filed affidavit of publication of notice of suit. April 7th declaration was filed. April 28th defendant's default was entered. July 30th notice of trial for the August term of court and proof of service on "Covell & Cross, attorneys for the within named defendant," was filed. August 8th the defendant moved to quash the proceedings for the reason, among others, that the affidavit was void. September 7th plaintiffs moved for an order "permitting said plaintiffs to file the affidavit for attachment hereto annexed for the purpose of curing any defect that exists or is claimed to exist in the original affidavit," etc. September 12th the court denied defendant's motion, and on the next day granted plaintiffs' motion. It is conceded that no general appearance was entered for the defendant. The record is before us for review upon writ of certiorari. Three questions are presented for our determination, as follows:

(1) Was the affidavit so defective as not to confer jurisdiction upon the court?

(2) Was the affidavit amendable?

(3) Did defendant, by giving the statutory bond, waive any defects in the affidavit ?

1, 2. The statute (3 Comp. Laws, § 10556) requires that the affidavit shall contain a statement "that the defendant therein is indebted to the plaintiff," etc. The affidavit in question does not contain such an allegation, but contains an allegation that defendant "is indebted to de-. ponent," one of the plaintiffs. The affidavit was therefore jurisdictionally defective, and was not subject to amendment. Freer v. White, 91 Mich. 74; Heller v. Savings Bank, 138 Mich. 192; Duryea v. Raymond, 146 Mich. 488.

3. A circuit court writ of attachment "is a summons with a clause authorizing a seizure of property." Thompson v. Thomas, 11 Mich. 274. The dissolution of the attachment by giving the statutory bond, to pay any judgment which may be recovered in the suit commenced by said writ of attachment, operated as an appearance

and converted the suit from an action in rem into an action in personam. Paddock v. Matthews, 3 Mich. 18; Goebel v. Stevenson, 35 Mich. 172; Hill v. Harding, 93 Ill. 77; Bunneman v. Wagner, 16 Ore. 433; 3 Enc. Pl. & Pr. p. 84; 4 Cyc. p. 686; Moore v. Hamilton, 2 Gil. (Ill.) 429. The case of Reynolds v. Marquette Circuit Judge, 125 Mich. 445, is not opposed to this conclusion. The bond in that case was given under the provisions of section 10761, 3 Comp. Laws. As said by the court at page 448 of 125 Mich. :

"The condition of the bond is not that the owner of the logs will pay any judgment which may be obtained against the principal, but merely that he will pay such sums as may be found to be a lien upon the logs. The bond stands in the place of the property."

In Streeter v. McMillan, 74 Mich. 123, cited in Reynolds v. Marquette Circuit Judge, supra, the court say:

*

*

"In the case of an ordinary attachment the suit is brought to recover a personal obligation, and nothing more, and the property is seized as defendant's own property to satisfy his debt and not because of any claim against the property itself. The property seized is not seized because it is in any way related to the debt, but because it is defendant's property, and the judgment, if he does not appear, is paid out of it because it has been seized in pledge for such payment as his own."

But in the case then under consideration, for the enforcement of a lien upon logs, it was said:

"As a proceeding in rem as well as in personam, the property seized was an essential element in the controversy and the only ultimate basis of relief in the absence of a personal liability."

The order overruling the motion to quash is affirmed, with costs to appellee.

MCALVAY, C. J., and CARPENTER, GRANT, and OSTRANDER, JJ., concurred.

MCARTHUR v. SAULT NEWS PRINTING CO.

1. WITNESSES-ARGUMENTATIVE EXAMINATION-PREJUDICE. That counsel for plaintiff to some extent argued his case in the form of questions to and answers from a witness is not prejudicial where it is obvious that, if the witness was otherwise truthful, the argument was sound, and, if untruthful, unsound.

2. LIBEL AND SLANDER-INSTRUCTIONS-VERDICT-FORM. There is no reason for advising the jury in a libel case to specify in their verdict the amount awarded for injury to feelings where they are limited to a verdict for injury to feelings.

3. SAME-INSTRUCTIONS-DAMAGES-REPUTATION.

In an action for libel in publishing the statement that plaintiff's boarding house, which had burned down, had for some time borne a bad reputation, an instruction that, if the house bore no worse reputation after the publication than before, plaintiff cannot recover, is properly refused, where business was not resumed in the house and no recovery for loss of reputation of the house or for injury to business, profits, or property is permitted.

4. SAME-INJURIES TO FEELINGS.

A person may be entitled to substantial damages for injuries to her feelings resulting from a libelous publication, though she had a bad character and a bad reputation, neither of which are changed by the publication.

Error to Chippewa; Steere, J. Submitted April 12, 1907. (Docket No. 79.) Decided June 3, 1907.

Case by Jennie McArthur against the Sault News Printing Company for libel. There was judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

Davidson & Hudson, for appellant.

Doig & Doig, for appellee.

Affirmed.

OSTRANDER, J. Plaintiff was permitted by the charge

of the court to recover only for injuries to her feelings. The jury returned a verdict in her favor for $216, for which sum judgment was entered. Defendant has brought the case here. Defendant published an article which, after stating that a certain boarding house kept by plaintiff had been consumed by fire, that the inmates who were mostly women escaped with nothing but their night clothing, continued as follows:

"This is the second time the old house has been visited by fire in the past few months. The place has borne for some time a rather bad reputation, although Chief of Police Swart says the officials have been unable to procure evidence enough against the inmates to warrant making arrests."

These and other statements in the article are charged as meaning that the place was a house of prostitution and the plaintiff the keeper of such a house. The court, in terms not criticised by counsel, left it to the jury to determine the import of the article and its truth or falsity.

Certain errors are assigned and argued upon rulings admitting and excluding testimony. They require no discussion. Counsel for plaintiff to some extent argued his case in the form of questions to and answers from the witness Vigeant; but as it is obvious that, if the witness was otherwise truthful, the argument was sound, and, if untruthful, unsound, defendant was not prejudiced. In respect to the other rulings no error was committed.

It is contended that certain requests to charge should have been given. As the charge which was given is understood, these requests became immaterial. (1) There was no reason for advising the jury to specify in the verdict the amount awarded for injury to feelings because, and counsel concede this, the jury were limited to a verdict for injuries to feelings. (2) It was unnecessary and would have been misleading to instruct the jury, as requested, that, if the house had no worse a reputation after than it had before the publication of this article, plaintiff could not recover. Business was not resumed in the

house. No recovery for loss of reputation of the house or to business or profits or property was permitted. (3, 4) These requests relate to the reputation and character of plaintiff before and after the publication, and the words "reputation" and "bad character" are used without qualification. It is evident the jury found that the import of the article was to charge that plaintiff was keeper of a house of ill fame. A woman might have a bad reputation and a bad character, neither of which would be changed by such a publication, and yet be entitled to substantial damages for injuries to her feelings resulting from the publication. The verdict does not indicate that the jury were insensible to such proper considerations as the evidence presented.

We find none of the errors well assigned, and the judgment is affirmed.

MCALVAY, C. J., and CARPENTER, GRANT, and BLAIR, JJ., concurred.

SMITH v. PICKANDS.

1. WITNESSES - - EXAMINATION
ORIGINAL ENTRIES.
In an action for the price of trees sold it is not error to allow
plaintiff, while testifying to the number of trees and the
prices charged therefor, to refresh his memory by looking at
a copy which he himself has made from a book of original
entries.

REFRESHING MEMORY COPY OF

2. SALES

ACTION FOR PRICE
BURDEN OF PROOF.

QUALITY OF GOODS ACCEPTED ·

In an action for the price of trees sold, defendant having accepted them, the burden is upon her to show that they did not comply with the contract.