become destitute and dependent or in necessitous circumstances there will not give its courts jurisdiction if the abandonment took place in another state.53 But a person may be prosecuted for failure to provide for the support of his wife or children in a state where desertion or abandonment is not an essential element of the offense, though the desertion or abandonment took place in another state,54 and though he was not in the state of the forum when the offense is alleged to have been committed.55 A person may be prosecuted in a state where the desertion or desertion and failure to provide take place although he resides in another state,56 but not in a state where neither party has acquired a domicile.57 And a person having his domicile in a state may be convicted there of failing to provide for his minor child, although such child has never been within the state. 58 Generally a prosecution for failure to provide for one's wife or children may be instituted in any county where it is the defendant's duty to provide for them,59 even though the desertion did not take 53 Jemmerson v. State, 80 Ga. 111, 54 State v. McCullough, 1 Pennew. (17 Del.) 274, 40 Atl. 237. Defendant may be prosecuted for desertion where he comes within the state and there continues the desertion of his family and his failure to provide for them, though the original act may have occurred in another state. Com. v. Hart, 12 Pa. Super. Ct. 605. Under New York city charter, where both the husband and wife live in the city, he may be prosecuted there for failure to support her, though he originally abandoned her in another state. People v. Wexler, 152 N. Y. App. Div. 67, 136 N. Y. Supp. 679. Contra. People v. Crouse, 86 N. Y. App. Div. 352, 83 N. Y. Supp. 812. 55 In re Fowles, 89 Kan. 430, 131 Pac. 598, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 227; State v. Gillmore, 88 Kan. 835, 129 So where, by reason of a man's place there,60 or though he does not reside there.61 If it is his duty to provide for them in the county of his domicile, the prosecution may be instituted there.62 And if he is only obliged to provide for them in the county of his domicile, then it must be instituted there.63 It is sometimes provided by statute that a prosecution may be had either in the county where the desertion takes place, or in any county in which the deserted wife or children have lived for a specified length of time next preceding the filing of the complaint.64 The offense of leaving the state after abandoning a child is commenced in the county where the abandonment takes place, and is consummated in the county where the defendant passes into another state. If these counties are different the jurisdiction is in either, where the statute provides that an offense commenced in one county 179 N. W. 541; State v. Dvoracek, 140 Iowa 266, 118 N. W. 399; Bayne v. People, 14 Hun (N. Y.) 181. 60 Ex parte Brennen, 43 Nev. 165, 183 Pac. 310. The offense of abandoning one's child and leaving it destitute is consummated in the county where the child's dependency upon others begins, and where a father sends a child into another county and there fails to provide for it, so that it becomes destitute, he may be prosecuted there. Bennefield v. State, 80 Ga. 107, 4 S. E. 869; Cleveland v. State, 7 Ga. App. 622, 67 S. E. 696. Where the husband agrees to a separation, and to pay the wife a specified sum weekly, and fails to pay it, he may be prosecuted for nonsupport in New York, where the wife has taken up her residence, although the separation took place in Brooklyn. People v. Neyer, 12 N. Y. Misc. 613, 33 N. Y. Supp. 1123. 61 In re Price, 168 Mich. 527, 134 N. W. 721, Ann. Cas. 1913 C 594; Ex parte Brennen, 43 Nev. 165, 183 Pac. 310; Adams v. State, 164 Wis. 223, 159 N. W. 726. If the defendant removes all the furniture from the home in which he and his wife have been living, pro vides no other place for her to go, and tells her that he does not intend to live with her any longer, and she then goes into another county to live with her father, he may be prosecuted in the latter county. State v. Stone, 111 S. C. 496, 98 S. E. 333. Where the custody of the children is granted to the wife by a decree of divorce which provides no restriction as to where she shall live with them, the husband may be prosecuted in a county to which she takes them though he does not reside there. State v. Yocum, 182 Ind. 478, 106 N. E. 705. 62 State v. Morel, 146 La. 6, 83 So. 318; In re Baurens, 117 La. 136, 41 So. 442; State v. Peeples, 112 S. C. $10, 99 S. E. 813. 63 State v. Smith, 145 La. 913, 83 So. 189. He can only be prosecuted in the county where the abandonment and the failure or refusal to support takes place, and not in another county where the wife takes up her resi dence. State v. Justus, 85 Minn. 114, 88 N. W. 415. 64 Hood v. State, 87 Tex. Cr. 222, 220 S. W. 550; Noodleman v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. 611, 170 S. W. 710. and consummated in another may be prosecuted in either, and if there is but one county, its courts have jurisdiction.65 § 299. Abortion. The offense of administering a drug or using instruments or other means with intent to produce a miscarriage is complete when the drug is administered or the instruments are used, regardless of the result,66 and hence must be prosecuted in the state 67 and county 68 where such use or administration takes place, and cannot be prosecuted in another state or county where the miscarriage takes place, even though the woman dies there. And it has also been held that the offense of producing an abortion may and should be prosecuted in the county where the drug is administered or the instruments used.69 But where the statute provides that if a crime is committed partly in one county and partly in another, the jurisdiction is in either,70 an indictment for producing an abortion will lie in a county where the abortion takes place and the woman dies, although the drugs were administered or the instruments used in another.71 A person who, while in one state, sends a drug to a woman in another state by mail, with intent to have her take the same for the purpose of causing an abortion, which she does, is not guilty of procuring an abortion in the latter state, unless the woman does not know the nature of the drug, and is therefore an innocent agent. But he is indictable in the state to which the drug is thus sent, under a statute punishing any person who shall advise or procure a woman to take a drug with intent to cause an abortion.72 § 300. Abduction, enticing, inveigling, etc. The offense of enticing a woman to enter a house of ill-fame," 73 or to leave her home for immoral purposes,74 or of taking a girl away from her parents for 65 State v. Adams, 137 Tenn. 521, 194 S. W. 579. 66 See § 366, infra. 67 State v. Wheaton, 79 Kan. 521, 99 Pac. 1132. 68 State V. Hollenbeck, 36 Iowa 112; State v. Wheaton, 79 Kan. 521, 99 Pac. 1132; Com. v. Bingaman, 51 Pa. Super. Ct. 336. 69 Moore v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 552, 40 S. W. 287. 70 See § 288, supra. 71 Hauk v. State, 148 Ind. 238, 46 N. E. 127, 47 N. E. 465. 72 State v. Morrow, 40 S. C. 221, 18 S. E. 853. 73 Studer v. State, 29 Ohio Cir. Ct. 33, aff'd 74 Ohio St. 519, 78 N. E. 1139. Though she enters a house of illfame in another state or county. State v. Stickney, 118 Minn. 64, 136 N. W. 419. 74 The offense of enticing a woman the purpose of concubinage, prostitution, or marriage,75 is committed in the state and county where the enticement or taking takes place, and its courts have jurisdiction. The crime of inveigling a person with intent to cause him to be sent out of the state against his will is committed in the county where such person is caused or induced to surrender himself to the guidance or control of the persons whom the defendant proposed or expected to take him out of the state and must be prosecuted there.76 § 301. Assault and assault and battery. An assault or an assault and battery is committed, of course, in the state or county in which the battery is inflicted or attempted, and ordinarily, therefore, there is no difficulty in determining the locality of the offense. When a force is put in motion in one jurisdiction, with intent to inflict a battery, and it takes effect in another, the offense is committed in the latter. Thus, if a person standing in one state or county shoots or throws across the line at a person standing in another state or county, he is guilty of assault and battery in the latter state or of previous chaste character from her home, by means of false representations, for immoral purposes, is complete when she is so enticed to leave her home in the state for such purposes, and the person so enticing her may be prosecuted in the state although the woman is taken to another state where further representa tions are made to her followed by her prostitution or unlawful sexual intercourse. State v. Wood, 136 La. 658, 67 So. 542. 75 State v. Johnson, 115 Mo. 480, 22 S. W. 463. Where a man takes a girl from her father in a particular county, with the intent then and there existing to use her for purposes of prostitution, the offense is wholly committed in that county and must be prosecuted there, though he does not use her for such purposes until after he has taken her into another county. But if he takes her for a proper purpose, and with the consent of her father, in one county, and first forms the intent to use her for purposes of prostitution after he has taken her into another county, he may be prosecuted in the latter county. People v. Lewis, 141 Cal. 543, 75 Pac. 189. Where a girl residing with her father in Missouri went to visit a relative in Iowa, and the defendant, pursuant to an arrangement previously made with her, took her from there to the county in Missouri where her father resided and there had intercourse with her, it was held that he was properly indicted in the latter county. State v. Round, 82 Mo. 679. Where a girl voluntarily goes into another state with the defendant, she is still in the constructive custody of her parent or guardian, and if the defendant there prevents her, by force or persuasion, from returning home, he may be prosecuted there. State v. Gordon, 46 N. J. L. 432. 76 In re Kelly, 46 Fed. 653. county if he strikes him, or of assault if he does not strike him; and if his intent is to murder, he is guilty in such state or county of assault with intent to murder.77 The same is true where a person in one state or county sends poison or any other deleterious drug by mail 78 or by means of an innocent agent 79 to a person in another state or county, and the latter takes it there. § 302. Attempts to commit crimes. An attempt to commit a crime is punishable in the jurisdiction where the attempt is made.80 And, in the absence of statute, it is generally held that it may and must be punished in the state 81 and county 82 where the crime, if consummated would have been committed and could have been punished. If the attempt is made by letter it has been held that the prohibited act is not completed until the letter is received by the person solicited, and hence can only be punished in the state where it is received.83 But it has also been held that an attempt to bribe may be punished in a federal district where a letter offering the bribe is written and mailed although the person to whom it is addressed resides and receives it in another district.84 Under some statutes where the offense consists of a series of acts committed partly in one county and partly in another, it may be punished in either.85 § 303. Bigamy and polygamy. The offense of bigamy is committed in the state and county in which the bigamous marriage takes place, and in the absence of statute an indictment will not lie in any other jurisdiction, although the parties subsequently cohabit 77 Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 17 S. E. 984, 44 Am. St. Rep. 75; State v. Hall, 114 N. C. 909, 19 S. E. 602, 41 Am. St. Rep. 822. And see Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 131; State v. Morrow, 40 S. C. 221, 18 S. E. 853. See also § 311, infra. 78 See Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 131. 79 See § 293, supra. 80 State v. Terry, 109 Mo. 601, 19 S. W. 206; State v. Stow, 83 N. J. L. 14, 84 Atl. 1063. 81 So one who mails a letter in New Jersey to a person in Pennsylvania soliciting the latter to illegally register as a voter in New Jersey, cannot be convicted in New Jersey of an attempt to procure an illegal registration. State v. Stow, 83 N. J. L. 14, 84 Atl. 1063. 82 Graham v. People, 181 Ill. 477, 55 N. E. 179, 47 L. R. A. 731. This is true whether the defendant was in the county or not. Griffin v. State, 26 Ga. 493. 83 State v. Stow, 83 N. J. L. 14, 84 Atl. 1063. 84 United States v. Worrall, 2 Dall. 384, 1 L. Ed. 426, Fed. Cas. No. 16,766. 85 People v. Grubb, 24 Cal. App. 604, 141 Pac. 1051. And see generally as to such statutes § 287, supra. |