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COUNSELLOR AT LAW.

Charge of Divulging Secrets of Client.
To charge a counsellor at law with offering himself as a witness, in order to

divulge the secrets of his client, is libellous; and it is not a sufficient justifi-
cation, that he disclosed matters communicated to him by his client, which

had no relation or pertinency to the cause in which he was engaged.
The secrets of his client, which the counsel is bound to keep, are the commu-

nications and instructions of the client, relative to the management or de-
fence of his cause. Riggs v. Denniston, 198, 549.

See LIBEL

COURTS,

I. Justices.
II. Common Pleas-of Mandamus to.
III. General Sessions of the Peace.

1. Of the right to grant new trials.
2. of Mandamus to.

3. Of their power to discharge Juries.
IV. Oyer and Terminer.

1. Justices.

See JUSTICES' COURTS.

II. Common Pleas-of Mandamus to.

1. The Common Pleas is an inferior court, and a mandamus will lie to that
court to restore an attorney who was improperly removed.

People on pro. of Gephard v. Common Pleus of Delaware, 462.
See vol. 1, p. 181, 184, n. (a.)

III. General Sessions of the Peace.

1. Of the right to grant new trials.
2. The sessions have no power to grant a new trial in a case of felony.

Mandamus granted. The People v. Justices of Chenango, 462.
Soo vol. 1, p. 179.

2. Of Mandamus to.

See Supra, II. 1.

3. Of their power to discharge Juries.
3. On an indictment for a misdemeanor as an inspector of an election, the
jury were detained a long time, (- hours,) and several times retired
and returned to the bar, and could not agree. This appearing to be sincere
on their part, the court considered it necessary to discharge them, and did
80 without the consent of the defendant. Held, it was proper and in the
discretion of the court, in the case of a misdemeanor, as in civil cases, and
that the defendant was again liable to be tried.

People v. Denton, 505. See vol. 2, p. 275.
4. The court may dismiss a jury in a case of misdemeanor, where it appears
after a full experiment that they cannot agree.

The People v. Olcott, 512. See vol. 2, p. 301.

IV. Of Oyer and Terminer-Practice.

4. After a conviction of perjury at the Dutchess oyer and terminer, and re-

ported by the presiding judge to be against evidence, a new trial was di.
rected, and the judge at the next oyer and terminer, to communicate the
opinion as the award of a new trial, must there be made. The proceed-
ings brought up by certiorari, were not received, and ordered to be returned.
If filed, they could not be returned, but the case would have to be tried at
the Circuit by nisi prius. In a capital case, that probably could not be
done. Benson added, such certiorari ought only to be allowed in open

court. The People v. Townsend, 431. See vol. 1, p. 104.
5. Defendant was convicted of a nuisance in the oyer and terminer in West.

chester. It was brought up by certiorari, and an application made for a
writ to the sheriff to prostrate the nuisance. Refused, because it appeared
the record was not made up.

The People v. Valentine, 460. See vol. 1, p. 336

COVENANT.

1. Action of

1. Where it lies.
2. By whom.

3. Against whom.
II. Construction of

1. Action of

1. Where it lies.

1. Executors are liable upon the express covenant of their testator, so long

as a privity of contract exists, though the breach happen while a third
person is in possession of premises to which the covenant relates.
Ex'rs of Van Rensselaer v. Ex’rs of Platner, 475. See vol. 2, p. 17.

2. By whom.
2. An executor cannot recover rent acccrued aster the testator’s death upon

a lease in fee. Ex'rs of Van Rensselaer v. Ex'rs of Platner, 475.

3. Against whom.
3. The executors of a lessee of an estate in fee are not liable for rent accrued

after the death of their testator. There is no privity of ostate nor contract.
The privity was destroyed by the will under which the plaintiffs must claim
as devisees or assignees, and they are not assignees under the statute 32
Hen. VIII., ch. 34, which applies only to leases for life or for years. So
held although the covenant was express.
Devisees of Van Rensselaer v. Ex'rs of Platner, 475. See vol. 2, p. 24.

II. Construction of.

4. In covenant, the defendant held to the express terms of his covenant con-
trary to a supposed coustruction of its spirit.

Betts v. Turner, 427. See vol. 1, p. 65.
5. A covenant from the subject matter construed distributively, although it

contained no words of severalty. Ernest v. Bartle, 457.
See vol. I, p. 319. Also id. 327, n (a), 69, n. (a), and 71, n. (a)
6. A covenant of seisio and warranty agai st all persons "except the lord of

the soil,” construed to apply to the interest of the covenantor, exclusive of
that of the owner of the fee only, and the covenant of seisin and warranty

to be commensurate in this respect. Cole v. Hawes, 488.
See vol. 2, p. 203, 204, n. (a), 247, n. (a.)

See DEBTORS. DEED.

CRIMINAL LAW.

See ATTAINDER, Court, CONSPIRACY, FURGERY, GRANT,

INDICTMENT, TITLE.

DAMAGES.

See Factor.

See vol. 2, p. 17, 22, n. (a.)

DEATH.

Both defendants being convicted and sentenced to the state prison for life ;
held, that being civiliy dead the suit is abated.

Graham v. Adams, 523. See vol. 2, p. 408.

DEBTORS.

1. Possession by, after bona fide assignment not deemed

fraudulent.

II. Proceedings under attachment against, for Benefit

of Surety.
III. Insolvent discharge.

1. Effect of

2. When it must be plead.
IV. Set-off of Note after assignment by Insolvent.
V. Act for the Relief of, with respect to Imprisonment

of their persons.

Service of Notice.

I. Possession by, after bona fide assignment not deemed

fraudulent.

1. The possession of a bankrupt, after a bona fide assignment of all his es.

tate, for the benefit of all his creditors, not deemed fraudulent, it being con-
tinued at the instance and for the benefit of the assignees.

Vredenburgh v. White f. Stout, 441. See vol. 1, p. 156, 157, n. (a.)

II. Proceedings under attachment against, for Benefit of

Surety.

In re McKinley, 433. See vol. 1, p. 137.

III. Insolvent's discharge.

1. Effect of
2. The maker of a note was discharged as an insolvent, asterwards the en.

dorser was obliged to pay the note. The payment being subsequent to the
discharge, held, that the maker was liable to the endorser.

Frost v. Carter, 449. See vol. 1, p. 73, 74, n. (a.)
3. Judgment by confession set aside, it being entered on a warrant given be-
fore the defendant's insolvency.
Skutt v. Billings, 426. See vol. 1, P.

105.
See Cone v. Whitaker, 478, 501, overruled. See vol. 2, p. 281, n. (a), (b.)

1. Where it must be plead.
4. The defendant was discharged under the insolvent act, pendente lite, and

in time to plead or give it in evidence. Neglecting to do this, the court
refused to discharge him from custody, aster a judgment by default and
execution against him. Valkenburgh v. Dederick, 437. See vol. 1, p. 133.

IV. Set-off of Note after assignment by Insolvent.
5. A note purchased at an under value by the debtor of an insolvent, after

notice of the insolvency, not allowed to be set off in a suit brought in the
name of the insolvent, for the benefit of his assignees.

Circumstances to excite inquiry, sufficient notice, and the interest of the as-
siguees protected in this suit in the name of the insolvent.

Johnston v. Bloodgood, 428. See vol. 1, p. 51.
See Bills of ExcHANGE-PROMISSORY NOTES AND

CHECKS.

V. Act for the Relief of, with repect to Imprisonment of

their Persons.

Service of Notice.
6. Notice of a petition under the act for the relief of debtors, &c., where the

plaintiff (the creditor resided out of the state,) served on his attorney in
the suit, held sufficient. Bates v. Williams, 423. See vol. 1, p. 30,416.

DEBT ON BOND.

See PRACTICE.

DEED.

1. Construction of.
II. Covenant to stand Seised.
III. Delivery ofwhat constitutes.
IV. Relation of to previous Contract.
V. Sheriff's Deed.
VI. of land where an adverse possession.
VII. Estoppel under.

I. Construction of.

1. Soveral instruments or deeds of the same date, and relating to the same

subject, construed as parts of one assurance, and a deed in consideration of
108. made by a father to his son, held to be a covenunt to stand seised to

the use of the grantee. Jackson, ez dem. Trowbridge v. Dunsbagh, 429.
See vol. 1, p. 97, 98, n. (a.)
2. A sheriff's deed conveying certain lands by metes and bounds, together

with “ all ways, paths, easements,'" &c., does not include lands held by a
distinct title, though adjoining the premises, and formerly purchased and
used as a road for the same, when it is not included within the description

of the premises. Jackson, ex dem. Jones v. Striker, 451.
Seo vol. 1, p. 284.

II. Covenant to stand Seised.

See Supra, I.

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