necessary that he own such property or that he shall have any interest in it.78 Generally the statutes apply to any building, regardless of its character or the use to which it is put,79 and many of them, are not confined in their operation to the burning of buildings, but extend to any property insured.80 Some of them, however, require that the property burned be of a specified value.81 To sustain a conviction it must appear that the property burned was insured against fire,82 that it was wilfully burned by the accused,83 and that it was burned with intent to injure or defraud the insurer,84 where the statute makes these matters essential elements Jones v. State, 70 Ohio St. 36, 70 N. 78 People v. Barbera, 29 Cal. App. 604, 157 Pac. 532; State v. Jessup, 42 Kan. 422, 22 Pac. 627; Com. v. Bradford, 126 Mass. 42; Com. v. Goldstein, 114 Mass. 272; State v. Bersch, 276 Mo. 397, 207 S. W. 809; State v. Korth, 38 S. D. 539, 162 N. W. 144. 79 People v. Mix, 149 Mich. 260, 112 N. W. 907, 12 Ann. Cas. 393. 80 Alabama. Heard v. State, 81 Ala. 55, 1 So. 640. Illinois. People v. Darr, 255 Ill. 456, 99 N. E. 651; Mai v. People, 224 Ill. 414, 79 N. E. 633. Iowa. State v. Vandewater, Iowa - 176 N. W. 883. Massachusetts. Com. v. Andrews, 155 Mass. 68, 28 N. E. 1124. Michigan. People v. Jones, 24 Mich. 215. Missouri. State v. Bersch, 276 Mo. 397, 207 S. W. 809. New York. Dedieu v. People, 22 N. Y. 178. 81 Under a statute requiring that the property burned or set fire to shall be of the value of $50, it is not necessary that the interest of the accused in it shall be of that value. Jones v. State, 70 Ohio St. 36, 70 N. E. 952, 1 Ann. Cas. 618. Nor is it necessary that the prop New York. Dedieu v. People, 22 N. Y. 178. This is not necessary where the prosecution is under a statute making it an offense to burn property with intent to defraud any other person, etc. United States v. McBride, 7 Mackey (18 D. C.) 371. 83 Dedieu v. People, 22 N. Y. 178. The fire need not be applied directly to the insured property but it is sufficient if it is applied to a building or other property and communicated to the insured property. Com. v. Andrews, 155 Mass. 68, 28 N. E. 1124. 84 Alabama. Heard v. State, 81 Ala. 55, 1 So. 640. of the offense. And knowledge on the part of the accused that the property was insured is essential to the existence of an intent to defraud and hence must be shown, where such an intent is required.85 Under some of the statutes, however, an intent to defraud the insurance company is not necessary, but it is only necessary that the property be insured.86 Malice is not an essential element of the offense unless the statute so provides.87 It is entirely immaterial whether or not the burning does in fact defraud the insurer.88 A single burning of the same property cannot be divided so as to make several offenses merely because the property is insured by sev eral companies.89 California. People v. Rose, 38 Cal. App. 493, 176 Pac. 694; People v. Barbera, 29 Cal. App. 604, 157 Pac. 532. Illinois. People v. Novick, 265 Ill. 436, 107 N. E. 138; People v. Darr, 255 Ill. 456, 99 N. E. 651; Mai v. People, 224 Ill. 414, 79 N. E. 633; McDonald v. People, 47 Ill. 533. Massachusetts. Com. v. Asherowski, 196 Mass. 342, 82 N. E. 13; Com. v. Bradford, 126 Mass. 42. Michigan. Mich. 99. Meister v. People, 31 Missouri. State v. Bersch, 276 Mo. 397, 207 S. W. 809; State v. Greer, 243 Mo. 599, 147 S. W. 968, Ann. Cas. 1913 C 1163. New York. Dedieu v. People, 22 N. Y. 178. Vermont. State v. Gorham, 67 Vt. 365, 31 Atl. 845. An intent to defraud may be inferred from the circumstances. Freund v. People, 5 Park Cr. (N. Y.) 198. The jury is justified in finding an intent to defraud, where it appears that the building belonged to the defendant, that he burned it, and that it was at the time insured against loss by fire. People v. Vasalo, 120 Cal. 168, 52 Pac. 305. 85 People v. Rose, 38 Cal. App. 493, 176 Pac. 694; Com. v. Asherowski, 196 Mass. 342, 82 N. E. 13; Com. v. Goldstein, 114 Mass. 272; Meister v. People, 31 Mich. 99; State v. Bersch, 276 Mo. 397, 207 S. W. 809; State v. Greer, 243 Mo. 599, 147 S. W. 968, Ann. Cas. 1913 C 1163. In Texas it is not necessary to allege that the defendant knew that it was insured, but that he did not is matter of defense. Arnold v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. 269, 168 S. W. 122; Moore v. State, 66 Tex. Cr. 169, 146 S. W. 183. The jury may infer knowledge from the circumstances. Meister v. People, 31 Mich. 99. 86 This is true under Tex. Pen. Code art. 1208, making it arson for the owner to burn a house when it is insured. Arnold v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. 269, 168 S. W. 122; Baker v. State, 25 Tex. App. 1, 8 S. W. 23, 8 Am. St. Rep. 427. But it is necessary under art. 1220, making it an offense to burn insured property with intent to defraud the insurer. Arnold v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. 269, 168 S. W. 122. 87 People v. Barbera, 29 Cal. App. 604, 157 Pac. 532. 88 McDonald v. People, 47 Ill. 533; State v. Steinkraus, 244 Mo. 152, 148 S. W. 877. 89 Com. v. Goldstein, 114 Mass. 272; State v. Korth, 38 S. D. 539, 162 N. W. 144. It is not necessary to allege or prove that the insurance company was legally incorporated,90 or, if a foreign corporation, that it is authorized to insure in the state.91 And according to the weight of authority the fact that the policy is invalid,92 or has been forfeited before the fire,93 or by the act of the insured in setting the fire,94 is no defense where the defendant believed it to be valid and in force. But some courts have held that a valid, subsisting policy is essential to the commission of the offense.95 90 Johnson v. State, 65 Ind. 204; Com. v. Goldstein, 114 Mass. 272; State v. Steinkraus, 244 Mo. 152, 148 S. W. 877. Proof that it is a de facto corporation is sufficient. People v. Schwartz, 32 Cal. 160; People v. Hughes, 29 Cal. 257; People v. Morley, 8 Cal. App. 372, 97 Pac. 84; State v. Byrne, 45 Conn. 273; Martinez v. State, 76 Fla. 159, 79 So. 751; State v. Tucker, 84 Mo. 23; Carneross v. People, 1 N. Y. Cr. 518. Wis. 63, 134 N. W. 1123; Parb v. 92 California. People v. Hughes, 29 Cal. 257; People v. Morley, 8 Cal. App. 372, 97 Pac. 84. Connecticut. State v. Byrne, 45 Conn. 273. Illinois. People v. Novick, 265 Ill. 436, 107 N. E. 138; Mai v. People, 224 Ill. 414, 79 N. E. 633; McDonald v. People, 47 Ill. 533. 23. Missouri. State v. Tucker, 84 Mo. Texas. Arnold v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. 269, 168 S. W. 122, Wisconsin. Smith V. State, 149 Wis. 63, 134 N. W. 1123; Parb v. State, 143 Wis. 561, 128 N. W. 65. 93 Smith v. State, 149 Wis. 63, 134 N. W. 1123. 94 People v. Morley, 8 Cal. App. 372, 97 Pac. 84. 95 Meister v. People, 31 Mich. 99. And see State v. McDonald, 117 Me. 474, 104 Atl. 849; Jhons v. People, 25 Mich. 499; Evans v. State, 24 Ohio St. 458. CHAPTER 12 ASSAULTS AND ASSAULT AND BATTERY I. NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE § 392. Definitions of assault. § 393. Acts constituting an assault-In general. § 394. — Pointing or drawing weapons, etc. § 395. Definition and nature of battery. § 396. Acts amounting to a battery or assault and battery-In general. § 397. Particular acts. Indirect injuries. § 399. Intent-In general. § 400. § 401. § 402. - Actual and apparent intent. Unintentional injury in doing unlawful act. § 403. Conditional offer of violence. § 404. Ability to commit a battery. § 405. Degrees. II. AGGRAVATED AND FELONIOUS ASSAULTS § 406. General considerations. § 407. Assaults with intent to commit some other offense. § 408. Assaults with intent to kill or murder-In general. § 411. - Battery; use of weapons, etc. § 412. Assault with intent to commit rape. § 413. Assault with intent to rob. § 414. Assault with intent to commit crime against nature. § 415. Assault with a deadly or dangerous weapon-General considerations. - What are dangerous or deadly weapons-General principles. § 416. § 417. § 418. - As affected by distance or condition of weapon. § 419. Assault with intent to do great bodily harm, etc. § 420. Assaults by or upon particular persons. § 421. Assaults in particular places. § 422. Other aggravated assaults. § 423. Ability to commit intended crime-In general. § 424. - Physical or mental incapacity. § 425. Injury to person not intended. § 426. Wounding-In general. Person provoking or bringing on difficulty-In general. - Duty to retreat. § 434. Resisting arrest. § 435. Defense of others. § 436. Defense of property-In general. § 440. Abusive, threatening or insulting language or gestures. § 441. Adultery with or insult to wife or relative. § 442. Effect of consent-In general. I. NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE § 392. Definitions of assault. An assault is an attempt or offer, with force and violence, to do a corporal hurt to another.1 Some courts and statutes define it as an attempt by force or violence to do an injury to the person of another, coupled with a present ability to carry that intention into effect.2 And it is sometimes defined by 11 Hawk. P. C. c. 15, § 1. See also the following decisions: United States. Anderson v. Crawford, 265 Fed. 504; United States v. Reeves, 38 Fed. 404; United States v. Hand, 2 Wash. C. C. 435, Fed Cas. No. 15, 297. Alabama. Burton v. State, 8 Ala. App. 295, 62 So. 394; McGee v. State, 4 Ala. App. 54, 58 So. 1008. Delaware. State v. Hill, 2 Boyce (25 Del.) 537, 82 Atl. 221. Florida. Bailey v. State, 76 Fla. 230, 79 So. 639. Mississippi. Smith v. State, 39 Miss. 521. New York. Hays v. People, 1 Hill 351. North Carolina. State v. Davis, 1 Ired. 125, 35 Am. Dec. 735. Oregon. State v. Godfrey, 17 Ore. 300, 20 Pac. 625, 11 Am. St. Rep. 830. "An intentional attempt by force to do an injury to the person of another." Sweeden v. State, 19 Ark. 205. An attempt by means adequate to use any unlawful violence on the person of another with intent to injure him is an assault. Robey v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. 9, 163 S. W. 713; Ward v. State, 68 Tex. Cr. 154, 151 S. W. 1073; Cromeans v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. 611, 129 S. W. 1129. See also the statutes of the various States. 2 Alabama. 354. Tarver v. State, 43 Ala. Arkansas. Sullivan v. State, 131 Ark. 107, 198 S. W. 518; Hunt v. |