insanity seems to have been regarded as a defense in Scott v. Com., 4 Metc. (Ky.) 227, 83 Am. Dec. 461, but there can be little doubt that the court meant insane irrésistible impulse. In a Connecticut case it was said that moral insanity may reduce a homicide from murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree. Andersen v. State, 43 Conn. 514, 21 Am. Rep. 669. But see United States v. Lee, 4 Mackey (15 D. C.) 489, 54 Am. Rep. 293. And see § 117, supra. An uncontrollable or irresistible im pulse is sometimes referred to as a species of moral insanity. See § 120, supra. 30 Cawley v. State, 133 Ala. 128, 32 So. 227; Walker v. State, 91 Ala. 76, 9 So. 87; Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 60 Am. Rep. 193; Boswell v. State, 63 Ala. 307, 35 Am. Rep. 20; Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 530, 180 S. W. 186. Transitory frenzy. Com. v. Renzo, 216 Pa. 147, 65 Atl. 30. 31 United States. Guiteau's Case, 10 Fed. 161. Arkansas. Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 530, 180 S. W. 186; Green v. State, 64 Ark. 523, 43 S. W. 973. California. People v. Kerrigan, 73 Cal. 222, 14 Pac. 849. Colorado. Ryan v. People, 60 Colo. 425, 153 Pac. 756, L. R. A. 1917 F 646, Ann. Cas. 1917 C 605. Georgia. Spann v. State, 47 Ga. fact to be determined is whether she really and in truth acted under such coercion, or whether she acted of her own free will and independently of any coercion or control by him." 8 When an offense is committed by a woman in the absence of her husband, coercion is not presumed, for no presumption arises from the mere fact of coverture; but coercion may be shown as a fact.9 To give rise to the presumption of coercion, however, the presence of the husband need not have been at the very spot where the offense was committed, nor even in the same room, but it is sufficient if he was near enough for the wife to be under his immediate control or influence.10 sumption." Com. V. Adams, 186 Mass. 101, 71 N. E. 78. In Com. v. Moore, 162 Mass. 441, 38 N. E. 1120, it was held that since, under a statute, a wife could not be compelled to be a witness on an indictment against her husband, there was no presumption of coercion where a wife testified in favor of her husband on a criminal prosecution, and committed perjury. And see Smith v. Myers, 54 Neb. 1, 74 N. W. 277; Rex Dix, 1 Russ. Crimes 147. V. 8 Com. v. Adams, 186 Mass. 101, 71 N. E. 78; Com. v. Daley, 148 Mass. 11, 18 N. E. 579. Where a wife choked a man, and told him to keep still, while her husband picked his pockets, it was held that the jury were justified in finding that she was not acting under coercion. People v. Wright, 38 Mich. 744, 31 Am. Rep. 331. 9 Indiana. Pennybaker v. State, 2 Blackf. 484. Iowa. State v. Fitzgerald, 49 Iowa 260, 31 Am. Rep. 148. Maine. State v. Nelson, 29 Me. 329. Massachusetts. Com. V. Roberts, 132 Mass. 267; Com. v. Munsey, 112 Mass. 287; Com. v. Tryon, 99 Mass. 442; Com. v. Butler, 1 Allen 4; Com. v. Whalen, 16 Gray 23; Com. v. Murphy, 2 Gray 510; Com. v. Lewis, 1 Metc. 151. New Hampshire. State v. Haines, 35 N. H. 207. New York. Seiler v. People, 77 N. Y. 413; Quinlan v. People, 6 Park. Cr. 9. Rhode Island. State v. Shee, 13 Tennessee. See Morton v. State, 495. State v. Potter, 42 Vt. England. 2 East P. C. 559; Brown v. Attorney General (1898), App. Cas. 234, 18 Cox C. C. 658; Reg. v. John, 13 Cox C. C. 100; Reg. v. Cohen, 11 Cox C. C. 99; Rex v. Hughes, 2 Lewin C. C. 229; Rex v. Morris, Russ. & R. 270. She is not protected by his order or direction unless she is within his presence and control, so as to be presumed by law to act by his coercion. Com. v. Feeney, 13 Allen (Mass.) 560; Com. v. Butler, 1 Allen (Mass.) 4. There is no such presumption although the offense was committed by command of the husband given before he left. State v. Potter, 42 Vt. 495. 10 State v. Fertig, 98 Iowa 139, 67 |