which is susceptible of culture, considering the fertility of the soil, and allowing for the variety of climate, is capable of being made in a single reign to produce subsistence sufficient for the present population of Europe. Nor was the issue of the late campaigns of a nature to repress the self-confidence arising from the contemplation of the internal resources of the country. Russia could not have been prepared for the weight of war which fell upon her, by the annihilation of the Prussian armies at the battle of Jena. She required more time than circumstances allowed, to collect her forces. A small and compact state, when suddenly attacked, may as suddenly send forth the "burning cross," and muster her clans to the field; but what energy and activity can command the necessary succors with out due warning from the distant points of a dominion which occupies a tenth part of the habitable globe? General Beningsen was not sufficiently experienced to cope with Buonaparte, and the Russian commissariat was at that period defective and inefficient; yet, in defiance of all these disadvantages, notwithstanding the refusal of a loan on the part of our govern ment, and even of the guarantee of a loan which the merchants of London were willing to raise, the battles of Pultusk, Eylau, Heilsburg, and Friedland, contested by inferior numbers, and under the most unpropitious circumstances, combined to testify the military heroism of the Russian army. That defects exist in their composition, is admitted by themselves; but in these instances they were more than counterbalanced by the skill of the generals and the bravery of the soldiers; nor does modern history present us with a more admirable series of military operations than the retreat of the army of Kutusof from the frontiers of Poland to the interior of Russia; during the whole of which, though pressed by a force greatly superior in numbers, no detachment was cut off, no battalion broken, nor a standard or a single piece of artillery taken by the enemy. The views of Napoleon were only par tially carried into effect by the treaty of Tilsit. His revenge was gratified by the total subjugation of Prussia, and his vanity by the apparent submission of the emperor Alexander, while his future designs on Russia were facilitated by the establishment of garrisons in the Prussian towns, and on the Polish frontier. These became his outposts, and the boundaries to his conquests in a former war were now the points from which he expected to find an easy entrance into the centre of the Russian dominions. That Napoleon de pended for much of his success on the supposed pliability of Alexander's temper, and on the representations that had been made of the dissatisfaction of the peasantry with the government, cannot be doubted. So early as the spring of 1811, the king of Saxony had been advised to concentrate on the Vistula the troops of the duchy of Warsaw; the conscription had extended to boys of sixteen; the veteran soldiers were marched from all quarters towards the north, and their places in the garrisons or along the coasts, were supplied by young recruits. The determination of Russia to resist the aggressions of France remaining un moved, and the military preparations of Buonaparte being nearly completed, a pretext for the declaration of war was next to be invented, and on the 25th and 30th of April, a note was transmitted to count Romanzow, chancellor of Russia, of which the language was purposely ca. culated to provoke resentment. The reply of prince Kurakin, the Russian ambas sador, explained the necessity that there should be between France and Russia a neutral country, (Prussia) which should not be occupied by the troops of either of the two powers, and demanded, as the first basis of negotiation, a formal engagement that the Prussian states should be evacuated, the garrison of Dantzic diminished, the French troops withdrawn from Swedish Pomerania, and a just and amicable arrangement concluded with the king of Sweden. The correspondence was prolonged till the 6th of June, when the preparations of Napoleon, having been nearly completed, the Russian ambassador defending in future the little that remained was dismissed. of national independence. The intentions of Sweden were at this moment the objects of interesting specuculation to the court of St. Petersburgh. Fortunately for the cause of Europe, the circumstances of her political situation rendered a system of defensive neutrality as beneficial to Sweden as propitious to the views of Russia. When Finland formed a part of the Swedish territory, the friendship of France was of importance to the cabinet of Stockholm, as presenting the most certain guarantee of that valuable province. Its separation from the Swedish territory dissolved the most powerful bond of attachment between Napoleon and the crown prince, and the seizure of Pomerania by France exasperated the latter to facilitate rather than counteract the views of Russia. It would have been fortunate for Sweden if she had long before been deprived of that foreign possession which frequently involved her in expensive and ruinous connections with the continental powers. The former declaration of war against England had been attended with trifling inconveniencies, but a closer alliance with France would have involved Sweden in actual hostilities. During such a war, she would have been unable to protect her commerce and her flag; France could have lent her no adequate support by sea; her trade and navigation would have been destroyed, and her communication with the continent cut off. The inevitable and immediate effects, therefore, of an alliance with France, would have been war with Russia; the expense of a numerous army in Finland; its probable destruction, and a corresponding loss of men and money in replacing it.War with Great Britain would have oc casioned the loss of her merchantmen, the bombardment of her towns, and the blockade of her ports. The nation would have been exhausted without object, and weakened without hope of indemnification. An humiliating peace would have succeeded to a short and desperate campaign, and would have left her without the means of All these considerations were present to the mind of Buonaparte, when, in January, he ordered general Friant, with 20,000 troops, to take possession of Pomerania. The capital, Stralsund, being weakly fortified, niade no resistance to a colonel who was sent to take possession of it on the 26th, and who required quarters and provisions, asserting, in answer to a demand of payment for the latter, "It is our custom and our orders, that the country in which we are should furnish us with every thing necessary." Friant entered on the following day; and, when the Swedish general Peyton informed him that he should resist the occupation of the isle of Rugen, the French general replied that he was his prisoner, and affixed seals to the door of the custom-house. It was intended to march with 2000 men across the ice, but the attempt was abandoned in consequence of the lieutenant who commanded there, declaring his resolution to repel force by force. The seizure of Pomerania was evidently occasioned by the desire of Buonaparte to have in his possession a pledge, by which the conduct of Sweden might be influenced in the approaching contest. The vessels on the coast were afterwards detained for service, Rugen was occupied, and the French colors were hoisted instead of the Swedish. In the next month Engelbrecht arrived off Stralsund with a fleet, for the purpose of conveying away the troops of Sweden, but no communication was permitted with the shore, and all correspondence was declined by the French commander, so that the fleet was obliged to return without producing any beneficial effect. A meeting of the French conservative senate was held on the 10th of March, at which Maret, (duke of Bassano) minister for foreign affairs, presented a report containing the usual tirades against the maritime policy of England, a triumphant reference to the supposed effects of the Berlin and Milan decrees, and a proposition that the national guards should, be divided into three bands, of which the first was to be composed of all the conscripts from 1806 to 1812, who had not already served in the army or been married, out of which, cohorts were to be formed to do the coast duty. The plan was submitted to the senatus consultum, and adopted. The very proposal of such a measure was an indication of the importance of the impending struggle. ... 16 batts. 4 Regiments, of 4 battalions 1 18 batts. The effective army of Buonaparte at this period will appear by the following statement, originally published in the " Emplacement de l'armée Imperiel," under his own authority, for the use of his generals, to have amounted to more than 800,000 men. GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE FRENCH 2 Regiments of light infantry, of ARMY. And 1 comp. of artillery. . 2 batts. Men. 5 regiments of the line, of 4 batts. 11 batts. Infantry of the line.-122 regiments of 5 battalions each, and each battalion about 600 men, 15 batts. each regiment will amount to 3000, and 122 regiments. Light infantry.-32 regiments, which, estimated of similar strength, amounts to 366,000 96,000 462,000 13. Neapolitan Troops. 1 Regt. of light infantry 2 batts. 6 batts. 3 comps. 1 comp. 5. Confederation of the Rhine. Regt. of the grand duke of Baden 1 comp. of foot artillery train of artillery regiment of Hesse Darm stadt foot artillery 2 regts. of Nassau Nassau chasseurs à cheval mate 3 regiments of Saxony regt. d'Ysembourg Prussian regt. Spanish regt. 2 batts. 6 comps. militaires Etrangers colonial batts. regiment of pioneers 1 comp. 3 batts. 3 comps. 1 comp. 3 squads. 17 comps. Besides the above, there are 109 comps. of cannoniers gardes côtes, and 28 comps. of cannoniers gardes côtes sedentaires. 12 batts. of equipages militaires. 10 comps. of infirmiers militaires. 10 demi-brigades of veterans en activite. 18 comps. of cannoniers veterans. 30 legions of the gendarmerie imperiale. And the comps. de reserve departementales. Estimate of the numbers, allowing to each batt. 600 men, and to each squadron 200. Infantry of the line, 610 batts. 366,000 light infantry, 160 batts. 96,000 cavalry, 332 squads. 66,400 Auxiliaries, &c. &c. Infantry of the line, 162 batts. 528,400 batts. 1 batt. 1 batt. municipal guard of Paris 4 batts. chasseurs des montagnes 97,200 legion du midi chasseurs 4 squads. cavalry, 27 squads. 5,400 -106,800 4 squads. Portuguese legion, 5 regts. 10 batts. 635,200 1 demi-brigade Exclusive of the troops in the artillery and engineer departments, of which there are French 501 companies, which, taken at 100 men each: 50,100 In the auxiliaries 19 comps. 1,900 Croats, 6 regts. : 12 batts. 10. Troupes Etrangeres. Regt. de la Tour d'Auvergne 4 batts. In 1806, the French army, effective, was estimated at 467,000 men. Of the force above enumerated, it ap pears from the concurrent testimony of the events of the campaign, and of the most intelligent writers on the subject, that about 380,000 were destined from the first commencement of actual warfare to act in the ensuing operations. At an early period of the spring, the French army, including that of the confederation of the Rhine, was in full march towards the frontiers of Poland. At the beginning of April, Ney had his head-quarters at Weimar, and Napoleon had arrived at Dresden. The king of Prussia, who appears to have hesitated for some time what line of policy to pursue, was induced, by the rapid advance of the French, to ratify a treaty of alliance with the emperor, which was proclaimed to be defensive against all the other powers of Europe, with which either of the parties had entered or should enter into war. The veteran troops were recalled from Spain, and their place supplied by newly raised conscripts. Troops VOL. II. 106,800 of all nations under French command, proceeded with rapidity and in succession, to the Russian border. About the 20th of April, they crossed the Vistula, and afterwards took possession of Konigsberg and Elbing. On the 9th of May, the emperor, accompanied by the empress and the prince of Neufchatel, (Berthier) left Paris, and proceeded to Metz. They reached Dres den on the 16th, where they had agreed to meet the emperor and empress of Germany. In the beginning of May, the headquarters of the duke of Abrantes (Junot) were at Glogau in Silesia, and the French and allied troops, of which his army consisted, were stationed on both banks of the Oder. A numerous body of Prussians was assembling at Breslau, under the direction of field-marshal count Kalreuth. The relative positions of the French and Russian armies at this period were nearly as follow. The first corps of the French were at Ma rienberg and Elbing, under Davoust. |