of mind, gordian knots, which anybody can cut, but nobody can untie.

Evolutionism satisfies so many minds, because it is, when looked at in a large, abstract way, a complete mechanical system, like pantheism, and the gaps in its logic are brought to view by a closer inspection, only after the devotee has become habituated to the pantheistic mode of thought, when he finds it easy to cross them. But again, pantheism is fascinating to many minds,

2. Because it satisfies the intellectual desire for unity. This ineradicable tendency of the human mind to reduce the all to the one has also received great encouragement in the most recent times. To trace up all laws of nature into one generalized expression, to reduce all forces to one force, to diminish the number of simple or elementary substances to a small and still smaller one, to bring all the complicated phenomena of life and history under one formula,--such are the very problems which modern science, in its speculative excursions, proposes to itself. To such a state of mind pantheism is evidently congenial. Here all this unification is done beforehand. The doctrine of unity is assumed as the great fundamental postulate of all thought, and the highest reaches of modern speculative physics fall into line, without shocking or straining the intellect. There is a wonderful fascination about a system which makes thought on the grandest themes so easy, and reduces the difficult, the contradictory, the complicated, to simplicty itself.

3. Pantheism seems to furnish an easy solution of some of the great problems of psychology. The problem of knowledge is apparently, if not really, simplified. How do we know? How can mind come in contact with matter, or, how is it that a connection takes place between two opposite substances, so that the one is conscious of the other? This, variously stated, is the great problem of all philosophy, which has sharpened the wits of men in many ages, and caused a vast amount of fruitful thinking, though itself insoluble. This problem seems less insoluble if we assume that matter and mind are but two faces of the same divine Substance, with no chasm to be bridged, no incompatibility between them. True, this seems to us no solu tion at all; it is as difficult for us to understand how a sub

stance can be conscious of itself, as it is to understand how one substance can be conscious of another. But then we have an inward self-consciousness of our own, which may serve to make the first alternative conceivable; while, as to the external world, its existence may be denied, and often has been denied.

A curious and puzzling inquiry is, how to explain sensation and perception, without using terms which will imply the existence of immaterial souls in the lower animals, as well as in man. The difficulties of this point are considerable, though often overlooked. Professor Huxley argues that animals are automata, an opinion also held by DesCartes, the father of modern philosophy. The moral and philosophical dangers of such a theory are obvious. It leads directly to the opinion that men themselves are only automata, an opinion which Professor Huxley has, we believe, already avowed. It is on record that some of the early followers of DesCartes used to kick and beat their dogs, laughing the while at their cries, and calling them "the creaking of the machine." At the present time this theory of the automatism of animals seems to have no small influence towards deadening the moral sense of the perpetrators of vivisection. On the other hand, psy

chology has not yet produced an exposition of sensation, presupposing an immaterial soul in man, which does not also require the same assumption to explain sensation in the lower animals. Some philosophers, accordingly, boldly admit the existence of beast-souls, while others deny the palpable facts of beast-sensation, and still others inconsistently admit inferences in the one case which they deny in the other. Now pantheism escapes both classes of difficulties. True, the pantheist holds both men and beasts to be automata, but he com pletes that opinion and renders it logical by seeing the eternal and universal soul in both. Thus his psychology is not required to draw a hard and fast line between two classes of intelligence, nor can he consistently despise or abuse either class.

In apparently solving so easily these difficulties, which are plain and often felt by thinking minds, pantheism has another fascination, another strong hold on modern thought.

4. Finally pantheism has deep roots in religion. It is not our intention to dwell at any length upon this point. The

great abundance of pantheistical mysticism in the world in various ages, is a commonplace of the history of theology, philosophy, and literature. Such a book as Vaughan's Hours with the Mystics, for example, might give to many readers new views concerning some tendencies of the human mind. And in the Christian system these tendencies are not without a certain justification; for not only are some of its doctrines often stated in such a way as to favor pantheistic modes of thought, but some of its inspired and authoritative documents contain phrases which are often misunderstood or twisted in the same general direction. The doctrines concerning the divine presence and power, are easily pushed into an unbalanced statement which approaches very near to these perilous depths. For example; how can the Deity be present everywhere, unless he be the worker of all things, the evil as well as the good, and directly identified with all change or motion? And if God is present in every point of space, is the whole Deity present in each point? The usual course is to treat such puzzling questions as useless metaphysical abstractions, and declare that man can never understand the mode of the existence of the infinite Person. But pantheism steps in and offers to explain these mysteries, or at least to give an intelligible method of regarding these inexplicable topics. It says that space itself and everything in space is a part of the divine Substance, the points of space themselves, and whatever fills them. It says that evil and sin are not contrary to the divine nature, but only stages of existence, imperfect, perhaps, but of divine origin. Granted that such solutions are not real solutions, granted that they are presumptuous, that they are without evidence, yet the records of mysticism show that the human mind, even in these mazes of speculation beyond its reach, hates to acknowledge its own weakness, but loves to believe that it can compass the universe with its thought, and by searching find out God.

This creed, therefore, so often called gloomy, and cheerless, has religious, as well as intellectual fascinations, a theological as well as a scientific foothold, and may sometimes be found by Christianity as an enemy within the walls.

The moral dangers of pantheism are better understood than its intellectual attractions, and it is not our purpose to set them forth at length. The pantheist cannot, of course, believe in sin, and therefore not in any atonement for sin or pardon of it. For him our mistakes are irremediable, unpardonable, producing misery by an irreversible law, but by no fault of ours. For him it is no wrong, when life becomes unpleasant, to end it, like young Werter, with a pistol. The moral dangers of this mode of thought are not unknown to ministers of the gospel or unnoticed by them, but they will be better able to meet these dangers with useful help, if they are familiar with the intellectual dangers and fascinations of pantheism, and its remarkable concurrence with much modern scientific thought.

ARTICLE VII.-THE PRESENT OUTLOOK FOR OLD TESTAMENT STUDY.*

ON such an occasion as this, it is commonly thought desirable to discuss some subject regarding the department into which one is inducted, and to discuss a subject of present interest. This opinion is natural and just. You desire to know how I think our day and generation is to be served by the work which you have assigned to me. Your desire is your right.

At some periods in the past it would have been necessary that I vindicate for the Old Testament a place beside the New Testament in a seminary curriculum. I should have felt obliged to prove the necessity of mastering the Hebrew language in order to understand the Hebrew modes of thinking. Especially appropriate would this line of discussion have been on an occasion when, as now, the departments of Old Testament and New Testament study are separated; for by this separation two instructors take the place of one, and it might be thought proper for the second to vindicate his work.

This apologetic attitude regarding the study of the Hebrew Scriptures would have been almost a necessity only ten years ago. Then the fact was that the Old Testament had been dethroned from its legitimate place. Ministers had reacted against an excessive dogmatic use of the Old Testament. The laity had been led to feel that the Old Testament was an excrescence upon the book of Revelation. Students of divinity shirked the study of Hebrew and hence of the Old Testament. Regarding the attitude of students, a recent writer says: "Theological students have too generally considered the effort spent upon Hebrew to be almost lost, and, as a class, have consequently shown well nigh total lack of enthusiasm in this part of their work. Among the noble army of martyrs, the glory and crown of the Christian church, surely none will more

* Address delivered by F. B. Denio, on being inaugurated as Professor of Old Testament Language and Literature, in Bangor Theological Seminary.