wrong Conclufion, except it were laid down as a Principle, that we are not to believe any Thing, but what we ourselves fee with our own Eyes: A Principle fo abfurd that no Man of Sense will ferioutly maintain it, and from which numberlefs Abfurdities would follow. If this were once generally admitted, no Societies could fubfift, a Stop would be put to all judicial Proceedings, no Witneffes could be depended upon in any Cafe, there would be an End of all Credit and mutual Intercourfe among Men, and almost of all our Knowledge and Means of Improvement; we could have no Advantage from the Obfervations of others, or from the History and Experience of former Ages and other Countries, or of our own Age or Country, in any Cafe where we ourfelves were not actually prefent: In a Word, it would, in it's Confequences, introduce an univerfal Confufion, Ignorance, and Barbarifm. Nothing can be more evident, than that the Author of our Beings hath fo formed our Natures, and hath placed us in fuch Circumftances in the World, that we are under a Neceffity of admitting the Teftimony of others in numberless Inftances: And it would not have been fo ordered, if this were not an Evidence that is in many Cafes fufficient, and fafely to be relied upon. And indeed it

cannot

cannot be denied, that there are many Things, that we receive only by the Teftimony of others, which yet we may be as fure of as if they came to us confirmed by the im mediate Evidence of our own Senfes. Will any Man fay, that he cannot be certain. there is fuch a City as Paris, or fuch a Country as America, because he was never there? He that should seriously affirm this would be thought to have an Head fo oddly turned, that few of them would look upon him to be right in his Senfes, or fit to be argued with. The fame may be faid, as to many Facts done in diftant Places, which may come to us fo well attefted, and confirmed with fuch Circumftances, that we can no more reasonably doubt that fuch Actions were done, than if we ourselves had been prefent: And, if any Man fhould affect not to believe them, and give no other Reason for it, but that he himself did not fee them done, instead of being admired as a Person of exact Judgment, and who was careful not to be impofed upon, he would only expofe himself to juft Contempt, as unreasonably ftanding out against clear Evidence. The like Obfervation holdeth, with Refpect to Things that were done in paft Ages. A Man could not more effectually expose himfelf than by pretending to lay it down as a

Rule,

Rule, that he will believe nothing that happened in any Age or Time before that in which he himself liveth: For it is manifeft, that in many Cafes we have as convincing an Affurance of Facts that were done before we were born, as of any Facts whatsoever that were done in our own Time; and can no more reasonably doubt of them, than if we faw them with our own Eyes, of which many Instances might eafily be given, if it were neceffary. And this holdeth not only with Regard to Things that were done in the Age immediately preceding, but also with Regard to Facts done at a greater Diftance of Time from us, and even feveral ago. We must not imagine that the Evidence we have of the Certainty of past Facts always diminisheth, in Proportion to the Distance of Time from us in which they were done. This dependeth upon other Circumstances; for Things done feveral Ages ago may be tranfmitted to us in fuch a Manner, and with fuch a Degree of Evidence, as to leave no Room for reasonable Doubt concerning them; and, on the other Hand, we may be very uncertain as to Things faid to be done in the former, or in the present Age, for Want of having them confirmed to us by proper Evidence.

Upon

Upon the Whole, it is manifeft that our not having lived in the Age or Country in which Things were done is no just Argument to prove, that therefore we cannot be fure they were done, or to make it reafonable for us to doubt whether they were done. Muft we then lightly give Credit to every Thing that is reported to have been done in former Ages, or other Countries? This would argue a foolish Credulity, and would be equally abfurd and void of Reason, as to believe nothing at all of what was done in former Times. What remaineth therefore is, that we must carefully confider and examine the Nature of the Evidence, and the Conveyance by which Things are tranfmitted to us, that we may be able to form a proper Judgment concerning them.

There are two Ways by which the Knowledge of paft Facts, Doctrines, or Laws, may be tranfmitted to fucceeding Ages: The one is by oral Tradition, or verbal Relations and Reports, conveyed from Age to Age; the other is by written Accounts or Records: And each of these may be attended with collateral Circumstances, that may heighten or diminish the Evidence arifing from them. As to the former of thefe, viz. oral Tradition, it must be acknowledged not to be fo certain a Way of Conveyance. Indeed fome

main Facts may be thus conveyed with a confiderable Degree of Certainty; but the Circumstances of Facts, and efpecially Doctrines and Laws, can fcarce be conveyed this Way in fuch a Manner as may be depended upon. This was the only Way of conveying them, in the earlieft Ages before the Flood; and, when the Life of Man was generally very much longer than now it is, Things might be thus conveyed with fome Degree of Probability; but now, by the Experience of all Mankind, it is fubject to many Uncertainties. When the Preferving the Remembrance of Things, and especially of Doctrines and Difcourfes, is left merely to oral Tradition, there is great Danger of their being in Process of Time quite loft, or at least very much varied from what they originally were.

The fafest Way of tranfmitting paft Facts, but efpecially Doctrines and Laws, and the Circumstances of Facts, is by Writing. It is thus that authentic Hiftories of past Events are preferved, and that the public Records are tranfmitted to us. It is by this that we come to know the Laws that have been formerly enacted, the Constitutions of States, the various Revolutions of Kingdoms and Empires, the Lives and Actions of great Men, the Sayings, the Doctrines, and the VOL. III. Cc Sentiments