authority existed in fact. While the intent to defraud is necessary, it is not essential that the party intended to be defrauded should be injured thereby. It is no defense for the forger to say that his work was done so blunderingly that it would deceive only stupid and careless persons. An alteration of an instrument which though intended to do so does not in fact and law alter the rights or obligations of the parties to it is not a forgery, though the party making it did so with a fraudulent intent. The uttering of the forged instrument is complete when the forger by words or actions declares that the forged instrument is genuine with a knowledge that it is false. By the statutes of most states the possession of forged or counterfeit bank notes with intent to utter or pass them is punishable as forgery.

§ 292. Homicide.-Homicide is the killing of a human being, and it may be a lawful and an innocent act or a criminal act. Where it is a criminal it is designated as murder or manslaughter. In most of the states there are grades of murder, as murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree.

The highest grade of murder, that is, murder in the first degree, is the unlawful and felonious killing of another human being with malice aforethought and with deliberate premeditation. Murder in the second degree is like murder in the first degree, except that it lacks the premeditated design which is essential to the first, it being the intentional unlawful killing with malice, but without premeditation.

§ 293. Voluntary manslaughter.-Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another human being without malice, and is either voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary manslaughter is where the act causing death is com

mitted in the heat of sudden passion caused by provocation. There must be a purpose to kill or to inflict serious bodily harm. It is not necessary that the passion should be such as to dethrone the reason, but it must be sufficient in degree to negative the idea of malice in the slayer. Whether in the particular case the provocation was adequate, or the passion excited sufficient to rebut the idea of malice, is for the jury to determine. The provocation may consist of abusive language, or an unlawful assault. And where two engage in a combat with or without weapons and one is killed, it is voluntary manslaughter, unless the combat was sought by one merely as a pretext for killing the other.

§ 294. Involuntary

manslaughter. — Involuntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice, and without intent to kill or to inflict the injury causing death, committed accidentally in doing an unlawful but not felonious act, or in the improper or negligent doing of a lawful act. The following are instances of involuntary manslaughter when death results:

The reckless handling and discharge of firearms, gross carelessness on the part of a locomotive engineer or the master of a vessel, the grossly negligent use of defective material in building a house, reckless riding of a horse or driving a vehicle, cruel and immoderate punishment of a child or pupil.

§ 295. Justifiable homicide.-Homicide is justifiable where life is taken by the proper officer in pursuance of the lawful sentence of a court adjudging the execution of a convict; where the killing is in the necessary selfdefense of the person of the slayer, or of a husband or wife, parent or child, master or servant, or a man's habitation; where it is necessary for the preservation of

the peace, or to arrest or prevent the escape of a felon, or to prevent the commission of a felony. So also is the slaying of enemies in time of war, or the execution of persons guilty of certain breaches of the rules of military law. In the case of an overloaded boat, where the sailors threw some passengers overboard to lighten the vessel, the court held that they were guilty of manslaughter, and that in such an extremity the victims should have been selected by lot.

To justify homicide on the ground of self-defense the accused must show that he was in apparent danger of losing his own life, or of suffering grievous bodily harm at the hands of his assailant. It may turn out that the danger was not real, but if the conduct of the assailant was such as to create in the mind of the person assaulted a reasonable apprehension of danger at the time, it is sufficient. The same rule applies where the plea is urged by one who takes life in the defense of those to whom he owes the duty of protection.

§ 296. Malice.-Malice and the intent to kill are essential ingredients of murder, but this malice does not necessarily involve the notion of ill will toward the person slain. Where by one's conduct one is shown to be depraved in mind, devoid of social duty and fatally bent on mischief, malice is sufficiently proved. Proof of a formed purpose to take the life of the victim is sufficient to establish the existence of what is called malice aforethought, and it is enough if the intent to kill exists at the moment of killing, if it is deliberate. The jury may infer malice from the act and manner of killing where it is unlawful, and it is for them to determine from all the circumstances whether malice in fact existed.

§ 297. Libel.-Libel is made criminal by the laws

of some states, and it may be defined to be the wilful and malicious publication of any false and scandalous matter tending to injure the reputation of another, or to hold him up to public ridicule and contempt. In most states the injured person is left to his remedy at law by means of a civil action for damages.

§ 298. Malicious trespass or malicious mischief.The offense is ordinarily limited to injuries to property, as the maiming of cattle or other beasts, girdling trees, disfiguring houses. Malice is an essential ingredient of the offense; but where the injury is wilful, malice will be presumed. It is essential that damage shall have resulted to the property.

§ 299. Mayhem.-Mayhem at common law was the act of unlawfully and violently depriving another of the use of some member of his body whereby he was rendered less able to fight. A mere disfiguring, such as cutting off an ear or a nose, was not mayhem at common law. By statutes in England and America, the definition has been extended so as to include all malicious injuries which disable or disfigure the injured person. must be intentional, and an injury resulting from a random blow or thrust during a fight will not constitute mayhem, although it may result in maiming or disfiguring the injured party. There must be the specific intent to do the act which results in the crippling or disfiguring.

It

§ 300. Nuisance.-Nuisance is a common-law offense and consists in the unlawful doing of an act, or permitting a condition of things to exist which is prejudicial to the health, comfort, safety, property, sense of decency or morals of the citizens at large, and it may be an act unauthorized by law, or from neglect of a

duty imposed by law. To carry on an offensive trade in a populous community; to keep a pig sty in a city; to allow a stable in a city to become filthy; to disturb the public rest by useless and unlawful noise; to pollute streams or lakes which supply drinking water to the public; to keep a disorderly house, and other such acts, constitute the offense.

§ 301. Perjury.-The crime of perjury as described in the common law is committed where a lawful oath is administered in some judicial some judicial proceedings or due course of justice to a person who swears wilfully and absolutely, and falsely in a matter material to the issue or point in question. By various statutes the offense is extended to false swearing in matters not connected with judicial proceedings. The crime may be committed by a witness on oral examination, in the course of a trial, or by a deposition taken before an officer duly authorized to take it, or by an oath to an affidavit to be used at any stage of the judicial proceedings to which it relates. The form of an oath is immaterial, if it be administered in such a way as to bind the conscience of him who takes it and to accord with his religious belief.

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An affirmation taken by one who has conscientious scruples as to the taking of an oath is the same as an oath, and one who falsely affirms is as much a perjurer as if he falsely swears. The false statement must be of a matter material to the subject under consideration. guilty intent is necessary to perjury, but a reckless statement under oath of the existence of a fact of which the person taking the oath had no knowledge has been said to be perjury, although the statement sworn to may be

true.

§ 302. Piracy.-Piracy is robbery on the high