such agent in the latter state, with knowledge that they have been so stolen, is guilty of receiving stolen goods, for, in contemplation of law, he receives them from the original thief.38 And if goods are stolen in one county, and shipped by carrier to a person in another county, in accordance with a preconcerted arrangement, delivery to the carrier is a delivery to the person to whom they are sent, and he is therefore guilty of receiving the stolen goods in the county where they are delivered to the carrier.39 Statutes in some states expressly provide that a person receiving stolen property in the state may be prosecuted there although the property was stolen in another state or country 40 or permit a prosecution either in the county where the property was stolen or where it was received.41

Carrying stolen property into another jurisdiction after it is received is not a new receiving, and does not permit a prosecution in the state or county into which it is taken,42 unless the statute so provides.43 It has been held that a person who purchases or is given stolen property in one county and takes possession of it in another may be prosecuted in either, under a statute providing that if acts

38 See § 293, supra.

39 State v. Habib, 18 R. I. 558. That receipt and possession by an agent is sufficient to constitute a receiving, see § 925, infra.

40 O'Neal v. State, 24 Ga. App. 160, 99 S. E. 891; People v. Goldberg, 39 Mich. 545.

41 Mooney v. State, 76 Tex. Cr. 539, 176 S. W. 52.

The receiver may be prosecuted in the county where the property was stolen where he received it in an adjoining county and within 100 rods of the dividing line between them, and the statute provides that offenses committed within 100 rods of the dividing line between two counties may be prosecuted in either. People v. Hubbard, 86 Mich. 440, 49 N. W. 265.

He may be prosecuted either in the county where the goods were stolen or in which they were received, where the statute provides that the receiver of stolen goods shall be proceeded against as a principal, and shall be prosecuted

before the same court and punished in the same manner as if he had been the principal. State v. Ward, 49 Conn. 429.

42 People V. Disperati, 15 Cal. App. 120, 113 Pac. 889; Campbell v. People, 109 Ill. 565; State v. Pray, 30 Nev. 206, 94 Pac. 218; Roach v. State, 5 Coldw. (Tenn.) 39.

A person who receives stolen goods in one state and takes them to another cannot be prosecuted in the fatter state, even though its statutes make it larceny to steal property in another state and bring it into the state. Wilson v. State, 97 Ark. 412, 134 S. W. 623.

43 Wills v. People, 3 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 473. (But see People v. Zimmer, 174 N. Y. App. Div. 470, 160 N. Y. Supp. 459). Zweig v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. 306, 171 S. W. 747; Polk v. State, 60 Tex. Cr. 150, 131 S. W. 580; Thurman v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 646, 40 S. W. 795; Reg. v. Cryer, 7 Cox C. C. 335.

and their effects constituting an offense occur in different counties, the jurisdiction is in either county.44

§ 322. Robbery. Since a robbery is not completed until the property has come into the actual possession of the robber,45 the offense is committed in the state 46 and county 47 where such possession is obtained, and the robber can only be prosecuted there. And a person who commits robbery in one county or state and carries the stolen property into another county or state, is not guilty of robbery in the latter county or state, but of larceny only. 48

§ 323. Selling articles in violation of law-In general. The offense of selling adulterated food,49 or pooled crops,50 or intoxicating liquor,51 in violation of law, may and must be prosecuted in the state and county where the sale is made.

44 Ellison v. Com., 190 Ky. 305, 227 S. W. 458.

45 See § 935 et seq., infra.

46 Where defendants compelled the prosecuting witness to draw a check and exchange it for another check in West Virginia, and then took him to Kentucky where they compelled him to deliver the latter check to the payee, it was held that if this constituted a robbery, it was committed in Kentucky. State v. McAllister, 65 W. Va. 97, 63 S. E. 758, 131 Am. St. Rep. 955.

47 Where the defendants pretended to arrest the prosecuting witness in one county and there took possession of his coat in which there was a sum of money, and then took him and the coat to another county, where by threats and intimidation they induced him to let them have a part of the money, it was held that the offense was committed in the latter county. Sweat v. State, 90 Ga. 315, 17 S. E. 273.

48 2 Russ. Crimes 328; 1 Hale P. C. 507, 536; Rex v. Thomson, 2 Russ. Crimes 328.

49 Where a traveling salesman for a New York manufacturer takes an order for candy in Minnesota, and

such order is subject to acceptance or rejection by the manufacturer, and such order is accepted by delivering the candy to a carrier in New York for delivery to the purchaser, the sale takes place in New York, and is not a violation of the Minnesota statute prohibiting the sale of candy of the character in question. State v. Gruber, 116 Minn. 221, 133 N. W. 571, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 591.

The manager of a company engaged in business in one county who sells adulterated food through an agent in another county, may be prosecuted in the latter county. Meyer v. State, 54 Ohio St. 242, 43 N. E. 164.

50 A person cannot be convicted for selling pooled crops without the consent of the agent of the pool, where the crops are taken out of the state with the agent's consent and are then sold out of the state without his consent. O'Bannion v. State (Ky.), 113 S. W. 907.

51 Hopson v. State, 116 Ga. 90, 42 S. E. 412; Duff v. Com., 24 Ky. L. Rep. 201, 68 S. W. 390; People v. De Groot, 111 Mich. 245, 69 N. W. 248.

The offense of furnishing intoxicating liquor to a minor is committed in the county where the minor receives the liquor,52 the offense of placing an unlabeled package of liquor with a carrier for delivery in prohibition territory, in the county where the delivery to the carrier takes place,53 and the offense of soliciting orders for intoxicating liquor, when committed by mail, in the state and county in which the letter containing the solicitation is received by the addressee.54

§ 324. Selling or disposing of mortgaged property. The offense of selling mortgaged personal property with intent to defraud the mortgagee is committed, and can only be prosecuted, in the state 55 and county 56 where the sale takes place. But the offense of disposing of mortgaged property with intent to defraud is committed when the property is taken out of the state with intent to put it beyond the reach of the mortgagee,57 and hence may be prosecuted in the state from which the property is taken though such property

is sold in another state.58 And where property is taken from one county with intention to dispose of it in another county, and is actually sold or disposed of in the latter county, a statute making it an offense to sell or dispose of such property is violated in both counties and a prosecution may be had in either.59

§ 325. Threatening letters. It has been held that the offense of sending a threatening letter, when it is sent by mail, is committed in the county where the letter is mailed.60 But some courts have held that it is committed where the letter is received, on the theory that the post office is the innocent agent of the sender.61 And it may be punished either in the county where the letter is sent or where it is received, under a statute providing that where an offense is committed partly in one county and partly in another, the jurisdiction is in either county.62

§ 326. Other miscellaneous offenses. The offense of bringing into the United States an alien not entitled to admission,63 or of importing an alien woman for purposes of prostitution,64 is committed at the place where the alien enters the country; the offense of refusal by a person summoned as a witness to appear and be sworn, at the place where he is required to appear and be sworn, and not at the place where the subpoena is served on him; 65 the offense of concealing property of a bankrupt from his trustee, in the federal district where the concealment takes place; 66 the offense of knowingly subscribing to a false report by an officer or agent of a bank, in the county where the report is subscribed; 67 the offense of unlawfully procuring oneself to be registered as a physician, in the county where the application is made and filed and the license is issued; 68 and the

58 State v. Haynes, 74 S. C. 450, 55 S. E. 118; State v. Rice, 43 S. C. 200, 20 S. E. 986.

59 State v. Perry, 87 S. C. 535, 70 S. E. 304.

60 Landa v. State, 26 Tex. App. 580, 10 S. W. 218.

61 People v. Griffin, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 427; Rex v. Esser, 2 East P. C. 1125; Rex V. Girdwood, 1 Leach C. C. 142.

62 Com. v. Morton, 140 Ky. 628, 131 S. W. 506, Ann. Cas. 1912 B 454. 63 United States v. Capella, 169 Fed. 890.

64 United States v. Krsteff, 185 Fed. 201; Ex parte Lair, 177 Fed. 789.

65 State v. Brewster, 87 N. J. L. 75, 93 Atl. 189.

66 A bankrupt cannot be prose cuted in the state where the bankruptcy proceedings are pending for concealing property which was never in that state. Gretsch V. United States, 231 Fed. 57.

67 Eureka County Bank (Habeas Corpus) Cases, 35 Nev. 80, 145, 126 Pac. 655, 129 Pac. 308.

68 Though he is examined in an

offense of compounding a felony in the state where the agreement to compound it is entered into.69

A senator may be punished for agreeing to receive compensation for services to be rendered in a proceeding in which the government is interested, in violation of the federal statute, in the district where the agreement was consummated,70 but he must be tried for receiving compensation for such services in the district where the compensation is received.71

It has been held that a prohibited advertisement in a newspaper is published only at the place of publication of the paper, and not in each county in which the paper circulates.72

III. JURISDICTION AND POWER TO PUNISH AS BETWEEN STATES AND UNITED STATES.

§ 327. In general. An act committed within a state cannot be made an offense against the United States unless it has some relation to the execution of a power of congress, or to some matter within the jurisdiction of the United States. Otherwise it is a matter with respect to which the state alone can legislate.78 The federal courts have no power to execute the penal laws of the individual states nor to punish violations of their

other county. People v. Maczulski, 194 Mich. 193, 160 N. W. 576.

69 Where persons while in one state agree to compound a felony committed in another state, and then go to the latter state and there sign a written agreement purporting and intended to carry into effect the previous parol understanding, they may be indicted for compounding in the latter state. Hays v. State, 142 Ga. 592, 83 S. E. 236.

70 Where a senator sent from Chicago an offer to enter into such an agreement to a firm in St. Louis, the offense was completed when the offer was accepted in St. Louis and the offense was committed and was punishable there, though the defendant was not there when the offer was accepted. Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 344, 50 L. Ed. 1057, 26 Sup. Ct. 688, 6 Ann. Cas. 362.

criminal laws.74 Nor as a rule

71 Where payment was made by checks on a St. Louis bank sent to Washington, and the defendant deposited the checks in a bank in Washington, and they were credited to his account at once and subsequently paid in due course, it was held that he could not be prosecuted in Missouri. Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283, 49 L. Ed. 482, 25 Sup. Ct. 243.

72 State v. Bass, 97 Me. 484, 54 Atl. 1113.

78 United States v. Barnow, 239 U. S. 74, 60 L. Ed. 155, 36 Sup. Ct. 19, rev'g 221 Fed. 140; United States v. Fox, 95 U. S. 670, 24 L. Ed. 538.

74 Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 36 L. Ed. 1123, 13 Sup. Ct. 224; Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 32 L. Ed. 239, 8 Sup. Ct. 1370.