of the government,13 or a commission or board,14 or to the judiciary,15 or a private corporation.16 And Congress cannot delegate to a state legislature authority to fix the punishment for offenses against the federal law, though it may adopt existing punishments prescribed by state statutes.17 The constitution may expressly permit the delegation of legislative power to a board in certain cases, and when it does, of course such a delegation is valid.18 And state constitutions generally give the legislature authority to delegate to municipal corporations and other political subdivisions of the state the right to enact by-laws and ordinances to prevent vice and immorality, to enforce order, and for other purposes affecting the health and welfare of their people,19 or such right is sanctioned by immemorial usage.2 20 § 32. To the judiciary. The determination and definition of acts. which are punishable as crimes cannot be delegated to courts and Tennessee. Wright v. Cunningham, 115 Tenn. 445, 91 S. W. 293. Texas. Ex parte Leslie, 87 Tex. Cr. 476, 223 S. W. 227; Jannin v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. 631, 51 S. W. 1126, 62 S. W. 419, 96 Am. St. Rep. 821. 13 United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677, 36 L. Ed. 591, 12 Sup. Ct. 764; United States v. Dodson, 268 Fed. 397; United States v. Maid, 116 Fed. 650; State v. Thompson, 111 Wash. 525, 191 Pac. 620, and other cases cited in the preceding note. See also § 17, supra. That congress and state legislatures may provide for the punishment of persons who violate rules and regulations prescribed by executive officers or boards or tribunals, see § 34, infra. 14 Williams v. Evans, 139 Minn. 32, 165 N. W. 495, 166 N. W. 504, L. R. A. 1918 F 542. As a code commission, State v. Gaunt, 13 Ore. 115, 9 Pac. 55; or a board of health, Globe School Dist. No. 1 of Globe, Gila County v. Board of Health City of Globe, 20 Ariz. 208, 179 Pac. 55; or an industrial board. People v. Klinck Packing Co., 214 N. Y. 121, 108 N. E. 278, Ann. Cas. 1916 D 1051, aff'g 164 N. Y. App. Div. 97, 149 N. Y. Supp. 504. 15 See § 32, infra. 17 Hollister v. United States, 145 19 Illinois. Massachusetts. Com. v. Kingsbury, 199 Mass. 542, 85 N. E. 848, L. R. A. 1915 E 264, 127 Am. St. Rep. 513. Michigan. People V. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611, 42 N. W. 1124, 4 L. R. A. 751. Minnesota. State v. Ludwig, 21 Minn. 202. New Hampshire. State v. Noyes, 30 N. H. 279. New Jersey. Howe V. Treasurer of Plainfield, 37 N. J. L. 145. 20 Wright v. Cunningham, 115 Tenn. 445, 91 S. W. 293. juries.21 So a statute providing that if any judge, justice of the peace, sheriff, or any other civil officer "shall be guilty of any misdemeanor in the execution of either of their respective offices," he shall, on conviction thereof, be fined or imprisoned, is invalid where it does not undertake to define in any manner what acts are to be deemed misdemeanors in office, and there is no other law which furnishes such definition, since, under such circumstances, the matter is left to the discretion of the judiciary 22 And the same is true of statutes which are so indefinite as not to enable it to be known what they forbid, and therefore leave it to courts and juries to determine what acts shall be held to be criminal and punishable under them.23 But a statute making it an offense for a husband to neglect or fail to provide for his wife "without good cause," is not invalid for this reason.24 And the legislature may leave it to a court to determine a fact or state of things upon which the action of a law depends,25 and may authorize courts or juries to exercise discretion in fixing the punishment for crimes within prescribed limits.26 § 33. To private corporations. The legislature has no power to delegate to private corporations or associations power to impose penalties or fines upon persons other than its members who violate its rules or regulations,27 or power to make laws for the discharge of offenders, or to prescribe rules which shall acquit persons charged with crime.28 21 United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81, 65 L. Ed. 516, 41 Sup. Ct. 298, aff'g 264 Fed. 218; Burcher v. People, 41 Colo. 495, 93 Pac. 14, 124 Am. St. Rep. 143; State v. Gaster, 45 La. Ann. 636, 12. So. 739. 22 State v. Gaster, 45 La. Ann. 636, 12 So. 739. 23 United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81, 65 L. Ed. 516, 41 Sup. Ct. 298, aff'g 264 Fed. 218. And see 62. 24 State v. Dixon, 138 Tenn. 195, 196 S. W. 486. 25 A statute authorizing a court to order the erection of safety gates and the stationing of flagmen at railroad crossings upon the application of the local authorities does not delegate legislative power to the court. People v. Long Island R. Co., 134 N. Y. 506, 31 N. E. 873, aff'g 58 Hun 412, 12 N. Y. Supp. 41. See generally, § 34, infra. 26 In re O'Shea, 11 Cal. App. 568, 105 Pac. 776; Hankins v. People, 106 Ill. 628. 27 As a cemetery association. Johnstown Cemetery Ass'n v. Parker, 45 N. Y. App. Div. 55, 60 N. Y. Supp. 1015, aff'g 28 N. Y. Misc. 280, 59 N. Y. Supp. 821. 28 A statute authorizing magistrates to permit persons charged with disorderly conduct on account of drunkenness to take a cure for drunkenness of some corporation organized for the purpose of administering such cure, and providing for the discharge of accused on his showing that he had taken the cure and abstained from the use of liquor for a specified length of time was held And a statute making it a criminal offense to wear the badge or button of a fraternal or secret order, or to use its name to obtain aid or assistance, or to use its name, or the title of its officers, or its insignia or rituals, unless entitled to do so under its constitution, by-laws, rules and regulations, has been held to be void in that it leaves to the various societies coming within its provisions to supply by declaration in their secret work, from time to time, the description of the articles whose use was attempted to be made unlawful.29 And the same has been held to be true of a statute making it a crime for any person other than the agent of a railroad company to sell a railroad ticket, provided the ticket contains a printed notice that it is a penal offense for the holder to sell the same,30 or to sell, give away, or transfer any pass or other form of free transportation issued by a common carrier which by conditions expressed thereon is not transferable,31 where there is no requirement of law compelling such companies to print such notices or conditions on such passes or tickets. But statutes making it an offense to traffic in nontransferable railroad tickets signed by the purchaser,32 or for anyone except the authorized agents of a railroad company to sell railroad tickets and requiring railroad companies to commission their agents,33 or to fraudulently or wilfully violate rules made by street railway companies governing the issuance and use of transfers,34 have been held to be valid. 31 Such a statute leaves it to the companies named therein to create an offense or not, as they see fit, by merely making passes issued by them transferable or declining to do so. Allardt v. People, 197 Ill. 501, 64 N. E. 533. 32 Samuelson v. State, 116 Tenn. 470, 95 S. W. 1012, 115 Am. St. Rep. 805. 33 The mere fact that the companies may not appoint all applicants their agents to sell tickets does not make those not appointed guilty of crime. "If they become guilty, it is because, of their own volition, they persist in engaging in an act which the legislature says shall constitute a crime." In re O'Neill, 41 Wash. 174, 83 Pac. 104, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 558, 6 Ann. Cas. 869. 34 Whaley v. State, 168 Ala. 152, § 34. Delegation of power to make rules and regulations or to grant permits. The legislature may provide for the punishment of acts in resistance to, or violation of, authority conferred by it upon a subordinate officer, tribunal or board.85 It may also delegate to such an officer, tribunal or board the power to determine a fact or state. of things upon which the action of a law depends,86 or to make and enforce administrative regulations for the execution of a statute according to its terms.87 And where a statute defines and denounces a crime, a person may be prosecuted for its violation although the evidence or indicia which render the commission of the crime possible is created by regulations prescribed by executive or administrative officers, or though such regulations provide the place, occasion and opportunity for committing it.38 So a statute which denounces penalties upon the omission, misuse, falsification, or removal or defacement of stamps, marks or brands thereafter to be prescribed by executive officers does not amount to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.39 Nor does a statute which expressly authorizes the secre 52 So. 941, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 499. 35 State v. McCarty, 5 Ala. App. 212, 59 So. 543; People v. Tait, 261 Ill. 197, 103 N. E. 750; Pierce v. Doolittle, 130 Iowa 333, 106 N. W. 751, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 143. As to the right of the legislature to delegate to a board of medical examiners the power to declare by rules and regulations what shall constitute unprofessional conduct, which is made a misdemeanor by statute, see Ex parte McNulty, 77 Cal. 164, 19 Pac. 237, 11 Am. St. Rep. 257. 36 United States. Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 51 L. Ed. 523, 27 Sup. Ct. 367, aff'g 143 Fed. 377; United States v. Casey, 247 Fed. 362; St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Terminal Ry. Co. v. United States, 188 Fed. 191; United States v. Moody, 164 Fed. 269; United States v. Ormsbee, 74 Fed. 207. Illinois. Biffer v. City of Chicago, Louisiana. State v. Guidry, 142 Mississippi. Abbott v. State, 106 Miss. 340, 63 So. 667. Missouri. State v. Thompson, 160 Mo. 333, 60 S. W. 1077, 54 L. R. A. 950, 83 Am. St. Rep. 468. New Hampshire. State V. Normand, 76 N. H. 541, 85 Atl. 899, Ann. Cas. 1913 E 996. Pennsylvania. In re Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 491, 13 Am. St. Rep. 716. Washington. State v. Thompson, 111 Wash. 525, 191 Pac. 620; State v. Storey, 51 Wash. 630, 99 Pac. 878. 37 Cook v. Burnquist, 242 Fed. 321; Pakas v. United States, 240 Fed. 350, aff'd 245 U. S. 467, 62 L. Ed. 406, 38 Sup. Ct. 148; St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Terminal Ry. Co. v. United States, 188 Fed. 191; United States v. Moody, 164 Fed. 269. 38 Caha v. United States, 152 U. S. 211, 38 L. Ed. 415, 14 Sup. Ct. 513; United States v. Ehrgott, 182 Fed. 267; Wilkins v. United States, 96 Fed. 837. And see other cases cited in the following notes. 39 Stamps, marks от brands required to be placed on oleomargarine. tary of war to prescribe rules and regulations for the use, administration and navigation of canals owned by the government,40 or for the protection of improvements made by the government in navigable rivers, or which authorizes the secretary of agriculture to make rules and regulations governing the use of forest reserves,42 and which expressly declares the violation of such rules and regulations to be a criminal offense, nor a statute which makes it an offense to fail or refuse to alter or remove a bridge over a navigable stream after the secretary of war has determined that the same unreasonably obstructs navigation, 43 or to mail certain articles unless in accordance with rules and regulations as to preparation and packing which the postmaster-general is authorized to prescribe.44 And the same is true of statutes enacted under the war power making it an offense to keep a house of ill-fame within such distance from military posts, camps. or stations as may be designated by the secretary of war,45 or to sell food or fuel at higher prices than those fixed by the agencies upon In re Kollock, 165 U. S. 526, 41 L. Ed. 813, 17 Sup. Ct. 444, denying writ of habeas corpus applied for by the defendant in Kollock v. United States, 9 App. Cas. (D. C.) 420; Wilkins v. United States, 96 Fed. 837; United States v. Ford, 50 Fed. 467; Prather v. United States, 9 App. Cas. (D. C.) 82, writ of error dismissed, 164 U. S. 452, 41 L. Ed. 510, 17 Sup. Ct. 997. 40 United States v. Moody, 164 Fed. 269; United States v. Ormsbee, 74 Fed. 207. 41 A person may be prosecuted criminally for violation of a rule of navigation prescribed by the secretary of war under a statute authorizing him to make such rules and regulations as might be necessary to protect improvements. under construction at the mouth of the Mississippi River. United States V. Breen, 40 Fed. 402. 42 A person may be prosecuted for pasturing cattle or sheep on such a reserve without having obtained a permit to do so as required by rules and regulations so prescribed. Light v. United States, 220 U. S. 523, 55 L. Ed. 570, 31 Sup. Ct. 485; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 55 L. Ed. 563, 31 Sup. Ct. 480; rev'g 170 Fed. 205; United States v. Bale, 156 Fed. 687; United States v. Deguirro, 152 Fed. 568; United States v. Domingo, 152 Fed. 566. See also Dastervignes v. United States, 122 Fed. 30, aff'g 118 Fed. 199. Or for maintaining a saloon on such a reserve without a permit. United States v. Rizzinelli, 182 Fed. 675. "A violation of reasonable rules regulating the use and occupancy of the property is made a crime, not by the secretary, but by Congress. The statute, not the secretary, fixes the penalty." The offense is not against the secretary, but against the United States. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 55 L. Ed. 563, 31 Sup. Ct. 480, rev'g 170 Fed. 205. 43 Union Bridge Co. V. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 51 L. Ed. 523, 27 Sup. Ct. 367, aff'g 143 Fed. 377. 44 Bruce v. United States, 202 Fed. 98. 45 McKinley v. United States, 249 |