William A. Challener and Clarence Burleigh, both of Pittsburgh, and F. J. Hartmann, of Ebensburg, for appellants. Chas. J. Margiotti. of Punxsutawney, and McCann & McCann and James W. Leech, all of Ebensburg, for appellee. MOSCHZISKER, C. J. Joe Gairt, claimant and appellee. on October 10, 1919, presented a petition to the Workmen's Compensation Board to reinstate a compensation agreement. which had been entered into May 4, 1917, between him and the Curry Coal Mining Company, defendant, and the Etna Life Insurance Company, insurance carrier (intervener), for injuries which Gairt had sustained, on March 10, 1917, while in the course of his employment as a coal miner for defendant. On July 29, 1918. the compensation authorities made an order that the agreement of May 4, 1917, should "terminate." for "total disability," as of July 9, 1918, and that further compensation, "to be determined after claimant has returned to work and his loss of earning power has been established," should be paid for "partial disability." Payments ceased as of July 9. 1918. Between December 2, 1918, and March 24, 1919, three separate petitions were presented by Gairt, asking for review and modifications, all of which were refused. On August 24, 1920, the board, acting on the petition of October 10, 1919, first above mentioned, found that claimant was totally and permanently disabled; and it made an order reinstating the compensation agreement as of July 9. 1918. This was affirmed by the common pleas, and thereupon defendant and the insurance carrier appealed. Appellants contend that the compensation authorities were without jurisdiction to make the order now before us, because claimant's right to receive compensation covering the period since July 9, 1918, was finally adjudicated against him by the refusal of the three prior petitions, and the board's power to act in that regard was exhausted. As to this, the court below held that the original order, stopping payments to claimant, "clearly left open." to be fixed at a subsequent date, "the payments to be made on acount of the injury, the amount of these payments to be determined on a later investigation," adding. * * * "The last investigation satisfied the board, on the question of fact, that the claimant had never been able to resume [his normal] work, * * * and it made, inter alia, the following findings of fact, amply supported by testimony: 'These injuries are permanent, and have rendered him unfit for the occupation in which he was engaged at the time of the injury, namely, that of a miner. Claimant made a real effort to work, but was unable to do so, frequently being compelled to move about on his hands and knees because of the pain and inconvenience suffered in his efforts to comply with the referee's order. * * [He] has demonstrated in his efforts, as well as by the medical testimony taken in these proceedings, that he is totally and permanently disabled.' [Again it may be said] the questions as to the extent of the injury, and the extent of its interference with the ability of the claimant to labor, were clearly left open by the order and decree of July 29, 1918, and the investigation subsequently made satisfied the board that the injury resulted in total disability. * * The referee, in the first instance, very properly undertook to relieve the defendant from the obligation to pay until the exact status of the claimant could be determined * * * * [and] * * the testimony in the proceedings [for review and modification] did not develop what the present testimony clearly reveals." * We quite agree with the conclusion reached by the compensation board and affirmed by the learned court below; and, since the chairman of the former, in his opinion filed in this case, so correctly states the law, we quote therefrom as follows: "The act gives to the board jurisdiction over an agreement [for purpose of review] at any time during the life of the agreement, or duing the period of time [it has] to run. A disability agreement contemplates a total payment of compensation to the claimant for a period of 500 weeks. If, for any good cause * * * by action of the board, the employer is relieved of payment of compensation, at any time during the period, such action is entirely to the benefit of the employer, and he cannot complain if, subsequently, during the 500 weeks, a changed status of the claimant revives the employer's liability to pay compensation. When the referee made his order [stopping payments] the use of of the word 'terminate' was unfortunate, as it [likewise] was in the original act. It was beyond the power of the referee to find that total disability had so absolutely ceased that there could be no further liability on the part of the employer to pay the injured man on that basis. All the referee could [properly] find, as a fact, under the medical testimony at the time, was that the malignant features of total disability had disappeared; he could not find, nor could any human being know that, at some time in the future within the running of the agreement as contemplated by the laws, there would not be a recurrence of total disaDility [as there has been in this case]. When a workman is injured and a compensation agreement is entered into, it is within the minds of the parties, or at least the law imputes the intention to the parties, that such agreement may run 500 weeks, if the injury develops total disability for that length of time; so that, when the board, either of itself, or by one of its referees, relieves the employer of such payment, it merely suspends that payment or that obligation, waiting further developments of injuries. The Legislature recognized this fact when it included in the amended law (see section 413, Act of June 26, 1919, P. L. 642, 661 [Pa. St. 1920, § 22032]) the word 'suspend.' Many times previous to that amendment the board had made suspensory orders to relieve an employer from present payment, but preserving at the same time the right of payment to the injured man, should there be a recurrence of disability." As said in the matter quoted above, the first order, stopping payments. merely suspended the obligations to pay, and, during the period indicated, it was within the power of the compensation authorities to revise their order to accord with the requirements of the case as the facts might demand. The fundamental error of appellants lies in their idea that a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law (Pa. St. 1920, §§ 2191622112) is "litigation," and that established rules and principles of common-law practice should be applied thereto; whereas the fact is quite the contrary. Although the arrangement, inaugurated by the Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 736, to pay standardized compensation in cases of injury or death, rests on the theory of contract between employer and employee,Anderson v. Carnegie Steel Co., 225 Pa. 33, 39, 40, 99 Atl. 215) yet, in administering this plan, those vested with authority act for the state, in its capacity of parens patriae, and the relevant legislation clearly contemplates that, after a compensation agreement has been filed, or an order for compensation made, persons affected may apply for review and modification during the time the agreement or order has to run. Article 4, § 423, Act of 1915; article 4, § 408, and particularly article 4, § 413, Act of 1919; Hughes v. American Int. S. S. Corp., 270 Pa. 27, 30, 112 Atl. 433; also see Kuca v. Lehigh V. C. Co., procedural parts of the act of 1919 apply to pending cases. Under this benevolent piece of legislation, one in the position of the present claimant may, from time to time, come to those in authority saying, "Since you stopped payments to me, facts have developed which show my need of, and right to, compensation; I pray you to look into those facts and determine what, if anything. I am now entitled to receive;" and that, in substance, is what the present claimant did. We need to refer to but one remaining point suggested by appellant ; While the board makes reference to the fact that it had not been demonstrated whether or not claimant had capacity to work other than as a miner, since no different position has been given him by defendant, yet, as shown by the quotations hereinbefore recited from the opinions of the board below, the conclusions of neither of those tribunals depend on the circumstance that defendant had failed to place claimant at different work, but upon other facts which prove him to be totally and permanently disabled The assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment is affirmed. MCNEILL v. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RAILROADS. 116 Atlantic Reporter, 476. 1. COMMERCE-CUTTING CAR INTO INTERSTATE TRAIN "IN STATION ORDER" HELD TO RENDER TRAIN INTERSTATE. Where an interstate train was being cut so that another car might be made a part thereof "in station order" so that each car when it reached its destination might readily be detached and the train sooner proceed, and thus interstate as well as intrastate transportation be better effected, the entire train, so far as liability is concerned, was an interstate train. 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-BURDEN ON COMPENSATION CLAIMANT TO SHOW RAILROAD EMPLOYEE'S INJURY WITHIN STATE LAW. In a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Pa. St. 1920, § 21916 et seq.) for death of a brakeman on an interstate train, the burden was on claimant to prove that some other railroad than deceased's employer was responsible for the injury, in order to recover on the theory that the federal law did not apply. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 403.) Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County; Norris S. Barratt. Judge. Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Frances M. McNeill, for the death of Joseph V. McNeill, opposed by the Director General of Railroads. United States Railroad Administration, Philadelphia & Reading Railroad, employer. Ruling of referee that decedent was employed in interstate commerce and claim not compensable affirmed by the Workmen's Compensation Board and common pleas court, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Argued before Moschzisker, C. J., and Frazer, Walling. Simpson, Kephart, and Sadler, JJ. Harry A. Gorson and John J. McDevitt, Jr., both of Philadelphia, for appellant. George Gowen Parry and Charlemagne T. Wolfe, both of Philadelphia, for appellees. SIMPSON, J. [1] Joseph V. McNeill, a brakeman of defendant, while working on its right of way, was struck by another train and received injuries from which he died the same day. His widow, on behalf of her self and their minor children presented a claim petition under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Pa. St. 1920, § 21916 et seq.), the referee held that decedent was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the injury, and hence the claim was not compensable; the Workmen's Compensation Board and the court below sustained this ruling and from the judgment of the latter tribunal plaintiff appeals. It is admitted that there were interstate cars in the train on which decedent was working, but it is alleged the train crew were engaged in a "purely shifting operation or local movement," and hence, under Murray v. Pgh.. C., C. & St. L. R. R. Co., 263 Pa. 398, 107 Atl. 21, interstate commerce was not affected, and the rules applicable thereto do not apply. to another, to be left at the latter point; while in the instant case, as case cited a purely local car, which had not been and was not intended to be a part of the train, was being shifted from one part of the yard to another, to be left at the latter point; while in the instant case, as appellant herself says, this interstate train was being "cut so that another car might be made a part" thereof "in station order;" that is, so that each car when it reached its destination might readily be detached and the train sooner proceed. thus the interstate as well as the intrastate transportation being the better effected. This necessarily had a direct bearing upon interstate commerce, and makes the entire train, so far as liability is concerned, an interstate train. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. State of Washington, 222 U. S. 370, 32 Sup. Ct. 160, 56 L. Ed. 237; Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. Hancock, 253 U. S. 284, 40 Sup. Ct. 512, 64 L. Ed. 907. It is true that, after the train had gone a little further, it was to be broken up into several trains, which would proceed separately to the ultimate destination of the cars therein; but this progress towards the point of division was as much a movement in interstate commerce. as was the further movement of those cars to the place to which they were routed. Phila. & Reading Co. v. Hancock, supra. [2] It is further contended by appellant that since decedent was injured by the negligent act of a railroad which was not his employer, the federal law does not apply, and hence she may invoke the provisions of our Workmen's Compensation Act. To this it need only be said that the evidence fails to disclose the basic fact upon which the claim is made, namely, that decedent was injured by a railroad which was not his employer. All that is shown touching this point is that decedent was killed by "a train from Washington to New York, operated over the Royal Blue Line; over the Reading, B. & O., and Central Railroad of New Jersey;" it does not apapear which of them was operating it at the time of the accident. The burden of establishing her right to recover being upon appellant. her failure to prove that some other railroad than defendant was responsible for the injury occurring on its right of way necessarily compels us to hold that her contention upon this point fails for this reason at least. The judgment of the court below is affirmed. NUPP v. ESTEP BROS. COAL MINING CO. ET AL. MASTER AND SERVANT-COMPENSATION TO SURVIVING Workmen's Compensation Act, § 306 (Pa. St. 1920, § 21998), providing that should the employee die from injury, "the period" during which compensation shall be payable to his dependents, under section 307 compensation shall be payable to his dependents. under section 307 (Pa. (Pa. St. 1920, §§ 21999-22002), shall be reduced by the period during which compensation was paid to him in his lifetime, applies to the widow, but has no application to the surviving children of an employee receiving compensation, section 307, subsec. 7. providing that in the event of death of the employee the compensation of each child shall continue after the period of 300 weeks, until such child reach the age of 16 years. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 386[2].) Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Indiana County; J. N. Langham, President Judge. Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Alice Nupp for the death of Irvin Nupp. opposed by the Estep Bros. Coal Mining Company. employer, and another, insurer. On appeal to the court of common pleas the award and finding of Compensation Board was approved, and defendants appeal. Affirmed. Argued before Moschzisker, C. J., and Frazer, Walling. Simpson, Kephart, Sadler. and Schaffer, JJ. Frank P. Martin, of Pittsburgh, for appellants. J. W. Leech (of Leech & Leech), of Ebensburg, Pa., for appellee. SCHAFFER, J. The amending Workmen's Compensation Act of June 26, 1919 (P. L. 642, 646, § 306 [Pa. St. 1920, § 21998]) provides: "Should the employee die as a result of the injury. the period during which compensation shall be payable to his dependents, under section three hundred and seven of this article, shall be reduced by the period during which compensation was paid to him in his lifetime, under this section of this article." Irvin Nupp. an employee of defendant, was injured on December 23, 1918, and died March 3, 1920, as a result of his injuries. He had received compensation for a period of 58 weeks at the rate of $10 per week under the act of 1915. He left to survive him a widow and four children. The insurance carrier of defendant claimed, under the section of the act quoted, that the period during which compensation is payable to the widow, 300 weeks, should be reduced 58 weeks, by reason of the payments made to the husband while he lived, and that, at the end of the 242-week period, during which the widow will be entitled to receive compensation, payment should be commenced to the children, but that payment to them should terminate, with respect to each child, 58 weeks prior to its sixteenth birthday. An agreement to this effect having been tendered the widow, she refused to sign it, and a claim petition was filed with the compensation referee, who declined to find as defendant requested, and held that the only period which should be reduced by reason of payments to the decedent in his lifetime was the period of 300 weeks during which |