a third person, and whether it be for a temporary purpose or otherwise, it is a conversion, if the dominion of the owner be interfered with. It follows from this that many wrongs that are trespasses may, at plaintiff's option, be treated as conversions. Anything that is personal property, even though it have no value except to the owner, may be the subject of a conversion. Whoever has the mere possession of goods, provided the possession was not gained by force or fraud, is entitled to maintain an action for conversion against any one except the owner. And any one who has not the actual possession, but who has the right to immediate possession, may maintain the action.

§ 197. Conversion by persons rightfully in possession. When a person who has a special property in goods, as a bailee, mortgagee, etc., does any act in excess of his authority, and inconsistent with the rights of the general owner, his acts may be treated as a conversion. If a mortgagee should sell the mortgaged property, as his own, and in denial of the mortgage, it would be a conversion; if sold subject to the terms of the mortgage, however, it would not be.

Whoever buys the property must ascertain the title, and if he takes possession and thereby denies the owner's right, he is liable for conversion. The question of good faith is not involved. All who participate in the conversion, as seller or buyer, principal or agent, may be held liable. But if one is innocently in possession of goods belonging to another, and, before notice of the true owner, surrenders them to the person from whom he received them, he will not be liable for conversion. And if, after notice of the true ownership, he surrenders possession upon demand to the owner, he will not be held

liable either to the owner or to the person from whom he received them.

§ 198. Demand for possession. It is a general rule that where one has obtained possession of goods by force or fraud, it is not necessary to demand possession from the wrongdoer before bringing suit; and when the possession was originally rightful, but there has been such abuse or excess of authority as to constitute a conversion, no demand need be made. If, however, one has rightful possession and does not deny the owner's title, it is essential, in order to maintain the action, that a demand shall have been made for possession, and a refusal to deliver. Such demand and refusal need not be express; they may be implied from conduct. An attempt to take the property is usually a sufficient demand, and opposing the attempt is a sufficient refusal.

§ 199. Conversion by tenant in common.-As each tenant in common has a right to possession of the thing held in common, there can not be a conversion by one who merely withholds possession from the other. But anything that amounts to a loss or destruction of the property by fault of the one in possession may be a conversion. So it is generally held that a sale would be. In, some states it is held that if the property be in its nature divisible, a demand by one owner for his share refused by the other would be enough to establish a conversion.

§ 200. Legal process.-Whenever property is interefered with under color of legal process, the person interfering must confine himself within his lawful powers, and for any excess he may be held liable as for a conversion of the property.

An officer of the law may without process take a thief

together with the stolen property, or when he arrests a felon may take his weapons. But generally, in order to take property he must have process. When acting under legal process he can not be held liable as for conversion, if the process be issued by a court having jurisdiction, and be on its face without suspicious earmarks, and if he substantially follows the command of the writ. If he exceeds or violates the command of the writ, as for instance by selling without notice or injuring the goods, he may be held liable for the conversion.

A magistrate is liable for issuing process if he acts knowingly without jurisdiction, and a party who knowingly sets a magistrate or officer in motion to act without authority is liable. If property is sold at a judicial sale upon a void judgment or void process, the purchaser may be liable for conversion.

§ 201. Remedies.-The remedies permitted by law for injuries done to personal property are the following: (1) Recaption, that is, the act of the owner in retaking possession without suit. This he is permitted to do provided he does it before complete possession has been established in the wrongdoer.

(2) By an action at law. The forms of action under which redress was given at common law were: Trespass, to recover damages for direct injuries to property; trover, to recover damages for the wrongful taking or detention of property; detinue, to recover the possession of the property itself; replevin, to recover the possession as well as damages for taking property. Where the injury was indirect or consequential, the action was in "trespass on the case.

(3) In some cases a court of equity granted an injunction to prevent the doing or continuance of injury. The remedies named substantially exist in all the

states. The forms of the common-law action have, however, been more or less modified and simplified by statutes. As a rule, the action being personal, redress may be had wherever jurisdiction can be acquired over the wrongdoer, regardless of the place where the property is or the wrong was committed.

§ 202. Ownership.-The owner of real estate is entitled to dominion as against all the world; the person in possession is entitled to dominion as against all but the one having a better right. Whoever interferes with his dominion may be treated as a wrongdoer. The injuries that may be done to an owner as to his real estate may be (1) by putting or keeping him out of possession; (2) by injuring his land while in his possession.

§ 203. Dispossession.-Under the common law a classification of the wrongs of dispossession included some which, by reason of changes in the law, are now of little importance. Abatement, that is, where on the death of a person a stranger entered before the heir, and intrusion, that is, where a stranger entered before a remainderman or reversioner, were wrongs that now do not differ in legal