classes of phenomena; it knows not only that space and time exist, but it also knows them as necessarily self-existent; it knows what they are, viz: pure conditions, and as such, them. selves not only unconditioned, but absolutely unconditionable. Mind then relates itself to space and time by cognition. Is any medium between the essence in which a power of cognition inheres, and abstract law, or space and time, pure conditions, possible?

If it be true that mind brings itself into relation with abstract law, pure conditions, and the phenomena of mind, simply by cognition, without any medium whatever, is any medium between the knowing mind and material phenomena required? Certainly none would be were all cognition a priori.

Cognitions are of two distinct classes, which may be distinguished as primary and secondary: primary cognitions are those in which the object is itself known to exist; secondary, those in which the existence of the object is inferred, because the existence of some other thing, or things, is known. All a priori cognitions are primary, but there are primary cognitions which are not a priori; that is, there are certain things which the mind knows in themselves, which it does not know at once, but for cognition of which it must wait, until certain relations are established between it and the object to be known. The reason for this is that finite mind is localized, or caused to abide at the nerve centers of a material organism, and limited to cognitive contact with these nerve centers. This assigning to mind a definite position in space affects its cognition of those things only which are themselves localized. All material phenomena are assigned positions in space; each individual finite mind has its own position, and is removed in space from every other; in consequence of this separation of each mind from every other, and of its removal from material phenomena in general, and in consequence of its being limited to cognitive contact with phenomena occurring at its own particular position, it must wait for cognition of all removed material phe nomena, until certain relations are established between such phenomena, and the position in space with which it is in cognitive contact. These relations are established by producing, at that position material phenomena, related to the removed

phenomena. The process by which the related phenomena are produced is of necessity a purely material one, and as such need not be considered here. The mental act by which they are apprehended when produced, is exactly the same in kind as an a priori act of cognition; it is unconscious, immediate, and spontaneous, and concerns itself not only with the produced phenomena themselves, but also with their relations to the removed phenomena; but the activity in the cognition of the removed phenomena differs from a priori cognitive activity in that it depends upon some antecedent act of the mind, viz: the a priori cognition of the produced phenomena, and is recognized by consciousness.

Thus the distinction between the two methods of the mind's activity in primary cognition is clearly brought out; in a priori cognition the mind acts unconsciously, immediately and spontaneously, when both it and the object to be known come to be in a posteriori it acts consciously, and the object to be known being removed in space from the position occupied by the mind, cognition cannot take place, until by a material process, material phenomena, related to the object, are produced at the given position, and apprehended both in themselves and in their relations. This latter method may, with propriety, be termed a posteriori, since it depends upon a previous cognition as its necessary antecedent; nor can the term be applied to all cognitions which are not a priori, without confusion, for these cognitions are of two distinct classes, primary and secondary, and are the result of the cognitive faculty working by two distinct methods.

The two methods, a priori and a posteriori, in their activity cover the whole ground of primary cognition; a priori cognitions furnish the primary basis, and both a priori and a posteriori (here made equivalent to sense-perception), the occasions for secondary cognitions; these secondary cognitions are arrived at by means of reflective processes, which may consist of a single inference from a law known a priori, or of a series, more or less complicated, of inferences from laws, relations or conditions so known, from phenomena known a posteriori, or from secondary cognitions the result of previous reflective processes.

As mind brings itself into relation to space, time, and abstract law, at once and spontaneously, by its cognitive energy, so it brings itself into relation to the produced phenomena, as soon as they are produced; but with the removed phenomena, through the medium of the cognition of the produced phenomena and their relation to the removed phenomena.

The localizing of mind, while it necessitates a distinct method of cognition, is not the primary limiting agency of the mind's cognitive power. Finite mind is constituted to know after the a priori, which is allied to the infinite method, those things, and those only, which are essential as a basis for reflective knowing. The exercise of the a priori cognitive power is also limited in consciousness; we are conscious of a part only of the mind's activities. The economy of this limitation appears in the cognition of substance; substance may, probably does, exist out of relation to space, and must exist at the mind's own position, but the power to apprehend it when so existing would be superfluous, so long as the mind knows the law of substance, and apprehends particular phenomena; it also appears in the analysis of the mind's activity in the cognition of removed phenomena; did the mind apprehend consciously the produced phenomena, the attention would be divided be tween two sets of phenomena, one representative of the other, and the result would be an apprehension of the removed phenomena less clearly defined. In the exercise of the a posteriori method of cognition, mind is limited in being localized; it is limited to cognitive contact with that position in space at which it is caused to abide. Reflective cognition is by its nature limited.

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These three methods differ further in their degree of certainty; what is known after the a priori method, is known with absolute certainty, and no doubt ever arises concerning it, save speculative doubt; that after the a posteriori, which involves the a priori, with a modified certainty, that is the duced phenomena, are apprehended exactly as produced, but whether they exactly represent the removed phenomena, depends upon the perfect working of the material organism by, and in, which, they are produced. Reflective cognitions, never absolutely certain, vary in their degree, as they are the result of a simple or complicated, a skillful or unskillful process.

Summing up the results of these investigations, we have, First the essentials of a cognitive act, are a being in which cognitive energy inheres, and an object of cognition.

Second: cognition is a priori when it is unconscious, immediate and spontaneous, and without condition.

Third: consciousness is this cognitive energy, acting after the a priori method, and concerning itself with the activities of the being in which cognitive energy inheres.

Fourth cognitive activity is a posteriori when it requires as its necessary antecedent or condition, an a priori cognitive act; this method becomes necessary as the result of limiting the cognitive energy to cognitive contact with a definite position in space. The objects of a posteriori cognitions are material phenomena removed from this given position. A posteriori cognition is thus made identical with sense-perception.

Fifth the cognitive is the primary relation of the ego to the non-ego in being; mind spontaneously establishes this relation with whatever it has the power to know a priori, but in so doing it acts under the laws of causality and substance, and in time, by being assigned a definite position, it is first brought into relation to space. It brings itself into cognitive relation with removed material phenomena, through the medium of the a priori cognition of produced material phenomena related to the removed phenomena.

These results are not only in accordance with the phenomena of mind as revealed by consciousness, but by them the common intelligence of mankind is justified, resting, as it does, upon a basis of absolute certainty.

ARTICLE VII.-THE PAULICIANS.

THE important agency of the Paulicians in the church, or in the progress and development of Christianity, has never yet, as it seems to me, been fully recognized. Indeed there has been hardly any other opinion entertained respecting them than that they were some unimportant heretical sect which troubled for a time the early church and then passed away. By church historians they have usually been regarded as some off-shoot or remnant of the Manicheans, Gnostics or other oriental sects, and entitled only to a suspicious consideration. They have been judged as to their tenets, philosophical or doctrinal, but not in respect of their real elements of life and power, that is, as a moral and religious agency; they have been judged as the representatives of a theological system in relation to the orthodoxy of the church, and not as a development of its spiritual and religious life.

Even those who have spoken of them most favorably have represented them as an erratic growth of a portion of the church, rather than a fresh infusion and a beautiful exhibition of the apostolic spirit. They have been seen through an obscure and hostile medium, hence it is not strange their excellencies are distorted.

We are acquainted with them only through their enemies and persecutors, but a careful examination of even these testimonies will convince us that there has scarcely ever been since the time of Christ any religious movement which, in its glorious results, has more powerfully affected the universal visible church than that which began among the Paulicians on the banks of the Euphrates in the seventh century. The object of this article will be to establish and illustrate this important fact, and in doing this I shall refer to various matters connected with their origin, growth and subsequent religious history in their descendants and adherents in different lands and under different names.

About the middle of the seventh century, when the Saracens