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accustomed to play; but it is not negligence to leave such an instrument in a private enclosure, which, from its very privacy, excludes the public, and puts on their guard all who enter."

See, also, Busse v. Rogers, 120 Wis. 443 (64 L. R. A. 183). The Kaumeier Case is easily distinguished. Plaintiff was denied the right to recover there, not because she was a trespasser, but because there was no evidence of defendant's negligence. In this case it is clear there was evidence of defendant's negligence. The question is whether that negligence is the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. I am of the opinion that the correct rule by which this is to be determined is the first one stated in Skinn v. Reutter, 135 Mich. 57 (63 L. R. A. 743):

"The wrongdoer is responsible for all consequences naturally resulting from his wrong, whether he could have anticipated those consequences or not."

The question then is whether the injury to plaintiff was a natural-not an anticipated-consequence of defendant's wrong. When a particular consequence results from a wrong, it may be said that the wrong is the proximate cause of that consequence, unless there intervenes between the wrong and said consequence something which may properly be denominated a cause. If such cause intervenes, it may be said that the wrong of the defendant is too remote to be made the basis of an action. It is in such case a condition, and not a cause. See Lewis v. Railway Co., 54 Mich. 55; Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Burrows, 33 Mich. 6; McLane, Swift & Co. v. Elevator Co., 136 Mich. 664. What is there in this case intervening between defendant's wrong and plaintiff's injury which may be called a cause? Nothing, unless it be the action of plaintiff's companion, a child of tender years. It is true that the intervention of a responsible human agency has frequently been held to destroy the causal connection between a wrong and its consequences; but the intervening human agency in this case was irresponsible.

"Neither an idiot nor a maniac can be a juridical cause, and the same reasoning applies to persons so young and inexperienced as to be unable to exercise intelligent choice as to the subject-matter." Wharton on Negligence (2d Ed.), § 88.

It may also be said that the intervention of human agency-at any rate, unless that intervention is a wrongful intervention does not exempt a wrongdoer for the consequences, where his wrong is one imminently dangerous to human life, and we cannot say that the wrong in this case was not one imminently dangerous to human life. Skinn v. Reutter, 135 Mich. 57; Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397. See, also, Harriman v. Railway Co., 45 Ohio St. 11, and cases cited; Binford v. Johnston, 82 Ind. 426; Fishburn v. Railway Co., 127 Iowa, 483, and cases cited.

It was not error to refuse the requests of defendant based upon its theories above indicated, nor to give the charge excepted to, which was in harmony with the views of this court herein expressed.

Another request of defendant was refused which defendant claims should have been given. This request eliminated the question of permanent injury, on the claimed ground that there was no evidence in the case to warrant it. We disagree with defendant upon this proposition. The evidence in the case upon that question warranted its submission to the jury.

The judgment is affirmed.

CARPENTER, MONTGOMERY, and MOORE, JJ., concurred with MCALVAY, C. J.

MONTGOMERY, J. I understand this case to present the question whether the owner of property, which in itself is likely to prove attractive to young children and dangerous to them as well, and who leaves it in the public highway accessible to children liable to be induced into using it, where the only trespass which they commit is in the use of the thing itself, is liable for a resulting injury,

or whether he may answer the claim of the child to whom injury has occurred by the statement that before such accident could have happened or injury have been inflicted the child must have been guilty of a technical trespass. It is thought that responsibility has been denied in such cases by Ryan v. Towar, 128 Mich. 463 (55 L. R. A. 310). I was so unfortunate as to disagree with the majority opinion in Ryan v. Towar. That circumstance in no way militates against the authority of the majority opinion in that case, and if this question is in fact ruled by that decision, it becomes my duty to bow with submission, and the first inquiry should be whether it is so ruled. It became necessary in Ryan v. Towar to deal with the previous decisions of this court, and the one the most nearly in point was Powers v. Harlow, 53 Mich. 50%, which was not overruled by the majority opinion. In speaking of Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Adol. & E. (N. S.) 29, Mr. Justice HOOKER, in Ryan v. Towar, said:

"It is noticeable that even the Lynch Case did not involve a trespass upon defendant's close, though it did perhaps involve a trespass to personal property.

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Then, after discussing the case of Powers v. Harlow, the opinion, after quoting from the opinion in Powers v. Harlow, proceeds:

"The court then proceeded to show that the children were rightfully there by invitation, and that some caution was required in such a case. Clearly this does not adopt the rule of Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 657."

Now, what was meant by the statement in Powers v. Harlow that the children were rightfully there by invitation? In that case the father of the plaintiff by virtue of a lease of the lands from the defendant was held to have a right of way of necessity across the defendant's farm. In going from the highway to the plaintiff's home the evidence showed that he would pass within a distance of from 1 to 10 rods of a temporary shed in which had been

left a box containing explosives. The plaintiff, who was something over eight years of age, went with his brother two years older to take his father's dinner, and after working at destroying potato bugs for an hour or so moved about at his pleasure in the vicinity of his father's work. The plaintiff looked into the shed, saw the box there partly uncovered, and from the sawdust took out one of the explosives. He was aware of no danger from handling it, and thought no harm in taking it from the open box. After a little he picked up a small stone, and, holding the explosive upon another stone, he struck it with the stone in one hand, while holding it in the other, and with the third blow it exploded, tearing from his left hand the thumb and one finger. Now whatever may be said of the invitation of the child to cross these premises, it is manifest that no invitation was extended to enter this temporary shed or to meddle with the contents of this box. It is directly against the fact to say that they were invited to play with the contents of the box. No such invitation was any more to be implied than was an invitation to any child lawfully in the public street to enter upon the wagon in question in this case and engage in play.

It is noticeable that the duty imposed upon the defendant in the opinion of Chief Justice COOLEY in that case is illustrated by the analogy between a child in a public highway, and one passing across the premises of another as licensee. He says:

"The moving about of the children upon the lands where they were at liberty to go, while they were not actually employed, was as much an incident to their being there as is the loitering or playing by children outside the traveled part of the highway as they go upon it to school or upon errands."

And, in speaking of this shed, he said:

"In this case a shed in which a dangerous explosive was stored was left only partly inclosed, and its structure and location were such as naturally to invite the entrance of children either for play or for shelter from sun and rain.

Children were rightfully near it, there was nothing in its appearance to warn them off, it was not fastened against their entrance, and there was nothing about it to indicate that they would do injury or be injured by going there. The box containing the explosives seems to have had more the appearance of a box discarded as of no value and with worthless refuse in it than of a box which it was of the very highest importance should be guarded with sedulous care.

With these facts in the case, it was thought wise and found necessary for Chief Justice COOLEY to rest his decision upon the doctrine, which he states as follows:

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Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childish instincts and impulses; and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution towards them must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly. If they leave exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to them, and which they, in their immature judgment, might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with, they should expect that liberty to be taken."

The case of Ryan v. Towar refused to apply this rule, for the reason that the plaintiff in Ryan v. Towar was a trespasser upon defendant's land. That was the distinction which must have been noted, for Powers v. Harlow is plainly authority that there is no such immunity to a defendant arising from a technical trespass upon the dangerous thing itself by a child who must be expected to act upon childish instincts and impulses. This step having been taken in Ryan v. Towar, the result of now holding that a trespass upon the property, which itself furnishes the invitation to a child of immature years, defeats recovery, would result in overruling by piecemeal the case of Powers v. Harlow, and remove the only basis for distinction recognized by both the majority and minority opinion in Ryan v. Towar. The case of Kaumeier v. Railway Co., 116 Mich. 306 (40 L. R. A. 385), is cited as authority for the proposition that a child who interferes with property in the street is a trespasser and cannot recover. That case was a case of interference with a car

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