the assault must have been made with the specific intent to rob.12 Actual taking and asportation of the property is not necessary, however, 18 and the fact that the intended victim defended himself and prevented the robbery does not tend to prove the absence of the necessary intent.1 14 Under some statutes the assault must have been felonious, wilful and with malice aforethought.15 As against this offense there can be no plea of self defense.16 § 414. Assault with intent to commit crime against nature. Some of the statutes provide for the punishment of assaults with intent to commit the crime against nature. 17 A specific intent to commit 12 Arkansas. Gordon v. State, 125 Ark. 111, 187, 913, Ann. Cas. 1918 A 419. Illinois. People v. Kuhn, 291 Ill. 154, 125 N. E. 882; O'Donnell v. People, 224 Ill. 218, 79 N. E. 639, 8 Ann. Cas. 123; Turley v. People, 188 Ill. 628, 59 N. E. 506; Rippetoe v. People, 172 Ill. 173, 50 N. E. 166; Garrity v. People, 70 Ill. 83. Iowa. State v. Lewis, 173 Iowa 643, 154 N. W. 432, Ann. Cas. 1918 A 403; State v. Schell, 172 Iowa 127, 153 N. W. 62. Kentucky. Taylor v. Com., 3 Bush (66 Ky.) 508. Montana. State v. Hanson, 49 Mont. 361, 141 Pac. 669. 24. Nevada. State v. Glovery, 10 Nev. Oklahoma. Axhelm V. United States, 9 Okla. 321, 60 Pac. 98. Texas. Smiley v. State, 87 Tex. Cr. 528, 222 S. W. 1108; Walters v. State, 56 Tex. Cr. 10, 118 S. W. 543; Sanders v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 613, 111 S. W. 157; Runnells v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 431, 30 S W. 1065; Atkinson v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 424, 30 S. W. 1064. ferred as a matter of law from the doing of the act, see § 91, supra. 13 Thomas v. State, 91 Ala. 34, 9 So. 81. One may be convicted of an assault with intent to rob where his acts possess all the essential elements of robbery other than the taking of money. People v. Allen, 32 Cal. App. 110, 162 Pac. 401. 14 People v. Kuhn, 291 Ill. 154, 125 N. E. 882. 15 Gordon v. State, 125 Ark. 111, 187 S. W. 913, Ann. Cas. 1918 A 419; Axhelm v. United States, 9 Okla. 321, 60 Pac. 98. "Malice aforethought" is "the voluntary and intentional doing of an unlawful act, with the purpose, means and ability to accomplish the reasonable and probable consequences of it, done in a manner showing a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief, by one of sound mind and discretion, the evidence of which is inferred from acts committed or words spoken." Gordon v. State, 125 Ark. 111, 187 S. W. 913, Ann. Cas. 1918 A 419. And see gen. erally, § 617, infra. 16 State v. Schell, 172 Iowa 127, 153 N. W. 62. 17 See the statutes of the various states and the cases cited in the following notes. But if the crime named is an essential element of the offense.18 any appreciable force is used with the necessary intent, the offense is complete, although the defendant afterwards desisted through fear of detection.19 § 415. Assault with a deadly or dangerous weapon-General considerations. In many states the statutes expressly punish as an aggravated assault, or as a distinct offense, an assault with a deadly or dangerous weapon,20 or with a sharp, dangerous weapon, 21 or a sharp or dangerous weapon,22 or with a weapon or instrument,28 or 18 People v. Dong Pok Yip, 164 Cal. 143, 127 Pac. 1031; People v. Wilson, 119 Cal. 384, 51 Pac. 639. The necessary intent may be inferred from circumstances, see § 90, supra. But it cannot be implied or inferred as a matter of law from the doing of the act, see § 91, supra. 19 People v. Wilson, 119 Cal. 384, 51 Pac. 639. 20 See the statutes of the various states and the cases cited in this and the following notes: Arkansas. Johnson v. State, 132 Ark. 128, 200 S. W. 982. California. People v. Perales, 141 Cal. 581, 75 Pac. 170; People v. Murat, 45 Cal. 281. Connecticut. State v. Costa, 95 Conn. 140, 110 Atl. 875. Florida. Lindsey v. State, 53 Fla. 56, 43 So. 87; Williams v. State, 41 Fla. 295, 26 So. 184. Idaho. State v. Crawford, 32 Idaho 165, 179 Pac. 511. Kentucky. Burgess v. Com., 176 Ky. 326, 195 S. W. 445. Montana. State v. McCaffery, 16 Mont. 33, 40 Pac. 63; State v. Eschbach, 13 Mont. 399, 34 Pac. 179. New Mexico. Chacon v. Territory, 7 N. M. 241, 34 Pac. 448. North Dakota. State v. Marcks, 3 N. D. 532, 58 N. W. 25. Oklahoma. Harris v. State, 15 Okla. Cr. 369, 177 Pac. 122; Polk v. State, 15 Okla. Cr. 324, 176 Pac. 538. In Texas the statute provides that an assault becomes aggravated when committed with a deadly weapon under circumstances not amounting to an intent to murder or maim. Lozano v. State, 83 Tex. Cr. 174, 202 S. W. 510; Myers v. State, 72 Tex. Cr. 630, 163 S. W. 432. Presenting a gun at another comes within this provision if the purpose of the defendant was not merely to alarm the other party. Myers v. State, 72 Tex. Cr. 630, 163 S. W. 432. To convict under this statute the defendant need not actually fire the gun, since if he does so it is an assault with intent to murder. Myers v. State, 72 Tex. Cr. 630, 163 S. W. 432. If the weapon is used merely for the purpose of frightening or alarming, it is a simple assault. Teague v. State, 84 Tex. Cr. 169, 206 S. W. 193; Shuffield v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. 556, 138 S. W. 402; Haygood v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 618, 103 S. W. 890; Vann v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. 244, 64 S. W. 243; Pearce v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 643, 40 S. W. 806. 21 Filkins v. People, 69 N. Y. 101, 25 Am. Rep. 143. 22 State v. Gunderson, 42 N. D. 498, 173 N. W. 791. 23 People v. Hannigan, 42 N. Y. App. Div. 617, 58 N. Y. Supp. 703, aff'd 160 N. Y. 706, 57 N. E. 1120; People v. Terrell, 58 Hun (N. Y.) 602, 11 N. Y. Supp. 364; People v. Connor, by any means or force 24 likely to produce great bodily harm or injury, or by any such means or force as is likely to produce death.25 The essential elements of the offense are an assault,26 and the use of a weapon of the character specified.27 Generally no specific intent is necessary other than such as may be embraced in the making of an assault with such a weapon,' 28 and an intent to inflict death or great bodily harm or to wound or injure need not be shown,29 unless the statute requires it.80 Nor is a battery necessary,81 unless the 53 Hun (N. Y.) 352, 6 N. Y. Supp. 220; State v. Albutt, 99 Wash. 253, 169 Pac. 584; State v. Reynolds, 94 Wash. 270, 162 Pac. 358; State v. McConaghy, 84 Wash. 168, 146 Pac. 396. 24 People v. Perales, 141 Cal. 581, 75 Pac. 170; People v. Brown, 42 Cal. App. 462, 183 Pac. 829; State v. Crawford, 32 Idaho 165, 179 Pac. 511. Throwing a person out of a third story window comes within such a provision. People v. Emmons, 61 Cal. 487; Jeanes v. State, 60 Tex. Cr. 440, 132 S. W. 352. 25 Harris v. State, 15 Okla. Cr. 369, 177 Pac. 122; Feaster v. State, 15 Okla. Cr. 366, 177 Pac. 124; Polk v. State, 15 Okla. Cr. 324, 176 Pac. 538. 26 Filkins v. People, 69 N. Y. 101, 25 Am. Rep. 143. 27 Lindsey v. State, 53 Fla. 56, 43 So. 87; Williams v. State, 41 Fla. 295, 26 So. 184. 28 Jackson V. United States, 102 Fed. 473; People v. Gordan, 103 Cal. 568, 37 Pac. 534; People v. Marseiler, 70 Cal. 98, 11 Pac. 503; State v. Cancelmo, 86 Ore. 379, 168 Pac. 721; State v. Selby, 73 Ore. 378, 144 Pac. 657; State v. Godfrey, 17 Ore. 300. 20 Pac. 625, 11 Am. St. Rep. 830. Where the assault is made by point. ing a pistol, and intent to discharge it need not be shown. People v. Connor, 53 Hun (N. Y.) 352, 6 N. Y. Supp. 220. A person may be convicted of an assault with a dangerous weapon although he mistakes the person assaulted for someone else. People v. Wells, 145 Cal. 138, 78 Pac. 470. 29 Lindsey v. State, 53 Fla. 56, 43 So. 87; Williams v. State, 41 Fla. 295, 26 So. 184; State v. Hertzog, 41 La. Ann. 775, 6 So. 622; State v. Scott, 39 La. Ann. 943, 3 So. 83; State v. Godfrey, 17 Ore. 300, 20 Pac. 625, 11 Am. St. Rep. 830; Stewart v. State (Tex. Cr.), 50 S. W. 459. In Florida the absence of a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed is an essential element of the statutory offense of aggravated assault. If such a design is present, or if there is an intent to kill, the offense is assault with intent to commit a felony. Lindsey v. State, 53 Fla. 56, 43 So. 87; Williams v. State, 41 Fla. 295, 26 So. 184. 30 See § 419, infra. 31 California. People v. Keefer, 18 Cal. 636. Florida. Lindsey v. State, 67 Fla. 111, 64 So. 501; Peterson v. State, 41 Fla. 285, 26 So. 709. Illinois. Moore v. People, 26 Ill. North Dakota. State v. Marcks, 3 Texas. Myers v. State, 72 Tex. Cr. 630, 163 S. W. 432. An assault need not have resulted in the infliction of grievous bodily harm in order to come within a statute contains a provision which makes a battery a necessary element of the offense.82 § 416. What are dangerous or deadly weapons-General principles. A deadly or dangerous weapon is any weapon or instrument which is likely to cause death, when used as it is used in the particular case, 33 or, according to some courts, any weapon which is likely or reasonably calculated to produce death or great bodily harm.34 It must, at the time of its use, be capable of producing death or great bodily harm.85 But the fact that a weapon is capable of causing death does not necessarily make it deadly.36 It need not have been made or designed for offensive or defensive purposes, or for the destruction of life or the infliction of injury.37 Nor is it necessary that an injury be actually inflicted with it which is likely to produce statute punishing assaults with a weapon or instrument likely to produce such an injury. State v. Albutt, 99 Wash. 253, 169 Pac. 584; State v. Reynolds, 94 Wash. 270, 162 Pac. 358. 32 Harris v. State, 15 Okla. Cr. 369, 177 Pac. 122; Polk v. State, 15 Okla. Cr. 324, 176 Pac. 538. A battery is not necessary under a statute providing for the punishment of "every person who shall make an assault, or battery, or both, with a dangerous weapon." State v. Baker, 20 R. I. 275, 38 Atl. 653, 78 Am. St. Rep. 863. 33 United States. Price v. United States, 156 Fed. 950, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1272, 13 Ann. Cas. 483. California. People v. Perales, 141 Cal. 581, 75 Pac. 170; People v. Rodrigo, 69 Cal. 601, 11 Pac. 481. North Carolina. State v. Archbell, 139 N. C. 537, 51 S. E. 801. Oklahoma. Wilcox v. State, 13 Okla. Cr. 599, 166 Pac. 74; Bourbonnais v. State, 7 Okla. Cr. 717, 122 Pac. 1131. Texas. Price v. State, 87 Tex. Cr. 163, 220 S. W. 89; Vann v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. 244, 64 S. W. 243; Scott v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. 607, 62 S. W. 419. And see § 417, infra. In determining whether a weapon is deadly or not, the court is not confined to its character alone, but may look to the manner of its use. Scott v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. 607, 62 S. W. 419. kill." It is not one that must or may State v. Archbell, 139 N. C. 537, 51 S. E. 801. 34 Jackson V. United States, 102 Fed. 473; United States v. Reeves, 38 Fed. 404; United States v. Williams, 2 Fed. 61; Pittman v. State, 25 Fla. 648, 6 So. 437; Blige v. State, 20 Fla. 742, 51 Am. Rep. 628; Burgess v. Com., 176 Ky. 326, 195 S. W. 445. And see § 417, infra. A weapon which is capable of producing death or great bodily harm. State v. Godfrey, 17 Ore. 300, 20 Pac. 625, 11 Am. St. Rep. 830. "A weapon with which death may be easily and readily produced." Acers v. United States, 164 U. S. 388, 41 L. Ed. 481, 17 Sup. Ct. 91. 35 State v. Godfrey, 17 Ore. 300, 20 Pac. 625, 11 Am. St. Rep. 830. 36 Pittman v. State, 25 Fla. 648, 6 So. 437. 37 Acers v. United States, 164 U. S. 388, 41 L. Ed. 481, 17 Sup. Ct. 91; Lindsey v. State, 67 Fla. 111, 64 So. death, or is attended with apprehension of that result, in order to make it deadly.38 § 417. 41 Particular weapons. Some weapons are per se deadly, such as a loaded pistol or gun, when used as a firearm,89 provided the accused was close enough to the person shot at to hit him,40 a hoe, a club,42 and a sledge hammer.43 Other weapons are not per se deadly, but may become such from the manner in which they are used, in which case the question whether they are deadly under the circumstances is generally one of fact for the jury.45 This has 501; Blidge v. State, 20 Fla. 742, 51 Am. Rep. 628; Com. v. Branham, 8 Bush. (71 Ky.) 387; State v. Hertzog, 41 La. Ann. 775, 6 So. 622. 38 Price v. State, 87 Tex. Cr. 163, 220 S. W. 89. 39 United States. Jackson V. United States, 102 Fed. 473; United States v. Williams, 2 Fed. 61. Arizona. Gonzalez v. State, 21 Ariz. 385, 188 Pac. 872. California. People v. Wells, 145 Cal. 138, 78 Pac. 470; People v. Montgomery, 15 Cal. App. 315, 114 Pac. 792. Illinois. Hamilton v. People, 113 Ill. 34, 55 Am. Rep. 396. New Mexico. Chacon v. Territory, 7 N. M. 241, 34 Pac. 448. Oregon. State v. Godfrey, 17 Ore. 300, 20 Pac. 625, 11 Am. St. Rep. 830. Rhode Island. State v. Baker, 20 R. I. 275, 38 Atl. 653, 78 Am. St. Rep. 863. Texas. Myers v. State, 72 Tex. Cr. 630, 163 S. W. 432; Hartfield v. State, 61 Tex. Cr. 515, 134 S. W. 1180; Lofton v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. 270, 128 S. W. 384. And see § 411, supra. 40 See § 418, infra. 41 Hamilton v. People, 113 Ill. 34, 44 State v. Godfrey, 17 Ore. 300, 20 Pac. 625, 11 Am. St. Rep. 830; Price v. State, 87 Tex. Cr. 163, 220 S. W. 89; Hilliard v. State, 87 Tex. Cr. 15, 218 S. W. 1052; Fisher v. State, 68 Tex. Cr. 297, 151 S. W. 544. "The deadly character of the weapon depends sometimes more upon the manner of its use and the condition of the person assaulted than upon the intrinsic character of the weapon itself. An instrument which might be harmless when used upon a strong man may become deadly when used upon a very frail and delicate woman. State v. Archbell, 139 N. C. 537, 51 S. E. 801. In determining whether a weapon is deadly, the jury has the right to consider the relative sizes and strength of the parties, the character of the weapon, the injury it inflicts, and to judge the surrounding circumstances. Price v. State, 87 Tex. Cr. 163, 220 S. W. 89. And see the other cases cited in the following notes, and § 420, infra. 45 United States. Acers v. United States, 164 U. S. 388, 41 L. Ed. 481, 17 Sup. Ct. 91. Florida. Smothers v. State, 64 Fla. 459, 59 So. 900. |