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with himself or with some other man.92 The necessary purpose may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.98 And the fact that the parties subsequently had sexual intercourse is evidence of the intent. 94

Concubinage means the act or practice of a man and woman who are not married to each other cohabiting in sexual intercourse as husband and wife.95 It is distinct from prostitution,96 and proof of a purpose of prostitution will not support a charge of a purpose of concubinage, nor vice versa.97 A taking for the purpose of sexual intercourse with several men is not a taking for the purpose of concubinage, since one woman cannot be the concubine of several men at the same time.98

Long continued illicit intercourse is not necessary to constitute the relation.99 And when a man and woman, not married, agree to cohabit with each other as though the marriage relation existed between them, without fixing any limit as to the duration of the relation, she becomes his concubine as soon as the relation begins. As a rule the taking away of a girl for the purpose of a single act of intercourse, or of having intercourse with her for a single night, is held not to be a taking for the purpose of concubinage,2 and proof

92 State v. Knost, 207 Mo. 18, 105 S. W. 616.

93 State v. Bussey, 58 Kan. 679, 50 Pac. 891.

The previous relations and subsequent conduct of the parties may be considered on the question of intent. People v. Carrier, 46 Mich. 442, 9 N. W. 487.

94 State v. Bobbst, 131 Mo. 328, 32 S. W. 1149; State v. Johnson, 115 Mo. 480, 22 S. W. 463.

One, two, or half a dozen acts of illicit intercourse, do not, of themselves constitute concubinage, but they may be considered in connection with the other facts and circumstances on the question of intent. United States v. ZesCloya, 35 Fed. 493.

95 United States v. ZesCloya, 35 Fed. 493; State v. William, 106 Kan. 778, 189 Pac. 906; State v. Overstreet, 43 Kan. 299, 23 Pac. 572; State v. Goodwin, 33 Kan. 538, 6 Pac. 899;

State v. Baldwin, 214 Mo. 290, 113 S. W. 1123; State v. Knost, 207 Mo. 18, 105 S. W. 616; State v. Bobbst, 131 Mo. 328, 32 S. W. 1149; State v. Gibson, 111 Mo. 92, 19 S. W. 980.

96 State v. William, 106 Kan. 778, 189 Pac. 906; State v. Goodwin, 33 Kan. 538, 6 Pac. 899; State v. Gibson, 111 Mo. 92, 19 S. W. 980.

97 State v. William, 106 Kan. 778, 189 Pac. 906; State v. Gibson, 111 Mo. 92, 19 S. W. 980.

98 State v. Gibson, 111 Mo. 92, 19 S. W. 980.

99 Henderson v. People, 124 Ill. 607, 17 N. E. 68, 7 Am. St. Rep. 391; State v. Bussey, 58 Kan. 679, 50 Pac. 891; South v. State, 97 Tenn. 496, 37 S. W. 210.

1 Henderson v. People, 124 Ill. 607, 17 N. E. 68, 7 Am. St. Rep. 391; State v. Bussey, 58 Kan. 679, 50 Pac. 891.

2 State v. Bobbst, 131 Mo. 328, 32 S. W. 1149; State v. Wilkinson, 121

of a single act of intercourse will not authorize a conviction of abduction for that purpose. But a taking with intent to cohabit for more than a single act of intercourse has been held to be sufficient.* In Michigan, the terms concubinage and prostitution, as used in the statute, have been held to apply to any lewd intercourse between the parties.5

The actual existence of the relation is not essential under statutes of this character. Nor is sexual intercourse."

$358. Prostitution. To sustain a conviction under a statute punishing a taking for the purpose of prostitution, it must be shown. that the taking was for that purpose. But such a purpose may be inferred or deduced from facts or acts in proof, such as that the girl was received into a house of prostitution and kept there, and that a man or men there had intercourse with her, either with her consent or by force. It is not necessary that such purpose be disclosed to or known by the girl.10

Mo. 485, 26 S. W. 366; State v. Gibson, 111 Mo. 92, 19 S. W. 980.

In State v. Overstreet, 43 Kan. 299, 23 Pac. 572, the court intimated that intercourse for a single night would be sufficient, but said that it was not necessary to go that far since the evidence pointed to the fact that the girl had been the defendant's mistress for months.

3 State v. Wilkinson, 121 Mo. 485, 26 S. W. 366; State v. Gibson, 111 Mo. 92, 19 S. W. 980.

4 State v. Baldwin, 214 Mo. 290, 113 S. W. 1123.

5 People v. Cummons, 56 Mich. 544, 23 N. W. 215.

Concubinage is a comprehensive term covering any illicit intercourse. People v. Bristol, 23 Mich. 118.

6 Slocum v. People, 90 Ill. 274; State v. Bussey, 58 Kan. 679, 50 Pac. 891; State v. Knost, 207 Mo. 18, 105 S. W. 616.

7 United States v. ZesCloya, 35 Fed. 493; Henderson v. People, 124 Ill. 607, 17 N. E. 68, 7 Am. St. Rep. 391; State v. Knost, 207 Mo. 18, 105 S. W. 616; State v. Bobbst, 131 Mo. 328, 32 S. W. 1149; State v. Johnson, 115 Mo.

480, 22 S. W. 463; State v. Gibson, 111 Mo. 92, 19 S. W. 980.

8 United States. United States v. ZesCloya, 35 Fed. 493.

California. People v. Lewis, 141 Cal. 543, 75 Pac. 189; People v. Newton, 11 Cal. App. 762, 106 Pac. 247. Illinois. Slocum v. People, 90 Ill.

274.

Maryland. Brown v. State, 72 Md. 468, 20 Atl. 186.

Missouri. State v. Corrigan, 262 Mo. 195, 171 S. W. 51; State v. Gibson, 111 Mo. 92, 19 S. W. 980.

New York. People v. Plath, 100 N. Y. 590, 3 N. E. 790, 53 Am. Rep. 236; Kauffman v. People, 11 Hun 82.

And see the other cases cited in the following notes.

9 State v. Corrigan, 262 Mo. 195, 171 S. W. 51.

The fact that the accused was the keeper of a bawdy house, and that the girl was brought to her house and permitted to remain there, is prima facie evidence that this was done for purposes of prostitution. Brown v. State, 72 Md. 468, 20 Atl. 186.

10 Slocum v. People, 90 Ill. 274.

Prostitution is the practice on the part of a woman of offering her body for indiscriminate sexual intercourse with men.11 And according to the weight of authority a person who entices or takes away a female for the purpose of having illicit intercourse with her himself alone, 12 or in order that another person alone may have inter

11 United States. United States v. ZesCloya, 35 Fed. 493.

Alabama. Haygood v. State, 98 Ala. 61, 13 So. 325.

Illinois. Bunfill v. People, 154 Ill. 640, 39 N. E. 565.

Indiana. Nichols

v. State, 127 Ind. 406, 26 N. E. 839; Miller v. State, 121 Ind. 294, 23 N. E. 94. Iowa. State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa 447. Kansas. State v. William, 106 Kan. 778, 189 Pac. 906; State v. Goodwin, 33 Kan. 538, 6 Pac. 899.

Maine. State v. Stoyell, 54 Me. 24, 89 Am. Dec. 716.

Massachusetts. Com. v. Cook, 12 Metc. (53 Mass.) 93.

Missouri. State v. Rorebeck, 158 Mo. 130, 59 S. W. 67; State v. Gibson, 111 Mo. 92, 19 S. W. 980.

New York. Carpenter v. People, 8 Barb. 603.

This is the meaning of the word as used in a statute making any person who procures or entices a person to become an inmate of a house of prostitution or to enter, for the purpose of prostitution, any place where prostitution is practiced, encouraged or allowed, guilty of pandering. Com. v. Lavery, 247 Pa. 139, 93 Atl. 276, rev'g 57 Pa. Super. Ct. 154.

See also § 1064, infra.

12 United States. United States v. Zes Cloya, 35 Fed. 493.

Alabama. Haygood v. State, 98 Ala. 61, 13 So. 325.

Illinois. Slocum v. People, 90 Ill.

274.

Indiana. Nichols v. State, 127 Ind. 406, 26 N. E. 839; Miller v. State, 121 Ind. 294, 23 N. E. 94; Osborn v. State, 52 Ind. 526.

Iowa. State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa 447. Kansas. State v. William, 106 Kan. 778, 189 Pac. 906.

Maine. State v. Stoyell, 54 Me. 24, 89 Am. Dec. 716.

Massachusetts. Com. v. Cook, 12 Metc. (53 Mass.) 93.

Missouri. State v. Rorebeck, 158 Mo. 130, 59 S. W. 67.

New Hampshire. State v. Brow, 64 N. H. 577, 15 Atl. 216.

New York. Carpenter v. People, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 603.

It has been said that the defendant might be guilty even under such circumstances if he took the girl to a house of prostitution, upon the principle that her prostitution might be regarded as almost necessarily to follow, and that he would be presumed to intend the natural, necessary or probable consequences of his act. State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa 447.

Under the New York statute punishing, inveigling or enticing a woman "into a house of ill fame or of assignation for the purpose of prostitution or sexual intercourse,'' there must be an enticing for purposes of prostitution, and an enticing for a single act of intercourse will not sustain a conviction. People v. Warden of City Prison, 207 N. Y. 354, 101 N. E. 167, aff'g 152 App. Div. 912, 137 N. Y. Supp. 1137, aff 'g 137 N. Y. Supp. 268.

A person who takes a woman to a house of prostitution for the purpose of having intercourse with her himself alone, is not within a statute punishing as pandering any person who procures or entices a woman to enter, for the purpose of prostitution,

course with her,18 is not guilty of taking or enticing her away for the purpose of prostitution. But in Texas it has been held that the offense is committed where the abductor takes the girl for the purpose of having intercourse with her individually.14

Actual intercourse is not essential to the crime,15 and it may be committed by a woman as well as by a man.1 16 Nor is it necessary that the girl shall actually become a prostitute or be placed in a house of prostitution.17 The girl need not be unmarried unless the statute so provides. 18

§ 359. Compelling marriage or defilement. Statutes in some states provide for the punishment of any person who shall take any female, or any female over a certain age, unlawfully and against her will, and by force, menace, fraud, deceit, stratagem, or duress, compel or induce her to marry him or any other person, or to be defiled.1o The offense is to be distinguished from seduction,20 and from rape, although it closely resembles the latter crime, when the defilement consists in having sexual intercourse.2 To come within such a pro

V.

a place where prostitution is practiced, encouraged or allowed. Com. Lavery, 247 Pa. 139, 93 Atl. 276, rev'g 57 Pa. Super. Ct. 154.

Detention for the purpose of prostitution does not occur where a stepfather detains his stepdaughter in his own house for the purpose of having intercourse with her himself. Bunfill v. People, 154 Ill. 640, 39 N. E. 565. 13 Haygood v. State, 98 Ala. 61, 13 So. 325.

14 Lopez v. State, 70 Tex. Cr. 71, 156 S. W. 217.

15 United States v. ZesCloya, 35 Fed. 493; People v. Lewis, 141 Cal. 543, 75 Pac. 189; State v. Rorebeck, 158 Mo. 130, 59 S. W. 67; Lopez v. State, 70 Tex. Cr. 71, 156 S. W. 217.

16 People v. Newton, 11 Cal. App. 762, 106 Pac. 247; State v. Rorebeck, 158 Mo. 130, 59 S. W. 67; State v. Gibson, 111 Mo. 92, 19 S. W. 980.

17 People v. Lewis, 141 Cal. 543, 75 Pac. 189; Slocum v. People, 90 Ill. 274; Kauffman v. People, 11 Hun (N. Y.) 82.

21

18 People v. Newton, 11 Cal. App. 762, 106 Pac. 247.

19 State v. Brown, 95 Iowa 381, 64 N. W. 277; State v. Fernald, 88 Iowa 553, 55 N. W. 534; State v. Montgomery, 79 Iowa 737, 45 N. W. 292; Pollard v. State, 2 Iowa 567; Kauffman v. People, 11 Hun (N. Y.) 82.

In the Mississippi code this offense is classified under the head of abduction. Hem. Ann. Code, 1917, § 750. And is apparently treated as abduction by the courts. See Lampton v. State (Miss.), 11 So. 656.

In Iowa it is said that the statute is somewhat analogous to those of different states denouncing abduction. State v. Hromadko, 123 Iowa 665, 99 N. W. 560.

20 Lampton v. State (Miss.), 11 So. 656.

21 State v. Montgomery, 79 Iowa 737, 45 N. W. 292; Pollard v. State, 2 Iowa 567.

It differs from rape in that there must be an unlawful taking against the woman's will, while in rape the

vision the taking must have been unlawful, and against the woman's will,22 and her defilement must be accomplished by force, menace, duress, etc.28 Previous chastity of the woman is not an essential element of the offense unless made so by the statute.24

matter of taking is not material and need not be alleged; and also in that any defilement of the person is suffi cient, while in rape carnal knowledge is essential, and in that the same strictness of proof with respect to the exertion of force, menace, or duress and absence of acquiescence is not required. State v. Hromadko, 123 Iowa 665, 99 N. W. 560.

22 Lampton v. State (Miss.), 11 So. 656; State v. Hromadko, 123 Iowa 665, 99 N. W. 560; State v. Fernald, 88 Iowa 553, 55 N. W. 534; State v.

Montgomery, 79 Iowa 737, 45 N. W. 292; Pollard v. State, 2 Iowa 567; Kauffman v. People, 11 Hun (N. Y.) 82.

23 State v. Hromadko, 123 Iowa 665, 99 N. W. 560; State v. Fernald, 88 Iowa 553, 55 N. W. 534; State v. Montgomery, 79 Iowa 737, 45 N. W. 292; Pollard v. State, 2 Iowa 567; Lampton v. State (Miss.), 11 So. 656; Kauffman v. People, 11 Hun (N. Y.) 82.

24 State v. Fernald, 88 Iowa 553, 55 N. W 534.

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