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land; held, that the grantee shall also be indemnified against the bond ac-
companying the mortgage, and for which the mortgage was given as a
collateral security. White v. Villiers, 439. See vol. 1, p. 173.

BOTTOMRY.

See INSURANCE..

BROKER.

1

An agent who effects a policy in the name and for the benefit of another,

cannot transer or pledge the policy as a security for his private debt; the
creditor who takes it must, from the face of the policy, have notice of the
interest of the assured, and if he receives money upon it must resund, ex-

cept as to the mere commissions of the ageut.
In this case too the agreement made by the agent with the defendants, if he
had power, would not entitle them to keep the money.

Foster v. Hoyt, 510. See vol. 2, p. 327, 329, n. (6.)

BROTHERTOWN INDIANS.

A Brothertown Indian is amenable, for the murder of his wife, to our law.
Note-It was formerly considered that an Oneida Indian was not, for a
crime committed against one of his tribe.

In re George Peters, 518. See vol. 2, p. 344.

CERTIORARI.

See JUSTICES' COURTS.

CHANCERY.

I. Jurisdiction.
II. Parties to Suits in.
III. Limitation of demands in.
IV. Relief of Parties in pari delicto.
V. Pleadings.

I. Jurisdiction.

1. The whole case being before the chancellor, although a specific and not
general relief was prayed, he ought and may decide on the whole merits.

Armstrong v. Gilchrist, 607. See vol. 2, p. 424.

II. Parties to Suits in.

2 In a suit in equity, the bill must call all necessary parties, who may be

affected by the demand, before the court. If, upon the face of the bill, it
is apparent, that any whose rights may be affected are not made parties,
the defendant may demur, or if the want of parties do not appear, he may
plead it. If it be disclosed by the answer, the complainant may imme-

diately amend, by adding the proper parties. Per Radcliff, J.
The court is, at all times, vigilant in requiring proper parties against whom

its decrees are to operate. It will arrest the proceedings in any stage of
the cause, in order to obtain them, and will not finally decree, if the want
of parties appear on the hearing of the cause. If it does, the decreo may
be reversed, and if not reversed, yet none but such as were parties to tho

suit, and their representatives, can be bound by it. Per Radcliff, J.
A. being indebted to B. on the 230 March, 1787, assigned to him, as security

for the payment of the debt, certain lands and a lease in see, for the same.
B. executed a bond to A., conditioned, that in case the debt and interest
were paid on or before the first of June, 1788, he would reassign the lease
and premises to A. and give him a receipt for the debt. The debt not
being paid at the time, B. took possession of the premises under the assign-
ment, in July, 1792, and assigned his interest in the lease and premises to
C. and D., who touk possession thereof. A. afterwards brought a bill to
redeem the premises, on the ground that the transaction between him and
B. amounted to a mortgage, and on appeal from the decree of the court of
chancery, it was held, that C. and D. ought to have been made parties to
the suit, and that the decree of the court below, for that reason, was re-
versed, with liberty to the respondent to have his bill dismissed in the court
below, or to aniend it, by adding all proper parties; and in that case, the
evidence taken to stand, as between the present parties, saving all just ex-
ceptions, and that each party, in this court, pay his own costs.

Hicock v. Scribner, 311, 610.
Cases and authorities on this rule, 322, n. (a.)
3. A. being indebted to B. by a promissory note, in the sum of $1,491, as

collateral security. for the payment, endorsed to B. another note made by
C. to A. or order, for $1,551, and at the same time delivered to B. a mort-
gage executed by C. to A., to secure the payment of the note so endorsed ;
but made no assignment of the mortgage writing. B. filed a bill against
C for the sale of the mortgaged premises, to pay his note. It was held,
that by the endorsement of the note, and delivery of the mortgage, B. had
an equitable (if not legal) interest in the mortgage; but that A., if he had
not the legal estate, was interested in the subject, and ought to have been
made a party, as he was entitled to recover back the mortgage on pay.
ment of the $1,491. And the decree of the court of chancery ordering a
sale, &c, was reversed, with liberty to B. to have his bill dismissed, or to
add proper parties, on payment of the costs in the court below.

Johnson v. Hart, 322, 608.

III. Limitation of demands in.

4. An account which accrued before the war during which the parties were

scattered, &c., and notwithstanding several circumstances accounting for
the delay, was denied to be opened on the principle that the demand was
old and stale, not as barred by the statute of limitations, which was not
pleaded. Justices Benson and Kent, and a few others contra. Radcliff, J.
would also have been contra, but was absent at the March Circuit in New
York. Ray v. Bogert, 608. See vol. 2, p. 432.

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IV. Relief of Parties in pari delicto.

5. A bill to be relieved against a judgment in the Supreme Court, on a note

given for Susquehanna lands, was dismissed in chancery and the decree
affirmed here, by some on the ground of pari delicto, and neither party to
be relieved in equity, and by others that the consideration was good. On
the latter point, Justices Benson, Kent and Radcliff, were contra, and they
went on the first point, that of an illegal consideration. An outstanding
nute for the same consideration, was refused to be enjoined. The opinion
of the majority as to the validity of the consideration, could not be ascer-
tained. Dole v. Woodworth, 607.

V. Pleadings.
6 The answer of a defendant in chancery is received as true, unless dis-

proved, and he swearing to a compromise with the assent of the plaintiffs,
his principals, it must prevail. Armstrong v. Gilchrist, 607.

CHARTER PARTY.

A ship was let to freight, for a voyage from New York to Gibraltar, Cadiz and

Malaga, all or either of the said ports, at the option of the affreighters, and
as they or their assigns might direct; and they were allowed 40 working
days for unloading and loading in Europe, and they covenanted, that in
case the ship should, by the order or through any default, neglect or delay
of them, their factors or assigns, be detained longer than 40 working days,
for unloading the cargo in Europe, to commence whenever she was ready
to deliver her cargo, at any of the said ports, and to continue until she
should depart from thence, they would pay the shipowner 51. 108. sterling

per day, for de murrage.
The ship on her voyage was taken by a British cruiser, and carried into Gibral.

tar, the 16th May, and was released, and on the 5th June, sailed for Cadiz,
where she arrived the 10th June, and performed a quarantine of 7 days.
On the 21st June, the captain applied to the custom house, but was refused
an entry, on the ground that she had previously been at a British port ;
but she was under no restraint of the government, and might have left Ca.
diz at any time. After repeated applications by the supercargo, permission

was given to the ship to enter on the 26th August, and she then landed
her cargo, and took in another, with which she arrived at New York on the

28th September.
In an action brought by the shipowner against the affreighters, for demur-

rage, it was held, that the prohibition to enter at Cadiz, being permanent
in its nature, and the defendants having an option to go to another port,
and the ship at liberty to sail when she pleased, the detention, afterwards,
was at the instance and for the benefit of the defendants, who were there-
fore, liable for the demurrage, after the expiration of the 40 working days,
to commence from the 21st June, when the caplain was refused permission
to enter. Duff v. Lawrence, 162. See 547, 593.

CHECKS.

See Bills of ExchangE, PROMISSORY Notes AND

CHECKS.

CITIZENSHIP.

Petition to remove a cause to the court of the United States, refused, the de-

fendant being naturalized here in 1784, asterwards, in 1795, became the
Spanish Consul, and took the oath of allegiance to the King of Spain, but
continues to reside here. Fish v. Stoughton, 522. See vol. 2, p. 407.

See ALIEN. INSURANCE.

COLUMBIA TURNPIKE COMPANY.

Where an inquisition taken under the second section of the act, amending

the act to establish the Columbia Turnpike Company, passed March 28,
1700, (sess. 23,) omitted to state a disagreement between the owner of the
lands mentioned, and the company, and that the judge who appointed the

commissioners was not interested, &c.. it was held defective and quashed.
Where a special power is granted by statute affecting the property of indi-

viduals, it must be strictly pursued; and it must appear on the face of the
proceedings, that the directions of the statute have been strictly observed.

Gilbert v. The Columbia Turnpike Co., 107, 541.

COMMISSION TO EXAMINE WITNESSES.

See PRACTICE.

COMMISSIONER.

1. Power of Court over.
II. Libel on Commissioner of Bankruptcy.

I. Power of Court over.
This court has the same power over the proceedings of the recorder of New

York, while acting as commissioner, as when acting as recorder; but they
will not exercise the power where the recorder has a discretion by the act,
and has acted definitely, as in granting a supersedeas under the act, as
to absconding debtors. The regular course is to bring up the proceedings
of the recorder, by certior ari, not by an order of this court.

Learned v. Duval, 141, 542.
II. Libel on Commissioner of Bankruptcy.

See LIBEL.

CONDITION.

I. Condition precedentwhat is not.
II. Waiver of Forfeiture of.

I. Condition precedent--what is not.

1. A devise to the use of another till Thomas shall be of age, to whom the

estate was previously devised, after the death of his mother, is not a
condition precedent to the vesting of the estate in Thomas. It vested on

the death of the mother. Jackson, ez dem. Beach v. Durland, 510.
See vol. 2, p. 314.

II. Waiver of Forfeiture of.

2. No parol assent or silent acquiescence withont an act by the lessor will

amount to a waiver of the forseilure of a condition.
Jackson, er dem. Bronk v. Crysler, 436. See vol. I, p. 125, 126, n. (a.)

CONSIGNOR AND CONSIGNEE.

Liabilities of Consignee.
1. Where a vessel, on her arrival in the port of New York, is ordered to per-

form quarantine and the cargo is landed and stored at the quarantine
ground, the shipper or consignee of the goods is bound to pay the expense

of landing and storage. Rice v. Clendening J. Adams, 183. See 555.
Authorities, 184, n. (a.)
2. A master and consignee of goods shipped to be sold at Bourdeaux, not lia-

ble to the owner when he acted bona fide, and could not sell in a reasona-
ble time. If he were guilty of fraud or cressa negligentia, he would be
liable. Lawler v. Keaguick, 439. See vol. 1, p. 174.

CONSOLIDATION RULE.

Where there are several actions on one policy, the court will grant impar.

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