It is no longer a question of recovering the conquests we have made."

Such was the gloomy document which closed the eventful year of 1813. Out of 400,000 men with whom he commenced the campaign, only 80,000 recrossed the Rhine in November, and it was with this force and raw levies that he was preparing to fight Europe, and even attacking the allies on the Rhine. The Correspondence, though it speaks of the Senate and its report, makes no mention of the report of Lainé in the Lower House, which ably exposed the sufferings entailed upon the country by a series of sanguinary and useless wars. His report, adopted by a large majority, was not allowed to be printed, and it caused the dissolution of the Chamber.

VOL. III.

U

CHAPTER V.

THE YEAR 1814.

FRANCE was about to suffer the horrors of invasion. She had carried fire and the sword through every country on the Continent, and now, for the first time since the beginning of the Revolution, the sacred soil was going to be violated. In 1814 Schwartzenberg and his Austrians debouched into France by way of Switzerland; the English had crossed the Pyrenees, a large force of Russians and Prussians pushed forward from the east, and another host of Germans and Swedes, under Bernadotte, approached from the north. It was almost too much to hope that an exhausted France would be able to resist so mighty a torrent as that which now threatened to overwhelm her. Napoleon in 1814 stood in much the same position as did Frederick the Great in 1756-a position which Macaulay has thus described :-" No such union of the Continental Powers had been seen for ages. A less formidable confederacy had compelled Louis XIV. to bow down his haughty head to the very earth. A less formidable confederacy has within our own memory subjugated a still mightier empire and abased a still prouder name. . . The people whom Frederick ruled were not 5,000,000. The populations of the countries leagued against him amounted to at least 100,000,000. . . . Above all Frederick was one

A DESPERATE GAME.

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and his enemies were many. In their camp would inevitably be found the jealousy, the dissension, the slackness inseparable from coalitions; on his side were the energy, the unity, the secresy of a strong dictatorship. Small as the king's army was when compared with the 600,000 men which the confederates could bring into the field, celerity of movement might in some degree compensate for deficiency in bulk. It was just possible that genius, judgment, resolution, and good luck might protract the struggle during a campaign or two. The Senate, at the close of 1813, had voted Napoleon 300,000 men, but when he took the field on the 25th January he was fearfully over-matched, and yet he was more than once on the point of driving the allies out of the country. If there was no absolute dissension in the confederate camp Austria was at first very lukewarm, having views of her own, and it was the same with Bernadotte. The military errors, too, committed by the allies gave Napoleon a fine opportunity for a display of his genius and for turning to account the advantages enumerated by Macaulay. With 60,000 men he rushed against the allies and beat Blucher at St. Dizier and Brienne on the 27th and 29th January; then he experienced a check at La Rothière on the 8th February, but repaired it a few days later at Champaubert and Montmirail; he triumphed again at Vauchamps, at Montereau, at Craonne, and at Rheims. At Bar-sur-Aube, however, at Laon, and at Arcis the French arms were not fortunate. Unable to arrest the advance of the allies in front, Napoleon conceived the bold idea of marching to St. Dizier to cut off their communications, leaving the road to Paris open. His knowledge of the Austrian generals led him to suppose that directly they found their rear threatened they would become terribly alarmed and would at once fall back. The allies, however, pushed forward to Paris, which Mortier and Marmont in vain endeavoured to defend. Marmont then forsook his old chief and treated with the enemy. On the 11th April

Napoleon signed his abdication and on the 13th he took the poison at Fontainebleau, which he had always carried about him since he was nearly snapped up by the Cossacks during the retreat from Moscow, but its strength having wasted away it had little effect. On the 20th April he bid farewell to his Guard and set off for Elba.

Among other matters which aided in the downfall of Napoleon was the defection of Murat, who thought to save his crown by coming to terms with the Austrians. Soult was unable to prevent Wellington from entering Bordeaux on the 12th March, and Angereau, who displayed very little energy, failed to prevent the Austrians. from entering Lyons on the 21st, while General Maison was driven out of Belgium.

During all these battles, or up to 19th March, the Congress of Chatillon had remained sitting, and frequent and ineffectual attempts, perhaps not very sincere on either side, were made to bring hostilities to a close. When French prospects looked bright Napoleon talked arrogantly of dictating terms of peace on the Vistula, and the allies reduced their demands; but when the Empire was down they insisted upon her being reduced, not to her natural limits of the Alps and the Rhine, as demanded at Frankfort, but to her frontiers of 1789. Napoleon indignantly rejected this proposal. "Abandon the conquests which were made before me," he exclaimed; "leave France smaller than I found her? Never!"

Marie Louise played the part of Regent during the stormy time which preceded the abdication of Napoleon, and after the abdication she and the King of Rome were sent to Vienna, where her return was hailed with the same enthusiasm as had been exhibited four years previously when Berthier arrived to demand her hand. While Napoleon on his road to embark for Elba narrowly escaped being torn to pieces, crowds flocked round the carriage of Marie Louise during her journey to welcome

her home. What Napoleon most dreaded occurred-both wife and son fell into Austrian hands-and after leaving Fontainebleau all communication was cut off between the Emperor and the Empress.

On the 4th January appeared a decree ordering a levée en masse in the departments through which the enemy were pushing forward. Nine generals were appointed to direct this movement; they were to raise free corps and to give commissions to partisans who were to act on the flanks of the enemy and do them all the damage possible.

TO GENERAL CAULAINCOURT.

"PARIS, 4th January, 1814.

"I consider it doubtful if the allies are acting in good faith, and if England desires peace. For myself I desire it, but solid and honourable. France without her natural limits, without Ostend and Antwerp, would not be on an equal footing with the other states of Europe. England and all the Powers recognised these limits at Frankfort. The conquests of France within the Rhine and the Alps cannot be considered as a compensation for what Austria, Russia and Prussia have acquired in Poland and Finland, and England in Asia. The policy of England and the hatred of the Emperor of Russia will carry the day with Austria. I have accepted the bases of Frankfort, but it is probable that the allies have other ideas. Their propositions have been merely a mask. . . . It is not certain that you will be received at head-quarters; the Russians and the English wish to prevent all conciliation and explanation with the Emperor of Austria. You must try and fathom the views of the allies, and you must let me know day by day what you learn, so that I may be in a position to furnish you with instructions. Do they wish to reduce France to her ancient limits? This would be to degrade