nor is it necessary that the counterfeit be completed, nor material that the maker has not done everything that he intended to do to make the resemblance more complete.61 To come within the federal statute punishing whoever shall make any engraving, print, photograph or impression of any obligation or security of the United States, it is not necessary that the similarity be such as is calculated to deceive, but the making of miniature photographs is within the statute.62 It is immaterial of what substance the counterfeit is made.63 And statutes sometimes provide that he is guilty of counterfeiting who makes, in the semblance of true gold or silver coin, any coin having in its composition a less proportion of the precious metal of which the true coin intended to be imitated is composed, than is contained in such true coin.64 § 592. Mutilation and alteration of coins, notes and bills. The federal statutes make it an offense to deface, mutilate, impair, diminish, falsify, scale, or lighten domestic or foreign gold or silver coins, or to pass or utter or have in one's possession coins of that character;65 or to so place or connect together different parts of two or more notes, bills, or other genuine instruments issued under authority of the United States, or by any foreign government or corporation, as to produce one instrument, with intent to defraud; or to mutilate or disfigure national bank notes with intent to render the same unfit to be reissued.67 66 Punching a good coin, in such a way as to remove an appreciable amount of the original metal from it, and filling the hole with base 605, 78 S. W. 1068, 108 Am. St. Rep. 980. A note purporting to be signed by the president and cashier of the Bank of the United States, was held to be within a statute making it an offense to falsely make any bill or note "in imitation of or purporting to be" a bill or note issued by such bank, or to utter the same, although the persons whose names were signed to it had never been president and cashier of the bank, but were president and cashier of its office of discount and deposit. United States v. Turner, 7 Pet. (32 U. S.) 132, 8 L. Ed. 633. 61 It is immaterial that the maker of counterfeit coins had not coated them with silver, as he intended to do. United States v. Abrams, 18 Fed. 823. 62 Ex parte Holcomb, 2 Dill. 392, Fed. Cas. No. 6,598. 63 State v. Griffin, 18 Vt. 198. 64 Glass v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 605, 78 S. W. 1068, 108 Am. St. Rep. 980; Stroube v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. 581, 51 S. W. 357. 65 Pen. Code, §§ 165, 166. metal or other foreign substance is counterfeiting.68 But adding something to a genuine coin is not. So it is not counterfeiting to punch a hole in a genuine coin in such a way that the original metal is crowded into a different shape, but all of it is left in the coin, and to then fill up the hole with base metal.69 The altering of any coin of lower value so as to make it resemble coin of higher value is sometimes declared to be counterfeiting by state statutes.70 And statutes in some states specifically punish the altering of bank bills or notes.71 It has been held that such a provision includes only such an alteration as will increase the apparent value of the bill.72 And it has also been held that it is not an indictable offense to cut strips from several bank bills with intent to unite the parts thus separated, and to form an extra bill with such strips, and to utter the same.73 § 593. Having possession of counterfeit bills, coins, obligations, etc.-In general. The federal statutes make it an offense for any person to have in his possession any counterfeited gold or silver coins or bars,74 or counterfeited minor coins of the United States,75 or any counterfeited obligation or other security of the United States,76 or counterfeited foreign paper money, bonds, etc.,77 or any business or professional card, notice, placard, token, device, print, or impression, or any other thing whatsoever, in the likeness or similitude as to design, color, or the inscription thereon of any of the coins of the United States or any foreign country,78 with certain prescribed in 68 United States v. Lissner, 12 Fed 840. 69 United States v. Lissner, 12 Fed. 840. 70 Glass v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 605, 78 S. W. 1068, 108 Am. St. Rep. 980. 71 Cutting out the words "one dollar" from the body of a note and fitting in blank paper, and substitut ing the figure 5 for the figure 1 where these figures appeared in the margin was held to be an alteration within such a statute. Haynes v. State, 15 Ohio St. 455. 72 Com. v. Hayward, 10 Mass. 34. 73 Com. v. Hayward, 10 Mass. 34, where it is said that if the defendant had completed his intent and made the extra bill, perhaps this would have been forgery. 74 Pen. Code, § 163; Linningen v. Morgan, 241 Fed. 645; Riggio v. United States, 223 Fed. 529; Tresca v. United States, 183 Fed. 736. 75 Pen. Code, § 164; Linningen v. Morgan, 241 Fed. 645. 76 To bring into the United States or keep in possession or conceal any counterfeited, forged or altered security or obligation. Pen. Code, § 151; United States v. Provenzano, 171 Fed. 675. 77 Pen. Code, § 160. 78 Pen. Code, § 171. For cases construing this provision see § 591, supra. tents, varying in the different provisions;79 or for any person to have in his possession any obligation or other security made or executed, in whole or in part, after the similitude of any obligation or other security issued under the authority of the United States, 80 and there are similar statutes in many of the states.81 To constitute possession it is not necessary that the accused have the counterfeit in his hands or pocket, or on his person, but it is sufficient if it is in his power in such a sense that he can and does command its use.82 A person to whom counterfeit notes are delivered, pursuant to a contract with the person printing them, has possession of them though the printer has previously notified the police and they have directed him to print and deliver the notes for the purpose of entrapping the person ordering them printed.83 It is sufficient if the possession is in the defendant or his immediate agent.84 And possession by a messenger is sufficient to warrant his conviction if he has knowledge of the purpose for which the counterfeits are to be used.85 It is immaterial how the defendant acquired possession of the forbidden thing, as whether he made, or bought or found it.86 § 594. Instruments within the statutes. There is considerable conflict of authority as to what instruments come within the federal statute providing for the punishment of whoever shall have in his possession or custody, except under proper authority, any obligation or other security made or executed, in whole or in part, after the similitude of any obligation or other security issued under the 79 See § 595, infra. 80 Penal Code, § 150. See § 589, supra. 81 See the statutes of the various states and the following cases: Indiana. Jones v. State, 11 Ind. 357. Iowa. State v. Washburn, 11 Iowa 245. Maine. State v. McKenzie, 42 Me. 392. Massachusetts. Com. v. Woods, 10 Gray (76 Mass.) 477; Com. v. Price, 10 Gray (76 Mass.) 472, 71 Am. Dec. 668; Com. v. Stearns, 10 Metc. (51 Mass.) 256; Brown v. Com., 8 Mass. 59. Michigan. People v. Stewart, 5 Mich. 243; People v. Stewart, 4 Mich. 655. Ohio. Hess v. State, 5 Ohio 5, 22 Am. Dec. 767. Rhode Island. State v. Brown, 4 R. I. 528, 70 Am. Dec. 168. 82 As where he keeps it in a secret place, and has the control of it, and can take it into his actual possession at his pleasure. State v. Washburn, 11 Iowa 245. 83 People v. Ah Sam, 41 Cal. 645. 84 Reg. v. Williams, 1 Car. & M. 259, 41 E. C. L. 145. 85 People v. Ah Sam, 41 Cal. 645. 86 United States v. Fitzgerald, 91 Fed. 374. authority of the United States.87 Some of the federal courts have held that it is immaterial whether or not the instrument was criminal in its inception, or was intended to simulate any security of the United States,88 or in any of its features purports to be an obligation or security of the United States,89 and that it is not necessary that the similitude or resemblance be so great as to deceive experts or cautious men, but that it is sufficient if the fraudulent obligation bears such a likeness to any of the genuine obligations or securities of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible, and unsuspecting person of ordinary observance and care in dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest,90 and that whether it bears such resemblance is ordinarily a question for the jury.91 Under this rule it has been held that having possession of confederate notes,92 or state bank bills, 94 or stock or bonds 95 pur 87 Pen. Code, § 150. 88 Leib v. Halligan, 236 Fed. 82. 89 Leib v. Halligan, 236 Fed. 82; United States v. Weber, 210 Fed. 973; United States v. Stevens, 52 Fed. 120; United States v. Sprague, 48 Fed. 828; United States v. Williams, 14 Fed. 550. 90 Leib v. Halligan, 236 Fed. 82; Wiggains v. United States, 214 Fed. 970; United States v. Weber, 210 Fed. 973; United States v. Fitzgerald, 91 Fed, 374; United States v. Kuhl, 85 Fed. 624; United States v. Sprague, 48 Fed. 828. And see § 591, supra. If such a man must and would observe the lack of similitude, then the instrument is not within the statute. United States v. Kuhl, 85 Fed. 624. 91 Leib v. Halligan, 236 Fed. 82; Wiggains v. United States, 214 Fed. 970; United States v. Weber, 210 Fed. 973; United States v. Fitzgerald, 91 Fed. 374. Ordinarily the question is for the jury. But if there is no similitude, and a verdict of guilty could not be sustained for that reason, the court may quash the indictment on that ground. United States v. Kuhl, 85 Fed. 624. 93 92 United States v. Kuhl, 85 Fed. 624, holding that the particular note in question did not have the similitude required by the statute. And see Leib v. Halligan, 236 Fed. 82. Or 93 As an instrument made by pasting together back to back notes of two state banks. United States v. Weber, 210 Fed. 973. Or a note legally issued by a state bank, but which has become worthless because of the bank's insolvency. United States v. Stevens, 52 Fed. 120. an instrument made by pasting together, back to back, two notes purporting to have been issued by a state bank, alleged to be after the similitude of a United States legal tender note, and which resembles such a note in its shape, size and color, or in the grouping of words, figures or vignettes, though on its face it purports to have been issued before the issue of legal tender notes. Leib v. Halligan, 236 Fed. 82. 94 United States v. Fitzgerald, 91 Fed. 374. 95 United States v. Sprague, 48 Fed. 828; United States v. Williams, 14 Fed. 550. porting to have been issued by a private corporation, or national bank notes signed by the proper federal officers, but never issued by or signed by the officers of the bank,96 may be within the statute. Other federal courts have held that the instrument must have been intended in its inception to simulate some obligation or security of the United States, and that incidental similitude arising from the fact that the instrument complained of was intended to subserve the same purpose as national obligations or securities is not enough,97 and under this rule it has been held that confederate bills,98 or state bank bills, 99 not within the statute. are Some of the state statutes have been held to cover the possession of bank bills printed in blank with intent to fill up the blanks and pass them, or genuine bank notes which have been altered, and some of them have been held not to include fictitious bills purporting to have been issued by a bank having no actual existence.3 § 595. Intent. The statutes making it an offense to have counterfeit notes or coins in one's possession vary in their provision as to intent. Under the federal statute punishing whoever shall have in his possession any false, forged or counterfeited gold or silver coins or bars, knowing the same to be false, forged or counterfeited, with intent to defraud, the prescribed knowledge and intent must be shown. And an intent to defraud is essential under the statute making it an offense to have in one's possession counterfeit minor coins.5 It is a crime to bring counterfeit obligations or securities of the United States into the United States with intent to pass, utter, publish or sell 96 Such notes are an obligation or security, in view of the statute providing for their redemption though they are not signed by the officers of the bank. Wiggains v. United States, 214 Fed. 970. 97 United States v. Pitts, 112 Fed. 522; United States v. Conners, 111 Fed. 734; United States v. Barrett, 111 Fed. 369. 98 A facsimile of a confederate bill. United States v. Barrett, 111 Fed. 369. 99 United States v. Pitts, 112 Fed. 522; United States v. Conners, 111 Fed. 734. 1 People v. Ah Sam, 41 Cal. 645. 2 Com. V. Woods, 10 Gray (76 Mass.) 477. 3 Having possession of bills purporting to have been issued by a fictitious bank held not within a statute. Com. v. Morse, 2 Mass. 138. 4 Linningen v. Morgan, 241 Fed. 645; Kaye v. United States, 177 Fed. 147. 5 It is not necessary to allege that the accused knew the coins to be counterfeited. Linningen v. Morgan 241 Fed. 645. |