son.45 Some include accusing or threatening to accuse one of any immoral conduct which, if true, would tend to degrade or disgrace him, or in any manner to subject him to the ridicule or contempt of society, or threatening to injure the character of another,47 or to expose or impute to the person threatened, or to any relative of his or member of his family, any deformity or disgrace,48 or to expose any secret affecting him or them,49 or publishing or exposing any of a person's personal or business acts, infirmities or failings, or threatening to do so,50 or publishing or conniving at publishing any libel.51 § 451. Truth of accusation. As a rule, the fact that the accusation or threatened accusation is true, and that the victim is guilty of the crime or immoral conduct charged, or that the defendant believes him to be, is not a defense.52 But the truth of the accusation N. Y. App. Div. 211, 174 N. Y. Supp. 327; or for a policeman to threaten a person engaged in tearing down a building that he will not be permitted to continue unless he sees a police captain. People v. McLaughlin, 2 N. Y. App. Div. 419, 37 N. Y. Supp. 1005. The word property, as defined by the Montana statute, does not include manual labor, or the right of an employee to work, and hence the act of a foreman in extorting money from an employee by threatening to dis charge him is not within the statute. In re McCabe, 29 Mont. 28, 73 Pac. 1106. 45 See the statutes of the various states and the following cases: Utterback v. State, 153 Ind. 545, 55 N. E. 420; State v. Hammond, 80 Ind. 80, 41 Am. Rep. 791; People v. Vitusky, 155 N. Y. App. Div. 139, 140 N. Y. Supp. 19. 46 Eacock v. State, 169 Ind. 488, 82 N. E. 1039; McMillen v. State, 60 Ind. 216; Elliott v. State, 36 Ohio St. 318. And see Utterback v. State, 153 Ind. 545, 55 N. E. 420; State v. Hammond, 80 Ind. 80, 41 Am. Rep. 791. 47 Brown v. State, 15 Ala. App. 180, 72 So. 757; Mitchell v. Com., 75 Va. 856. 48 State v. Coleman, 99 Minn. 487, 110 N. W. 5, 116 Am. St. Rep. 441; People v. Wightman, 104 N. Y. 598, 11 N. E. 135; People v. Wickes, 112 N. Y. App. Div. 39, 98 N. Y. Supp. 163; People v. Gillian, 50 Hun (N. Y.) 35, 2 N. Y. Supp. 476, aff'd 115 N. Y. 643, 21 N. E. 1117. 49 State v. Coleman, 99 Minn. 487, 110 N. W. 5, 116 Am. St. Rep. 441; In re Sherin, 24 S. D. 232, 130 N. W. 761, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 801, Ann. Cas. 1913 D 446. 50 See Chunn v. State, 125 Ga. 789, 54 S. E. 751. 51 People v. Wickes, 112 N. Y. App. Div. 39, 98 N. Y. Supp. 163; State v. Richards, 97 Wash. 587, 167 Pac. 47. 52 Arizona. Bush v. State, 19 Ariz. 195, 168 Pac. 508. California. People v. Beggs, 178 Cal. 79, 172 Pac. 152. Delaware. State v. Adams, 7 Boyce 335, 106 Atl. 287. Indiana. Eacock v. State, 169 Ind. 488, 82 N. E. 1039. Iowa. State v. Debolt, 104 Iowa 105, 73 N. W. 499; State v. Waite, 101 Iowa 377, 70 N. W. 596. Maine. State v. Bruce, 24 Me. 71. or threatened accusation may generally be shown as having a tendency to establish that the intent of the defendant was not to extort, but only to secure reasonable compensation for property, or the payment of a just debt.53 And it has been held that threats by a person whose goods have been stolen to prosecute the supposed thief unless he pays for the property cannot, standing alone, be considered to have been made maliciously and with intent to extort money if there are grounds to suspect such person to be guilty.54 $ 452. Force or fear. Under statutes punishing the making of threats with a prescribed intent, without more, it is immaterial whether they did or did not produce any effect upon the mind of the person threatened,55 nor need they inspire fear or be calculated to produce terror,56 although it has been held that it is not the policy of the law to punish those unsuccessful threats which it is not presumed would terrify ordinary persons excessively.57 But to come within statutes making it an offense to obtain property from another, with his consent induced by the wrongful use of force of fear, the wrongful use of force or fear is essential.58 Under such statutes the property Massachusetts. Com. v. Buckley, 148 Mass. 27, 18 N. E. 577, 1 L. R. A. 624. Michigan. People v. Whittemore, 102 Mich. 519, 61 N. W. 13. Ohio. Mann v. State, 47 Ohio St. 556, 26 N. E. 226, 11 L. R. A. 656; Elliott v. State, 36 Ohio St. 318. South Dakota. In re Sherin, 27 S. D. 232, 130 N. W. 761, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 801, Ann. Cas. 1913 D 446. Texas. Cohen v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 118, 38 S. W. 1005. 53 Mann v. State, 47 Ohio St. 556, 26 N. E. 226, 11 L. R. A. 656; Cohen v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 118, 38 S. W. 1005. Evidence of his guilt is admissible for that purpose where he was accused of assault on defendant's wife, since if he was guilty the defendant might lawfully demand reparation. Com. v. Coolidge, 128 Mass. 55. And see Com. v. Buckley, 148 Mass. 27, 18 N. E. 577, 1 L. R. A. 624. Contra; People v. Whittemore, 102 Mich. 519, 61 N. W. 13. As to whether it is within the statute where the money obtained or attempted to be obtained is legally due, see § 455, infra. 54 State v. Bruce, 24 Me. 71; Com. v. Coolidge, 128 Mass. 55. And see § 455, infra. 55 State v. Bruce, 24 Me. 71. 56 People v. Thompson, 97 N. Y. 313, 2 N. Y. Cr. 520; People v. Wickes, 112 N. Y. App. Div. 39, 98 N. Y. Supp. 163. 57 People v. Jones, 62 Mich. 304, 28 N. W. 839. 58 People v. Beggs, 178 Cal. 79, 172 Pac. 152; People v. Hoffman, 126 Cal. 366, 58 Pac. 856; State v. Lampe, 131 Minn. 65, 154 N. W. 737. If the victim in paying the money exacted was not actuated by fear, but was seeking to entrap the defendant, must have been obtained with the victim's consent,59 and he must have parted with it by reason of force or fear induced by threats of the character specified in the statute.60 In other words, the fear must be the operating cause which produces the consent. If some other cause is the primary and controlling one in inducing the consent, the offense is not committed.61 § 453. Intent and malice. Many of the statutes punish the making of threats with intent to extort or gain any money, property, or pecuniary advantage, 62 or to compel the person threatened to do any the defendant may be convicted of an attempt to commit the offense under the general statute relating to attempts. People v. Gardner, 144 N. Y. 119, 38 N. E. 1003, 28 L. R. A. 699, 43 Am. St. Rep. 741. 59 People v. Hoffman, 126 Cal. 366, 58 Pac. 856; State v. Coleman, 99 Minn. 487, 110 N. W. 5, 116 Am. St. Rep. 441; People v. Vidaver, 60 N. Y. Misc. 1, 112 N. Y. Supp. 606. In a legal sense, money or property is obtained from a person with his consent if he, with apparent willingness, gives it to the party obtaining it with the understanding that by so doing he is to save himself from some personal calamity or injury, though mentally he may still protest against the circumstances requiring him to dispose of it in that way or for such a purpose. People v. Peck, Cal. App., 185 Pac. 881. 60 State v. Coleman, 99 Minn. 487, 110 N. W. 5, 116 Am. St. Rep. 441; People v. Vidaver, 60 N. Y. Misc. 1, 112 N. Y. Supp. 606; State v. Barr, 67 Wash 87, 120 Pac. 509. 61 People v. Beggs, 178 Cal. 79, 172 Pac. 152. That fear induced by the threat formed a part of the reason for the payment of the money is not enough if the victim would have parted with the money without it. People v. Williams, 127 Cal. 212, 59 Pac. 581. 62 See the statutes of the various states and the following cases: Alabama. Brown v. State, 15 Ala. App. 180, 72 Sơ. 757. Georgia. Chunn v. State, 125 Ga. 789, 54 S. E. 751; Jackson v. State, 118 Ga. 125, 44 S. E. 833; Cook v. State, 22 Ga. App. 770, 97 S. E. 264. Indiana. Eacock v. State, 169 Ind. 488, 82 N. E. 1039; Utterback v. State, 153 Ind. 545, 55 N. E. 420; State v. Hammond, 80 Ind. 80, 41 Am. Rep. 791. Iowa. State v. Debolt, 104 Iowa 105, 73 N. W. 499; State v. Brownlee, 84 Iowa 473, 51 N. W. 25. Maine. State v. Blackington, 111 Me. 229, 88 Atl. 726; State v. Bruce, 24 Me. 71. Massachusetts. 128 Mass. 55. Michigan. Com. v. Coolidge, People v. Whittemore, 102 Mich. 519, 61 N. W. 13. Mississippi. State v. Ricks, 108 Miss. 7, 66 So. 281, Ann. Cas. 1917 E 244. New York. People v. Gillian, 50 Hun 35, 2 N. Y. Supp. 476, aff'd 115 N. Y. 643, 21 N. E. 1117; People v. Vidaver, 60 Misc. 1, 112 N. Y. Supp. 606. Ohio. Mann v. State, 47 Ohio St. 556, 26 N. E. 226, 11 L. R. A. 656. Texas. Wynne v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. 504, 55 S. W. 837; Cohen v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 118, 38 S. W. 1005; Han act against his will,63 in which case the prescribed intent is an essential element of the offense and must be shown.64 But under some of the statutes it is not necessary to prove any intent other than an intent to do the prohibited act.65 66 Under some of the statutes the threat must be made maliciously, or maliciously and wilfully.67 "Maliciously" as used in such statutes does not require a feeling of spite, ill-will, revenge or malice toward the person threatened, but means the wilful doing of an unlawful act without excuse, and it is sufficient if the threat is wilful and intentional.68 A person may be convicted of maliciously threatening to son v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 593, 34 S. W. 929; Landa v. State, 26 Tex. App. 580, 10 S. W. 218. Washington. State v. Richards, 97 Wash. 587, 167 Pac. 47. Extort is here used in its broad sense of obtaining money or property by compulsion. Cohen v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 118, 38 S. W. 1005. And see § 446, supra. Truth of accusation as negativing intent to extort, see § 451, supra. 63 See the statutes of the various states and the following cases: Indiana. State v. Hammond, 80 Ind. 80, 41 Am. Rep. 791. Iowa. State v. Todd, 110 Iowa 631, 82 N. W. 322; State v. Brownlee, 84 Iowa 473, 51 N. W. 25. Maine. State v. Bruce, 24 Me. 71. Massachusetts. Com. v. Coolidge, 128 Mass. 55. Ohio. Elliott v. State, 36 Ohio St. 318. It is not necessary that the act which it is sought to compel him to do be a crime. State v. Todd, 110 Iowa 631, 82 N. W. 322. An intent to procure the signature of a person to a deed against his will is within such a provision. People v. Whittemore, 102 Mich. 519, 61 N. W. 13. 64 See the cases cited in the preceding notes. 65 The Minnesota statute does not make it necessary to prove intent as an independent fact, but it may be inferred from proof that the defendant brought about a series of events by which he inveigled his victim into a compromising position and accepted money which the victim was induced to pay by threats of exposure. State v. Coleman, 99 Minn. 487, 110 N. W. 5, 116 Am. St. Rep. 441. 66 State v. Browning, 153 Iowa 37, 133 N. W. 330; State v. Waite, 101 Iowa 377, 70 N. W. 596; State v. Bruce, 24 Me. 71; Com. v. Coolidge, 128 Mass. 55; Com. v. Carpenter, 108 Mass. 15; People v. Whittemore, 102 Mich. 519, 61 N. W. 13. A commissioner of fisheries who has statutory authority to settle offenses under a statute relating to the taking of lobsters does not violate the statute by advising or urging an offender to settle for a violation of such statute, and pointing out to him that the alternative will be his criminal prosecution. State v. Hanna, 99 Me. 224, 58 Atl. 1061. Truth of the accusation as negativing malice, see § 451, supra. 67 The word "wilful" in the statute is covered by the word "malicious" in the indictment, the latter meaning all that the former does, and more. Glover v. People, 204 Ill. 170, 68 N. E. 464. 68 Com. v. Buckley, 148 Mass. 27, arrest another or to accuse him of crime with intent to extort money, etc., though he had the lawful right to arrest him, or though it was his duty to make the accusation.69 Under most, if not all, of the statutes punishing the sending of threatening letters, the letter must have been knowingly sent or delivered.70 § 454. Obtaining or attempting to obtain money or property-In general. To come within a statute making it an offense to obtain property from another with his consent induced by the wrongful use of force or fear, some property must actually have been obtained.71 But at common law,72 and under statutes making it an offense to attempt to rob by accusing of crime,73 or to make accusations or threats with intent to extort money or property,74 the offense is complete when the accusation or threat is made, though the purpose is not accomplished, and no money or property is in fact obtained. And some of the statutes in terms provide for the punishment of every person who unsuccessfully attempts to extort money or property from another by verbal threats of this character,75 or by threatening letters.76 It has been held that a person may be convicted under a statute making it an offense to make threats with intent to extort, etc., although the object and purpose of the threats have been accomplished.77 18 N. E. 577, 1 L. R. A. 624; Com. v. Goodwin, 122 Mass. 19; People v. Whittemore, 102 Mich. 519, 61 N. W. 13. And see generally, § 448, supra. 69 The misuse of such powers for malicious purposes and with intent to extort is one of the things aimed at by the statute. State v. Browning, 153 Iowa 37, 133 N. W. 330. 70 State v. McCabe, 135 Mo. 450, 37 S. W. 123, 34 L. R. A. 127, 58 Am. St. Rep. 589; Castle v. State, 23 Tex. App. 286, 4 S. W. 892; Tynes v. State, 17 Tex. App. 123. And see the statutes. 71 State v. Coleman, 99 Minn. 487, 110 N. W. 5, 116 Am. St. Rep. 441; People v. Vidaver, 60 N. Y. Misc. 1, 112 N. Y. Supp. 606. 72 State v. Erans, Houst. Cr. Cas. (Del.) 97. 78 Elliott v. State, 36 Ohio. St. 318. 74 State v. Browning, 153 Iowa 37, 133 N. W. 330; State v. Bruce, 24 Me. 71; Com. v. Coolidge, 128 Mass. 55. 75 People v. Beggs, 178 Cal. 79, 172 Pac. 152; People v. Gillette, 200 N. Y. 275, 93 N. E. 953, rev'g 140 App. Div. 27, 124 N. Y. Supp. 470; People v. Vitusky, 155 N. Y. App. Div. 139, 140 N. Y. Supp. 19; People v. Misiani, 148 N. Y. App. Div. 797, 133 N. Y. Supp. 291. 76 People v. Beggs, 178 Cal. 79, 172 Pac. 152; In re Sherin, 27 S. D. 232, 130 N. W. 761, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 801, Ann. Cas. 1913 D 446. 77 State v. Hollyway, 41 Iowa 200, 20 Am. Rep. 586. |