21. Guilt is criminal lia

CHAPTER XV.

DEFINITION OF GUILT AND OF IMPUTATION.

THE word, guilt, is much used by the standard writers on original sin. By the Westminster divines, it is employed in such connections that their whole doctrine is materially involved in the sense in which it is to be understood. bility. Thus, in the very definition of original sin, the word occurs:-"The guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of his whole nature," "is commonly called original sin." It is therefore requisite that we ascertain precisely the meaning of this word. It is the more necessary, as a definition is sometimes given which we are constrained to regard as materially defective; and which tends to modify very seriously the sense of our standards on the subject before us.

According to the definition to which we allude, the words, guilt and guilty, as applied to persons, do not convey any impeachment of crime. If the party is a criminal, other language is requisite to express the fact. All that is meant by guilt is, mere liability to punishment, at the bar of the law; and he who is guilty may be without crime, although condemned to suffer a penal infliction. This definition seizes upon a secondary and accidental element in the meaning of the word, and appropriates it, to the exclusion of that which is the primary and fundamental idea, from which the other takes its origin. That the question at issue is of importance, is evident. If the definition be adopted, which we suppose to be the true one, our Shorter Catechism is to be understood as teaching that "the sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell, consists in the criminality of Adam's first sin, the want of original righteousness,

and the corruption of his whole nature." If the other be preferred, that sinfulness is made to consist in the liability to be punished for that sin, &c. How our children are to be satisfied of the sinfulness of a mere penal liability, is not very clear. This much, however, is evident,-that the matter at issue is worthy of a very careful investigation.

In respect to the Scripture usage as to the word, guilt, much need not be said. We have already had occasion to point out the fact that the essential idea expressed by the word, sin, is, deflection from a recognised rule of conduct; and that, although it ordinarily has respect to the law of God, it is also used in reference to other rules of action, as well as that; and hence the moral nature of the action involved is to be determined by the nature and obligation of the rule which is violated. The same remark applies to the word, guilt. It is invariably used to express the position of one who has sinned; that is, who has violated some law. Thus it is used in respect to the laws of the country. When, at the tribunal, a party is found guilty, the idea expressed is that of condemnation for violation of law. So, in the Scriptures, it is sometimes used in cases where great moral turpitude is not implied; but never where there has not been transgression of law. As Owen well expresses it, "Guilt is the respect of sin to the sanction of the law." It includes two ideas in its meaning. The one is, violation of law; and upon the character of the law which is violated depends the moral enormity which the word implies. Thus, the guilt of petty larceny is one thing, that of murder is another. One person may be guilty of violating conventional rules, which have no moral obligation; whilst another incurs the fearful guilt of blaspheming God. The second element in the meaning of the word, is, the liability to punishment which the transgression involves. This liability results from the terms of the law itself, denouncing the penal infliction against transgression; and the design of it is to vindicate the sovereignty of the law; which, if not honoured by the obedience of the subject, must be so by the infliction which it lays upon him. Hence no one can be guilty

except he has violated the law which condemns him.

And the

amount of moral turpitude which the word imputes, is dependent upon the moral obligation of the law which has been transgressed. The law of God being of infinite obligation, its demands infinitely righteous, and its penalty infinitely just, it follows that there cannot be guilt at the bar of that law without moral turpitude, and that of infinite enormity. The word is never used in the Scriptures where the guilty party is not impeached of transgression. In fact, so intimate is the relation there recognised between sin and guilt, that the word, (D), which is the one commonly employed to express guilt, is used, as Owen truly remarks, equally for sin, the guilt of it, its punishment, and satisfaction for it, whether pecuniary or by expiation. How intimately such a usage as this identifies guilt with sin, we need not insist.

writers.

The definitions of the standard theologians accord perfectly with the principles which we have stated, and the practice of 2. Standard the Scriptures. Calvin does not formally define the word; but we have his testimony on the question before us, in a line. He says of original sin, that "it is properly accounted sin before God; because there cannot be guilt without crime; (non esset reatus absque culpa)."

Says John Marck, "Guilt is obligation to punishment (ex peccato vel delicto) from sin or crime. It is, by some, inaccurately defined as the essence of the sin itself; but the essential matter of sin is the violation of law itself, which produces defilement and guilt. This guilt follows sin, partly by virtue of the divine law denouncing punishment against transgressions; partly from the intrinsic nature of sin, which, on account of its deformity and deviation from the ultimate end, always deserves punishment from a most righteous God. It therefore arises out of crime, and precedes punishment. As to its result, it pertains to the punishment; as to its source, to the crime. Guilt proceeds directly from sin; but the punishment, since it is by justice, is only from it by consequent provision."

"The papists improperly discriminate between the guilt of crime and of punishment; for if crime be taken for the offence,

* Institutes, Book II. chap. i. 8.

guilt is the medium between that and the punishment; if, for the stain, to it guilt is contradistinguished, since guilt is either potential, in its first action, indicating the intrinsic desert of punishment, which inseparably inheres in the crime or the stain so long as they remain, although the sin be remitted by the mercy of God; or actual, in its second action, which is separated and taken away from sin by remission, which is properly the taking away of the actual guilt,-the not enforcing of the declared will of God respecting the punishment which sin otherwise deserves,-on account of satisfaction given. These two [potential and actual guilt] differ as do gravity and gravitation, of which the latter is separable from a solid body, but the former is not. Whence it appears that the papists improperly distinguish between the remission of the punishment and of the crime, that they may favour their purgatory. Nor do they conform to reason, whilst sometimes they wish the guilt to be inseparable from the crime, that they may prove nothing of original sin to remain to the baptized,—they being unable to distinguish potential and actual guilt. Sometimes they so make guilt separable from the crime, that, the latter being remitted, they pretend the guilt and liability, at least to temporal punishment, to remain. But in fact the crime is not only the antecedent cause of the guilt, but also the recipient subject of it. It is not, therefore, possible for the accident to remain, the subject being taken away; but the accident being removed, the subject may still remain."*

"Guilt," says Van Mastricht, "is obligation to punishment for sin, by which the sinner is said to be, DN,-Lev. v. 2, 3, 4, 5; vy' åμapriav elvar,-under sin,-Rom. iii. 9, vii. 14; and in his sins,-1 Cor. xv. 17; úñódıxov ziveo0α tậ 0ε@,—Rom. iii. 19; a debtor to God.-Matt. vi. 12, and Luke vi. 4. Guilt follows sin, partly from its intrinsic nature and demerit, inasmuch as it is not a thing without character, or indifferent, but in its own nature evil, and deserving punishment; which, unless the nature of things should be confounded, and the distinction between

* Marckii Medulla, Locus vi. 16, 18, 19.

good and evil taken away, may not be withheld;-partly by the sanction of the divine law. The first is called the intrinsic. desert of punishment, (Rom. i. 32,) the latter, the actual condemnation to punishment. The one is potential guilt, inseparable from sin; the other, actual, which, by the gracious dispensation of God, may be separated, if not from the sin, at least from the sinner. Guilt is, therefore, (medium quid,) a link of connection between the crime and the punishment. It springs out of the crime, and leads to the punishment; so that the guilt of crime and the guilt of punishment are one, which lies as a medium between these termini, and is named equally from each."

"From guilt arises (1) a conscience justly accusing and condemning; (2) terror; (3) flight from the presence of God, arising from fear of the divine vengeance; (4) punishment, the ultimate consequence of sin."*

Of the distinction between reatus pœnæ and reatus culpæ, this writer says, "All guilt consists in obligation to punishment; therefore the distinction is made without a difference; for guilt is a medium between crime and punishment, which, growing out of the crime, leads to the punishment, coalescing with both, and constituting a medium which embraces both, and is designated as much from the one as from the other." "Our opponents are able to urge nothing, unless it be that the guilt of crime cannot be separated from sin, since sin by its very nature deserves punishment, whilst the guilt of punishment may be taken away. But this does not call for a discrimination between criminal and penal guilt, but only between potential and actual, -of which the former cannot be separated, but the latter is by Christ."+

Our next authority is Samuel Rutherford, Professor of Divinity in the University of St. Andrews. "In July, 1643, the Westminster Assembly sat, and to it he was sent up as one of the commissioners from Scotland. There exists, in the MSS. in the library of Edinburgh University, a sketch of the Shorter

Van Mastricht, Theol. Lib. iv. cap. ii. § 7, 8. † Ibid. Cap. iv. 23.