the internal administration of a federal institution. So a state has no power to require a federal employee driving a government motor truck in the transportation of the mail to obtain a state license to drive by submitting to an examination concerning his competence and paying a fee. And the governor of a federal soldiers' home cannot be punished for disregarding a state law concerning the use of oleomargarine while furnishing it to the inmates as part of their rations. Nor is a pension examiner amenable to a state statute providing for the punishment of one who maliciously threatens to accuse a person of a crime in order to compel him to do an act, for acts done by him while investigating alleged fraudulent pension claims.7 Nor can a collector of internal revenue nor a United States marshal be punished under a state statute for a homicide or an assault committed by him in performing the duties of his office. Nor do laws and ordinances governing the speed of motor vehicles apply to military or naval despatch bearers when acting under orders and in cases of military necessity in time of war.10 But state speed laws and other traffic regulations have been held to apply to federal employees engaged in transporting and distributing the mail.11 And

of individuals, they may maintain civil actions for damages, or seek protection under the federal laws. In re Waite, 81 Fed. 359.

4 Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276, 43 L. Ed. 699, 19 Sup. Ct. 453.

5 Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51, 65 L. Ed. 126, 41 Sup. Ct. 16.

6 This is true although the federal government has ceded to the state jurisdiction over the land on which the home is located. Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276, 43 L. Ed. 699, 19 Sup. Ct. 453.

7 In re Waite, 81 Fed. 359.

8 Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 25 L. Ed. 648.

9 In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, 34 L. Ed. 55, 10 Sup. Ct. 658; Ex parte Jenkins, 2 Wall. J. 521, Fed. Cas. No. 7,259.

10 A member of the United States Naval Reserve force, on duty as a despatch bearer, is not amenable to the speed laws, while acting under the immediate orders of his superior

officer to proceed along a highway with all possible speed, which instruction is assumed by said officer to necessitate a violation of the speed laws, and is given in a matter deemed by him to be of urgency and appertaining to the conduct of the war. State v. Burton, 41 R. I. 303, 103 Atl. 962, L. R. A. 1918 F 559.

11 Com. v. Closson, 229 Mass. 329, 118 N. E. 653, La R. A. 1918 C 939. And see Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51, 65 L. Ed. 126, 41 Sup. Ct. 16; United States v. Hart, Fed. Cas. No. 15,316.

Speed laws apply to a federal employee while engaged in transporting the mail in a machine owned by the federal government and pursuant to the direction of the postmaster general, where it does not appear that such direction fixes a schedule for the carrying or delivery of the mail, or that it otherwise requires him to violate the statute. Hall v. Conn., Va. 105 S. E. 551.

-

mail carriers are amenable to state laws punishing the carrying of weapons or concealed weapons, at least where they are not authorized or empowered by any federal authority to carry them.12 Nor will the mere fact that a federal officer claims that the acts for which he is sought to be punished by a state were within the line of his official duty afford him immunity, if the acts are such as to show that the claimed immunity is a mere subterfuge, and that under no fair consideration of his official duty could he have assumed that he was acting in his official capacity when doing them.18

§ 331. Offenses committed on the high seas. The constitution expressly gives to congress power to punish piracies and felonies on the high seas. The federal statutes provide for the punishment of offenses committed upon the high seas, or on any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state,14 or when committed within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state on board any American vessel.15 The open waters of the great lakes and of the rivers connecting them are within the general designation of "high seas" as used in these provisions, 16 and the federal courts have jurisdiction of offenses committed thereon to the same extent as of offenses committed on the oceans.17 By their terms these statutes do not

12 Hathcote v. State, 55 Ark. 181, 17 S. W. 721; State v. Boone, 132 N. C. 1107, 44 S. E. 595; State v. Barnett, 34 W. Va. 74, 11 S. E. 735.

13 In re White, 81 Fed. 359. 14 Pen. Code, § 272.

Earlier statutes provided for the punishment of murder and other offenses "committed upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin, or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state." See Rev. Stat., §§ 5339, 5346, 5361, 5362, 5372, etc.

Under Pen. Code, §§ 272, 287, a citizen of the United States may be punished in the federal courts for the larceny of fish from a pound on the high seas belonging to another citizen. Miller v. United States, 242 Fed. 907, L. R. A. 1918 A 545, cer

tiorari denied 245 U. S. 660, 62 L. Ed. 535; 38 Sup. Ct. 61.

15 Pen. Code, § 272. See § 331, infra. 16 Ex parte O'Hare, 179 Fed. 662, rev'g 171 Fed. 290; United States v. Rodgers, 150 U. S. 249, 37 L. Ed. 1071, 14 Sup. Ct. 109. And see United States v. Peterson, 64 Fed. 145.

17 United States v. Rodgers, 150 U. S. 249, 37 L. Ed. 1071, 14 Sup. Ct. 109.

The criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts was expressly extended over them by Act Sept. 4, 1890 (26 Stat. p. 424, c. 874). United States v. Peterson, 64 Fed. 145.

Penal Code, § 272, provides for the punishment of crimes "committed upon the high seas, or on any other waters within the admiralty and

deprive the states of jurisdiction over offenses committed within their territorial limits.18

The

§ 332. Offenses on waters within territorial limits of a state. criminal laws of a state bordering on the ocean apply to offenses committed on bays, arms of the sea, or tidal rivers within its borders, whether above or below the ebb or flow of the tide, and state courts have jurisdiction to punish for such offenses, where there has been no attempt on the part of congress to assert exclusive jurisdiction.19 And the same is true of offenses committed on waters of the Great Lakes and the rivers connecting them, within the territorial jurisdiction of a state.20 The federal statutes punishing offenses committed upon the high seas, or on any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, or on board any American vessel, "and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state," 21 do not apply under such circumstances, and do not affect the jurisdiction of the state courts.22

Subject to the paramount right of navigation, the regulation of which in respect to foreign and interstate commerce is granted to the United States by the constitution,28 each state owns the beds of

maritime jurisdiction of the United States," etc., on board an American vessel, and of crimes committed on a vessel being on a voyage upon the great lakes or any of the waters connecting them.

18 See § 332, infra.

19 People v. Welch, 141 N. Y. 266, 36 N. E. 328, 24 L. R. A. 117, 38 Am. St. Rep. 793.

A New York state court has jurisdiction of a prosecution for manslaughter against a licensed pilot based on the killing of a person in a collision in the Hudson River as a result of his negligence, although the federal statute declares that every person employed on a vessel by whose misconduct, negligence, etc., a person is killed, shall be guilty of manslaughter. People v. Welch, 141 N. Y. 266, 36 N. E. 328, 24 L. R. A. 117, 38 Am. St. Rep. 793.

20 The federal courts have no juris

diction of an offense committed on an American vessel anchored within the government breakwater at Buffalo. Such waters were held to be a "haven" within the meaning of Rev. Stats. §§ 5346, 5360, 5361. Ex parte O'Hare, 179 Fed. 662, rev'g 171 Fed. 290.

21 Penal Code, § 272.

22 United States V. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336, 4 La Ed. 404; United States v. Grush, 5 Mason 290, Fed. Cas. No. 15,268; Ex parte O'Hare, 179 Fed. 662, rev'g 171 Fed. 290; Com. v. Peters, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 387.

23 The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S. 166, 56 L. Ed. 390, 32 Sup. Ct. 310; Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240, 35 L. Ed. 159, 11 Sup. Ct. 559, aff'g 152 Mass. 230, 25 N. E. 113, 9 L. R. A. 236, 23 Am. St. Rep. 820; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, 24 L. Ed. 248. And see § 331, supra.

all tidal waters within its territorial limits, unless they have been granted away.24 A state may, therefore, regulate the planting and harvesting of oysters and sponges on the beds of such waters, and make the violation of such regulations a penal offense.25 And the right of the states in this respect is exclusive, and congress has no right to make such regulations.26 Subject to the same limitations the states also own the tidewaters themselves, and the fish in such waters, so far as they are capable of ownership while running,27 and may enact penal laws regulating the taking of fish in such waters, at least in the absence of any legislation by congress on the subject.28

§ 333. United States forts, arsenals, dockyards, etc. The consti-. tution of the United States confers upon congress exclusive power to legislate over places purchased by the United States, by consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings,20 and no state has any jurisdiction to punish for offenses committed in territory so purchased or over which exclusive jurisdiction has been ceded to the federal government by the state.30

24 The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S. 166, 56 L. Ed. 390, 32 Sup. Ct. 310; Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240, 35 L. Ed. 159, 11 Sup. Ct. 559, aff'g 152 Mass. 230, 25 N. E. 113, 9 L. R. A. 236, 23 Am. St. Rep. 820; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, 24 L. Ed. 248; Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. (U. S.) 71, 15 L. Ed. 269.

25 The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S. 166, 56 L. Ed. 390, 32 Sup. Ct. 310; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, 24 L. Ed. 248; Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. (U. S.) 71, 15 La Ed. 269.

26 The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S. 166, 56 L. Ed. 390, 32 Sup. Ct. 310.

27 The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S. 166, 56 L. Ed. 390, 32 Sup. Ct. 310; Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240, 35 L. Ed. 159, 11 Sup. Ct. 559, aff'g 152 Mass. 230, 25 N. E. 113, 9 L. R. A. 236, 23 Am. St. Rep. 820; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, 24 L. Ed. 248.

28 Fishing with nets in Buzzard's Bay. Manchester v. Massachusetts,

139 U. S. 240, 35 L. Ed. 159, 11 Sup. Ct. 559, aff'g 152 Mass. 230, 25 N. E. 113, 9 L. R. A. 236, 23 Am. St. Rep.

820.

29 See § 24, supra.

30 United States. Battle v. United States, 209 U. S. 36, 52 L. Ed. 670, 28 Sup. Ct. 422; Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 29 L. Ed. 264, 5 Sup. Ct. 995; United States v. Andem, 158 Fed. 996; United States v. Baum, 74 Fed. 43; United States v. Meagher, 37 Fed. 875; United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason 60, Fed. Cas. No. 14,867.

Maine. State v. Kelly, 76 Me. 331. Massachusetts. Com. v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72; Mitchell v. Tibbetts, 17 Pick. 298.

Mississippi. State v. Seymour, 78 Miss. 134, 28 So. 799.

Montana. State v. Tully, 31 Mont. 365, 78 Pac. 760, 3 Ann. Cas. 824.

Nevada. State v. Mack, 23 Nev. 359, 47 Pac. 763, 62 Am. St. Rep. 811.

1

The mere purchase or occupation of land by the United States is not enough to oust state jurisdiction, however,31 but to have that effect the land must have been purchased with the consent of the state legislature, or exclusive jurisdiction over it must have been ceded to the United States by the state,32 or reserved by the United