away or detaining a woman against her will, or, in the case of minors, against the will of their parents or other person having lawful charge of them. In a more restricted sense it is the unlawful seizure or detention of a female for the purpose of marriage, concubinage or prostitution. Kidnapping is the unlawful seizure of any person with the intent to remove him to another place. It is a false imprisonment aggravated by the intent to carry the person imprisoned to another place. By the common law kidnapping was the forcible abduction or stealing away of a man, woman or child from their own country and sending them into another.

§ 271. Bestiality-Sodomy.-The first is the copulation of man or woman with a beast, the second the unnatural copulation of man with man or man with woman. Both parties are guilty of sodomy and the consent of the parties is no defense. These crimes are generally spoken of as the abominable and detestable crimes against nature, and as crimes not to be named among Christians.

§ 272. Affray. An affray is the fighting together of two or more persons, either by mutual consent or otherwise, in some public place, to the terror of the people. There must be some stroke given or offered; mere quarreling and the use of threatening words are not sufficient. If the fighting is in private it is not an affray. Prize fighting as it is now practiced is not an affray, but it is made a misdemeanor by the laws of most of the states of the Union. In some states the fighting must be by mutual agreement to constitute an affray; elsewhere it is held that the mere fighting in a public place, with or without mutual consent, constitutes the offense.

§ 273. Arson.-Arson, as defined by Coke, is the malicious and voluntary burning of the house of another by night or by day. There must be an actual burning of some part of the building, though it is not necessary that any part should be wholly consumed. The burning is sufficient to constitute the offense when any part of the building is charred, but a mere scorching or discoloration is not enough. Formerly the crime of arson was limited to the burning of dwelling-houses, but it now has a wider scope, under the legislation of the various states, so that stables, mills, churches, warehouses, schoolhouses and other structures may be the subjects of arson. The burning must be malicious and wilful, and not merely negligent. The intent to injure is an essential ingredient of the crime, but this intent will be generally presumed.

§ 274. Assault. A simple assault as defined by Bishop is an unlawful physical force partly or fully put in motion, creating a reasonable apprehension of immediate physical injury to a human being. It is essential that the force intended to be applied should be put in motion. Mere preparation or threats are not an assault. There must be some act which if not stopped may apparently, or, as some courts hold, actually, produce injury. Striking at another within striking distance though the blow comes short, throwing a missile at another, aiming a gun within gunshot, pointing a pitch-fork at a person within reach such act coupled with a present intention to do violence would be an assault.

§ 275. Assault and battery.-A battery is the unlawful touching of another in a rude, insolent or angry manner. To spit upon one, to set a dog upon him which touches or bites him, to touch or lay hold of the clothes of another, is sufficient. There must be intentional

physical contact. If this is lacking it can amount to no more than a simple assault.

§ 276. Assault with intent.-An assault with intent is where an intent to commit a specific crime accompanies the assault, as an assault with intent to kill, to rob, to rape or to inflict some serious bodily injury. In order to convict in such cases the specific intent charged against the accused must be proved, and this intent may be inferred from his acts, words and the circumstances surrounding the transaction. The apparent consent of persons who are legally incapable of giving consent is no defense to a charge of assault with intent. In case of assault with intent to commit a crime, there must be, according to the rule established in some courts, a present ability in the assailant to inflict the injury, but the better opinion is that it is sufficient, if there is a reasonably apparent present ability, so as to create an apprehension that the injury may be inflicted, and cause the person threatened to resort to measures of selfdefense.

§ 277. Justification for assault.-No one can be held to be guilty of an unlawful assault who has a sufficient justification or excuse for his act, as where it is in the necessary defense of his person, his property, or the persons to whom he owes the duty of protection, as wife, child or servant. As we have seen, a person who shoots at one, believing him to be another person whom he intends to kill, is guilty of shooting with intent to kill, and shooting or throwing a missile into a crowd is an assault with intent to kill or injure any one who may be in reach of the gun or the missile thrown.

§ 278. False imprisonment.-False imprisonment

is the unlawful restraint of a person contrary to his will, either with or without process of law. There must be a forcible detention of the person, and the detention must be unlawful. An officer who arrests and holds one in obedience to a writ directed to him from a court of competent jurisdiction is not guilty of the offense unless there was something on the face of the writ itself showing that it was not properly issued.

§ 279. Barratry, champerty and maintenance.— These offenses were all punishable at common law. Barratry is the offense of frequently stirring up quarrels and suits, either at law or otherwise. The indictment should charge the offender with being a common barrator, and there must be proof of at least three instances of offending. Champerty is a bargain with a party to a suit for a portion of the land or other matters sued for, in case of a successful termination of the suit which the champertor undertakes to carry on at his own expense. Contracts by attorneys for purely contingent fees, to be paid out of the damages recovered, were formerly considered champertous and void, but they are looked upon with more indulgence now and the practice of making such contracts is common, though it must be admitted that they have a pernicious influence on the character and standing of attorneys who make them. Where such contracts exist the attorney becomes, in effect, one of the real parties to the action. In some states it is held that the purchase and sale of land in litigation, or in the adverse possession of another, is a champertous contract and will not be enforced. Maintenance is a malicious, or at least officious, interference in a suit in which the offender has no interest, to assist one of the parties to it against the other with money or advice to prosecute or defend the action, or, as it is otherwise defined, it is

the intermeddling of a stranger in a suit for the purpose of stirring up strife and continuing the litigation.

§ 280. Bigamy or polygamy.-One already married and having husband or wife living, who marries a second time, is guilty of bigamy. These are statutory and not common-law crimes. If the first marriage has been annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties are free to contract a second marriage, and a person whose husband or wife has been absent for a certain number of years without being known by such person to be living may innocently contract a second marriage. Where there has been no valid divorce from the first husband or wife and a second marriage is contracted on the advice of counsel and in the honest belief that the divorce is valid, it is generally no defense, though it has been held that where the belief was on reasonable grounds after due inquiry, it is a defense to a criminal prosecution.

§ 281. Bribery.-Bribery at common law was limited to the giving to a judge or other officer connected with the administration of justice any undue reward to influence his behavior in office. A better definition is the giving or receiving of a reward to influence any official act, whether of a judicial officer or not. The statutes of the states have extended the scope of the crime until it now includes judges, jurors, election officers, voters, legislators and all public officials who are placed in responsible stations to perform public service.

§ 282. Burglary.—Burglary at common law is the breaking and entering of the dwelling-house of another in the night-time with the intent to commit a felony therein. There must be some breaking, and if the entry