II. Bond-to remain a faithful prisoner --Against escapes.

2. A bond at common law, conditioned that a prisoner should remain a true

and faithful prisoner in the jail, is valid and not a bond for ease and favor

within the statute 23d H. 6, c. 10.
But a bond against escapes, which implies a permission to escape on being in-
dennified, has been held void, &c.

Dole v. Bull Porter, 498. See vol. 2, p. 239.
3. The act, (sess. 24, c. 91,) as to jail liberties, is imperative on the sheriff,

who is bound to grant the liberties to the prisoner on his tendering a suffi-
cient bond; but as this bond is intended only for the sheriff's indemnity,
he may waive it, and grant the liberties, without taking the bond ; and he
will not therefore, be liable for an escape.

Holmes v. Lansing, 73. See 446, 535.

III. Bond for Ease and Favor.
See Supra, Dole v. Bull g. Porter. Escape.

IV. Deed of.

4. A sheriff's deed conveying certain lands by metes and bounds, together with

“all ways, paths, easements,” &c., does not include lands held by a dis-
tinct title, though adjoining the premises, and formerly purchased and used
as a road for the same, when it is not included within the description of the

premises.
A subsequent deed from the sheriff will not help if such road was not knowo
at the time of the sale, and understood to be part of the premises sold.

Jackson, ex dem. Jones v. Striker, 450. See vol 1, p. 284.

V. Sale by
5. On a sheriff's sale by an alias fi. fa., held :
1st. That the alias clause inay be rejected, no previous fi. fa. having issue.l.
2d. That the sheriff's return on the writ is not material to the purchaser's

title.
3d. That the purchase of an agent for the plaintiff, and a deed to him creates

a resulting trust for the plaintiff, not within the statute of frauds, and that
the possession of the desendant is not to be deemed adverse to the purchaser
without an actual disseisin or ouster.

Jackson, ex dem. Kanes v. Sternbergh, 440. See vol. 1, p. 153.

VI. Voluntary escape.

1. What is.
6. In an action against a sheriff for an escape, if it be averred, or found on

the record. that the sheriff permitted the prisoner to escape, it is equivalent
'to a finding of a voluntary escape. Holmes v. Lansing, 73. See 446, 535.

See Jail LIBERTIES. ESCAPE.

2. Effect of
7. A sheriff aster suffering a voluntary escape of a prisoner on execution, can

never retake him nor lawfully detain him, although he voluntarily returns
and submits to the process. Radcliff, J. contra.

Lansing v. Fleet, 474. See vol. 2, p. 3.

SLANDER.

I. Words spoken of one in office.

1. Actionable.

2. Must be spoken of the person in his official capacity.
II. Words otherwise actionable explained by reference to

known transaction.

I. Words spoken of one in office.

1. Actionable.
1. Words spoken of the plaintiff as sheriff, importing malconduct in his office,
are actionable. Dole v. Van Rensselaer, 461. See vol. 1, p. 330.

2. Must be spoken of the person in his official capacity.
2. These words in slander “ Squire Oakley is a damned rogue,” held not to

be spoken of the plaintiff in his character of a justice, and therefore not
actionable. Oakley v. Farrington, 434. See vol. 1, p. 129.

II. Words otherwise actionable explained by reference to

known transaction.

3. In slander.
Words otherwise actionable, explained at the time by referring to a known

and particular transaction, are to be construed accordingly, and were held

not actionable.
The verdict being sound against the charge of the court on this point, was

considered as a verdict against law, and the costs therefore to abide the
event of the suit. Dole v. Rensselaer, 458. See vol. 1, p. 279.

SLAVES, ACT CONCERNING.

1. An indenture that a slave shall serve another until both parties agree to

vacate the same, is equivalent to a sale.
Executors and persons acting in auder droit, may sell a slave, notwithstand.

ing the act of the 22d February, 1788. Sable v. Hitchcock, 479.
See vol. 2,
2. 4 slave escaping from another state into this, and afterwards sold here by

the master, is equivalent 10 a “bringing in," in the first instance, and within
the act of 220 February, 1783.

p.

A letting to service for 20 years, when the slave was af the age of 25, &c.,

is a sale and an evasion of the act. Fish v. Fisher, 480.
See vol. 2, p. 89.

SOLDIER.

See HABEAS CORPUS.

SPRINGFIELD PATENT.

Vide Jackson er dem. Staats v. Carey, 518; and vol. 2, p. 349.

STALE DEMAND.

See CHANCERY. JUDGMENT. STATUTE.

STATUTE INSOLVENT.

The maker of a note was discharged as an insolvent, afterwards the indorser

was obliged to pay the note. The payment being subsequent to the dis-
charge, held, that the maker was liable to the indorser.-Vide Strange ads
Light, 543. Frost v Carter, 449. See vol. 1, p. 73.

STIPULATED DAMAGES.

See PENALTY.

STOCK CONTRACT.

See GUARANTY.

SUBROGATION.

that the surety was responsible for the acts of the surviving guardian ; the

bond being co-extensive with the trusts. The People v. Byron, 53.
Cases and authorities, 60, 60-2, n. (a.)

SUSQUEHANNAH LANDS.

Vide Whitaker v. Cone, 478; Doe v. Woodworth, 406.

TAVERN KEEPERS.

See ACT TO LAY A DUTY ON STRONG LIQUORS.

TENANT

I. By the Curtesy.
II. At Will.

I. By the Curtesy.

1. A. a feme covert died seised of lands, in June, 1795, leaving a husband and

two sons and three daughters. The husband continued seised, as tenant
by the curtesy, until his death, in 1798. B., the eldest son, died abroad,
in 1784, an infant, intestate, and without issue. C., the other son, on the
death of his father, entered as heir to his mother. It was held, that the
descent was suspended, during the tenancy by the curtesy, and that A.
being last seised, was the stock of descent; and as she died before the sta-
tute of descents, C., the second son, took the inheritance, as sole heir to

his mother.
Jackson er dem. Gomez, v. Hendricks ; same, ex dem. same, v. Marmet and

Hendricks, 214.
Cases and authorities, 215, n. (a.) and (b)

II. At Will.

2. No notice to quit is necessary in the case of a tenant strictly at will.

Jackson ex dem. Van Allen v. Rogers, 428. See vol. 1, p. 23.

TENDER

A being indebted to B., by a promissory note, for $1,167, it was agreed in

writing between them, that A. should deliver to B. as much coal at ten
dollars per chaldron, as would amount to the sum due on the note, the coal
to be of the like quality with that purchased by A. of B. out of a certain
ship. No time or place were fixed for the delivery. A. having in his coal
yard a large quantity of coal, and sufficient of the quality mentioned,
though consisting of different kinds, immediately afterwards, and at diffe-
rent times, tendered to B. the coal, in satisfaction of the note, and B. mado
Vol. III.

104

no objection to the place or mode of delivery, but said, at one time, he would
send and take them, and at another, that he was not ready to receive them,
and finally neglected to take them. In an action, afterwards brought by
B. against A., on the note, it was held that the agreement for the delivery
of the coal was valid, and that the tender on the part of A. was equivalent
to a performance, so as to bar the plaintiffs' action, and might be pleaded

by way of accord and satisfaction.
An accord, in order to be an effectual plea in bar, must be executed and sa-

tisfied with a recompense in fact, or with an action, or other remedy to
execute it and recover a recompense. Per Thompson, J., the other judges

асс.

It is a principle settled, that if a person is to acquire a right to a debt or duty

by previously doing some act, this right is as commonly vested by an offer
to do it and a resusal, as if the act had been actually performed, or, in other
words, a tender and refusal is equivalent to a persormance. Per Living-

ston, J., the other judges acc.
Radcliff, J., thought that the defendant ought, in strictness, to have separa-

ted the quantity sold, in order to make a specific tender, ard to ascertain
that it corresponded with the quality contracted for: and that the accord
was never in fact executed.

Coit and Woolsey v. Houston, 243. S. C. 559.

TESTAMENT.

See WILL

TIME.

See BILLS OF EXCHANGE. STATUTE.

TITLE.

1. Presumption of from Possession-- Alienism-Dis-

ability.
II. Buying and Selling precluded.

1. Presumption of from Possession-- Alienism-Dis-

ability.
1. A tract of land was granted, by letters patent, to A. B. in 1735, which

was surveyed and laid out into lots. In 1736, B. executed leases for seve-
ral lots to different persons, for lives, reserving rent, in which he asserted
his claim to the whole tract; and exercised various acts of ownership, until
his death, in 1752, and his heirs also gave leases of some of the lots, in
1767, and his title and that of his heirs, continued to be acknowledged by
the tenants, and remained undisputed, until after the year 1783. In an ac-