of record; ordered, that the same be vacated, and the parties be left in
statu quo as to the claims of the assignee. The court will thus take notice
of the rights of an assignee. Wardel v. Eden, 500. See vol. 2, p. 258.

V. Trial of Issue of Usury in.

4. After a judgment is assigned to an innocent third party, the court will not
award an issue at the instance of a defendant, to try the fact of usury al-
leged by him to impeach it.

Wardel v. Eden, 500. See vol. 2, p. 258.
5. A feigned issued awarded to try the fact of usury, a judgment having been
entered by confession on a warrant of attorney, accompanying the bond,
&c. Gibert v. Edens, 501. See vol. 2, p. 280.

JUDGE'S ORDER.

See PRACTICE.

JURY, DISCHARGE OF.

1. The court may dismiss a jury in a case of misdemeanor, where it appears
after a full experiment that they cannot agree.

The People v Olcott, 512. See vol. 2, p. 301.

2. On an indictment for a misdemeanor as an inspector of an election, the
jury were detained a long time, (— hours,) and several times retired and
returned to the bar, and could not agree. This appearing to be sincere on
their part, the court considered it necessary to discharge them, and did so
without the consent of the defendant. Held, it was proper and in the dis.
cretion of the court, in the case of a misdemeanor, as in civil cases, and
that the defendant was again liable to be tried.

The People v. Denton, 505. See vol. 2, p 275.
See CONSPIRACY.

JUSTICE AND JUSTICES' COURT.

I. Abatement.

II. Adjournment.

III. Actions against, for want of Jurisdiction.

1. When liable.

2. When not liable.

IV. Certiorari to.

V. Declaration and Practice.

VI. Joint Debtors.

VII. Jurisdiction.

I. Abatement.

1. In error on certiorari, a plea in abatement after a plea in chief is a nullity
and need not be answered. Palmer v. Greene, 427. See vol. 1, p. 101.

II. Adjournment.

2. The justice without the consent of parties had no power to adjourn the
trial beyond six days, and for this cause judgment reversed.

Palmer v. Greene, 427. See vol. 1, p. 101.

III. Actions against, for want of Jurisdiction.

1. When liable.

3. Where a point is reserved by the judge at the trial, it belongs to the plain-
tiff to prepare the case and open the argument.

Percival v. Jones, 453. See vol. 2, p. 49.

4. If such courts exceed their powers, they become trespassers.

Case v. Shepherd, 476. See vol. 2, p. 27.

2. When not liable.

5. Where judgment was recovered before a justice, who asked the defendant
if execution should issue, and the defendant said he did not care how soon,
and did not state that he was a freeholder, and had a family, or claim any
exemption from imprisonment; and the justice thereupon, without any di-
rections from the plaintiff, who was not present, issued an execution against
the body of the defendant, on which he was imprisoned 30 days; in an
action brought by him against the justice, for assault and battery and false
imprisonment, it was held that the justice was not liable.

Hess v. Morgan, 84. Cases and authorities, 86, n. (a.)

IV. Certiorari to.

6. A certiorari commanding a justice, among other things, to return the tes-
timony, must be obeyed at his peril, according to its legal effect, but he
need not return the evidence. Van Patten v. Oudurkirk, 469.

See vol. 2, p. 108.

7. On certiorari. No place being stated in the summons where the court
would be held, and defendant must appear, and the defendant not appear-
ing and the judgment against him by default, it was reversed.

Case v. Van Ness, 464. See vol. 1, p. 243.

V. Declaration and Practice.

8. On certiorari.

1. A formal issue before a justice not necessary.

2. The sum in each count being laid over £10 and under £80, when the

narr. concludes with damages to £10 only, on error.

Culvil v Dolph, 459. See vol. 1, p. 333.

9. On certiorari. The plaintiff had a summons by the name of Carner, aud
judgment by default was given by his right name. Held, too late to ob-
ject to this variance. The defendant below ought to have appeared and
objected there. Judgment affirmed.

Ford v. Gardner, 464. See vol. 1, p. 243.

VI. Joint Debtors.

10. Judgment before a justice against two joint debtors, when one only ap-
peared, reversed. But see the Revised Act provides for that case.

Jones and Crawford v. Reed, 424. See vol. 1, p. 26.

VII. Jurisdiction.

11. A justice has no jurisdiction where an executor or administrator is a party.
Wells v. Newkirk, 448. See vol. 1, p. 238.

12. A justice has no jurisdiction in case for a malicious prosecution.
Main v. Prosser, 435. See vol. 1, p. 130.

KAYADEROSSERAS PATENT.

The commissioners who divided Kayaderosseras patent, in 1770, adopted the
true construction of the patent, as to the northwestmost head of the Kay-
aderosseras credit; and in running a line due north, to the object, where
the course mentioned in the patent was northerly.

Jackson, ex dem. Woodworth v. Lindsay, 86 and 87, n. (a)

LACHES.

See AGENT. BAIL. BILLS OF EXHANGCE, AND PROMIS-
SORY NOTES.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

1. An offer or request to be considered, the tenant of the lessor not accepted,
or answered, does not create a tenancy, or the relation of landlord and te-
nant, the defendant then and before holding under a different right.
2d. The written acknowledgment of the defendant, that the land belonged to
lessor, is prima facie evidence of a right to recover; but such acknowledg-
ment may be explained, &c., by defendant, and shown to be founded in
mistake.

Jackson, ex dem. Viely and Clark v. Cuerden, 519. See vol. 2, p. 354.
2. Tenant at sufferance cannot maintain trespass against his landlord.
Wilde v. Cantillon, 435. See vol. 1, p. 422.

LEASE.

See EJECTMENT. DISSEISIN.

LEGACY.

I. Construction of Testament.

II. Interest on, for purposes of Maintenance.
III. When Legacy is presumed to be given in satisfac-
tion of Debt-Evidence in Action for.

I. Construction of Testament.

1. Interest on a legacy to be paid out of moneys constituting a general fund,
although charged on land, is to be allowed only from the time it became
due. Van Bramer v. Executors of Hoffman, 488. See vol. 2, p. 200.

II. Interest on, for purposes of Maintenance.

2. A grandchild is not within the rule which allows interest on the legacy of
a child for the purpose of maintenance. (Vide the rules respecting in-
terest on legacies in the opinion by Radcliff, J.)

Van Bramer v. Executors of Hoffman, 488. See vol. 2, p. 200.

III. When Legacy is presumed to be given in satisfaction
of Debt-Evidence in Action for.

3. A legacy to one who at the date of the will is indebted to the testator, does
not extinguish the debt, unless it appear to be so intended on the face of
the will.

Indorsements on a bond of the testator, that plaintiff had assumed to pay it,
without more, are not enough to charge him, although a legatee with the
debt of another.

The acts of the testator, may in some cases, be evidence of a debt against
his legatee.

The transfer of a debt is a sufficient consideration for a promise.

Rickets v. Livingston, 479. See vol. 2, p. 97.

LIBEL.

I. Generally what is.

1. Counsellor at Law.

2. Commissioner of Bankruptcy.

II. Evidence on Indictment for.

I. Generally what is, 205, n. (a.) and (b.)

1. Counsellor at Law.

1. To charge a counsellor at law with offering himself as a witness, in order

to divulge the secrets of his client, is libellous; and it is not a sufficient
justification, that he disclosed matters communicated to him by his client,
which had not relation or pertinency to the cause in which he was en-
gaged.

The secrets of his client, which the counsel is bound to keep, are the commu-
nications and instructions of the client, relative to the management or de-
fence of his cause. Riggs v. Denniston, 198, 549.

2. Commissioner of Bankruptcy.

2. To charge a commissioner of bankruptcy with being a misanthropist, a parti-
zan, stripping the unfortunate debtors of every cent, and then depriving
them of the benefit of the act, &c. is libellous. And to make out a justifi-
cation of the charge, the defendant must show that the plaintiff, as commis-
sioner, wilfully perverted the law to such oppressive purposes.

Whether the law allows a justification of a libel which does not charge any
indictable offence? quære. Riggs v. Denniston, 198, 549.

C

II. Evidence on Indictment for.

3 On an indictment for a libel, can the defendant give the truth in evi-
dence?

And are the jury to decide both on the law and the facts? (See act of the
6th April, 1805, sess. 28, c. 90.) The People v. Croswell, 337.

4. See the Constitutional provisions of the several States upon this subject,
411, n. (a.)

LIEN.

See AGENT. FACTOR. JUDGMENT.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

In consequence of the statute 21st March, 1783, suspending the statute of
limitations, during the war and the statute 26th February, 1788, saving
the plaintiff's right of action where the defendant was out of the State, a
person within the lines of the enemy, during the war, and departing with
them out of the jurisdiction of the State, at the close of it, was deemed
during the war, and during such departure, to be out of the State, and
therefore not protected by the limitation.

Sleght v. Kane, 429. See vol. 1, p. 76.

LOCAL ACTION.

See ACTION.

MANDAMUS.

I. General principles on which granted.