conveying to them one acre (describing it). The deed contained the following:

"It is understood that the parties of the first part are to retain a certain lot in said burying ground that they have used, and said lot is two rods square."

No cemetery association had then been formed, but one was subsequently formed. The burying ground was then platted into lots, and the ground referred to in the deed was set apart to Mr. Sharp, and numbered lot 22. Previous to the execution of this deed, the grantors had buried three children in it. Mr. Sharp died, and was buried there. Subsequently his wife died, and was also buried there. After his death the farm was partitioned between his children, and that portion on which was this burying ground was allotted to the complainant. In the report of the commissioners, no reference was made to the burial ground.

Defendant James obtained a quitclaim deed from two of the heirs of Thomas Sharp, and the bill alleges that the defendant James claims an interest in this lot, and that the cemetery association has granted to the defendant certain rights of burial upon said lot, and that the association has no right to issue any right of burial to him. Complainant, claiming to own the entire lot, filed this bill to quiet his title. The court entered a decree for the complainant, holding that he had title to the entire lot.

Louis E. Howlett and Glenn S. Mack, for complainant.

William P. Van Winkle, for defendants.

GRANT, J. (after stating the facts). In the construction of deeds, the intention of the parties must prevail, unless it is contrary to law. 2 Devlin on Deeds (2d Ed.), § 836; Erickson v. Iron Co., 50 Mich. 604.

The land deeded by Thomas Sharp was conveyed for no other purpose or intention than to make a burial place for the dead. If, as contended by the complainant, Mr.

Sharp excepted this lot, two rods square, from the grant for other purposes than for the burial of the dead, the exception would be repugnant to the grant, and void. The use of this lot as a potato or cabbage patch would be repugnant to the purpose for which the land was deeded, and as well that for which Mr. Sharp retained it. The very language of the deed shows that he retained it as a lot "in said burying ground that they have used." The right, therefore, which the grantor obtained by this deed, was none other or greater than that which he would have obtained by the omission of this language from the deed and the purchase of the same lot for burial purposes. The only right retained was the right of burial in the lot. Neither Mr. Sharp in his lifetime could have conveyed this lot, nor can his heirs now convey it, for any other purpose. It was not a part of his estate, subject to partition. The graves of the dead cannot be partitioned among the heirs of one who owns a burial lot in a cemetery.

The question of the right of burial by his heirs is not before us, and upon that we pass no opinion.

It follows that the decree of the court is erroneous.

It is therefore reversed, and the bill dismissed, with the costs of both courts.

MCALVAY, C. J., and CARPENTER, BLAIR, and OSTRANDER, JJ., concurred.

AMERICAN COPYING CO. v. STERN.

1. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE-VENUE-NONRESIDENT PARTIES
When a nonresident plaintiff brings suit in justice's court he is
not required to bring it in the township of the defendant's
residence or an adjoining township. Weaver v. Rix, 109
Mich. 697, followed.

2. JUDGMENT

JUSTICES OF THE PEACE COLLATERAL ATTACK—

IRREGULARITIES.
Objections to a judgment of a justice of the peace that he made
an unauthorized adjournment, that he did not require secur-
ity for costs, the plaintiff being a nonresident, and that no
notice was given of a commission to take a deposition, relate to
irregularities in the proceedings after the court had acquired
jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of the suit,
and cannot be raised by motion to set aside the judgment and
levy of the execution thereon.

Certiorari to Kalamazoo; Adams, J. Submitted April 10, 1907. (Docket No. 46.) Decided April 30, 1907.

Assumpsit in justice's court by the American Copying Company against Herman Stern for goods sold and delivered. There was judgment for plaintiff, and a transcript filed in the circuit court. From an order denying a motion to vacate said judgment, defendant brings certiorari. Affirmed.

Plaintiff, a nonresident corporation, brought suit before a justice's court in the township of Brady, in the county of Kalamazoo, against the defendant, a resident of the city of Kalamazoo. The summons was personally served upon the defendant in that city. On the return day, defendant not appearing, the court, at the request of the plaintiff's attorney, granted an adjournment from May 26th until June 9th, for the purpose of taking a deposition

in Chicago, Ill. The return of the justice does not show whether the plaintiff made an affidavit to obtain the adjournment. The commission was issued and the deposition returned before the adjourned day and filed with the justice. The plaintiff did not furnish security for costs before the issuance of the writ or afterwards. Execution was issued by the justice and returned nulla bona. A transcript of judgment was filed in the circuit court, judgment and execution entered thereon, and levy made upon real estate of the defendant. The defendant then appeared in the circuit court and moved that the judgment be vacated and the levy set aside. The motion was denied, and the case is now before us for review upon the writ of certiorari.

William A. Luby, for appellant.
Jesse R. Cropsey, for appellee.

GRANT, J. (after stating the facts). Four objections are assigned to the validity of the judgment:

1. That the court obtained no jurisdiction because the plaintiff and defendant were nonresidents of the township of Brady, and that that township did not adjoin the city of Kalamazoo.

2. That the adjournment was unauthorized.

3. That no security of costs was given.

4. That no notice was given of the issuance of the commission to take the deposition.

The first objection is ruled against the defendant by the case of Weaver v. Rix, 109 Mich. 697, the facts of which are parallel to those in this case.

The other objections raised are collateral attacks upon the judgment, and cannot be considered. These objections should have been made in the original suit. They relate to irregularities in the proceedings after the court had acquired jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-matter of the suit. Reed v. Gage, 33

Mich. 179; Mayhew v. Snell, 33 Mich. 182; Harris v. Doyle, 130 Mich. 470; Miller v. Smith, 115 Mich. 427; Deitz v. Groesbeck, 32 Mich. 303.

Judgment affirmed.

MCALVAY, C. J., and CARPENTER, BLAIR, and OsTRANDER, JJ., concurred.

HOGAN v. DETROIT UNITED RAILWAY.

1. RAILROADS-EQUIPMENT-SALES-CONTRACTS-PASSING TITLE. Where an electric railroad in process of construction sold to another "all the property, rights, and assets" of the seller, the buyer succeeded to the seller's right to have certain machinery, for which the seller had contracted, installed, and to acquire title to it as the result of such installation.

2. SAME GOOD FAITH-QUESTION FOR JURY.

Where an electric railroad bought "all the property, rights,

and assets" of another in process of construction, whether it did so in good faith, so as to confer upon it title to equipment purchased under a contract of conditional sale, not recorded as required by section 6336, 2 Comp. Laws, held, a question for the jury.

Error to Wayne; Murphy, J. Submitted April 11, 1907. (Docket No. 66.) Decided April 30, 1907.

Trover by Walter G. Hogan against the Detroit United Railway. There was judgment for plaintiff on a verdict directed by the court, and defendant brings error. versed.

Re

Brennan, Donnelly & Van De Mark (Geer, Williams, Martin & Butler, of counsel), for appellant.

Bowen, Douglas, Whiting & Murfin, for appellee.