The Philosophy of Locke: In Extracts from The Essay Concerning Human UnderstandingH. Holt, 1891 - 160 σελίδες |
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The Philosophy of Locke: In Extracts from The Essay Concerning Human ... John Locke Πλήρης προβολή - 1891 |
The Philosophy of Locke: In Extracts from The Essay Concerning Human ... John Locke Πλήρης προβολή - 1891 |
The Philosophy of Locke, in Extracts From the Essay Concerning Human ... John E. Russell Δεν υπάρχει διαθέσιμη προεπισκόπηση - 2018 |
Συχνά εμφανιζόμενοι όροι και φράσεις
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Δημοφιλή αποσπάσματα
Σελίδα 35 - Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety ? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, From experience: in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself.
Σελίδα 32 - Characters, as it were stamped upon the Mind of Man, which the Soul receives in its very first Being; and brings into the World with it.
Σελίδα 112 - SINCE the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate ; it is evident, that our knowledge is only conversant about them.
Σελίδα 46 - Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call idea ; and the power to produce any idea in our mind I call quality of the subject wherein that power is.
Σελίδα 89 - I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places...
Σελίδα 36 - These two, I say, viz., external material things as the objects of sensation, and the operations of our own minds within as the objects of reflection, are, to me, the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings.
Σελίδα 36 - I would be understood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding.
Σελίδα 88 - This also shows wherein the identity of the same man consists; viz., in nothing but a participation of the same continued life by constantly fleeting particles of matter,, in succession vitally united to the same organized body.
Σελίδα 90 - For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and 'tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal Identity, ie the sameness of a rational Being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person...
Σελίδα 38 - When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thoughts, to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned; nor can any force of the understanding destroy those that are there...